An onerous donation is not covered by Article 749. There is no need for a public instrument. A private document is enough to make an onerous donation valid.
FACTS:
Respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner for recovery of a farm lot and a residential lot which she claimed she had purchased from Domingo Melad, the original owner, and were now being unlawfully withheld by the defendant. In his answer, the petitioner denied the allegation and averred that he was the owner of the said lots of which he had been in open, continuous and adverse possession, having acquired them from Domingo Melad in 1941 and 1943 by donation.
For his part, the Petitioner testified that he was the husband of Isidra Melad, Domingo's niece, whom he and his wife Juana Malupang had taken into their home as their ward as they had no children of their own. He and his wife lived with the couple in their house on the residential lot and helped Domingo with the cultivation of the farm. Domingo Melad signed in a private instrument in which he gave the defendant the farm and in another private instrument in which he also gave him the residential lot, on the understanding that the latter would take care of the grantor and would bury him upon his death.
“I, DOMINGO MELAD do hereby declare in this receipt the truth of my giving to Felix Danguilan, my agricultural land...that I hereby declare and bind myself that there is no one to whom I will deliver this land except to him as he will be the one responsible for me in the event that I will die and also for all other things needed and necessary for me...”
“I, DOMINGO MELAD, declare the truth that I have delivered my residential lot to Felix Danguilan because he will be the one to take care of SHELTERING me or bury me when I die...”
Respondent attacked the alleged donations on the ground that that they were donations of real property and as such should have been effected through a public instrument.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation was valid
RULING:
It is our view, considering the language of the two instruments, that Domingo Melad did intend to donate the properties to the petitioner, as the private respondent contends. We do not think, however, that the donee was moved by pure liberality. While truly donations, the conveyances were onerous donations as the properties were given to the petitioner in exchange for his obligation to take care of the donee for the rest of his life and provide for his burial. Hence, it was not covered by the rule in Article 749 of the Civil Code requiring donations of real properties to be effected through a public instrument. The case at bar comes squarely under the doctrine laid down in Manalo v. De Mesa, where the Court held:
There can be no doubt that the donation in question was made for a valuable consideration, since the donors made it conditional upon the donees' bearing the expenses that might be occasioned by the death and burial of the donor Placida Manalo, a condition and obligation. Therefore, in order to determine whether or not said donation is valid and effective it should be sufficient to demonstrate that, as a contract, it embraces the conditions the law requires and is valid and effective, although not recorded in a public instrument.
The private respondent argues that as there was no equivalence between the value of the lands donated and the services for which they were being exchanged, the two transactions should be considered pure or gratuitous donations of real rights, hence, they should have been effected through a public instrument and not mere private writings. However, no evidence has been adduced to support her contention that the values exchanged were disproportionate or unequal.
As to the claim of Respondent that there was a deed of sale, assuming that the sale was valid, there was no trasnfer of ownership because the land was never delivered to Respondent. It is true that the same article declares that the execution of a public instrument is equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the object of the contract, but, in order that this symbolic delivery may produce the effect of tradition, it is necessary that the vendor shall have had such control over the thing sold that, at the moment of the sale, its material delivery could have been made. It is not enough to confer upon the purchaser the ownership and the right of possession. There is no dispute that it is the petitioner and not the private respondent who is in actual possession of the litigated properties.
