EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. 130515 & 147090. March 14, 2001]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANSELMO BARING, alias “SIMOY”, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA,
J.:
This is an appeal from
the decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 54,
Lapu-Lapu City, finding accused-appellant Anselmo Baring, alias “Simoy,” guilty
of two counts of rape against Baby Haydee Grace B. Pongasi and sentencing him
to suffer in each case the penalty of death and to pay complainant the amount
of P50,000.00, or a total of P100,000.00 in the two cases, as
moral damages.
Except for the dates of
the commission of the crime,[2] the complaints against accused-appellant
similarly alleged ¾
That on the __th day of April 1994 at about 7:00 o’clock in the morning, in Babag I, Lapu-Lapu City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the undersigned private offended party, BABY HAYDEE GRACE B. PONGASI, his stepdaughter, who is still twelve (12) years old against her will.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
Upon being arraigned,
accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges, whereupon the cases were
jointly tried.
The evidence for the
prosecution is as follows:
Complainant Baby Haydee Grace B. Pongasi, then 12 years of age, lived with her mother Lilia Bensi and accused-appellant Anselmo Baring in a house in Tianggue, Babag I, Lapu-Lapu City. Accused-appellant was Lilia’s second live-in partner after her separation from complainant’s father, Solomon Pongasi. On April 13, 1994, at about 7:00 a.m., complainant was left in the house with accused-appellant, her mother, Lilia, having gone out to buy and sell sacks. At that time, complainant took a bath in a bathroom near the kitchen, after which she wrapped a towel around her body and proceeded upstairs. Accused-appellant followed her and suddenly pulled complainant towards him and took off the towel from her body, rendering her totally naked. He fondled her breasts and made her sit on his lap facing him. Complainant resisted, but she was overcome by accused-appellant who threatened to kill her if she shouted for help. She felt excruciating pain as accused-appellant succeeded in penetrating her. After she was released, complainant noticed that her vagina was bleeding. Her private parts felt sore and she could hardly walk. Complainant told her mother what had been done to her, but she was told that she just fell from a guava tree.
A week later, on April 19, 1994,
also at around 7:00 a.m., complainant was again left alone with
accused-appellant in their house as her mother had gone to Calawisan to borrow
from a friend money which she planned to use for her business. She was raped by accused-appellant for the
second time. As on the first occasion,
she had just taken a bath and was upstairs dressing when accused-appellant
seized her. Accused-appellant fondled
her breasts and forcibly had sexual intercourse with her. She also felt pain in her vagina which made
it difficult for her to walk and to urinate.
She developed a fever and was taken to Dr. Rubie Tapang for
treatment. Dr. Tapang found complainant
to have lacerations and inflammation of the genitals and prescribed an antibiotic
for her. Suspecting that the patient
was probably sexually molested, Dr. Tapang advised Lilia to bring complainant
to a medico-legal expert or a gynecologist for further examination. Lilia, however, insisted that the girl had
simply fallen from a tree and her vagina had been pierced by a branch.[4]
Around 10:00 a.m. of the same day,
complainant went to the house of her aunt Tomasa Larayos and told the latter
about the pain in her genitals. For
this reason, Tomasa took her niece to the Carajay Lapu-Lapu District Hospital
where she was examined by a certain Dr. Mendoza, who told Tomasa that
complainant had been abused. When
confronted by her aunt, complainant told her that she had been raped by
accused-appellant on April 13 and 19, 1994.
Accordingly, Tomasa took complainant to the police station and filed a
complaint against accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant was shortly brought to the police headquarters for
investigation. There he was positively
identified by complainant as her assailant and subsequently detained. Complainant, accompanied by Tomasa, was
examined by Dr. Nestor Sator,[5] Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine National
Police Crime Laboratory,[6] who confirmed that complainant had been raped.[7] Dr. Sator made the following findings:
GENERAL AND EXTRA-GENITAL:
Fairly developed, fairly nourished and coherent female child subject. Breasts are underdeveloped with light brown areola and nipples from which no secretions could be pressed out. Abdomen is flat and tight.
GENITAL:
There is absence of pubic hair. Labia majora is light brown, round, convex, coaptated and swollen with the pinkish brown, abraded and swollen labia minora presenting in between. Pus formation and the onset of an infection was noted at the mucosal surface of the labia minora. The posterior fourchette is lacerated. On separating, the same disclosed an elastic and fleshy type hymen with deep fresh lacerations at 3, 6 and 9 o’clock positions. The external vaginal orifice offers moderate resistance to the introduction of the examining index finger.
REMARKS:
Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are NEGATIVE for the presence of gram negative diplococci and for spermatozoa.
CONCLUSION:
Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity.
Barring unforeseen complications, the above mentioned injuries are
estimated to resolve in 10 to 14 days.[8]
Two complaints for rape
were thereafter filed against accused-appellant.
Accused-appellant denied
the allegations against him. He claimed
that complainant’s father, Solomon Pongasi, had instigated the filing of the
charges because his wife, Lilia Bensi, had left him and lived with
accused-appellant. Accused-appellant
testified that at around 7:00 a.m. of April 13, 1994, his friend Jimmy Berdon arrived
in their house and invited him to a birthday party being given by Berdon’s
cousin. Accused-appellant and Jimmy
Berdon went to the party at 7:00 a.m.[9] According to accused-appellant, he stayed at
the party the whole day and returned home only in the evening.[10] Accused-appellant further testified that at
around 7:00 a.m. of April 19, 1994, he and his wife Lilia in fact took
complainant to the clinic of Dr. Rubie Tapang because complainant had a
fever. They returned home at around
11:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon.[11]
Danilo Augusto
corroborated accused-appellant’s testimony.
He testified that he saw accused-appellant and Jimmy Berdon bringing a
karaoke to the birthday party on April 13, 1994. Augusto said he was asked by the two to come along, but he
declined because he had not been invited by the celebrant.[12]
Lilia Bensi,
complainant’s mother and accused-appellant’s common-law wife, testified that it
was impossible for accused-appellant to have raped complainant on April 13 and
19, 1994, at around 7:00 a.m., because complainant had a fever on both occasions
and so could not have taken a bath.
According to her, on April 13, 1994, she did not leave their house until
9:00 a.m, while on April 19, 1994, she and complainant went out at 7:00 a.m. to
see Dr. Tapang on account of the latter’s fever. She further testified that her daughter sustained injuries in her
genitals because, as she had been told by the latter’s friend, her daughter
fell from a guava tree. Lilia Bensi
denied having been told by Dr. Tapang that complainant had probably been abused
and advised to see a government physician for further examination.[13]
On the basis of the
evidence presented by both parties, the trial court rendered its decision on
April 10, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Anselmo Baring nicknamed “Simoy” GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of two (2) counts of Rape in Criminal Cases Nos. 012931-L and 012932-L as defined under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and hereby imposes upon him the supreme penalty of DEATH for each count of rape committed with all the accessory penalties provided by law, and further sentences him to pay Moral Damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, for each count of rape in accordance with current jurisprudence and to pay the costs.
In view of the penalties imposed, let the records of these two (2) cases be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review pursuant to the mandates of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
SO ORDERED.[14]
In this appeal, accused-appellant contends that the trial
court erred ¾
I. IN SUSTAINING THE DOUBTFUL AND INCREDULOUS TESTIMONY OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT THAT SHE WAS RAPED BY THE ACCUSED IN TWO (2) OCCASIONS;
II. IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE EXPERT WITNESS DR. SAT[O]R THAT THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS A VICTIM OF RAPE;
III. IN NOT GIVING SUFFICIENT WEIGHT TO THE DEFENSE’S WITNESS; and
IV. IN FINDING THAT THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WAS BELOW EIGHTEEN
(18) YEARS OLD WHEN THE ALLEGED RAPE WAS COMMITTED.[15]
These contentions are
without merit. As in most rape cases,
the issue in these cases is the credibility of the witnesses. This issue is to be resolved primarily by
the trial court which is in a better position to decide the question, having
heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying on
the stand.[16] The trial court’s evaluation of the
credibility of the witnesses is given great respect on appeal, particularly if
no evidence is shown that there was bias, partiality, or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge.[17] In these cases, we hold that the trial court
correctly gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
First. Contrary to the claim of accused-appellant, there was nothing unusual
regarding the similarity in the circumstances of the crimes committed on April
13 and 19, 1994. Complainant was
categorical and consistent when she testified that, in both instances,
accused-appellant forced her to have sexual intercourse with him in their
house. In both cases, complainant was
made to sit on accused-appellant’s lap facing him. The fact that the two rapes were perpetrated in a similar manner
does not make her claim doubtful.
Complainant necessarily based her narration of the incident on what
actually transpired during the assaults.[18]
Accused-appellant tries to
impeach the credibility of complainant by pointing out inconsistencies in her
testimony during direct examination and cross-examination. It is said that she testified on direct
examination that accused-appellant removed his pants after she was made to sit
on his lap,[19] while on cross-examination she stated that
accused-appellant had already removed his pants when she was made to sit
astride him.[20] This inconsistency, however, is a minor one and does not detract from the
fact that accused-appellant forced complainant to sit on his lap and have
sexual intercourse with him.
Another alleged
inconsistency in complainant’s testimony refers to the exact time her mother
was out of the house. Accused-appellant
points out that she testified on direct examination that on April 19, 1994, her
mother was out of the house until around 9:00 p.m., while on cross-examination
she said that on the said date, she was with her mother from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00
a.m. at the clinic of Dr. Tapang. This
was sufficiently explained by complainant.
Upon confrontation with the said conflicting statements, she clarified
that her mother returned home at 8 a.m. in the morning on April 19, 1994, after
which her mother brought her to the clinic of Dr. Tapang.[21] For the same reason, complainant’s
inconsistent declarations with respect to the presence of her father, Solomon
Pongasi, while she executed her sworn statement before the police[22]cannot be taken against her.
It is settled that a few
inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of
the offended party, for, as has been observed by this Court, rape victims
cannot be expected to be errorless in recounting the details of a harrowing
experience.[23] Such minor inconsistencies in fact tend to
bolster the plausibility of complainant’s claim that she was raped by
accused-appellant as they negate any possibility that she was a rehearsed
witness.[24] In fact, the trial court even noted that
complainant, in the course of her testimony, broke into tears, stared blankly
into space, and manifested involuntary movements on her face and mouth, which
only showed the veracity of her claim and the trauma brought to her by her
ordeal.[25]
Accused-appellant claims
that the two rape charges against him have been trumped up at the instance of
complainant’s father whose wife (complainant’s mother) had left him and lived
with accused-appellant. This is pure
speculation. It is unnatural for a
parent to use his offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will
subject a daughter to disgrace.[26] Moreover, accused-appellant had been living
with Solomon Pongasi’s wife (complainant’s mother) for seven years without any
incident arising from the acts of complainant’s father. It is unlikely, therefore, that the latter
would think of seeking revenge after such a long time. Moreover, Solomon Pongasi himself had been
living with another woman.[27]
Complainant had been
living with accused-appellant for seven years and had treated him like her own
father.[28] It would be unthinkable that she would go
through the trouble and humiliation of the trial of a rape case if she had not
actually been abused by accused-appellant.[29] Absent any showing that complainant was
moved by any ill will towards accused-appellant, her testimony deserves to be
accorded the full faith and credit given to it by the trial court.[30]
Complainant’s testimony
is confirmed by Dr. Rubie Tapang’s findings that complainant suffered
lacerations and inflammation in her genitalia.
These findings caused Dr. Tapang to disbelieve Lilia’s claim that her
daughter’s injuries were due to a fall from a guava tree. Thus, Dr. Tapang suggested that complainant
be examined by a medico-legal expert due to probable sexual molestation.[31] Dr. Tapang’s suspicion was in turn confirmed
by Dr. Nestor Sator, who testified that complainant was indeed raped. Dr. Sator declared that it was possible for
complainant to be raped twice because he found super-imposed injuries and the
onset of infection in her vagina. He
testified that the injuries in complainant’s vagina were due to penile
penetration.[32] As this Court has held, when the victim’s
testimony of her violation is corroborated by the physician’s findings of
penetration, there is sufficient foundation to prove the existence of the
essential requisite of carnal knowledge.[33]
Accused-appellant,
however, contends that the testimony of Dr. Sator should not be given weight on
the ground that the latter did not identify complainant in court. He contends that this circumstance creates a
doubt as to whether the person whom he examined and found to have been sexually
abused was the same person as the complainant.
He further argues that complainant’s aunt, Tomasa Larayos, might have
presented to the doctor an impostor.
This is untenable. It is noteworthy that during the trial, accused-appellant
never put in issue whether the complainant and the patient examined by Dr.
Sator were one and the same person. He
even cross-examined Dr. Sator regarding his findings. Thus, he is now considered to have waived such objection and
cannot raise this issue for the first time on appeal.
Second. Accused-appellant contends that it would be impossible for him to have
raped complainant at around 7:00 a.m. of April 13 and 19, 1994, because
complainant’s mother was in the house during those times and did not leave
until around 9:00 a.m. He adds that his
friend, Jimmy Berdon, visited him in his house on those dates.
This contention is also
untenable. Time and again, this Court
has ruled that the presence of people in a certain place is not a guarantee
that rape was not committed, for lust is not a respecter of time and place.[34] Nor does accused-appellant’s alibi that he
was out of the house practically the entire day of April 13, 1994 because he
was at the birthday party of Jimmy Berdon’s cousin deserve any
consideration. Even if he was at the
party from 7:00 a.m. until evening, accused-appellant failed to show that it
was impossible for him to return to his house during the day. He admitted on cross-examination that he
could go home any time if he wanted to because his house was only 200 meters
away.[35] For alibi to prosper, it is not enough for
the accused to prove that he was somewhere else when the crime occurred but he
must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.[36]
Anent the rape committed
on April 19, 1994, accused-appellant contends that the fact that he accompanied
complainant and the latter’s mother to Dr. Tapang negates the possibility that
he had anything to do with complainant’s illness. This claim is not only uncorroborated; it was also denied by Dr.
Tapang, who testified that only Lilia Bensi accompanied complainant to her
clinic. Indeed, there was no mention
that accused-appellant was with them.[37]
Third.
Accused-appellant raises in issue the age of complainant. He maintains that the prosecution failed to
establish that she was 12 years old on the dates the crimes were committed
because her birth certificate was not presented. He further argues that it is possible that complainant was
already 18 years old and, thus, the death penalty cannot be imposed on him.
The contention has no
basis. Although the birth certificate
of complainant was not presented in evidence, there was sufficient evidence to
show that complainant was 12 years old in April of 1994.[38] Complainant testified that she was born on
February 11, 1982.[39] This was corroborated by her father, Solomon
Pongasi.[40] Complainant’s mother, Lilia Bensi, who
testified in favor of accused-appellant, also said that complainant was the
youngest of five children she had by Solomon Pongasi and that complainant was
about 12 years old in April 1994 when she was raped.[41] She thus confirmed Solomon’s testimony. Lilia’s testimony with regard to
complainant’s age was in turn corroborated by Dr. Rubie Tapang who testified
that she had been informed by Lilia Bensi that complainant was 12 years old at
the time of her physical examination.[42] The claim of accused-appellant that
medico-legal examiner Dr. Nestor Sator had doubts regarding complainant’s age
is misleading. What Dr. Sator said was that complainant could even be below 12
years old on April 19, 1994 when he examined her.[43] There is, therefore, no basis for
accused-appellant’s contention that the evidence does not clearly show
complainant to be less than 18 years of age on the dates of commission of the
crime.
Nonetheless, we hold that
accused-appellant cannot be held liable for qualified rape and sentenced to
death. Under Art. 355 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, the death penalty shall be imposed for
the commission of the crime of rape if the victim is under 18 years of age and
the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.[44] In these cases, the allegation in the
complaints that accused-appellant is the stepfather of complainant is not
correct. For accused-appellant to be
considered the stepfather of the complainant, he must be legally married to
complainant’s mother.[45] The evidence in these cases shows,
however, that accused-appellant and
complainant’s mother were not legally married but that they lived only in
common-law relation.[46] On the other hand, although the rape of a
person under 18 years of age by the common-law spouse of the victim’s mother is
also punishable by death, this fact must be alleged in the complaint or
information so as to warrant the imposition of the death penalty.[47] This was not done in the cases at bar.
In these cases, the
informations alleged that accused-appellant, through the use of force and
intimidation, had carnal knowledge of complainant. This Court has consistently held that rape is committed when
intimidation is used on the victim, which includes moral intimidation or
coercion.[48] Accused-appellant, whom complainant regarded
as her father, exercised moral ascendancy and parental influence over her, producing in her reasonable fear,
which made her vulnerable to threat.[49] Hence, the trial court should have found
accused-appellant guilty of two counts of simple rape only and sentenced him in
each case to reclusion perpetua.
The award of moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each count of rape should be
upheld, being in line with recent rulings.
In addition, however, complainant should be paid indemnity in the amount
of P50,000.00 for each count of rape.
This is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, which
is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.[50]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 54, Lapu-Lapu City, in Criminal Case Nos. 012931-L and 012932-L, finding
accused-appellant Anselmo Baring, alias “Simoy,” guilty of two counts of rape
against Baby Haydee Grace B. Pongasi is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that, in
each of the cases, accused-appellant’s sentence is reduced to reclusion
perpetua and he is further ordered to pay complainant the amount of P50,000.00
for each count of rape as civil indemnity, in addition to the amount of P50,000.00
for each count of rape awarded to complainant as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ., concur.
[1] Per
Judge Rumoldo R. Fernandez.
[2] April
13, 1994 in Crim. Case No. 012931-L and April 19, 1994 in Crim. Case No.
012932-L.
[3] Rollo,
pp. 5-10.
[4] TSN,
pp. 7-11, Dec. 5, 1994; TSN, pp. 2-7, Dec. 6, 1994.
[5] Also
referred to as Dr. Satur in the records.
[6] TSN,
p. 3, Nov. 16, 1994.
[7] TSN,
pp- 7-11, Dec. 6, 1994; TSN, pp. 4-14, Oct. 3, 1994; TSN, pp. 6-17, Nov. 16,
1994.
[8] Exh.
A.
[9] TSN,
pp. 2-4, July 29, 1996; TSN, pp. 3-7, Apr. 19, 1996.
[10] TSN,
p. 4, July 29, 1996.
[11] Id.,
pp. 4-7; TSN, pp. 7- 14, Apr. 19, 1996.
[12] TSN,
pp. 3-7, Nov. 8, 1996.
[13] TSN,
pp. 3-10, Jan. 8, 1996.
[14] Rollo,
pp. 57-58.
[15] Id.,
p. 86.
[16] People
v. Manahan, 315 SCRA 476 (1999).
[17] People
v. Dizon, 309 SCRA 669 (1999).
[18] People
v. Padil, 318 SCRA 795 (1999).
[19] TSN,
p. 2, Dec. 6, 1994.
[20] TSN,
p. 5, May 29, 1995.
[21] TSN,
p. 8, May 29, 1995.
[22] In
her sworn statement (Exh. E), complainant stated that she was with her father
in the police station, while in her direct examination on Dec. 6, 1994, she
stated that it was only her aunt who was with her.
[23] People
v. Reñola, 308 SCRA 145 4(1999).
[24] People
v. Padilla, 301 SCRA 265 (1999).
[25] People
v. Sagun, 303 SCRA 382 (1999).
[26] People
v. Perez, 319 SCRA 622 (1999).
[27] TSN,
p. 7, July 29, 1996.
[28] Id.,
pp. 8-9.
[29] People
v. Lopez, 302 SCRA 669 (1999).
[30] People
v. Sagun, supra.
[31] Exh.
F; TSN, pp. 4-17, Dec. 18, 1996.
[32] TSN,
pp. 4-17, Nov. 16, 1994.
[33] People
v. Bation, 305 SCRA 253 (1999).
[34] People v. Losano, 310 SCRA 707 (1999).
[35] TSN,
p. 10, July 29, 1996.
[36] People
v. Rabang, Jr., 315 SCRA 451 (1999).
[37] TSN,
p. 6, Dec. 18, 1996.
[38] People
v. Javier, 311 SCRA 122 (1999).
[39] TSN,
p. 3, Dec. 5, 1994.
[40] TSN,
p. 3, July 10, 1995.
[41] TSN,
p. 14, Jan. 8, 1996.
[42] TSN,
pp. 5-6, Dec. 18, 1996.
[43] TSN,
p. 17, Nov. 16, 1994.
[44] People
v. Carullo, 311 SCRA 680 (1999).
[45] People
v. Tolentino, 308 SCRA 485 (1999).
[46] People
v. Manggasin, 306 SCRA 228 (1999).
[47] People
v. Fraga, G.R. Nos. 134130-33, Apr. 12, 2000.
[48] People
v. Mosqueda, 313 SCRA 694 (1999).
[49] People
v. Manggasin, supra.
[50] People
v. Bañago, 309 SCRA 417 (1999).