28 PHIL 640



This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of the city of  Manila  in  favor  of  the  plaintiff  for  the  sum  of  P3,000,  with  interest thereon  at  the  rate  of  11⁄2  per  cent  month  from  September  5,  1912, together with the costs.
The  action  was  brought  by  the plaintiff  upon  the  contract  of  indorsement alleged to have been made in his favor by the defendant upon the following promissory note:
         Due 5th of September, 1912.
We  jointly  and  severally  agree  to  pay  to  the  order  of  Don  Antonio  G.
Serrano  on  or  before  the  5th  day  of  September,  1912,  the  sum  of  three
thousand  pesos  (P3,000)  for  value  received  for  commercial  operations.
Notice  and  protest  renounced.  If  the  sum  herein  mentioned  is  not
completely  paid  on  the  5th  day  of  September,  1912,  this  instrument  will
draw interest at the rate of 11⁄2 per cent per month from the date when
due  until  the  date  of  its  complete  payment.  The  makers  hereof  agree  to
pay the additional sum of P500 as attorney's fees in case of failure to pay
the note.
Manila, June 5, 1912.
(Sgd.) For Padern, Moreno & Co., by F. Moreno, member of the firm. For
Jose Padern, by F. Moreno. Angel Gimenez.
The note was indorsed on the back as follows:
Pay  note  to  the  order  of  Don  Fernando  Maulini,  value  received.  Manila,
June 5, 1912. (Sgd.) A.G. Serrano.


1.    The  accommodation  to  which  reference  is  made  in  Section  29  is not one to the person who takes the note but one to the maker or indorser of the note.  It is true, that in the case at bar, it was an
accommodation to the plaintiff, in the popular sense, to have the defendant  indorse  the  note;  but  it  wasn't  the  accommodation described in the law but rather a mere favor to him and one which in   no   way   bound   Serrano.      In   cases   of   accommodation indorsement,   the   indorser   makes   the   indorsement   for   the accommodation  of the maker.  Such an indorsement is generally for the purpose of better securing the payment of the note—that is, he lends his name to the maker and not the holder.

2.    Parol  evidence  is  admissible  for  the  purposes  named.    The prohibiton against parol evidence is to prevent alteration, change, modification, or contradiction of the term of a written instrument, admittedly existing, by the use of some parol evidence except in cases specifically named in the action.  The case at bar is not one where the evidence offered varies, alters, modifies, or contradicts the  terms  of  the  indorsement  admittedly  existing.    The  evidence was not offered for that purpose.  The purpose was to show that the  contract  of  indorsement  ever  existed;  that  the  minds  of  the parties never met on the terms of such contract; that they never mutually agreed to enter into such contract; and that there never
existed  a  consideration  upon  which  such  an  agreement  could  be founded.