Doctrine: Where property in the hands of a common carrier is not delivered within a reasonable time after it has reached its destination, the carrier, in the absence of any legal exemption and after demand has been made and delivery refused, is liable for a conversion of the property.
A tender of the property, to be effectual, must have been made within the time in which the defendant was entitled to deliver it and the plaintiff bound to receive it.
Facts:
1. Plaintiff Mariano Uy Chaco Sons & Co. alleges that upon arrival of the S. S. Satsuma at the port of Manila, there were short-delivered one case of varnish and paint remover and fifty bales of oakum, for the conversion of which, defendant is liable.
2. Defendant Admiral Line argues that the merchandise had been delayed, had been found, and delivery thereof had been tendered and rejected.
3. It appears that the interval which elapsed between the date when the merchandise should have been delivered and the presentation of the complaint was approximately 11 months. The delay which ensued between the date when the merchandise should have been delivered and the date when it was finally tendered was close to 2 years and 4 months. The time which passed between the date when the merchandise should have been delivered and the date when the defense of tender was set up, was over 3 years.
Issue:Whether or not defendant is guilty of conversion?
Held:
Yes. As a general rule, mere delay in the delivery of goods by a common carrier, no matter how long continued, is not a conversion thereof, but is only a breach of the contract of carriage. Therefore, where a carrier fails to deliver goods within a reasonable time, although he thereby makes himself liable for the damages incurred by reason of the delay, the consignee cannot refuse to accept the goods from him and recover their value but is compelled to receive them.
However, a demand and a refusal to deliver is sometimes essential to show a conversion. Even after demand, if the goods are tendered before a suit is brought, the consignee cannot refuse to receive the goods and sue for conversion, his sole remedy being an action for damages resulting from the delay.
Though the carrier may delay ever so long, the owner cannot charge him with a conversion, or for the value of the goods, if they are safely kept, unless they have been demanded of the carrier and their delivery refused.
Where property in the hands of a common carrier is not delivered within a reasonable time after it has reached its destination, the carrier, in the absence of any legal exemption and after demand has been made and delivery refused, is liable for a conversion of the property. The consignee, under such circumstances, may elect to waive all the title to the property and sue for conversion, and after he has done so, a subsequent tender by the carrier will not be available for it as a defense.
A tender of the property, to be effectual, must have been made within the time in which the defendant was entitled to deliver it and the plaintiff bound to receive it. In this case, the tender made was not until long after the lapse of this period, and, not being accepted, is no bar to plaintiff’s right to recover.
A delay of more than 2 years in making delivery was conclusively unreasonable. A delay in pressing a defense predicated on tender, of more than 2 years counted from the date when the complaint was filed, was likewise unreasonable. Defendant was unable to turn the goods over to plaintiff at any time before the complaint was presented, and in fact, could not do so until a long time thereafter. From the foregoing, defendant was in effect guilty of conversion and must accordingly respond for the value of the property at the time of conversion.
