SEPARATE OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
The core issue presented
to the Court is whether respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed the
Presidency within the parameters of the Constitution.
The modes by which the
Vice President succeeds the President are set forth in Article VII, Section 8
of the Constitution: (1) death, (2) permanent disability, (3) removal from
office, and (4) resignation of the president.[1]
Petitioner did not
die. He did not suffer from permanent
disability. He was not removed from
office because the impeachment proceedings against him were aborted through no
fault of his.
Did petitioner resign as
President? The ponencia conceded
that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he left
Malacañan Palace in the afternoon of January 20, 2001, after the oath-taking of
respondent Arroyo. However, the ponencia
held that petitioner resigned from the Presidency as “determined from his acts
and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of
prior contemporary and posterior facts and circumstances bearing a material
relevance on the issue.”[2] Among the “facts and circumstances” pointed
to were the so-called “people power” referring to the crowd that gathered at
EDSA and Makati City, the withdrawal of support by the military and police
forces from petitioner, the resignation of some officials of the government,
the incidents revealed in the diary of Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara,
serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer,[3] and the press statement issued by petitioner
at 2:30 p.m. of January 20, 2001 before he and his family left Malacañan
Palace.
None of the foregoing
“facts and circusmtances” clearly and unmistakably indicate that petitioner
resigned as President.
To constitute a complete
operative resignation of a public official, there must be: (1) the intention to
relinquish part of the term and (2) an act of relinquishment.[4] Intent connotes voluntariness and freedom of
choice. With the impassioned crowd
marching towards Malacañan Palace and with the military and police no longer
obeying petitioner, he was reduced to abject powerlessness. In this sense, he was virtually forced out
of the Presidency. If intention to
resign is a requirement sine qua non for a valid resignation, then
forced resignation or involuntary resignation, or resignation under duress, is
no resignation at all.
The use of “people power”
and the withdrawal of military support mainly brought about petitioner’s ouster
from power. This completely negates any
pretentions that he voluntarily stepped down from the presidency. More importantly, people power is not one of
the modes prescribed by the Constitution to create a vacancy in the office of
the President.
The doctrine that
sovereignty resides in the people is without doubt enshrined in our
Constitution. This does not mean,
however, that all forms of direct action by the people in matters affecting
government are sanctioned thereunder.
To begin with, the concept of “people power” is vague and
ambiguous. It is incapable of exact
definition. What number would suffice
for a mass action by irate citizens to be considered as a valid exercise of
“people power?” What factors should be considered to determine whether such
mass action is representative of the sovereign will? In what instances would “people power” be justified? There are no judicial standards to address
these questions. To be sure, the people
have the right to assemble and to petition the government for redress of their
grievances. But this right does not go
to the extent of directly acting to remove the President from office by means outside
the framework of the Constitution.
It must be underscored
that the Constitution is “the written instrument agreed upon by the people . .
. as the absolute rule of action and decision for all departments and officers
of the government . . . and in opposition to which any act or rule of any
department or officer of the government, or even of the people themselves, will
be altogether void.”[5] In other words, the Constitution ensures the
primacy of the Rule of Law in the governance of the affairs of the State.
The Constitution
prescribes that the sovereign power of the people is to be expressed
principally in the processes of election, referendum and plebiscite.[6] Thus specifically, the provisions in Article
XVII of the Constitution on Amendments or Revisions have been described as the
“constitution of sovereignty” because they define the constitutional meaning of
“sovereignty of the people.”[7] As explained by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, a
well-respected constitutionalist and member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission:
What is this “sovereign structure” on which the new would be built? It is the amendatory and revision process originally sealed with the approval of the sovereign people. The process prescribed in a constitution is called the “constitution of sovereignty,” distinguishing it from the “constitution of liberty” (the Bill of Rights). The amendatory and revision provisions are called the “constitution of sovereignty” because it is through these provisions that the sovereign people have allowed the expression of their sovereign will through this constitution to be canalized. And through this provision new changes are linked to the original expression of the will of the founders of the Constitution.
In other words, the amendatory provisions are called a
“constitution of sovereignty” because they define the constitutional meaning of
“sovereignty of the people.” Popular
sovereignty, as embodied in the Philippine Constitution, is not extreme popular
sovereignty.[8]
When the people
overwhelmingly ratified the Constitution on February 2, 1987,[9] they committed themselves to abide by its
provisions. In effect, the Filipino
people agreed to express their sovereignty within the parameters defined by the
Constitution. As an American professor
on legal philosophy put it: “By ratifying the constitution that included an
explicit amendment process, the sovereign people committed themselves to
following the rule of law, even when they wished to make changes in the basic
system of government.”[10] This is the essence of constitutionalism:
Through
constitutionalism we placed limits on both our political institutions and
ourselves, hoping that democracies, historically always turbulent, chaotic, and
even despotic, might now become restrained, principled, thoughtful and just. So we bound ourselves over to a law that we
made and promised to keep. And though a
government of laws did not displace governance by men, it did mean that now
men, democratic men, would try to live by their word.[11]
Adherence to the
Constitution at all times is the cornerstone of a free and democratic
society. In Ex Parte Milligan,[12] it was succintly said:
The Constitution x x x is a law for rulers and people, equally in
war and peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men,
at all times, and under all circumstances.
No doctrine involving more pernicious
consequences was ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions
can be suspended during any of the great exigencies of government.[13]
Thus, when the people,
acting in their sovereign capacity, desire to effect fundamental changes in
government, such must be done through the legitimate modes which they
previously agreed upon, meaning within the framework of the Constitution. To sanction any deviation from the modes prescribed
by the Constitution to remove the President from office, albeit seemingly the
public clamor, is to court instability and anarchy. In the words of Cooley:
x x x Although by their constitutions the people
have delegated the exercise of sovereign powers to the several departments,
they have not thereby divested themselves of the sovereignty. They retain in their own hands, so far as
they have thought it needful to do so, a power to control the governments they
create, and the three departments are responsible to and subject to be ordered,
directed, changed or abolished by them.
But this control and direction must be exercised in the legitimate mode
previously agreed upon. The voice of
the people, acting in their sovereign capacity, can be of legal force only when
expressed at the times and under the conditions which they themselves have
prescribed and pointed out by the Constitution, or which, consistently with the
Constitution, have been prescribed and pointed out for them by statute; and if
by any portion of the people, however large, an attempt should be made to
interfere with the regular working of the agencies of government at any other
time or in any other mode than as allowed by existing law, either
constitutional or statutory, it would be revolutionary in character, and must
be resisted and repressed by the officers who, for the time being, represent
legitimate government.[14]
For the same reason, the
withdrawal of support bythe military and police forces cannot legitimately set
the stage for the removal of the head of state. The fundamental law expressly mandates the supremacy of civilian
authority over the military at all times,[15] and installs the President, the highest-ranking
civilian government official, as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.[16] The designation by the Constitution of the
armed forces as protector of the people and of the State requires it to
staunchly uphold the rule of law. Such
role does not authorize the armed forces to determine, by itself, when it
should cease to recognize the authority of the commander-in-chief simply
because it believes that the latter no longer has the full support of the
people.
Reliance on the Angara
Diary to establish the “intent” or “state of mind” of petitioner is improper
since the contents thereof have not been duly established as facts and are
therefore hearsay. In any case, the
circumstances under which petitioner allegedly manifested his intention to
resign were, at best, equivocal.
The “circumstances”
mentioned in the diary refer to, among others, the incidents when petitioner
allegedly expressed his worry about the swelling crowd at EDSA; when he
proposed a snap election where he would not be a candidate; when he made no
objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit, but would have a
5-day grace period to stay in the palace; when he entered into negotiations for
a peaceful and orderly transfer of power and to guarantee the safety of
petitioner and his family; and when he uttered the following: “Pagod na
pagod na ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang
masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape,
bureaucracy, intriga (I am very tired.
I don’t want any more of this – it’s too painful. I’m tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy,
the intrigue.) I want to clear my name,
then I will go.” The negotiations were,
however, aborted, according to the Angara diary, by respondent Arroyo’s
oath-taking.
The incidents described
in the Angara diary tell a story of desperation, duress and helplessness
surrounding petitioner, arguing eloquently against the idea of intent and
voluntariness on his part to leave the Presidency. In any event, since the conditions proposed for his resignation
were not met, the act did not come to reality.
The hasty departure of
petitioner from Malacañan Palace and the issuance of the subject press
statement cannot likewise conclusively establish the “intent to relinquish” the
Presidency. Indeed, it can be argued
just as persuasively that petitioner merely left the Palace to avert violence
but that he did not intend to give up his office. He said that he was leaving Malacañan, the seat of the
presidency. He did not say he was
resigning. Note that in his press
statement, petitioner expressed “strong and serious doubts about the legality
and constitutionality” of Ms. Arroyo’s
proclamation as President. There
are other factual considerations that negate petitioner’s “intent to
relinquish” permanently, particularly, petitioner’s letters, both dated 20
January 2001, to the Senate President[17] and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives[18] informing them that he was unable to
exercise the powers and duties of his office and recognizing Ms. Arroyo as the
Acting President.
There is no doubt that the
crimes imputed to petitioner are egregiously wrongful. But he was not afforded the opportunity to
present his side either in the hearings before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
or before the Impeachment Court. What
were extant were the massive and relentless mass actions protraying his
“guilt,” whipping up passions into unimaginable frenzy. The senators sitting as judges in the
impeachment court were elected by the Filipino people because of the latter’s
trust and confidence in them to discharge their constitutional duties. They ought to have continued with the trial
until its conclusion, in fidelity to the Constitutional processes, thus
preserving the quietude, stability and order of society.
However, I share my
colleagues’ opinion that respondent Arroyo is now the recognized legitimate
President. It is an irreversible
fact. She has taken her oath as
President before the Chief Justice on 20 January 2001. Since then Ms. Arroyo has continuously
discharged the functions of the President.
Her assumption into power and subsequent exercise of the powers and
performance of the duties attaching to the said position have been acquiesced
in by the Legislative Branch of government.[19]
The Senate President and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives executed a Joint Statement of
Support and Recognition of respondent Arroyo as petitioner’s constitutional
successor.[20] The Senate[21] and the House of Representatives[22] passed their respective Resolutions
expressing support to the Arroyo administration. Congress confirmed the nomination of Senator Teofisto Guingona,
Jr. as the new Vice-President, thus acknowledging respondent Arroyo’s
assumption to the presidency in a permanent capacity.[23] The Impeachment Court has resolved that its
existence has ceased by becoming functus officio in view of petitioner’s relinquishment of the presidency.[24]
As President, Ms. Arroyo
has gained control over all the executive departments, bureaus and officers and
is the acknowledged Commander-in-Chief of all the armed forces of the
Philippines.[25] Her administration has, likewise, been
recognized by numerous members of the international community of nations,
including Japan, Australia, Canada, Spain, the united States, the ASEAN
countries, as well as 90 major political parties in Europe, North America, Asia
and Africa.[26] More importantly, a substantial number of
Filipinos have already acquiesced in her leadership.[27] The Court can do no less.
I vote to DISMISS the
petitions.
[1] Article VII, Section 8 of the Constitution states:
In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to serve the unexpired term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate, or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then act as President until the President or Vice-President shall have been elected and qualified.
x x x
[2] Decision,
p. 26.
[3] Erap’s
Final Hours, Philippine Daily Inquirer, February 4-6, 2001.
[4] F.
MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PUBLIC OFFICES AND OFFICERS, Sec. 411, pp.
262-263 (1890).
[5] T.M.
COOLEY, III CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS (1868).
Also cited in BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY (1996), pp.
xxxiv-xxxv.
[6] II RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 316.
FR. BERNAS. While I
agree with the lofty objectives of the amendment proposed, I am afraid that the
effect of the proposed amendment is, in fact, to weaken the provisions on
impeachment. The amendment speaks of
massive election frauds. We have a very
general principle in the Constitution which says that sovereignty resides in
the people and all government authority emanates from them. And the sovereignty of the people is
principally expressed in the election process and in the referendum and
plebiscite processes. (Underscoring
mine)
[7] See
BERNAS, Note 5, at 1163.
[8] Id.,
at 1162-1163.
[9] De
Leon vs. Esguerra, 153 SCRA 602 (1987).
[10] A.
ALTMAN, ARGUING ABOUT LAW (2001), p. 94.
[11] Id.
citing J. AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984).
[12] 4
Wall. 2, 18 L.Ed. 281 [1866].
[13] Id.,
cited in the Dissenting opinion of Gutierrez, J. in Marcos vs. Manglapus,
177 SCRA 668, 702 (1989).
[14] T.M.
COOLEY, II CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th
ED. (1927), P. 1349.
[15] Article
II. Section 3, CONSTITUTION.
[16] Article
VII, Section 18, CONSTITUTION.
[17] Annex
“A, Petition, G.R. Nos. 146710-15.
[18] Annex
“A-1” to Petition, G.R. Nos. 146710-15.
[19] The
Solicitor Gemneral and the Secretary of Justice point out that respondent
Arroyo has signed the Solid Waste Management Bill into law and nominated then
Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. as Vice-President, which nomination has been
confirmed by both Houses of Congress.
The Legislature has likewise called on the COMELEC to call a special
election simultaneously with the general elections in May to fill the vacancy
left by Vice-President Guingona (Joint Comment of the Solicitor General and the
Department of Justice, p. 22, Annexes “E” and “F”).
[20] Annex
“1,” Memorandum of Respondents De Vera and Funa.
[21] Comment
of Respondents De Vera and Funa, Annex “2.”
[22] House
Resolution No. 176, 11th
Congress, 3rd Session (2001).
[23] Senate
Resolution No. 82, 11th
Congress, 3rd Session (2001)
and House Resolution No. 178, 11th
Congress, 3rd Session (2001).
[24] Senate
Resolution No. 83, 11th
Congress, 3rd Session (2001).
[25] Memorandum
of Respondent Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, pp. 12-13.
[26] Joint
Comment of the Solicitor General and the Secretary of Justice, p. 7.
[27] The
ABS-CBN/SWS Survey conducted from 2-7 February 2001 showed that 61% of
Filipinos nationwide accepted the legitimacy of the Arroyo administration.