LYCEUM OF THE PHILS. V. CA

219 SCRA 610

FACTS:

1. Petitioner had sometime commenced before in the SEC a complaint against Lyceum of Baguio, to require it to change its corporate name and to adopt another name not similar or identical with that of petitioner. SEC decided in favor of petitioner. Lyceum of Baguio filed petition for certiorari but was denied for
lack of merit.

2. Armed with the resolution of the Court, petitioner instituted before the SEC to compel private respondents, which are also educational institutions, to delete word “Lyceum” from their corporate names and permanently to enjoin them from using such as part of their respective names.

3. Hearing officer sustained the claim of petitioner and held that the word “Lyceum” was capable of appropriation and that petitioner had acquired an enforceable right to the use of that word.

4. In an appeal, the decision was reversed by the SEC En Banc. They held that the word “Lyceum” to have become identified with petitioner as to render use thereof of other institutions as productive of consfusion about the identity of the schools concerned in the mind of the general public.

5. Petitioner went to appeal with the CA but the latter just affirmed the decision of the SEC En Banc.

HELD:

Under the corporation code, no corporate name may be allowed by the SEC if the proposed name is identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of any existing corporation or to any other name already protected by law or is patently deceptive, confusing or contrary to existing laws. The policy behind this provision is to avoid fraud upon the public, which would have the occasion to deal with the entity concerned, the evasion of legal obligations and duties, and the reduction of difficulties of administration and supervision over corporations.

The corporate names of private respondents are not identical or deceptively or confusingly similar to that of petitioner’s. Confusion and deception has been precluded by the appending of geographic names to the word “Lyceum”. Furthermore, the word “Lyceum” has become associated in time with schools and other institutions providing public lectures, concerts, and public discussions. Thus, it generally refers to a school or an institution of learning.

Petitioner claims that the word has acquired a secondary meaning in relation to petitioner with the result that the word, although originally generic, has become appropriable by petitioner to the exclusion of other institutions.

The doctrine of secondary meaning is a principle used in trademark law but has been extended to corporate names since the right to use a corporate name to the exclusion of others is based upon the same principle, which underlies the right to use a particular trademark or tradename. Under this doctrine, a word or phrase originally incapable of exclusive appropriation with reference to an article in the market, because geographical or otherwise descriptive might nevertheless have been used for so long and so exclusively by one producer with reference to this article that, in that trade and to that group of purchasing public, the word or phrase has come to mean that the article was his produce. The doctrine cannot be made to apply where the evidence didn't prove that the business has continued for so long a time that it has become of consequence and acquired good will of considerable value such that its articles and produce have acquired a well known reputation, and confusion will result by the use of the disputed name.

Petitioner didn't present evidence, which provided that the word “Lyceum” acquired secondary meaning. The petitioner failed to adduce evidence that it had exclusive use of the word. Even if petitioner used the word for a long period of time, it hadn’t acquired any secondary meaning in its favor because the appellant failed to prove that it had been using the same word all by itself to the exclusion of others.