CONCURRING OPINION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

I FULLY CONCUR with the opinion written for the majority by Mr. Justice Puno in the usual penetrating and scholarly flourish of his pen, characteristically his.  Allow me nonetheless to express my views on whether a vacancy occurred in the Office of the President to justify and validate Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s ascendancy to the Presidency, if only to emphasize and reinforce what he advocates in his ponencia.  I shall confine myself to this issue upon which the legitimacy of the present dispensation hinges and to which all others moor their bearings.

Section 8, Art. VII, of the Constitution which deals with vacancies occurring in the Office of the President is limited to four (4) specified situations, to wit: (a) death of the incumbent, (b) his permanent disability, (c) removal, or (d) resignation from Office[1] thus-

Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term.  In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice-President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.

The Congress shall, by law, provide who shall serve as President in case of death, permanent disability, or resignation of the Acting President.  He shall serve until the President or the Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified, and be subject to the same restrictions of powers and disqualifications as the Acting President (underscoring supplied).

This constitutional provision is intended precisely to forestall a hiatus in the exercise of executive powers due to unavoidable or unpredictable human factors that may supervene during the tenure of office of the incumbent.

It is admitted that the term permanent disability used in Sec. 8, Art. VII, is fair example of words which have one meaning that is commonly accepted, and a materially different or modified one in its legal sense.  It is axiomatic that the primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and assure the realization of the purpose of the framers, hence of the people, in adopting the Constitution.  The language of the Charter should perforce be construed in a manner that promotes its objectives more effectively.  A strained construction which impairs its own meaning and efficiency to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing times and conditions of society should not be adopted.  Constitutions are designed to meet not only the vagaries of contemporary events but should be interpreted to cover even future and unknown circumstances.  It must withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels at the same time bend with the refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events.[2] As it is oft repeated, constitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit which vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.[3]

Thus, under the pertinent constitutional provision governing the rules of succession by the Vice-President in the event of permanent disability of the President, the term must be reasonably construed, and as so construed means all kinds of incapacities which render the President perpetually powerless to discharge the functions and prerogatives of the office.  This is what appears to have been in the minds of the framers of the 1987 Constitution.  As borne by the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission[4]-

MR SUAREZ.  Thank you Madam President.  In the proposed draft for Section 5 of the Honorable de los Reyes, he employed the phrase “BECOMES PERMANENTLY DISABLED,” I suppose this would refer to a physical disability, or does it also include mental disability?

MR. DE LOS REYES.  It includes all kinds of disabilities which will disable or incapacitate the President or Vice-President from the performance of his duties (underscoring supplied for emphasis).

Clearly, permanent disability in the sense it is conceptualized in the Constitution cannot realistically be given a restrictive and impractical interpretation as referring only to physical or mental incapacity, but must likewise cover other forms of incapacities of a permanent nature, e.g., functional disability.  Indeed, the end sought to be achieved in inserting Sec. 8 of Art. VII in the Constitution must not be rendered illusory by a strained interpretation fraught with constitutionally calamitous or absurd consequences.  The present scenario confronting the Republic had been wisely foreseen and anticipated by the framers, for after all, the 1987 Constitution was sired by People Power I.

It may be asked:  Was petitioner rendered permanently disabled as President by the circumstances obtaining at the height of People Power II as to justify the ascension of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the 14th de jure President of the Republic?  So he was; hence, the assumption of respondent as President.

I view petitioner’s permanent disability from two (2) different perspectives: objectively and subjectively.  From the objective approach, the following circumstances rendered inutile petitioner’s administration and powers as Chief Executive: (a) the refusal of a huge sector of civil society to accept and obey him as President; (b) the mass resignation of key cabinet officials thereby incapacitating him from performing his duties to execute the laws of the land and promote the general welfare; (c) the withdrawal of support of the entire armed forces and the national police thus permanently paralyzing him from discharging his task of defending the Constitution, maintaining peace and order and protecting the whole Filipino people; (d) the spontaneous acknowledgment by both Houses of congress – the Senate represented by the Senate President, and the House of Representatives by the Speaker – of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the constitutional successor to the Presidency; and, (e) the manifestation of support by the Papal Nuncio, doyen of the diplomatic corps, and the recognition and acceptance by world governments of the Presidency of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.  By virtue hereof, petitioner has lost all moral and legal authority to lead.  Without the people, an effectively functioning cabinet, the military and the police, with no recognition from Congress and the international community, petitioner had absolutely no support from and control of the bureaucracy from within and from without.  In fact he had no more functioning government to speak of.  It is in this context that petitioner was deemed to be absolutely unable to exercise or discharge the powers, duties and prerogatives of the Presidency.

The irremediable nature of his disability cannot be doubted.  It is well-nigh inconceivable that there would be a reversal of all the factors that disabled him.  There was nothing in the withdrawal of support from the various sectors which would suggest that it was merely temporary or conditional.  On the contrary, the withdrawal of support was categorical and unqualified.  Certainly, the factual milieu of this case makes it all the more remote and very unlikely that those who have withdrawn their support from petitioner would suddenly have a change of heart, intone mea culpa, and shift back their allegiance to him once again.

From the subjective approach, I am likewise convinced that petitioner’s contemporaneous acts and statements during and after the critical episode are eloquent proofs of his implied – but nevertheless unequivocal – acknowledgement of the permanence of his disability.

First. His Press Statement released shortly before leaving Malacañan Palace on 20 January 2001, which sounded more like a mournful farewell, did not intimate any contingency or condition, nor make any allusion, nary a hint, that he was holding on to the office, or that he intended to reclaim the Presidency at some determinable future time-

At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines.  While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her Proclamation as President, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañan Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing process of our nation.  I leave the palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people.  I will not shirk from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.

MABUHAY!

This was confirmed by counsel for the petitioner during the oral arguments on 15 February 2001 the pertinent portions of the proceedings, textually quoted in part, follow:

SENIOR ASSOCIATE JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:

Mr. Counsel, after the petitioner stepped down from Malacañan could he have continued to perform his functions as president if he wanted to?

DEAN AGABIN:

No. Your Honor, in the light of the circumstances, it was not possible for him to perform his functions as President.

SENIOR ASSOCIATE JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:

In other words, from then on up to now, he has not performed the functions of the Office of the President of the Republic of the Philippines?

DEAN AGABIN: No, your Honor.

SENIOR ASSOCIATE JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:

Now, in that press statement explaining why he left Malacañan, can you see from there any reservation that he was going to reclaim this position afterwards?

DEAN AGABIN:

I do not see any reservation, your Honor, and in fact as we stated in our petition, the petitioner will have to consider several important factors before he ever mulls such a proposition because the petitioner has always considered the national interest, the avoidance of bloodshed, the need for unity among our fractious people and other political factors before he would ever think of doing that.[5]

Plainly, the foregoing dialogue that transpired in the session of the Court unmistakably evinced the intention of petitioner to vacate his office for good, as he did, without any reservation to return thereto.

Second. In the same Press Statement petitioner stated a fact:  Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the Philippines, thus belying his subsequent disclaimer that respondent merely assumed the office in an acting capacity.

Verily, the status of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo’s assumption into office is evident from her oath –

I, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, Vice President of the Philippines, do solemnly swear that I will faithfully and consentiously fulfill my duties as President of the Philippines, preserve and defend Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to every man, and consecrate myself to the service of the Nation.

So help me God (underscoring supplied).

Moreover, no less than counsel for the petitioner admitted this fact, as shown by this exchange –

SENIOR ASSOCIATE JUSTICE BELLOSILLO:

No, but what did she say, was she taking her oath as Acting president or as President of the Philippines in that oath that she took?

ATTY. SAGUISAG:

My recollection is only as President without qualifier; I could be mistaken on this, but that is my recollection at the moment, Your Honor.[6]

Petitioner’s admissions in his Press Statement, which were made instinctively at the denouement of the political drama, indubitably show that he recognized the vacancy and the legitimate ascent of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to the Presidency.

Third. There were serious efforts at negotiation on the eve of petitioner’s ouster between his few remaining allies headed by Executive Secretary Edgardo J. Angara and certain emissaries from the camp of Mme. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo concerning the peaceful transition of power – a spectacle reminiscent of a vanguished general suing for peace and relinquishing his fort to the victor.  Unfortunately, petitioner’s terms of capitulation were not met with approval by respondent’s camp as time was already of the essence to avert a serious confrontation between the agitated pro-Erap hold-outs and the sizzling anti-Erap radicals.

Fourth. Petitioner’s appeal to the nation for sobriety amidst the deafening clamor for his resignation as well as his ill-advised call for a snap election where he assured all and sundry that he would not run for re-election, further betrayed serious doubts on his mandate as President – obviously nothing more than a clever ruse to retard the inevitable, not to say, legally damned as it was devoid of constitutional anchor.

Fifth. Petitioner was quoted as saying, “pagod na pagod na ako. Ayo' ko na – masyado nang masakit,” a sigh of submission no doubt.  He repeatedly announced his lack of interest in reclaiming the Presidency.  These are hardly the utterances and deportment of a president in control of his constituents and the affairs of the state, thus affirming my conviction that petitioner’s permanent disability, facto et lege, created a constitutional vacancy in the Presidency.

A final word.  In every critical undertaking by the state the most powerful agent for success or failure is the Constitution, for from this, as from a fountainhead, all conceptions and plans of action not only emanate but also attain their consummation.  It is the Constitution, as the repository of the sovereign will, that charts the future of our fledging Republic.  The measure of our adherence thereto is the ultimate gauge of our insignificance or greatness.

As I observed with keen interest and grave concern the events as they unfolded in EDSA, the rumblings of a forthcoming tempest crossed my mind, only to realize in the end that my fears were completely unfounded.  The Filipinos once again have displayed political maturity and grace in the midst of a historic crisis, and despite strong temptations of the moment to effect change extra-legally, they have reaffirmed their commitment to the majesty of the Constitution and the rule of law.

I vote to dismiss the petitions.



[1] Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 Ed., p. 180.

[2] See Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, 2 May 1997, 272 SCRA 18, 64.

[3] See Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113, 3 September 1991, 201 SCRA 210, 228.

[4] Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 446.

[5] TSN, 15 February 2001, pp. 63-64.

[6] TSN, 15 February 2001, p. 36.