WBench1

^{SEPARATE OPINION}

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In the resolution of these consolidated petitions, the majority opinion defined the issues, foremost among which is whether there exists a justiciable controversy warranting the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial review.

I concur with the majority that the present petitions do not pose a political question. Indeed, the resolution of the more substantive issues therein merely entail an interpretation of the constitutional principles of freedom of speech and the right to assemble. Moreover, the cases call for the application of the provision that:

The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.[1]

However, I am constrained to write this separate concurring opinion to express my concern and disquietude regarding the use of “people power” to create a vacancy in the presidency.

At the outset, I must stress that there is no specific provision in the Constitution which sanctions “people power,” of the type used at EDSA, as a legitimate means of ousting a public official, let alone the President of the Republic. The framers of the Constitution have wisely provided for the mechanisms of elections, constitutional amendments, and impeachment as valid modes of transferring power from one administration to the other. Thus, in the event the removal of an incumbent President or any government official from his office becomes necessary, the remedy is to make use of these constitutional methods and work within the system. To disregard these constitutionally prescribed processes as nugatory and useless instead of making them effectual is to admit that we lack constitutional maturity.

It cannot be overlooked that this Court’s legitimation through sufferance of the change of administration may have the effect of encouraging People Power Three, People Power Four, and People Power ad infinitum. It will promote the use of force and mob coercion by activist groups expert in propaganda warfare to intimidate government officials to resolve national problems only in the way the group wants them to be settled. Even now, this Court is threatened with the use of mob action if it does not immediately proclaim respondent Arroyo as a permanent and de jure President, brought to power through constitutionally valid methods and constitutional succession. Totally baseless charges of bribery in incredibly fantastic amounts are being spread by malicious and irresponsible rumormongers.

People power to pressure Cabinet members, Congress, government officials and even this Court is becoming a habit. It should not be stamped with legitimacy by this Court.

When is the use of People Power valid and constitutional? When is its use lawless? It bears stressing that never in the entire history of our country’s legal system has mob action or the forcible menthod to seize power been constitutionally sanctioned, starting all the way from the Instructions of President McKinley to the Second Philippine Commission dated April 7, 1900 up to the 1987 Constitution. Surely, the court cannot recognize “people power” as a substitute for elections. Respondents are emphatic that there was no revolution. However, nothing in the Constitution can define whatever they may call the action of the multitude gathered at EDSA.

I agree with the majority opinion that rallies or street demonstrations are avenues for the expression of ideas and grievances, and that they provide a check against abuse and inefficiency. But in the removal of erring public servants, the processes of the Constitution and the law must be folowed. This Court should never validate the action of a mob and declare it constitutional. This would, in the long run, leave public officials at the mercy of the clamorous and vociferous throngs.

I wish to emphasize that nothing that has been said in these proceedings can be construed as a declaration that people power may validly interrupt and lawfully abort on-going impeachment proceedings. There is nothing in the Constitution to legitimize the ouster of an incumbent President through means that are unconstitutional or extra-constitutional. The constitutional principle that sovereignty resides in the people refers to the exercise of sovereign power within the bounds of that same Constitution, not outside or against it.

The term “people power” is an amorphous and indefinable concept. At what stage do people assembled en masse become a mob? And when do the actions of a mob, albeit unarmed or well-behaved, become people power? The group gathered at EDSA may be called a crowd, a multitude, an assembly or a mob, but the Court has no means of knowing to the point of judicial certainty[2] that the throng gathered at EDSA was truly representative of the sovereign people. There are 75 million Filipinos. Even assuming that there were 2,000,000 people gathered at EDSA, a generous estimate considering the area of the site, that makes up for only two and two-thirds percent (2.67%) of the population.

Revolution, or the threat of revolution, may be an effective way to bring about a change of government, but it is certainly neither legal nor constitutional. To avoid a resort to revolution the Constitution has provisions for the orderly transfer of power from one administration to the other.[3] People Power is not one of them. Its exercise is outside of the Constitution.

Neither can the Court judicially determine that the throng massed at EDSA can be called the “people.” When the Constitution uses the term “people” to define whom the Government may serve or protect,[4] or who may enjoy the blessings of democracy,[5] or people’s rights which the military must respect, it refers to everybody living in the Philippines, citizens and aliens alike, regardless of age or status. When it refers to “people” vested with sovereignty,[6] or those who may be called upon to render service,[7] or those imploring the aid of Divine Providence,[8] or who may initiate amendments to the Constitution,[9] honor the flag,[10] or ratify a change in the country’s name, anthem, or seal,[11] the reference is to citizens or, more particularly, enfranchised citizens.

The writing of this opinion is also impelled in part as my personal reaction to intemperate and rash demands that we should discuss the issues raised to us without the benefit of careful deliberation and to decide them with only one certain and guaranteed result.

Media comments that it should take only ten minutes for a rational human brain to decide the constitutional legitimacy of the Arroyo presidency; that the Court should not persist in stalling or hobbling, otherwise hordes of angry demonstrators will descend on it; that the Court should not digest the crap fed by an honest lawyer gone wrong; and that if the Justices do not behave they will get lynched;[12] may all be dismissed as evanescent and fleeting exercises of journalistic license which turn to something else the following day. However, if these are repeated and paraphrased on television, print, and radio to a largely uncomprehending but receptive public,[13] or even insinuated by otherwise responsible officials in moments of political passion, comments of this nature sow contempt for the constitutional system. They are destructive of the rule of law and the democratic principles upon which the stability of government depends.

The Philippines adheres to the rule of law. The Constitution fixes the parameters for the assumption to the highest office of Presdient and the exercise of its powers. A healthy respect for constitutionalism calls for the interpretation of constitutional provisions according to their established and rational connotations. The situation should conform to the Constitution. The Constitution should not be adjusted and made to conform to the situation.

While I am against the resort to mob rule as a means of introducing change in government, the peculiar circumstances in the case at bar compel me to agree that respondent Arroyo rightfully assumed the presidency as the constitutionally anointed successor to the office vacated by petitioner. There was at that time an urgent need for the immediate exercise of presidential functions, powers and prerogatives. The vacancy in the highest office was created when petitioner, succumbing to the overwhelming tumult in the streets as well as the rapidly successive desertions and defections of his cabinet secretaries and military officers, left Malacañang Palace “for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.”[14]

Accordingly, I concur in the result of the majority ruling, that both petitions should be DISMISSED.