RAMOS V. GATCHALIAN, 154 SCRA 703- Easement Right of Way
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to justify a grant of right of way. Real necessity must be shown.
FACTS:
Ramos is the owner of a house and lot in Parañaque. Respondents Asprec own Lot 4135. Gatchalian Avenue is alongside Lot 4135. Respondent Gatchalian Realty was granted the road right of way and drainage along Lot 4135 to service the Gatchalian and Asprec subdivision, by the respondent Asprecs.
Ramos alleged that, Gatchalian Realty, Inc. built a 7-8, feet high concrete wall right infront of his premises, blocking his entrance/exit to Gatchalian Road, the nearest, most convenient and adequate entrance/exit to the public road. or highway, Sucat Road but now known as Dr. A. Santos Avenue, Parañaque; that this house and lot is only about 100 meters from Sucat, Road passing thru Gatchalian Avenue. Ramos also alleged that due to Gatchalian's construction,he was constrained to use as his "temporary" way the adjoining lots belonging to different persons. Said way is allegedly "bumpy and impassable especially during rainy seasons because of flood waters, mud and tall 'talahib' grasses thereon." Moreover, according to Ramos, the road right of way which the private respondents referred to as the petitioner's alternative way to Sucat Road is not an existing road but has remained a proposed road as indicated in the subdivision plan of the Sobrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision.
RTC and CA both denied Ramos' complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a right of way must be granted based on allegation of inconvenience?
HELD:
No. The petitioner's position is not impressed with merit. We find no reason to disturb the appellate court's finding of fact that the petitioner failed to prove the non-existence of an adequate outlet to the Sucat Road except through the Gatchalian Avenue. As borne out by the records of the case, there is a road right of way provided by the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision indicated as Lot 4133-G-12 in its subdivision plan for the buyers of its lots. The fact that said lot is still undeveloped and causes inconvenience to the petitioner when he uses it to reach the public highway does not bring him within the ambit of the legal requisite. We agree with the appellate court's observation that the petitioner should have, first and foremost, demanded from the Sabrina Rodriguez Lombos Subdivision the improvement and maintenance of Lot 4133-G-12 as his road right of way because it was from said subdivision that he acquired his lot and not either from the Gatchalian Realty or the respondents Asprec. To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue inspite of a road right of way provided by the petitioner's subdivision for its buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows petitioner a much greater ease in going to and coming from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of a right of way, that "mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it."
