FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-00-1567. January 19, 2001]
FERNANDO DELA CRUZ, complainant, vs. JUDGE JESUS G.
BERSAMIRA, RTC, Branch 166, Pasig City, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
In a Resolution dated
July 24, 2000, the Court reprimanded respondent judge and fined him Ten
Thousand (P10,000.00) Pesos with a stern warning that a repetition of similar
acts complained of will be dealt with more severely.
On September 12, 2000,
respondent judge filed a Motion for Reconsideration insisting that –
I. THE “MAGTOLIS REPORT” WAS TOO INCOMPLETE, SLANTED, SUBJECTIVE, MISLEADING, AND UNTRUTHFUL EVEN, IN ITS PRESENTATION OF THE CASE AGAINST RESPONDENT TO HAVE BEEN CORRECT AND JUST BASIS OF THE SUBJECT RESOLUTION.
II. BY ADOPTING AND VALIDATING THE “MAGTOLIS REPORT”, THE SUBJECT RESOLUTION CAN ONLY BE MISREAD AS AN ABANDONMENT OF THE TIME-HONORED PUBLIC POLICY THAT GOOD FAITH, NOT MALICE, MUST BE PRESUMED.
strongly
insinuating that the investigating Justice was actuated by malice and was
biased against him.
Using words which come
close to saying that the investigating Justice prevaricated and that her
factual findings are speculative fabrications, respondent judge asserts he is
innocent arguing at length that the recital of the “‘Magtolis Report’ of the
‘factual milieu’ of the administrative complaint at hand, was dishonest
and distorted.”[1]
Respondent judge’s
charges of “dishonesty” and “distortion” of facts against an associate justice
of the second highest court in the land, who was tasked to look into
administrative indictments for wrongdoing against him, ring hollow in the
absence of any evidence whatsoever showing that the investigator harbored any
ill-feelings or malice toward him. Such
charges not only reveal a deplorable deficiency in that degree of courteousness
respondent is supposed to observe and extend towards other magistrates like
him, it also betrays a character flaw which leaves the Court even more
convinced that he deserves the administrative sanctions imposed on him.
A judge without being
offensive in speech may endeavor to call attention to what he perceives to be
erroneous findings against him. He may
criticize the points he feels are incorrect but he may not do so in an
insulting manner.[2] If respondent disagrees and feels he has to
express his dissent thereto, a firm and temperate remonstrance is all that he
should ever allow himself.[3] Intemperate speech detracts from the
equanimity and judiciousness that should be the constant hallmarks of a
dispenser of justice.[4]
Those who don the
judicial robe are expected to be restrained and sober in their speech. Restraint is, in fact, a trait desirable to
those who dispense justice.[5] Indeed, a judge’s language, both written and
spoken, must be guarded and measured lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued.[6] Offensive and intemperate speech directed
against brethren on the bench can not be condoned and deserves reproof.
While a circumspect
scrutiny of the factual findings of the investigating Justice discloses that
there are indeed certain points therein which may raise a quizzical eyebrow,
the said findings nevertheless do not detract from the immutable fact that
respondent’s conduct was anything but exemplary in this case. Contrary to respondent’s bare claim that
these findings “are denied, belied, contradicted by and/or nowhere at all in
‘the documentary evidence submitted by respondent and the record (sic)
of the three criminal cases as well as respondent’s answers to the
clarificatory questionings (sic) of the investigator’,[7] the findings of the investigating justice
are, in fact, supported by the documentary evidence on record.
Stated differently, the
points raised by respondent judge will not cleanse him of the whiff of
impropriety in this case. The Court
pointed out in Dawa v. De Asa[8] that the people’s confidence in the judicial
system is founded not only on the magnitude of legal knowledge and the
diligence of the members of the bench, but also on the highest standard of
integrity and moral uprightness they are expected to possess.[9] It
is towards this sacrosanct goal of ensuring the people’s faith and confidence
in the judiciary that the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates the following:
CANON 2 – A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES.
RULE 2.01 – A judge should so behave at all times to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.
CANON 3 – A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE.
By the very nature of the
bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to observe an exacting
standard of morality and decency. The
character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his official
acts but also through his private morals as reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s
personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be
free from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach.[10] Only recently, in Magarang v. Judge Galdino
B. Jardin, Sr.,[11] the Court pointedly stated that:
While every public office in the
government is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the
judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly
mandated to abide by the law, the Code of Judicial Conduct and with existing
administrative policies in order to maintain the faith of the people in the
administration of justice.[12]
Judges must adhere to the highest
tenets of judicial conduct. They must
be the embodiment of competence, integrity and independence.[13] A judge’s conduct must be above reproach.[14] Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but
above suspicion.[15] A judge’s private as well as official conduct must at
all times be free from all appearances of impropriety, and be beyond reproach.[16]
In Vedana vs. Valencia,[17] the
Court held:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties, but also to his behavior outside his sala as a private individual. There is no dichotomy of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have recently explained, a judge’s official life can not simply be detached or separated from his personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private life should be above suspicion.
As stated earlier, in
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, a judge should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all his activities.[18] A judge is not only required to be
impartial; he must also appear to be impartial.[19] Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded
by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges.[20]
Viewed vis-à-vis the
factual landscape of this case, it is clear that respondent judge violated Rule
1.02,[21] as well as Canon 2,[22] Rule 2.01[23] and Canon 3.[24] In this connection, the Court pointed out in
Joselito Rallos, et al. v. Judge Ireneo Lee Gako Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu
City,[25] that:
Well-known is the judicial norm that “judges should not only be impartial but should also appear impartial.” Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate decision is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal,
metropolitan and regional trial court judges like herein respondent, because
they are judicial front-liners who have direct contact with the litigating
parties. They are the
intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of the
people’s sense of justice. Thus, their
official conduct should be beyond reproach.[26]
To bolster his cause,
respondent judge makes reference to his thirty nine (39) year stint in the
government service “with not one record of dishonesty or corruption”[27] pointing out that neither of the two
administrative cases against him referred to in the Court’s Resolution involved
dishonesty or corruption. While indeed
the two administrative complaints had nothing to do with dishonesty and
corruption, the reference to these two cases by the Court was made precisely to
call attention to the fact that respondent judge’s claimed thirty-nine year
stint is not spotlessly clean and entirely free of wrongdoing.
In Cecilio Wycoco v.
Judge Jesus G. Bersamira,[28] respondent was initially admonished for absenteesim by the Court. Subsequently, in Jose Oscar M. Salazar v.
Judge Jesus G. Bersamira,[29] respondent intervened in a case which he could not properly take
cognizance of causing the complainant great prejudice resulting from the delay
of the execution of a decision in his favor in Civil Case No. 39608 of the MeTC
of Makati. For such transgression,
respondent was again sanctioned and fined Five Thousand (P5,000.00) with the
warning that a repetition of the same act would be dealt with more severely for
violating Administrative Order No. 3, series of 1983. It will be readily noted from the foregoing that respondent judge
had been meted penalties which steadily became stiffer for his subsequent
infractions, this case included.
Needless to state, such
unflattering footnotes on respondent’s service record only further erode the
people’s faith and confidence in the judiciary for it is the duty of all
members of the bench to avoid any impression of impropriety to protect the
image and integrity of the judiciary, which in recent times has been the object
of criticism and controversy.[30] To reiterate –
Officers of the court have the duty to see to it that justice is
dispensed with evenly and fairly. Not
only must they be honest and impartial, but they must also appear to
be honest and impartial in the dispensation of justice. Judges should make sure that their acts are
circumspect and do not arouse suspicion in the minds of the public. When they fail to do so, such acts may cast
doubt upon their integrity and ultimately the judiciary in general.[31]
Respondent’s closing plea
that “the unfairness letting the subject Resolution stand as is . . . will . .
. destroy Respondent’s future . . . and takes away from him any further
opportunity for career advancement or promotion”[32] is regrettable because respondent judge
appears unaware that he is actually the recipient of sympathetic consideration
in this case. Be that as it may,
respondent must bear in mind that –
Administrative penalties do not play the final strains of the
valkyrian chant to a public career, judicial or otherwise. It is for respondent judge, by subsequently
demonstrating his true worth through observance of judicial standards, to
vindicate himself from a misjudgment which is the heritage of the heedless and
to rise to higher levels which is the destiny of the deserving.[33]
However, in the interest
of compassionate justice, the Court has resolved to reduce the fine imposed on
respondent judge to five thousand pesos (P5,000.00).
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Motion
for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution dated July 24, 2000 is
MODIFIED by reducing the fine imposed on respondent judge from ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) to five thousand pesos (P5,000.00). This denial is FINAL.
SO ORDERED.
Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), and Puno, JJ., no part.
[1] Motion
for Reconsideration, p. 3, 3rd paragraph.
[2] See
Canon 4, Canons of Judicial Ethics; Royeca v. Animas, 71 SCRA 1 [1976].
[3] Agpalo,
R.E. Legal
Ethics. 6th Ed.
(1997), p. 438, citing IV Hoffman’s Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional
Deportment and Calo v. Tapucar, 88 SCRA 78 [1979].
[4] Kalalang
v. Fernandez, 39 SCRA 418 [1971].
[5] Delgra,
Jr. v. Gonzales, 31 SCRA 237 [1971;
Ysasi v. Fernandez, 26 SCRA 393 [1968].
[6] Agpalo
R.E., Legal
Ethics, 6th Ed.
(1997), p. 440, citing Masadao and Elizaga Re: Criminal Case No. 4954-M, 155
SCRA 72 [1987] and Naldoza v. Lavilles, 254 SCRA 286 [1996].
[7] Motion
for Reconsideration, p. 23, 2nd paragraph.
[8] 292 SCRA
703 [1998].
[9] Citing
Talens-Dabon v. Arceo, 259 SCRA 354 [1996].
[10] Dawa v. De Asa, supra, citing Yulo-Tuvilla
v. Balgos, 288 SCRA 358 [1998].
[11] A.M. No.
RTJ-99-1448, 6 April 2000, pp. 11-12.
[12] Garciano
v. Sebastian, 231 SCRA 588 [1994].
[13] Rule.
1.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.
[14] Canon
31, Canons of Judicial Ethics.
[15] Palang v. Zosa, 58 SCRA 776 [1974].
[16] Dysico v. Dacumos, supra.
[17] 295 SCRA
1 [1998].
[18] Prosecutor
Salvador C. Ruiz v. Judge Agelio L. Bringas, MTC, Branch I, Butuan City, A.M.
No. MTJ-00-1266, 6 April 2000, p. 8.
[19] Canon 3,
Code of Judicial Conduct.
[20] In Re: Judge
Benjamin H. Virrey, 202 SCRA 628 [1991].
[21] “A judge
should administer justice impartially and without delay.” (Italics supplied)
[22] “A judge
should avoid
impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities.” (Italics supplied)
[23] “A judge
should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary.”
[24] “A Judge
should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality and diligence.” (Italics supplied)
[25] A.M.
Nos. RTJ-99-1484 and RTJ-99-1484 (A), 17 March 2000, p. 19.
[26] Citing
Macasasa v. Imbing, A.M. No. RTJ-99-1470, 16 August 1999.
[27] Motion
for Reconsideration, 2nd paragraph, p. 29.
[28] A.M. No.
RTJ-87-128, 30 June 1988.
[29] A.M. No.
RTJ-91-711, 29 April 1993.
[30] Antonio
Yu Asensi v. Judge Francisco D. Villanueva, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1245, January 19,
2000.
[31] Re:
Procedure Adopted By Judge Daniel Liangco, Executive Judge Municipal Trial
Court (MTC), San Fernando, Pampanga, Re: Raffle of Cases Under P.D. No. 1602,
A.M. No. 99-11-158-MTC, 1 August 2000.
[32] Motion
for Reconsideration, 1st paragraph, p. 29.
[33] People v. Gacott, Jr., 246 SCRA 52 [1995].