WBench1

^{EXTENDED EXPLANATION OF INHIBITION}

PANGANIBAN, J.:

In response to the Petition to Recuse filed by petitioner on February 14, 2001, I announced immediately, prior to the Oral Argument, my voluntary inhibition from these consolidated cases. In my February 15, 2001 letter addressed to the Court en banc, I explained that although petitioner had not proven any legal ground for his request, I was nonetheless voluntarily inhibiting myself for two reasons: (1) to “hold myself above petitioner’s reproach and suspicion” and (2) to deprive “him or anyone else [of] any excuse to cast any doubt on the integrity of these proceedings and of the decision that this Court may render in these cases of transcendental importance to the nation.” I quote that letter in part, as follows:

“By his request for my recusation, petitioner – I take it – is of the opinion that I should no longer participate further in the oral argument today and in the deliberation and voting that will follow, because I may have prejudged his cause. As I understand it, he believes that he may not be able to convince me to alter my position and vote in his favor or in any other manner that would deviate from my earlier concurrence in the Chief Justice’s action.

“Though I am ready to hear his arguments and firmly believe that I have an open mind to consider his plea according to my best light and to vote according to my conscience, I nonetheless deem it of highest importance that, as a jurist, I must hold myself above petitioner’s ‘reproach and suspicion.’

“As he himself asserts (see p. 6 of his Petition for Recusation), my voluntary inhibition “cannot be construed as an admission of incapacity to render impartial rulings but merely illustrates the teaching xxx of Section 1, Rule 137” of the Rules of Court.

“To conclude, I am voluntarily inhibiting myself pro hac vice, not because petitioner has proven any legal ground therefor, but because I do not wish to give him or anyone else any excuse to cast any doubt on the integrity of these proceedings and of the decision that this Court may render in these cases of transcendental importance to the nation.”

In spite of the foregoing, disquisition, my action has been questioned by many people, including several well-meaning friends. Some have even berated me for allegedly shirking from my sworn duty to decide cases without fear or favor. I have therefore decided to write this extended explanation of my inhibition.

^{Disqualification,

Inhibition and Recusal Differentiated}

Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of court governs the disqualification and the inhibition of judicial officials, including members of the Supreme Court. It provides as follows:

“SECTION 1. Disqualification of judges. ¾ No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.

“A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.”

The first paragraph of the above-quoted Section governs the legal grounds for compulsory disqualification. To disqualify is “to bar a judge from hearing, a witness from testifying, a juror from sitting, or a lawyer from appearing in a case because of legal objection to the qualifications of the particular individual.”[1]

The Code of Judicial Conduct further elaborate the above rule in this manner:

“Rule 3.12 ¾ A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include proceedings where:

(a) The judge has personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;

(b) The judge served as executor, adminitrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matters in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;

(d) The judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree;

(e) The judge knows that the judge’s spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor, fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.”

A closer look at the construction of the aforequoted provisions reveals their mandatory or compulsory nature. They clearly mandate that “a judge should take no part in a proceeding,” in which any of the circumstances enumerated therein is present. Indeed, the court explicitly stated in Garcia v. Dela Peña[2] that the first paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, was compulsory.

The extent of sitting or taking part in a case was explained in Re: Inhibition of Judge Rojas,[3] as follows:

“xxx. According to Black’s Law Dictionary, to ‘sit’ in a case means ‘to hold court; to do any act of a judicial nature. To hold a session, as of a court, grand jury, legislative body, etc. To be formally organized and proceeding with the transaction of business.’ The prohibition is thus not limited to cases in which a judge hears the evidence of the parties, but includes as well cases where he acts by resolving motions, issuing orders and the like xxx. The purpose of the rule is to prevent not only a conflict of interest but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. He should administer justice impartiality and without delay.”

Rationalizing the rule, the Court explained:

“The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people’s faith and confidence in the courts of justice.”

The rationale for the rule on the compulsory disqualificatioin of a judge or judicial officer is predicated on the long-standing precept that no judge should preside in a case in which he or she is not wholly independent, disinterested or impartial. Judges should not handle cases in which they might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and partiality. The rule is aimed at preserving at all times the people’s faith and confidence in our courts, which are essential to the effective administration of justice.[4]

^Inhibition

While the disqualification of judges based on the specific grounds provided by the Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct is complusory, inhibition partakes of voluntariness on their part. It arises from just or valid reasons tending to cast doubt on their proper and impartial disposition of a case. The rule on inhibition is set forth in the second paragraph of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

‘A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.’

Whether judges should inhibit themselves from a case rests on their own “sound discretion.” In Rosello v. Court of Appeals,[5] how such discretion should be exercised was explained by the Supreme Court in these words:

“As to the issue of disqualification[6] [based on the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court], this Court has ruled that to disqualify or not to disqualify is a matter of conscience and is addressed primarily to the sense of fairness and justice of the judge concerned. Thus, the merre filing of an administrative case against respondent [j]udge is not a ground for disqualifying him from hearing the case, for if on every occasion the party apparently aggrieved would be allowed to either stop the proceedings in order to await the final decision on the desired disqualification, or demand the immediate inhibition of the [j]udge on the basis alone of his being so charged, many cases would have to be kept pending or perhaps there would not be enough judges to handle all the cases pending in all the courts. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial.”[7]

Alleged in CIR v. CA[8] were the grounds for the disqualification of an associate justice of the Supreme court from participating in the case. These alleged grounds were his having served under private respondent’s counsel when the latter was the solicitor general, and their having had business relations in connection with the operation of a small restaurant. Even if true, these were not regarded as compulsory bases for his disqualification. Instead, the Court ruled: “It is for him [the jurist] alone, therefore, to determine his qualification.”[9] On whether to disqualify him from participating in the case or not, the Court took note of the old doctrine that when a justice of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court is challenged, “the magistrate sits with the court and the question is decided by it as a body.”[10]

Earlier on, the Court had the occasion to lay down the appropraite guidelines in a situation where the judge’s capacity to try and decide a case fairly and judiciously would come to the fore by way of a challenge from any one of the parties. It ruled as follows:[11]

“A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstances reasonably capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. A salutary norm is that he reflect on the probability that a losing party might nurture at the back of his mind the thought that the judge had unmeritoriously tilted the scales of justice against him. That passion on the part of a judge may be generated because of serious charges of misconduct against him by a suitor or his counsel, is not altogether remote. He is a man, subject to the frailties of other men. He should, therefore, exercise great care and caution before making up his mind to act or withdraw from a suit where that party or counsel is involved. He could in good grace inhibit himself where that case could be heard by another judge and where no appreciable prejudice would be occasioned to others involved therein. On the result of his decisions to sit or not to sit may depend to a great extent the all-important confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary. If after reflection he should resolve to voluntarily desist from sitting in a case where his motives or fairness might be seriously impugned, his action is to be interpreted as giving meaning and substance to the second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137. He serves the cause of the law who forestalls miscarriage of justice.”

In a string of cases, the Supreme Court has said that bias and prejudice, to be considered valid reasons for the voluntary inhibition of judges, must be proved with clear and convincing evidence. Bare allegations of partiality and prejudgment will not suffice. These cannot be presumed, especially if weighed against the sacred obligation of judges whose oaths of office require them to administer justice without respect to person and to do equal right to the poor and the rich.[12]

The Court has also said that, to warrant the judge’s inhibition from the case, bias or prejudice must be shown to have stemmed from an extrajudicial source, and that it would result in a disposition on the merits on some basis other than what the judge learned from participating in the case. As long as opinions formed in the course of judicial proceedings are based on the evidence presented and the conduct observed by the judge, they will not prove personal bias or prejudice, even if found later on as erroneous. In addition to palpable error that may be inferred from the decision or the order itself, extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose.[13]

Hence, the Court exhorted in Go v. Court of Appeals[14] that the rule should “not be used cavalierly to suit a litigant’s personal designs or to defeat the ends of justice.” It deemed as intolerable acts of litigants who, for any conceivable reason, would seek to disqualify a judge for their own purposes under a plea of bias, hostility, or prejudgment. It further held that it did not approve of some litigants’ tactic of filing baseless motions for disqualification as a means of delaying the case or of forum-shopping for a more friendly judge.[15]

Moreover, in Aparicio v. Andal,[16] the Court said:

“Efforts to attain fair, just and impartial trial and decision, have a natural and alluring appeal. But, we are not licensed to indulge in unjustified assumptions, or make a speculative approval [of] this ideal. It ill behooves this Court to tar and feather a judge as biased or prejudiced, simply because counsel for a party litigant happens to complain against him. As applied here, respondent judge has not as yet crossed the line that divides partiality and impartiality. He has not thus far stepped to one side of the fulcrum. No act or conduct of his would show arbitrariness or prejudice. Therefore, we are not to assume what respondent judge, not otherwise legally disqualified, will do in a case before him. We have had occasion to rule in a criminal case that a charge made before trial that a party ‘will not be given a fair, impartial and just hearing’ is ‘premature.’ Prejudice is not to be presumed. Especially if weighed against a judge’s legal obligation under his oath to administer justice without respect to person and to equal right to the poor and the rich.’ To disqualify or not to disqualify himself then, as far as respondent judge is concerned, is a matter of conscience.”

There is however, a caveat in the grant of motions to disqualify or inhibit, even if founded on a compulsory ground. In Araneta v. Dinglasan,[17] the Motion to disqualify Justice Sabino Padilla from participating in the case was grounded on the fact that as justice secretary he had advised the President on the question of emergency powers. In denying the Motion, which was filed only after a Decision had been promulgated, the Court ruled that “a litigant x x x cannot be permitted to speculate upon the action of the court and raise an objection of this sort after a decision has been rendered.”[18]

In Limpin Jr. v. IAC,[19] filed after the decision had already become final and executory was a Motion for Inhibition of justices who had been associated with the law firm which had acted as counsel to a party. In that case, the Court reiterated that a motion for disqualification must be denied, if filed after a member of the Court had already given an opinion on the merits of the case.

^{Recusation/Recusal}

Recusation or recusal is the process in which, “because of self interest, bias or prejudice,” on the objection of either of the parties, disqualified from hearing a lawsuit; or one in which they disqualify themselves therefrom.[20] “In the civil law, [it is] a species of exception or plea to the jurisdiction, to the effect that the particular judge is disqualified from hearing the cause by reason of interest or prejudice.”[21]

From the definition of recusation or recusal, it can be easily discerned that the term is hardly any different from disqualification, except that it refers more specifically to judges. Thus, Melinkoff makes this simple distinction: “Unlike the multiple targets of a motion to disqualify, a motion to recuse is usually restricted to judges; it is sometimes used against a lawyer in an official position, e.g., a district attorney charged with conflict of interest, but not against lawyers generally.”[22]

^CONCLUSION

In sum, while disqualification and recusal are sourced from legal grounds provided in the Rules of Court and the Code of Judicial Conduct, inhibition is based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion depending on the circumstances of each case. Because all these, however, are rules of procedure, the Court has the final say. As the constitutional authority in such matters, it may in fact compel disqualification or reject offers of inhibition, on such grounds and under such circumstances as it may deem appropriate.

Thus, in Veterans Federation Party v. Comelec[23] (the party-list cases), the Supreme Court rejected my offer to inhibit myself in a Resolution announced during the Oral Argument on July 1, 1999. It did so for the following reasons: (1) I was merely a voluntary non-compensated officer of the nonprofit Philippine Chamber of Commerce and Industry (PCCI); (2) the case and its antecedents were not extant during my incumbency at PCCI; and (3) important constitutional questions were involved, and the Court believed that all justices should as much as possible participate and vote.[24]

The foregoing discussion shows the following:

(1) My nonparticipation in these consolidated cases did not arise from any legal ground showing partiality or bias in favor of or against petitioner.

(2) I voluntarily resorted to nonparticipation in order “to hold myself above petitioner’s reproach” and to deprive “him or anyone else [of] any excuse to cast doubt on the integrity of these proceedings and of the decision that this Court may render in these cases of transcendental importance to the nation.”

(3) My nonparticipation applies only to the instant consolidated cases, pro hac vice, and not necessarily to all other future cases involving any of the herein parties.