CONCURRING OPINION
KAPUNAN,
J.:
I respectfully submit
that respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing Resolution No. 3584, dated February 8, 2001, denying the
request to conduct a special registration of voters less than one hundred twenty
(120) days before the regular elections on May 14, 2001.
The right of suffrage is
enshrined in the Constitution as it is the means by which the people exercise
their sovereign authority to choose their representatives in the governance of
the State. The importance of this right
is such that the electoral process must be at all times free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible. To this end, the
Constitution has lodged with the COMELEC the duty to ensure and safeguard the
expression of the people’s will through the ballots.
R.A. No. 8189 (R.A. No.
8189)[1] entitled “An Act Providing for a General
Registration of Voters, Adopting a System of Continuing Registration,
Prescribing the Procedures Thereof and Authorizing the Appropriation of Funds
Therefor” was enacted by Congress on June 11, 1996.[2] It was adopted precisely “to systematize the
present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete,
permanent and updated list of voters.”[3] The certified list of voters then existing
under Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) was declared therein
to be ineffective and inoperative.[4] To replace the cancelled list, R.A. No. 8189
provided for a general registration as well as a system of continuing
registration thus:
SEC. 7. General Registration of Voters. - Immediately after the barangay elections in 1997, the existing certified list of voters shall cease to be effective and operative. For purposes of the May 1998 elections and all elections, plebiscites, referenda, initiatives and recalls subsequent thereto, the Commission shall undertake a general registration of voters before the Board of Election Inspectors on June 14, 15, 21 and 22 and subject to the discretion of the Commission on June 28 and 29, 1997 in accordance with this Act.
SEC. 8. System of Continuing registration of Voters. - The personal filing of application of registration of voters shall be conducted daily in the office of the Election officer during regular office hours. No registration shall, however, be conducted during the period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and ninety (90) days before a special election.
I
In support of their
petitions, petitioners argue that the COMELEC possess a “standby power” under
Section 29 of Republic Act No. 6646[5] (R.A. No. 6646) and Section 28 of Republic
Act No. 8436[6] (R.A. No. 8436) to fix additional periods
and dates for registration of voters other than those already provided for
under existing laws. The aforementioned
provisions identically state that “(i)f it shall no longer be reasonably
possible to observe the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain
pre-election acts, the COMELEC shall fix additional periods and dates to ensure
the accomplishment of the activities so that voters shall not be deprived of
their right of suffrage.” However, these provisions are inapplicable to the pre-election
activity of registration in view of the existence of Republic Act No. 8189, the
present law governing the system of registration of voters.
The “standby power” of
the COMELEC to fix additional dates and periods for registration under Section
29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 must be understood in the context
of the inadequacy of the registration period under the law then prevailing,
i.e. the period provided in Section 126 of B.P. 881. Under this provision,[7] registration of voters was held only on the
seventh and sixth Saturdays before a regular election. It was in recognition of the insufficiency
of the two-day registration period under Section 126 that Section 29 of R.A.
6646 granted the COMELEC a “standby power” to fix additional dates and times for
pre-election activities, including registration. Section 126 of B.P. 881 has, however, been impliedly repealed by
R.A. No. 8189, which prescribes an entirely new system of registration, and
which in fact allows a prolonged period of registration for potential
voters. The implied repeal of Section
126 of B.P. 881 by sections 7 and 8 of R.A. No. 8189 cannot be gainsaid
inasmuch as these provisions speak of two systems of registration of voters
which are obviously inconsistent with each other. B.P. 881 merely provided for a two-day registration period
whereas R.A. 8189 now calls for a prolonged and continuous period of
registration (daily during regular office hours) except during the prohibited
period. To uphold the view that both
systems of registration are presently co-existing would give rise to the absurd
situation where potential voters who failed to register daily during regular
office hours before the 120-day period would nonetheless be allowed to register
on the seventh and sixth Saturdays within the 120-day prohibited period. Obviously, when Congress prescribed the new
system of registration under R.A. No. 8189, it intended to discard that the
system set forth in B.P. 881.
There is clearly no
reason for the use of the “standby power” under Section 29 of R.A. No. 6646 and
Section 28 of R.A. No. 8436 to conduct a registration considering that Section
8 of R.A. No. 8189 specifically lays down a system of continuing registration,
i.e., voter registration conducted daily in the office of the Election Officer,
except one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election. It would seem that any exercise by the
COMELEC of the so-called “standby power” in the conduct of registration would
render the system of continuing registration meaningless and pointless.
Moreover, Section 29 of
R.A. 6646 and Section 28 of R.A. 8436 cannot prevail over R.A. 8189 with
respect to the pre-election activity of registration since the latter deals
specifically with registration of voters.
The rule is that a law which treats a subject in general terms and which
does not contradict the provisions of a special statute is not to be considered
as intending to affect the provisions of the latter, unless it is absolutely
necessary to construe it in order to give its provisions any meaning at all.[8] Where a conflict between a general law and a
special statute exists, the latter should prevail because it evinces the
legislative intent more clearly than the general law. The special law is to be construed as an exception to the general
law in the absence of circumstances warranting a contrary conclusion.[9] Applying the foregoing rule to the cases at
bar, since Section 29 of R.A. 6646 and Section 28 R.A. 8436 do not deal with
registration of voters alone, as in fact the aforementioned provisions speak of
pre-election activities in general[10] and R.A. 8189 deals particularly with the
pre-election activity of registration, the provisions of the latter regarding
registration are controlling.
To my mind, the provision
that no registration shall be conducted within 120 days prior to regular
elections is clear and unequivocal. The
reasons therefor are readily apparent.
The 120-day prohibition was designed to allow the COMELEC to make the
necessary preparations with respect to the coming elections, including, among
others: (1) completion of project
precincts, which is necessary for the proper allocation of official ballots,
election returns and other election forms and paraphernalia; (2) constitution
of the Board of Election Inspectors, including the determination of the
precincts to which they shall be assigned; (3) inspection, verification and
sealing of the Book of Voters containing the approved Voter Registration
Records; (4) finalizing the Computerized Voters List; and (5) preparation,
bidding, printing and distribution of additional list of Voters Information
sheet.[11] The said prohibition should be likewise
viewed in conjunction with Section 35 of the same law on the prohibition
against the filing of petitions for exclusion within one hundred (100) days
prior to regular elections. As pointed
out by the COMELEC, petitions for exclusion are necessary mechanisms to ensure
that the voters lists are free from “flying voters,” “ghost voters,” unqualified
registrants and the like. If a
“special” registration is conducted within the prohibited period, without
providing for an extension of time for the filing of exclusion petitions, then
the integrity of the Voters List and the entire election process might be
seriously compromised. Indeed, to allow
the conduct of registration at this very late hour, less than 50 days from the
election, is patently against the letter and spirit of R.A. No. 8189.
Considering the express
prohibition under Section 8 of R.A. 8189 against registration of voters within
120 days prior to a regular election and in the absence of power on the part of
the COMELEC to conduct a special registration within this prohibited period,
there is no legal basis for the Court to compel respondent Commission to
conduct such activity. Only a law
amending the periods for registration set forth in R.A. No. 8189 and allowing
such special registration can empower the COMELEC to conduct said process. This has been tacitly admitted by Congress
itself when it called for a special session for the passage of a law allowing a
special registration of voters before the May 14, 2001 elections. But since Congress has deemed it unwise to
enact a law providing for a special registration, COMELEC simply cannot hold
said activity.
To order the COMELEC to
conduct a special registration would, moreover, compel it to disregard certain
provisions prohibiting specific pre-election acts. Section 34 of R.A. No. 8189 proscribes the filing of a petition
for inclusion of voters in the permanent list of voters one hundred five (105)
days prior to a regular election or seventy-five (75) days prior to a special
election:
SEC. 34. Petition for Inclusion of Voters in the List. - Any person whose application for
registration has been disapproved by the Board or whose name has been stricken
out from the list may file with the court a petition to include his name in the
permanent list of voters in his precinct at any time except one hundred
five (105) days prior to a regular election or seventy five (75) days
prior to a special election. xxx.
Section 35 of the same
Act prohibits the filing of a petition for exclusion of voters from the
permanent list, thus:
SEC. 35. Petition for Exclusion of Voters from the List. - Any registered voter, representative of any
political party of the Election Officer, may file with the court a sworn
petition for the exclusion of a voter from the permanent list of voters giving
the name, address and the precinct of the challenged voter at anytime except
one hundred (100) days prior to a regular election or sixty-five (65) days
before a special election. xxx
The Commission is also
prevented from executing any order, ruling or decision annulling a book of
voters within ninety (90) days before an election under Section 39, R.A. No.
8189:
SEC. 39. Annulment of
Book of Voters. - The Commission
shall, upon verified petition of any voter of election officer of duly
registered political party, and after notice and hearing, annul any book of
voters that is not prepared in accordance with the provisions of this Act or
was prepared through fraud; bribery, forgery, impersonation, intimidation,
force or any similar irregularity, or which contains data that are
statistically improbable. No order,
ruling or decision annulling a book of voters shall be executed within (90)
days before an election.
Violation of any these
provisions is deemed an election offense punishable by imprisonment of one (1)
to six (6) years without probation, disqualification to hold public office and
deprivation of the right of suffrage.
SEC. 45. Election Offense. – The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act.
a) x x x
x x x
j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
SEC. 46. Penalties. - Any person found guilty of any Election offense under this Act shall be punished an imprisonment of not less than one (1) year but not more than six (6) years and shall not be subject to probation. In addition, the guilty party shall be sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. If he is a foreigner, he shall be deported after the present term has been served. Any political party found guilty shall be sentenced to pay a fine of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000) but not more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000).
These penal provisions
underscore the prohibitive feature of the foregoing provisions as well as that
prescribing the 120-day period against registration.
Indubitably, mandamus
would not lie since petitioners have not shown a duty, much less a clear
duty, on the part of respondent COMELEC to conduct a special registration. On the contrary, the issuance of the writ
would force COMELEC to perform an act prohibited and punished by law.
The Solicitor General
makes much ado over the issuance by the COMELEC of Resolution No. 3258, dated
September 28, 2000, prescribing December 27, 2000 as the last day of filing
applications for registration. He points
out that the 120-day prohibited period, counted from May 14, 2001, began on
January 14, 2001. Hence, prospective
applicants had until January 13, 2001 and not December 27, 2000 to apply for
registration. “Effectively,” the
solicitor General argues, “unregistered but otherwise qualified voters were
deprived by respondent COMELEC of eleven (11) working days within which to
register.” Petitioners and the
Solicitor General also fault the COMELEC for failing to engage in sufficiently
disseminating information to the public regarding the December 27, 2000
deadline.
It is an overstatement to
say, as petitioners and the Solicitor General do, that the reason for the
“disenfranchisement of four million new Filipino voters” – a figure not duly
established - was the alleged absence of a massive and
active information campaign by the COMELEC for new voters to register. R.A. No. 8189 providing for continuing
registration has been in existence since June 11, 1996 or for more than four
(4) years. Everybody is presumed to
know the law. The right of suffrage is
so important that every citizen knows or ought to know that it is his right,
duty and privilege to register and vote, if qualified. The failure to register lies, perhaps, on
neglect, apathy or nonchalance, rather than the COMELEC’s alleged lack of information
campaign.
On the argument that the
COMELEC advanced the deadline forregistration, it should be noted that the
COMELEC resolution setting the time limit was adopted on December 28, 2000;
hence, those who turned 18 between December 27, 2000 and January 13, 2001
should have been forewarned to register on or before the deadline or asked for
extension of up to January 13, 2001.
There is no showing that anybody had done so. The advancing of the deadline for a few days is not as serious an
infraction as petitioners would portray.
II
Granting arguendo
that COMELEC has the “standby power” to order a special registration during the
prohibited period, the Court cannot compel to compel the COMELEC to conduct the
same given its admission that it is already operationally impossible to
undertake said activity at this point in time.
In its Comment, the COMELEC outlined its calendar of activities for the
election on May 14, 2001, and showed, in the process, why the conduct of a
special registration is no longer practicable.
The Court should seriously take these objective facts into
consideration. After all, it is the
COMELEC which is solely tasked by the Constitution to “enforce and administer
all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite,
initiative, referendum, an recall”[12] and to ensure “free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.”[13]
The functions of the
COMELEC under the Constitution are essentially executive (“enforcement”) and
administrative (“administration”) in nature.[14] It is elementary in administrative law that
“courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities
coming under the special technical knowledge an training of such agencies.”[15] The reason behind this salutary policy has
been explained in this manner:
The rationale for this rule relates not only to the emergence of
the multifarious needs of a modern or modernizing society and the establishment
of diverse administrative agencies for addressing and satisfying those needs;
it also relates to accumulation of experience and growth of specialized
capabilities by the administrative agency charged with implementing a
particular statute. In Asturias
Sugar Central, Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs the Court stressed executive
officials are presumed to have familiarized themselves with all the
considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, an to have formed
an independent, conscientious and competent expert opinion thereon. The courts give much weight to
contemporaneous construction because of the respect due the government agency
or officials charged with the implementation of the law, their competence,
expertness, experience and informed judgment, and the fact that they are
frequently the drafters of the law they interpret.[16] (Citations
omitted)
The determination of the
feasibility of conducting a special registration less than fifty (50) days
prior to the regular election “must be dealt with realistically and not from
the standpoint of pure theory.”[17] The COMELEC, not this Court, is concededly
in a better position to resolve this matter considering its actual experience
as well as its knowledge of its own operational and logistical
capabilities. It should be allowed
considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will ensure the
accomplishment of the greater objective for which it was created - free, orderly and honest elections.[18] Since
it is the COMELEC’s honest-to-goodness assessment that it cannot undertake the
conduct of special registration without compromising the integrity of the
entire election process, then the Court would do well to respect this administrative
“finding of fact.”
The marked trend in our
laws and jurisprudence has been to grant the COMELEC ample latitude in order
that it can more effectively perform its duty in safeguarding the sanctity of
our elections. In Cauton vs. COMELEC,[19] the Court enunciated that the primordial
objective of the COMELEC is to “promote free, orderly, and honest elections:”
The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to protect the
integrity of the elections and to suppress all evils that may violate its
purity and defeat the will of he voters.
The purity of the elections is one of the most fundamental requisites of
popular government. x x x In the performance of its duties, the Commission must
be given a considerable latitude in adopting means and methods that will insure
the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was granted - to promote free, orderly, and honest
elections.x x x[20]
This pronouncement was
reiterated in Loong vs. COMELEC.[21] Due regard for the independent character of the COMELEC, as ordained by
the Constitution, requires that the Court must not “by any excessive zeal”[22] compel that body to perform an act that
would imperil the holding of a “free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible”
election on May 14, 2001. This Court’s
function is merely to check and not to supplant the COMELEC, or to ascertain
merely whether it has gone beyond the limits prescribed by law, not to exercise
the power vested in it or to determine the wisdom of its act.[23] Clearly, certiorari would not
lie.
A final word. Petitioners must remember that while the
right of suffrage is constitutionally guaranteed, this is no reason for them to
be complacent in the performance of their corresponding duties as potential
voters and excuse them from complying with the requirements laid down by law.
IN VIEW OF THE
FOREGOING, I vote to DISMISS
the instant petitions.
[1] An
Act providing for a General Registration of Voters, adopting A System of
Continuing Registration, prescribing the Procedures Thereof and Authorizing the
Appropriation of funds Therefor.
[2] The
Law took effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two newspapers of
general circulation.
[3] Section
2, R.A. No. 8189.
[4] Section
7, id.
[5] An
Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for Other
Purposes.
[6] An
Act Authorizing the Commission on Elections to Use an Automated Election System
in the May 11, 1998 National or Local Elections and in Subsequent National or
Local Electoral Exercises, providing funds Therefor and for other Purposes.
[7] The provision reads:
Sec. 126. Registration of voters.- On the seventh and sixth Saturdays before a regular election or on the second Saturday following the day of the proclamation calling for a new special election, plebiscite or referendum, any person desiring to be registered as a voter shall accomplish in triplicate before the board of election inspectors a voter’s affidavit in which shall be stated the following data:
(a) Name, surname, middle name, maternal surname;
(b) Date and place of birth;
(c) Citizenship;
(d) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;
(e) Exact address with the name of the street and house number or in case there is none, a brief description of the locality and the place;
(f) a statement that the applicant has not been previously registered, otherwise, he shall be required to attach a sworn application for cancellation of his previous registration; and
(g) Such other information or data which may be required by the Commission.
The voter’s affidavit shall also contain three specimens of the applicant’s signature and clear and legible prints of his left and right hand thumbmarks and shall be sworn to and filed together with four copies of the latest identification photograph to be supplied by the applicant.
The oath of the appellant shall include a statement that he has does not have any of the disqualifications of a voter and that he has not been previously registered in the precinct or in any other precinct.
Before the applicant accomplishes his voter’s affidavit, the
board of election inspectors shall appraise the applicant of the qualifications
and disqualifications prescribed by law for a voter. It shall also see to it that the accomplished voter’s affidavit
contain all the data therein required and that the applicant’s specimen
signatures, the prints of his left and right hand thumbmarks and his photograph
are properly affixed in each of the voter’s affidavit. (Emphasis supplied.)
[8] See
Laguna Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42,
56-57 (1995); Leveriza vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 157 SCRA 282,
294 (1988); Garcia vs. Pascual, 113 Phil. 632, 635 (1932).
[9] Laguna
Lake Development Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 42, 57 (1995).
[10] These
would include: (1) preparation and posting of the Certified List of Voters
[Sec. 30, R.A. 8189], and (2) sealing of precinct Book of voters [Sec. 31, R.A.
8189].
[11] Comment
of Respondent Commission on Elections, pp. 10-11.
[12] Section
2(1), Article IX.
[13] Section
2(3), Article IX.
[14] Ututalam
vs. COMELEC, 15 SCRA 465, 469 (1965).
[15] Melendres
vs. COMELEC, 319 SCRA 262, 275 (1999) citing First Lepanto Ceramics,
Inc. vs. CA, 253 SCRA 552 (1996).
[16] Nestle
Phil., Inc. vs. CA, 203 SCRA 504, 510-511 (1991).
[17] In Sumulong vs. COMELEC, 73 Phil. 288, 294-295
(19941), the court made the following pronouncement:
The Commission on Elections is a constitutional body. It is intended to play a distinct and
important part in our scheme of government.
In the discharge of its functions, its should not be hampered with
restrictions that would be fully warranted in the case of a less responsible
organization. The Commission may err,
so this court may also. It should be
allowed considerable latitude in devising means and methods that will insure
the accomplishment of the greater objective for which it was created - free, orderly and honest elections. We may not fully agree with its choice of
means but unless these are clearly illegal or constitute gross abuse of
discretion, this court should not interfere.
Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt
with realistically – not from the standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its
fact-finding facilities, its contacts with political strategists, and its
knowledge derive from actual experience in dealing with political
controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex
political questions. (Underscoring
ours)
[18] Id.
[19] 19
SCRA 911 (1967).
[20] Id.,
at 921-922.
[21] 305
SCRA 832 (1999).
[22] See
Note 17.
[23] See
Lansang vs. Garcia, 42 SCRA 448 (1971).