FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139760. October 5, 2001]
FELIZARDO S. OBANDO, JUAN S. OBANDO and THE ESTATE OF ALEGRIA STREBEL Vda. DE FIGUERAS, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-MANILA, BRANCH 17, ESTATE and/or HEIRS OF EDUARDO FIGUERAS & HEIRS OF FRITZ STREBEL, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
This is a petition for
certiorari and mandamus, seeking the annulment of the Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 49896 dated May 7, 1999[1] and August 13, 1999,[2] and praying that respondent Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 17, be ordered to give due course to
petitioners’ notice of appeal.
Jose Figueras died
testate on January 8, 1964, leaving as heirs Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras,
his second wife, and Francisco and Eduardo Figueras, his two legitimate
children by his first wife, Rosario Francisco.
Sometime in June 1965,
Francisco Figueras instituted Special Proceeding No. 61567, a petition for
probate of the last will and testament of Jose Figueras.
Alegria Strebel Vda. de
Figueras died on May 11, 1979.
Petitioner Felizardo Obando instituted on May 25, 1979 a petition for
probate of the last will and testament of Alegria which was docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 123948 of the then Court of First Instance of Manila. Felizardo claimed that he and his brother,
Juan, are the children of Alegria’s sister, Susan Strebel, and that they have
been named as heirs in Alegria’s will.
The two probate
proceedings were consolidated before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
17. Eduardo Figueras and Felizardo
Obando were appointed as co-administrators of the consolidated estates of the
deceased spouses.
On April 11, 1991,
Felizardo filed with the probate court a motion for the removal of Eduardo
Figueras as his co-administrator, on the ground that he was suffering from a
heart ailment which prevented him from going to court; that Eduardo failed to
prevent the foreclosure of the estate’s property in Marikina and failed to
account for rentals received on behalf of the estate; that Eduardo instituted
ejectment proceedings against a lessee of the estate without naming Felizardo
as co-administrator; and that Eduardo was convicted of the crime of rebellion.
Meanwhile, the National
Bureau of Investigation found that the last will and testament of Alegria was a
forgery. This finding was affirmed by
the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory.
Hence, on July 26, 1990, criminal charges for falsfication were filed
against petitioners Felizardo and Juan Obando who were thereafter convicted of
falsification.
In turn, Eduardo Figueras
and intervenor Fritz Strebel filed on June 29, 1991, a motion to remove
Felizardo as co-administrator, citing as ground Felizardo’s failure to account
for the rentals received from the Community of Learners, a lessee of the
estate, in the amount of P313,000.00; and the conviction of Felizardo and Juan
Obando for falsifying the last will and testament of Alegria Strebel Vda. de
Figueras.
In an Order dated
December 17, 1997,[3] the probate court denied the motion to
remove Eduardo Figueras, and granted the motion to remove Felizardo Obando as
administrator.
Felizardo filed a motion
for reconsideration of the aforesaid Order which was denied on February 5,
1998.[4] Further, the probate court dismissed Special
Proceeding No. 123948, i.e., the petition for probate of the last will
and testament of Alegria Strebel Vda. de Figueras, on the ground that the same
was forged.
Felizardo filed an Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration, which the probate court denied for being actually a
second motion for reconsideration.[5] The probate court also denied Felizardo’s
motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing Special Proceeding No.
123948.
Again, Felizardo filed a
motion for reconsideration of his removal as administrator, as well as the
order dismissing Special Proceeding No. 123948. On July 17, 1998,[6] the probate court issued an Order denying
the aforesaid motions.
Thus, on August 6, 1998,
Felizardo filed a Notice of Appeal against all the foregoing orders of the
probate court. In an Order dated August
27, 1998,[7] the probate court denied due course thereto,
finding that the second and third motions for reconsideration, being prohibited
under the Rules, did not toll the reglementary period to appeal. Hence, the order removing him as
administrator and dismissing Special Proceeding No. 123948 had already become
final.
Petitioners filed with
the Court of Appeals, on December 15, 1998, a petition for certiorari and
mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 49896, raising the following issues:
I) MAY THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT BE ORDERED TO GIVE DUE COURSE TO PETITIONERS’ APPEAL AND ELEVATE THE SAME TO THIS HONORABLE COURT?
II) WERE PETITIONERS’ NOTICE OF APPEAL AND RECORD ON APPEAL SEASONABLY FILED AND SUBMITTED?
III) WERE PETITIONERS’ MOTIONS FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE PREVIOUS ORDERS OF DECEMBER 17, 1997, FEBRUARY 5, 1998, APRIL 6, 1998 AND LATELY THE ORDER OF AUGUST 27, 1998 PROSCRIBED BY THE RULES AS BEING IN THE CONCEPT OF PRO FORMA MOTIONS?
IV) ARE PETITIONERS
ENTITLED TO APPEAL AS A MATTER OF FACT?[8]
On May 7, 1999, the Court
of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration which, however, was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners invoke
previous rulings of this Court which relate to the liberal construction of
rules of procedure. There is, however,
nothing in the case at bar which would warrant the application thereof, which
is the exception rather than the rule.
Indeed, the Rules of
Court are explicit that a second motion for reconsideration shall not be
allowed.[9] In this case, petitioners filed not only a
second motion for reconsideration, but a third motion for reconsideration as
well. Since the period to appeal began
to run from the denial of the first motion for reconsideration, consequently,
petitioners’ Notice of Appeal filed six months later was correctly denied by
the probate court for being late.
We quote with approval
the following ruling of the Court of Appeals:
We, on the other hand, agree with the respondents that the
petitioners’ period to appeal already expired.
They filed not only one but three Motions for Reconsideration. A second Motion for Reconsideration, as a
matter of fact, is not allowed (Rule 37, Section 5). Since a second Motion for Reconsideration is not allowed, then
necessarily, its filing did not toll the running of the period to appeal, with
more reason would a 3rd Motion for Reconsideration. To Us, the April 6, 1998 Order, mentioning
finality of the Order of dismissal of the Petition for Probate, together with
Felizardo’s removal as co-administrator, was validly issued.[10]
Likewise, the remedy of
certiorari was no longer available to petitioners. It is well-settled that the special civil action for certiorari
cannot be used as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.[11] In a recent case, we held:
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err when it dismissed the
petition for certiorari and mandamus, on the ground that the proper remedy was
to appeal within fifteen (15) days. The
lapse of the reglementary period was of no moment. A basic requisite for the special civil action of certiorari to
lie is that there be no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. Certiorari is a
remedy of last recourse and is a limited form of review. Its principal function is to keep inferior
tribunals within their jurisdiction. It
cannot be used as a substitute for a lost appeal. It is not intended to correct errors of procedure or mistakes in
the judge’s findings or conclusions.[12]
All told, therefore, the
Court of Appeals committed neither reversible error nor grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the petition for certiorari and mandamus.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant
petition is DISMISSED. The assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1999 is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Puno, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Kapunan, J., on official leave.
[1] Rollo, pp.
51-59; penned by Associate Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas and concurred in by
Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Roberto A. Barrios.
[2] Ibid., p. 60.
[3] Id., pp.
61-62.
[4] Id., pp.
67-71.
[5] Id., pp.
72-75.
[6] Id., pp.
76-79.
[7] Id., pp.
83-84.
[8] Record, p. 8.
[9] 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 37, Section 5, second paragraph.
[10] Decision, p. 7; Rollo,
p. 56.
[11] Cano-Gutierrez v.
Gutierrez, G.R. No. 138584, October 2, 2000.
[12] Republic v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95533, November 20., 2000.