DIZON V. SUNTAY- Pledge of Immovable

An owner of a movable unlawfully pledged by another is not estopped from recovering possession. Where the owner delivered the diamond ring solely for sale on commission but the seller instead pawned it without authority, the owner is not stopped form pursuing an action against the pawnshop.

FACTS:

Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3-carat diamond ring valued at P5,500. She and Clarita Sison entered into a transaction wherein the ring would be sold on commission. Clarita received the ring and issued a receipt. After some time, Lourdes made demands for the return of the ring but the latter refused to comply. When Lourdes insisted on the return, Clarita gave her the pawnshop ticket which is the receipt of the pledge and she found out that 3 days after the ring was received by Clarita, it was pledged by Melia Sison, the niece of Clarita’s husband in connivance with Clarita with the pawnshop of Dominador Dizon for P2,600. Lourdes then filed an estafa case. She then asked Dominador Dizon for the return of the ring pledged but refused to return the ring thus the case filed by Lourdes.

The CFI issued a writ of replevin so Lourdes was able to have possession of the ring during the pendency of the case. The CFI also ruled in her favor which was affirmed by the CA on appeal. Thus the case at bar.

ISSUE:

W/N the CA erred in ruling that Lourdes has a right to possession of the ring

HELD: NO

It reiterated the ruling in de Garcia v. CA, that the controlling provision is Art. 559 of the CC which states that the possession ofmovable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without reimbursing the price paid therefor.

Lourdes, being unlawfully deprived of her ring thus she has a right to recover it from the current possessor. Dizon is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would require him to inquire whether or not an individual who is offering the jewelry by pledge is entitled to do so. The principle of estoppel cannot help him at all. Since there was no precaution availed of, perhaps because of the difficulty of resisting opportunity for profit, he only has himself to blame and should be the last to complain if the right of the true owner of the jewelry should be recognized.

Other issues raised:

Principle of estoppel = has its roots in equity, moral right and natural justice.
> For estoppel to exist, there must be a declaration, act or omission by the party who is sought to be bound.

> A party should not be permitted to go against his own acts to the prejudice of another.
Concurring opinion by J. Teehankee:

> Interpretation of the “unlawfully deprived” in Art. 559 of the CC. It is understood to include all cases where there has been no valid transmission of ownership. If our legislature intended interpretation to be that of the French Code, it certainly would have adopted and used a narrower term than the broad language of Art. 559 (formerly 464) and the accepted meaning in accordance with our jurisprudence.