SEPARATE DISSENTING OPINION

PARDO, J.:

With due respect, I vote to grant the petition on the second ground raised therein, that is, multiplicity of offenses charged in the amended information.[1] Consequently, the resolution of the Sandiganbayan must be set aside, and the case remanded to the Ombudsman for the amendment of the information to charge only a single offense.

In my view, it is unnecessary to rule on the unconstitutionality of the entire law,[2] R. A. No. 7080, as amended by R. A. No. 7659, although I share the opinion of the dissenting justices in the case of People v. Echagaray,[3] that the heinous crime law is unconstitutional.  Hence, the amendments to the plunder law prescribing the death penalty therefor are unconstitutional.  I am of the view that the plunder law penalizes acts that are mala in se, and consequently, the charges must be the specific acts alleged to be in violation of the law, committed with malice and criminal intent.  At any rate, I venture the view that Section 4, R. A. No. 7080, must be interpreted as requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt of all the elements of plunder as prescribed in the law, including the elements of the component crimes, otherwise, the section will be unconstitutional.



[1] Petition, Annex “B”, Motion to Quash, Ground II.

[2] ‘The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record if the case can be disposed of on some other ground.” (Laurel v. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797, 813 [1990], citing Siler v. Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 312 U.S. 175 [1909]; Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 [1941]; Lalican v. Vergara, 342 Phil. 485, 498 [1997]; Mirasol v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001.

[3] 335 Phil. 343 [1997].