EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 135201-02. March 15, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FLORENCIO
FRANCISCO y ALEJO, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BELLOSILLO,
J.:
On automatic review is
the Joint Decision of the court a quo finding accused-appellant
FLORENCIO FRANCISCO y ALEJO guilty of the crimes of rape and acts of
lasciviousness committed against his
11-year old daughter Ma. Coralyn
Jucutan Francisco and imposing upon him the death penalty for the rape
and an indeterminate prison term ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal as minimum to fourteen (14) years and nine (9)
months of reclusion temporal as maximum for the acts of lasciviousness.[1]
Ma. Coralyn lived with
her parents Florencio Francisco and Isabelita Jucutan, eight (8) siblings and
an aunt in a one-room tenement at Area B, Talanay, Fairview, Quezon City. Florencio was jobless.[2] Isabelita, common-law wife of Florencio, provided for
the family by vending vegetables at the Balintawak market in the evening
and returning home in the morning.[3]
Coralyn's torments
started in the evening of April 1997.
The Franciscos were all sleeping on the cement floor of the sala with
Coralyn being situated nearest the doorway.
Her mother had already left the house that evening to sell vegetables
and was not expected home until early the following morning. While Coralyn was asleep she was suddenly
jolted when someone removed her shorts and panty. It was her father Florencio.
He fondled and caressed her and then licked her genitals.[4] She tried to
resist him but he pinned her down and angrily warned, "Huwag kang
malikot, papaluin kita."[5] His lewd misconduct
was interrupted when Coralyn's aunt, Maria Lourdes Ochavillo, unexpectedly
arrived and opened the door. Seizing
the opportunity, Coralyn pretended to be going to the toilet to urinate but
went instead to her aunt and asked whether she could sleep with her. Afterwards Coralyn confided to her aunt what
her father did to her. But her aunt
advised her not to tell her mother as it would only cause trouble in the
family.[6] Thus Coralyn
decided to keep the incident to herself except her aunt.
Her father’s prurience
had not run its full course. His sexual
molestation was to be repeated in a more grievous and loathsome manner than
Coralyn's first experience. In the
late evening of 27 June 1997 Coralyn was awakened when again her father slowly
took off her shorts and panty. He then
covered himself and Coralyn with a blanket and while underneath started licking
and sucking her genitalia. Now unable
to control his libido any longer, Florencio unzipped his maong pants and
let loose his erectile penis. He
mounted Coralyn and poked his penis several times against her genitalia while
nudging her anus in the process.[7] She felt intense
pain. She struggled to fend off his
lecherous advances but to no avail. Her
entreaties for filial pity were ignored.
She could only whimper amidst her father's assault on her virtue.
In the afternoon of 6
July 1997 Florencio went home after a drinking spree with friends. He was drunk. Fearing that her inebriated father might sexually violate her
again, Coralyn mustered enough courage to relate her sad fate to her mother who
immediately accompanied her to the Police Station at Batasan Hills, Quezon
City. As no one attended to them there,
Isabelita and Coralyn proceeded directly to the Department of Social Welfare
and Development which promptly referred them to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
Coralyn and Isabelita
both executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the special investigators of
the NBI. Dr. Annabelle L. Soliman,
Medical Specialist I of the NBI, conducted a medico-legal examination on
Coralyn as a matter of procedure. Dr.
Soliman's findings were that no extragenital physical injuries were noted on
Coralyn's body at the time of examination, that her hymen was intact, that its
orifice was small, thus precluding complete penetration by an average sized
Filipino adult male organ in full erection without producing any genital
injury.[8]
Thereafter, two (2)
separate Informations were filed against Florencio Francisco y Alejo, one for
rape[9] and another for acts of lasciviousness.[10] Thereafter the two
(2) cases were tried jointly.
In his defense, the
accused claimed that at the time of the incidents referred to in the
Informations he was working as a mason in a construction site somewhere in
Laguna, and that it was the brother of his common-law wife Isabelita, a certain
Amoncio Jucutan, who sexually molested Coralyn; alibi and avoidance, in other
words.
After trial, the court
below found the accused guilty of both
crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness as charged. According to the court -
The positive testimonies of Coralyn in these two jointly heard cases against her father is (sic) difficult to reject. Coralyn is still young to concoct a lie about so grave a crime as she has posited here. She got on the witness’ chair on two, long separate occasions - Jan. 19, 1998 and April 12, 1998 - and was also coming during the scheduled hearings of a rape case x x x if her father the herein accused, were innocent, it appears improbable that Coralyn x x x would have shown such deep interest in the prosecution of these capital cases against their (sic) own blood x x x x
Hence, this automatic
review of the rape case where the trial court imposed the death penalty. But how about the case for acts of
lasciviousness committed on a separate occasion?
At the outset, we address
the threshold question: Does the
automatic review of accused-appellant’s conviction for rape, for which the
death penalty was imposed, include the automatic appeal of his conviction for
the less serious crime of acts of lasciviousness?
In the 1983 case of People
v. Panganiban[11] we ruled that an automatic review of the
death penalty imposed by the trial court was deemed to include an appeal of the
less serious crimes, not so punished by death, "but arising out of the
same occurrence or committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that
giving rise to the more serious offense." The ruling was based on Sec. 17, par. (1), RA 296, as amended
(The Judiciary Act of 1948), which to date has not been repealed and continues
to be good law[12] thus -
Sec. 17. The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts as herein provided, in -
(1)All criminal cases involving offenses for which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment; and those involving other offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are charged as principals, accomplices or accessories or whether they have been tried jointly or separately x x x x (underscoring supplied).
Panganiban dealt with the types of cases where the
facts and circumstances involved in a less serious crime were interlinked and
closely interwoven with the facts in the capital cases subject of the automatic
review, such that the findings of fact in the latter case would substantially
affect the other cases.[13] In those instances
it became procedurally sound to include even the less serious crime in the
automatic appeal to enable the Court to review the facts as a whole and
accordingly evaluate all the evidence for the capital offense as well as the
less serious one.[14]
In the instant case,
however, it cannot be said that the acts of lasciviousness case "arose out of the same occurrence or
committed by the accused on the same occasion" as that of the more serious crime of rape. The two (2) cases involved distinct offenses
committed at an interval of two (2) months in point of time. The evidence reveals that the first crime
was committed sometime in April 1997 while the second was perpetrated on 27
June 1997. In both cases,
accused-appellant was animated by a separate criminal intent, although incidentally,
both crimes were directed against the same victim. Moreover, the evidence presented by the prosecution in the rape
case was not the same evidence they offered to prove the acts of lasciviousness
case.
Inescapably, the penalty
of reclusion temporal meted out to accused-appellant in Crim. Case No.
Q-97-73696 (now G.R. No. 135202) for acts of lasciviousness is within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.[15] Upon the other hand, Crim. Case No. Q-97-73695 (now
G.R. No. 135201) for rape, the penalty imposed therein being death, perforce
falls within the jurisdiction of this Court on automatic review.[16]
While we are not
unmindful of the practical advantages of a single consolidated review of these
two (2) criminal cases, we cannot array any legal justification therefor
without infringing upon the jurisdictional boundaries so clearly delineated by
our statutes. Hence, we have no other
recourse but to recognize this as a case of split appellate jurisdiction. We cannot infuse new meaning into the
provisions of our statutes apportioning appellate jurisdictions between this
Court and the Court of Appeals because their mandates and terms are specific
and unmistakable. Nor can we widen the
scope of our appellate jurisdiction on the basis of the fact that the trial
court heard two (2) distinct and separate cases simultaneously. Such procedure adopted by the trial court
cannot and did not result in the merger
of the two (2) offenses. In fact, a
cursory reading of
the assailed decision of the court a quo reveals
with pristine clarity that each case was separately determined by the trial
judge, as each should be
separately reviewed on appeal. Appellate competence is circumscribed by
statute, and not flux and ferment to be settled by the exigencies of trial
proceedings.
In fine, it is obvious
that accused-appellant’s conviction for acts of lasciviousness should have been
appealed to the Court of Appeals, instead of elevating the case to this Court
which has no jurisdiction over it.
Consequently, being with the wrong forum, the appeal in Crim. Case No.
Q-97-73696 for acts of lasciviousness erroneously brought to us is dismissed
and the decision therein of the court a quo stands. With this result, we now limit our review to
Crim. Case No. Q-97-73695 for rape where the trial court imposed the death
penalty.
Accused-apppellant
Florencio Francisco asserts his innocence in the charge of raping his 11-year
old daughter Coralyn. He challenges
his conviction therefor by theorizing that his daughter’s testimonies contain
material inconsistencies and that her forensic examination disclosed that she
remained a physical virgin, her hymen being intact with no extragenital injury
detected.
The Court is not at all
swayed by the remonstrations of accused-appellant. As we see it, his arguments boil down to the credibility of the
victim’s testimony and the weight and sufficiency of the prosecution
evidence. The determination of the
credibility of witnesses rests largely with the trial court. As we have declared time and again, the
trial judge's assessment of the witnesses' testimonies is accorded great
respect on appeal in the absence of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial judge who has the advantage of actually examining both real and
testimonial evidence including the demeanor of the witnesses.[17]
A careful review of the
records reveals no cogent reason to depart from the holding of the trial court
that Coralyn’s positive testimony against her father "is difficult to
reject," as she clearly narrated in detail how she was sexually assaulted
by him. Her story surely bears the stamp of truth and candor. In a manner that is typical of an
inexperienced young lass, she testified -
Q: You said that your father abused you, will you tell the Court how he abused you?
INTERPRETER: The witness is crying.
A: He would lay on top of me and would suck my private (sic) vagina.
Q: You said that your father would laid (sic) on top of you and lick your vagina, how many times did he do that on that evening?
A: Several times x x x
Q: You said he lay on top of you and he lick (sic) your vagina, what else did he do?
A: Tinutok (poked) po niya and kanyang ari sa akin.
Q: Was he successful in "pagtutok ng kanyang ari sa iyo?"
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How many times?
A: Several times.
Q: And when you said he poked his penis in your vagina, where did it land?
A: Sometimes on my vagina, sometimes on my anus.
Q: How many times did it land to (sic) your vagina?
A: Several times.
Q: What about in your anus, how many times?
A: Several times also.
Q: What did you feel when your father did that?
A: It was painful, it hurts.
Q: Will you kindly tell us when did he “tutok” his penis to your vagina?
A: June 27, 1997.
Q: And what did you feel when he did that to you?
A: It hurts.
Q: Which was painful?
A: My vagina.[18]
It is indeed extremely
hard to disbelieve Coralyn’s testimony.
She was only an 11-year old girl, guileless and innocent in the ways of
the flesh. When asked how her father
abused her, tears fell on her cheeks as she recounted the bestial act visited
upon her by her own father. There can
never be a more eloquent indicium of truthfulness than this public
baring of grief. Young as she was, it
is highly inconceivable that she would concoct such an intricate tale that
could put her father to death and drag herself and her family to a lifetime of
agony and shame. It is a natural
instinct of the typical Filipina to protect her honor, and no Filipina of
tender age like Coralyn would make of public knowledge that her own father
attempted to rob her of her virtue and chastity unless motivated by a genuine
desire to seek redress for the foul deed forced upon her and bring her aberrant
father before the bar of justice.[19]
Accused-appellant claims
that the victim even slept beside him after the incidents. To him, this is contrary to human nature and
that it is unlikely that an abused young girl would act thereafter in a natural
fashion.
We are not
persuaded. Behavioral psychology
teaches us that, even among adults, people react to similar situations
differently, and there is no standard form of human behavioral response when
one is confronted with a startling or frightful experience. It must be stressed that this case involves
a victim of tender years with limited schooling. With her simple, unsophisticated mind, she must not have fully
comprehended at first the detestable nature of the acts committed against
her. Besides, while she may be hurt
physically, psychologically and emotionally, the thought must have been
compelling that her assailant was still her own father. Instances are not few when daughters raped
by their fathers stayed with the latter, choosing to keep in the deepest
recesses of their hearts the evil deeds done even if the bitter memories would
haunt them forever.
However, we disagree with
the trial court’s conclusion that accused-appellant is guilty of consummated
rape. A careful sieving and sifting
examination of the evidence shows that as observed by the Solicitor General,
and to which we agree, accused-appellant is merely guilty of attempted
rape. We fail to discern from Coralyn’s
testimony that accused-appellant attained some degree of penile penetration
necessary to consummate the rape. In
fact, on redirect examination by Fiscal Beltran, as if leading her to say that
she was sexually penetrated by her father, she said -
Q: You said that "ang ari ng tatay mo ay hindi nakapasok ng tuluyan sa ari mo?"
A: Hindi po sa butas pero sa aking pepe lang.
Q: How many times?
A: Several times.[20]
What Coralyn merely
described, and clearly so, was the "hit and miss" character of
accused-appellant’s pumping motions, wherein his wayward phallus blindly
and aimlessly hammered the victim’s genitalia, likewise hitting the anus
in the process. There is indeed serious
doubt on the extent of the accused-appellant’s penis assaulting as to touch, if
at all, the labia majora.
Her testimony that "Hindi
po sa butas pero sa aking pepe lang," is inconclusive as it is
shrouded in ambiguity. What does pepe
mean to an 11-year old child? Does it
pertain to the external pudenda, the mons pubis and its environs,
as distinguished from her other term butas, which would then logically
refer to labia majora and labia minora, collectively? To be sure, the prosecution evidence
provided no explanation, much less an answer to enlighten the Court on what
crime indeed was perpetrated.
The medico-legal report
is likewise unavailing to confirm the commission of rape. On the contrary, it seems to support the
absence of penile-labial contact - no extragenital physical injuries were
noted on the body of the subject and that the hymen is intact and its
orifice small, as to preclude complete penetration by an averaged sized adult
Filipino male organ in full erection.
Thus, as explained by Dr. Soliman -
COURT: There is nothing entered in the vagina (sic)?
WITNESS: There is nothing entered in the hymenal (sic).
FISCAL AGARAN: So are you telling us Doctor that there was no complete penetration in the vaginal canal of the person of Coralyn?
WITNESS: There was no penetration.
COURT: Not even incomplete?
WITNESS: Yes, your honor.
In People v. Campuhan[21] we held that touching when applied to rape cases
does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs, a
slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s
vagina or her mons pubis, as in this case. There must be sufficient and
convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid
into the female organ, and not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for
an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias, which are required to be
"touched" by the penis, are by their natural situs beneath the
mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch them with the penis is to
attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence, the conclusion
that touching the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum
constitutes consummated rape. But in
the absence of any showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e.,
touching either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be
no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness.
The prosecution has the onus
probandi of establishing the precise degree of culpability of the
accused. It must demonstrate in
sufficient detail the manner by which the crime was perpetrated. Certainly, the testimony of the victim to
the effect that the accused repeatedly poked her vagina and that the she felt
pain as a consequence thereof, would not be enough to warrant the conclusion
that a consummated rape had indeed been committed. The quantum of evidence in criminal cases requires more than
that. More so in the instant case where
even the medico-legal certificate failed to back up the charge of consummated
rape -
In cases of rape where there is a positive testimony and a medical
certificate, both should in all respects complement each other; otherwise, to
rely on the testimonial evidence alone, in utter disregard of the manifest
variance in the medical certificate, would be productive of unwarranted or
even mischievous results.
It is necessary to carefully ascertain whether the penis of the accused
in reality entered the labial threshold of the female organ to accurately
conclude that rape was consummated.
Failing in this, the thin line that separates attempted rape from
consummated rape will significantly disappear.[22]
The lacuna in the
evidence engenders a cloud of doubt as to whether accused-appellant consummated
the crime charged. Courts must ensure
that verdicts of conviction rest firmly on sufficient and competent evidence,
and not the results of passion and prejudice.
Under Art. 6, in relation
to Art. 335, of The Revised Penal Code, rape is merely attempted when
the offender commenced the commission of the crime directly by overt acts but
does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance.
The penalty is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of death
for the offense charged, which is qualified rape. Two (2) degrees lower is reclusion temporal, the range of
which is twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum
of the penalty to be imposed upon the accused shall be taken from the medium
period of reclusion temporal, the range of which is fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months,
while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in
degree, which is prision mayor, the range of which is from six
(6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, in any of its periods.
In reality, the injury
inflicted in rape of this nature is not on the unfortunate minor victim
alone. It causes great consternation
to her entire family and offends the sensibilities of society as a whole. The full force of the law must be weighed
against accused-appellant if only to deter other Florencio Franciscos on the
loose from pursuing their malevolent propensities and sexual proclivities
against their innocent, defenseless daughters.
Indeed, only an uncompromising judicial will can arrest the alarming
upsurge of perverse sexual offenses perpetrated against the youth of the land.
Finally, we take judicial
notice of the conviction of accused-appellant Florencio Francisco y Alejo on 6
February 2001 for raping his other minor daughter, Editha Jucutan Francisco,
then fourteen (14) years old, where he was sentenced to reclusion perpetua
for simple rape.[23] Actually, he was convicted by the trial court of
qualified rape but was reduced by this Court to simple rape for the reason that
his relationship to his victim was not properly alleged in the Information,
which failure enabled this Court to snatch him from the throes of the death
penalty imposed by the court a quo.
His prior conviction for rape against his own daughter, then another minor,
all the more demonstrates and emphasizes his detestable moral depravity. Whatever compassion this Court may feel for
him is at once demolished by the nature and gravity of his unpardonable acts
committed, almost unbelievably, against his very own flesh and blood.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City in Crim. Case No. Q-97-73695 (now G.R. No. 135201) finding
accused-appellant FLORENCIO FRANCISCO y ALEJO guilty of qualified rape and
sentencing him to death, is MODIFIED. He is instead found guilty of ATTEMPTED RAPE
and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years, six (6) months
and fifteen (15) days of prision mayor maximum as minimum, to sixteen
(16) years, ten (10) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal medium
as maximum. He is also directed to pay
his victim Coralyn Jucutan Francisco the sum of P30,000.00 as civil
indemnity.[24]
For being in the wrong
forum, the appeal to this Court in Crim. Case No. Q-97-73696 (now G.R. No.
135202) for acts of lasciviousness is considered WITHDRAWN and the conviction
of the accused therein by the court a quo stands. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval
Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
[1] Decision
penned by Judge Jaime N. Salazar, Jr., RTC-Br. 103, Quezon City.
[2] TSN,
19 January 1998, pp. 43-44.
[3] Id.,
pp. 21-22.
[4] Id.,
19 March 1998, pp. 13-18.
[5] Id.,
p.18.
[6] Id.,
19 January 1998, pp. 59-60.
[7] Id.,
pp. 11-21.
[8] Exh.
“2,” Original Records, p. 104.
[9] Crim.
Case No. Q-97-73695.
[10] Crim.
Case No. Q-97-73696.
[11] Nos.
L-33822-23, 22 November 1983, 125 SCRA 595.
[12] See
Roman Catholic Archibishop of Manila v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R.
No. 111324, 5 July 1996, 258 SCRA 186, 197.
[13] In
the aftermath of the massacre of Generoso Panganiban, Victoria Panganiban and
Anatalia Gunda Panganiban, Moises Panganiban was convicted by the trial court
of Murder as charged in three (3) separate Informations, and sentenced to death
in two (2) cases and to reclusion perpetua in one (1) case. All three (3) convictions were deemed
automatically appealed, since the killings were committed on the same occasion.
[14] S
ee People v. Lasanas, Nos. L-48879-82, 7 July 1987, 152 SCRA 27.
[15] See
Sec. 17, R.A. 296, as amended, and Sec. 9, B.P. Blg. 129, taken conjointly with
Sec. 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court. See also, Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, Vol. II, 7th Revised Ed., pp. 472-473.
[16] The second paragraph of Art. 47, The Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Sec. 22, RA 7659 provides: “In all cases where the death
penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the
Supreme Court for automatic review and judgment of the court en banc x x x x”
Sec. 3, Rule 122 of the Rules of
Court mandates: “x x x x (e) In cases
where the death penalty is imposed, the same shall be automatically reviewed by
the Supreme Court as provided for in Section 10 of this Rule.”
[17] See
People v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 97920, 20 January 1997, 266 SCRA 335, 348.
[18] TSN,
19 January 1998, pp. 10-17.
[19] People
v. Magpantay, G.R. Nos. 113250-52, 14 January 1998, 284 SCRA 96, 103.
[20] TSN,
19 January 1998, pp. 76-77.
[21] G.R.
No. 129433, 30 March 2000.
[22] Ibid.
[23] People
v. Francisco, G.R. No. 135200, prom. 6 February 2001.
[24] People
v. Cruz, G.R. No. 116728, 17 July 1996, 259 SCRA 109, 119, citing People v.
Lucas, G.R. Nos. 108172-73, 25 May 1994, 232 SCRA 537.