THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142049. January 30, 2001]
GERMAN MARINE AGENCIES, INC. and LUBECA MARINE MANAGEMENT HK
LTD., petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and FROILAN
S. DE LARA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES,
J.:
On 17 October 1994,
private respondent was hired by petitioners to work as a radio officer on board
its vessel, the M/V T.A. VOYAGER.
Sometime in June, 1995, while the vessel was docked at the port of New
Zealand, private respondent was taken ill.
His worsening health condition was brought by his crewmates to the attention
of the master of the vessel. However,
instead of disembarking private respondent so that he may receive immediate
medical attention at a hospital in New Zealand, the master of the vessel
proceeded to Manila, a voyage of ten days, during which time the health of
private respondent rapidly deteriorated.
Upon arrival in Manila, private respondent was not immediately
disembarked but was made to wait for several hours until a vacant slot in the
Manila pier was available for the vessel to dock. Private respondent was confined in the Manila Doctors Hospital,
wherein he was treated by a team of medical specialists from 24 June 1995 to 26
July 1995.
After private respondent
was discharged from the hospital, he demanded from petitioners the payment of
his disability benefits and the unpaid balance of his sickness wages, pursuant
to the Standard Employment Contract of the parties. Having been assured by petitioners that all his benefits would be
paid in time, private respondent waited for almost a year, to no avail. Eventually, petitioners told private
respondent that, aside from the sickness wages that he had already received, no
other compensation or benefit was forthcoming.[1] Private respondent filed a complaint with
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for payment of disability
benefits and the balance of his sickness wages. On 31 July 1997, the labor arbiter rendered a decision,[2] the pertinent parts of which are quoted
hereunder –
In the case at bar, there is no issue on the propriety or illegality of complainant’s discharge or release from employment as Radio Operator. What complainant is pursuing is limited to compensation benefits due a seaman pursuant to POEA Standard Employment Contract, Part II, Section C, paragraph 4(c) and paragraph 5, which reads:
“SECTION C. COMPENSATION BENEFIT
x x x
“4. The liabilities of the employer when the seaman suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
x x x
c. The employer shall pay the seaman his basic wages from the time he leaves the vessel for medical treatment. After discharge from the vessel, the seaman is entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of his basic wages until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but is [sic] no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. For this purpose, the seaman shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by the company-designated physician within three working days upon his return, except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case the written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance x x x.
“5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seamen [sic] [during] the term of employment caused by either injury or illness, the seamen [sic] shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Appendix 1 of this Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time of [sic] the illness or disease was contracted.”
The aforecited provisions of the POEA Standards [sic] Employment Contract is clear and unmistakable that its literal meaning should be preserved.
Thus, the only question at which the liability of respondents is anchored is whether complainant was really fit to work in his position as radio operator. If this is so, it could mean that he is not entitled to disability compensation which respondents vigorously disputed, citing in support the certification made by Dra. Victoria Forendo [sic] Cayabyab, allegedly “the officially accredited and designated physician of respondents, which is likewise, accredited with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration” where it is stated that “Nothing [sic] his job description as a radio operator, Mr. de Lara may be allowed to go back to work.” (Annex D & E). Complainant on the other hand disputes respondent’s above posture contending that the more persuasive and authentic evidence for purposes of deciding his fitness or lack of fitness to work is the certificate issued by Ms. Naneth [sic] Domingo-Reyes, MD, FPMA where it appears that after submitting himself to another medical examination by his attending physicians at the Manila Doctors Hospital on December 4, 1996, to verify possible mistake in his post treatment examination on March 25, 1996, firmly “was classified under partial permanent disability and is not fit to go back to his previous work due to mental state.” (Annex “C”, complainant’s reply to respondent’s position paper).
We have gone into a judicious study and analysis of the arguments and exhibits particularly the ones relied upon by the parties and find that of the complainant worthy of consideration. Looking closely at Annexes “D” and “E” of respondents’ position paper, there is hardly any clear affirmation that complainant was fully fit to resume his work as radio operator. Although the document alluded to, declares that complainant may be allowed to go back to work, the tenor of the same seems uncertain that complainant is fit to resume his work, and that assuming that such was the message, the words “may be” can not be taken as overriding that coming from the Manila Doctor Hospital which in the beginning handled the medical case of complainant and to which respondents unconditionally referred him and by reason of which six or seven medical especialists [sic] of the hospital took turn[s] studying and reviewing his uncertain ailment after release by respondents. Otherwise stated, unlike the message of annexes D to E of respondents, annex “C” of complainant is clear and unmistakable and confirm complainant’s partial permanent disability and his definite unfitness to go back to his previous work due to his mental health. Some pronouncements in this exhibit mentions also that when complainant was admitted an emerging basis for drowsiness, behavioral change and off and on fever” and different procedures were resorted along his case, like emergency CT scan on the brain and his admission in June 24, 1995 was catastropic, whereas, more could be said in three document[s] issued by Dra. Victoria Florendo Cayabyab.
Finally, respondents contend that the annexes issued by Dr. Domingo-Reyes of the Manila Doctors Hospital should not be given weight because it is not issued by the hospital or doctor duly accredited by the POEA. Neither would a close look on the applicable provision for seamen show – that a duly accredited hospital or doctor is needed for purposes of the grant of compensation benefits to a such [sic] or ailing seamen. We are more persuaded based on the arguments of the complainant among others, that it is absurd to require an ailing seaman in high seas or in a foreign land to still wait until the ship where he is working land in the country to secure treatment in a duly accredited hospital or doctor.
On the basis of the above therefore, and convinced that complainant’s “partial permanent disability” which was contracted in the course or on account of his employment as radio operator in foreign principal’s vessel, he is entitled to disability benefit in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Appendix 1 of the Contract, the maximum of which is US $50,000. But since the amount prayed for is US$25,000.00 which we presume has a more realistic basis, the same is hereby granted.
Concerning the sickness wage, respondents averred that the same had already been paid. However, there is no evidence that the same has been paid except the payment to the complainant of P49,546.00. Since complainant’s salary as US$870 and a seaman’s sick wage entitlement is fixed to a maximum of 120 days, his “sickness wages would rest to a total sum of US$3,480 or its peso equivalent. On this, complainant has been paid only [P]49,546.00 (US$1,943), thereby leaving for complainant a balance of US$1,537. Finally, it is also argued that as regards the balance, the same has been paid citing as proof the Sickness Release and Quitclaim signed by complainant (Annexes “C” & “C-1”). Complainant, on the other hand denied this, and contended that the quitclaim and release is invalid. Considering that there is no proof on record that this balance of US$1,537 was paid, unlike the P49,546.00, the same is granted.
WHEREFORE, premises above-considered, a decision is hereby issued ordering respondent German Marine Agencies Inc. to pay complainant the following sums:
(a) Disability benefit - - - - - - - - - - - - - - US$25,000.00
(b) Sickness wage balance - - - - - - - - - - US$1,137.00
all in the aggregate of Twenty Six Thousand One Hundred Thirty Seven Dollars (US$26,137.00) or its peso equivalent, the claim for damages being hereby dismissed for lack of merit, plus ten (10%) percent attorney’s fees.
SO ORDERED.
On 29 July 1998, the NLRC[3] affirmed the labor arbiter’s decision in
toto and declared that the latter’s findings and conclusions were supported
by substantial evidence.[4] After its motion for reconsideration was
denied by the NLRC on 20 May 1999, petitioners repaired to the Court of
Appeals.[5] The appellate court’s assailed decision was
promulgated on 1 December 1999, upholding the decision of the NLRC, with the
modification that petitioners were ordered to pay private respondent exemplary
damages in the amount of P50,000.00.
The appellate court reasoned out its decision,[6] thus -
The basic issue here is: Whether or not petitioner is liable to pay private respondent’s claim as awarded by the NLRC, and whether or not there was abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in affirming such decision on appeal? To resolve this issue, this Court took time in looking closely at the pertinent provision of the Standard Employment Contract Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels, particularly PART II, SECTION C, par. no. 4 (c), and par. no. 5, which states as follows:
“SECTION C. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS
“4. The liabilities of the employer when the seaman suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
“x
x x x
“c. The employer shall pay the seaman his basic wages from the time he leaves the vessel for medical treatment. After discharge from the vessel the seaman is entitled to hundred percent (100%) of his basic wages until he is declared fit to work or his degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. x x x x
“5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seaman during the term of his employment caused by either injury or illness the seaman shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Appendix 1 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.
x
x x . . .”
A cursory reading of these applicable contractual provisions and a thorough evaluation of the supporting evidence presented by both parties, lends strong credence to the contentions and arguments presented by private respondent.
The award of disability compensation has a clear and valid basis in the Standard Employment Contract and the facts as supported by the medical certificate issued by Dr. Nannette Domingo-Reyes of the Manila Doctors Hospital. Petitioners’ contention, that Dr. Domingo-Reyes is not company designated is far from the truth. The designation of the Manila Doctors Hospital by petitioners as the company doctor for private respondent cannot be denied. Their very act of committing private respondent for treatment at the Manila Doctors Hospital under the care of its physician is tantamount to company designation. The very act of paying the hospital bills by the petitioners constitutes their confirmation of such designation. Hence, petitioners cannot resort to the convenience of denying this fact just to evade their obligation to pay private respondent of his claims for disability benefit.
This Court also finds no basis on (sic) the petitioners’ contention that the company-designated [physician] must also be accredited with the POEA before he can engage in the medical treatment of a sick seaman. There is nothing in the Standard Employment Contract that provides this accreditation requirement, and even if there is, this would be absurd and contrary to public policy as its effect will deny and deprive the ailing seaman of his basic right to seek immediate medical attention from any competent physician. The lack of POEA accreditation of a physician who actually treated the ailing seaman does not render the findings of such physician (declaring the seaman permanently disabled) less authoritative or credible. To our mind, it is the competence of the attending physician, not the POEA accreditation, that determines the true health status of the patient-seaman, which in this instant case, is [sic] the attending physicians from the Manila Doctors Hospital.
As to the award of the balance of wages, this Court is inclined not
to disturb the factual findings of the NLRC.
The failure of the petitioners to present a strong and credible evidence
supporting the fact of alleged payment of the balance of sickness justifies the
award of such claim. The long standing
doctrine in labor cases that “in case of doubt, the doubt is resolved in favor
of labor” applies. For there are
indications that the evidence presented by petitioners appears to be of dubious
origin as private respondent challenged the petitioners to present the original
copy of the quitclaim and the vouchers in a motion demanding from petitioners
to produce the original copy of those
documents purporting to show that he had received the alleged sum of P39,803.30,
which allegedly shows the payment of the balance of his sickness wages. This motion was vehemently opposed by
petitioners. To our mind, such
opposition only created more doubts and eroded the veracity and credence of
petitioners’ documentary evidence.
As to the award of attorney’s fees, the same is justified by the fact that private respondent actually hired the services of a lawyer to vindicate his right to claim for his disability benefit which is being arbitrarily denied to him by petitioners. Had it not been for the arbitrary denial of petitioners, private respondent could not have been compelled to hire the services of a lawyer to pursue his claims in court, for which he is presumed to have incurred costs.
With respect to private respondent’s claim for damages, this Court finds that the NLRC overlooked the attendance of negligence on the part of petitioners in their failure to provide immediate medical attention to private respondent. It further appears that negligence not only exists but was deliberately perpetrated by petitioners by its arbitrary refusal to commit the ailing private respondent to a hospital in New Zealand or at any nearest port deprived of his right to immediate medical attention by petitioners, which resulted to the serious deterioration of his health that caused his permanent partial disability. Such deprivation of immediate medical attention appears deliberate by the clear manifestation from petitioners’ own words which states that, “the proposition of the complainant that respondents should have taken the complainant to the nearest port of New Zealand is easier said than done. It is worthy to note that deviation from the route of the vessel will definitely result to loss of a fortune in dollars not only to the respondents but likewise to the owners of the cargoes being shipped by the said vessel.”
By petitioners’ own statement, they reveal their utter lack of concern for their Filipino crew. This kind of attitude cannot be taken to pass by this Court without appropriate sanction by way of payment of exemplary damages, if only to show that the life of a Filipino crew must be accorded due attention and respect by the petitioners. For after all, had it not been for the toils of this crew, among others, petitioners would not be doing as good in their business and making “fortunes in dollars.”
In affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter, this Court finds that the NLRC never abused its discretion nor exceeded its jurisdiction.
Hence, this Court finds no valid basis to disturb the findings of the NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the NLRC dated 29 July 1998, and the
Order dated 20 May 1999, are hereby AFFIRMED, and in addition thereto,
petitioners are ordered to pay exemplary damages to private respondent in the
sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners’ motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution of 11
February 2000. Hence, the present
appeal.
Disability
Benefits
Petitioners contend that
the existence and degree of a seaman’s disability must be declared by a
“company-designated physician” who must be accredited with the POEA. Following this line of reasoning,
petitioners claim that private respondent is not entitled to disability
benefits because he was found fit to return to work by Dr. Victoria Florendo
Cayabyab, the designated physician of petitioners, who is also accredited with
the POEA.[7]
Disagreeing with
petitioners’ stand, the labor arbiter ruled that, for purposes of determining
compensation benefits under the Standard Employment Contract, an ailing seaman
need not have his condition assessed by a doctor or hospital accredited with
the POEA. Consequently, the labor
arbiter gave more weight to the opinion of the specialists from the Manila
Doctors Hospital who treated private respondent and declared him as having
sustained a partial permanent disability and unfit to go back to his previous
work.[8] Meanwhile, the Court of Appeals held that
petitioners’ act of committing private respondent for treatment at the Manila
Doctors Hospital and of paying his hospital bills therein is tantamount to
“company-designation,” and therefore, the certificate issued by Dr. Nanette
Domingo-Reyes of the Manila Doctors Hospital describing private respondent as
suffering from a partial permanent disability should be construed as decisive
in the matter of private respondent’s entitlement to disability benefits. The appellate court also declared that
nothing in the Standard Employment Contract requires the company-designated
physician or hospital to also be accredited with the POEA.[9]
In the case at bar, the
parties are at odds as to the proper interpretation of the POEA Standard
Employment Contract Governing the Employment of All Filipino Seamen On Board
Ocean-Going Vessels (Standard Employment Contract), particularly Part II,
Section C thereof, which provides that –
xxx xxx xxx
4. The liabilities of the employer when the seaman suffers injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:
a. The employer shall continue to pay the seaman his basic wages during the time he is on board the vessel;
b. If the injury or illness requires medical and/or dental treatment in a foreign port, the employer shall be liable for the full cost of such medical, dental, surgical and hospital treatment as well as board and lodging until the seaman is declared fit to work or to be repatriated.
However, if after repatriation the seaman still requires medical attention arising from said injury or illness, he shall be so provided at cost to the employer until such time he is declared fit or the degree of his disability has been established by the company-designated physician.
c. The employer shall pay the seaman his basic wages from the time he leaves the vessel for medical treatment. After discharge from the vessel the seaman is entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of his basic wages until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician, but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. For this purpose, the seaman shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by the company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so, in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Failure of the seaman to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits.
xxx xxx xxx
5. In case of permanent total or partial disability of the seaman during the term of employment caused by either injury or illness the seaman shall be compensated in accordance with the schedule of benefits enumerated in Appendix 1 of his Contract. Computation of his benefits arising from an illness or disease shall be governed by the rates and the rules of compensation applicable at the time the illness or disease was contracted.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioners’ contention
that the existence and grade of a seaman’s disability must be pronounced by a
physician accredited by the POEA does not find any support in the abovecited
provision, nor in any other portion of the Standard Employment Contract. In order to claim disability benefits under
the Standard Employment Contract, it is the “company-designated” physician who
must proclaim that the seaman suffered a permanent disability, whether total or
partial, due to either injury or illness, during the term of the latter’s
employment. There is no provision
requiring accreditation by the POEA of such physician. In fact, aside from their own gratuitous
allegations, petitioners are unable to cite a single provision in the said
contract in support of their assertions or to offer any credible evidence to
substantiate their claim. If
accreditation of the company-designated physician was contemplated by the POEA,
it would have expressly provided for such a qualification, by specifically
using the term “accreditation” in the Standard Employment Contract, to denote
its intention. For instance, under the
Labor Code it is expressly provided that physicians and hospitals providing
medical care to an injured or sick employee covered by the Social Security
System or Government Service Insurance System must be accredited by the
Employees Compensation Commission.[10] It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation
of contracts that if the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulation shall control.[11] There is no ambiguity in the wording of the
Standard Employment Contract – the only qualification prescribed for the
physician entrusted with the task of assessing the seaman’s disability is that
he be “company-designated.” When the language of the contract is explicit, as
in the case at bar, leaving no doubt as to the intention of the drafters
thereof, the courts may not read into it any other intention that would
contradict its plain import.[12]
The word “designate”
means to specify, to mark out and make known, to identify by name, to indicate,
to show, to distinguish by mark or description, or to set apart for a purpose
or duty.[13] The Court agrees with the appellate court’s
ruling that petitioners’ act of committing private respondent for treatment at
the Manila Doctors Hospital and paying the hospital bills therein is tantamount
to “company-designation.” By such unequivocal acts, petitioners clearly set
apart and distinguished the Manila Doctors Hospital, together with its team of
specialists, as the ones qualified to assess the existence and degree of
private respondent’s disability and thereby resolve the question of the
latter’s entitlement to disability benefits under the Standard Employment Contract.
In addition to their
having been effectively designated by petitioners, it was the physicians from
the Manila Doctors Hospital who examined and treated private respondent for a
little more than one month, subjecting the latter to a series of medical
procedures, such as medical therapy, neurological surgical drainage for brain
abscess, bilateral thalamic area S/P craniotomy (Burr Hole), and
opthalmological (orbit) surgery for socket revision and reconstruction of his
left eye. The extensive medical attention
given to private respondent enabled the Manila Doctors Hospital specialists to
acquire a detailed knowledge and familiarity with private respondent’s medical
condition.[14] No doubt such specialized knowledge enabled
these physicians to arrive at a much more accurate appraisal of private
respondent’s condition, including the degree of any disability which he might
have sustained, as compared to another physician not privy to private
respondent’s case from the very beginning.
Thus, the appellate court was not mistaken in giving more weight to the
certificate issued by Dr. Nanette Domingo-Reyes of the Manila Doctors Hospital
dated December 4, 1996, than to the one issued by Dr. Victoria Florendo
Cayabyab.
On the strength of Dr. Domingo-Reyes’s
medical certificate which stated that private respondent “can be classified
under partial permanent disability and is not fit to go back to his previous
work due to his mental state,” the labor arbiter awarded $25,000.00 as
disability benefits, which award was upheld by the NLRC and the appellate
court. Petitioners insist that there is
no factual basis for the award of $25,000.00 since there is no finding as to
the grade of permanent partial disability sustained by private respondent, in
accordance with Appendix 1 of the Standard Employment Contract (Schedule of
Disability or Impediment For Injuries Suffered and Diseases or Illness
Contracted), and therefore, no means of determining the exact amount of
compensation to which private respondent may be entitled.[15]
The Court does not agree
with petitioners’ position. Under the
Standard Employment Contract the grade of disability suffered by the seaman
must be ascertained in accordance with Appendix 1 of such contract, which is
partially reproduced herein -
Appendix 1
SCHEDULE OF DISABILITY OR IMPEDIMENT
FOR INJURIES SUFFERED AND OR ILLNESS CONTRACTED
HEAD
Traumatic head injuries that result to:
1. Apperture unfilled with bone not over
three (3) inches without brain injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gr. 9
2. Apperture unfilled with bone over
three (3) inches without brain injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gr. 3
3. Severe paralysis of both upper or
lower extremities or one upper and one
lower extremity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gr. 1
4. Moderate paralysis of two (2) extremities
producing moderate difficulty in
movements with self care activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gr. 6
5. Slight paralysis affecting one extremity
producing slight difficulty with self-care
activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gr. 10
6. Severe mental disorder or Severe Complex
Cerebral function disturbance or post –
traumatic psychoneurosis which require
regular aid and attendance as to render worker
permanently unable to perform any work . . . . . . . . . . Gr. 1
7. Moderate mental disorder or moderate brain
functional disturbance which limits worker
to the activities of daily living with some
directed care or attendance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gr. 6
8. Slight mental disorder or disturbance that
requires little attendance or aid and which
interferes to a slight degree with the working
capacity of the claimant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gr. 10
9. Incurable imbecility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Gr. 1
Each
grade under Appendix 1 has an equivalent disability allowance or benefit
expressed in terms of a percentage of the maximum amount of $50,000.00. This is specified in Appendix 1-A of the
Standard Employment Contract -
APPENDIX 1-A
SCHEDULE OF DISABILITY ALLOWANCES
Impediment Grace Impediment
1 Maximum Rate x 120.00%
2 “ x 88.81%
3 “ x 78.36%
4 “ x 68.66%
5 “ x 58.96%
6 “ x 50.00%
7 “ x 41.80%
8 “ x 33.59%
9 “ x 26.12%
10 “ x 20.15%
11 “ x 14.93%
12 “ x 10.45%
13 “ x 6.72%
14 “ x 3.74%
Maximum Rate: US$50,000.
To be paid in Philippine Currency equivalent at the exchange rate prevailing during the time of payment.
Private respondent asked
petitioner for disability benefits in the amount of $25,000.00, or fifty
percent (50%) of the maximum rate of $50,000.00, which, under Appendix 1-A, is
awarded when the seaman sustains a grade 6 disability. One of the grade 6 head injuries listed in
Appendix 1, specifically number seven (7), is described as a “moderate mental
disorder or moderate brain functional disturbance which limits worker to the
activities of daily living with some directed care or attendance.” This
coincides with Dr. Domingo-Reyes’ diagnosis of private respondent’s condition,
as follows -
xxx xxx xxx
Work-ups and Management:
Patient was admitted on an emergency bases for drowsiness, behavioral change and on and off fever. This started with headaches since the first week of June 1995 while on duty (on voyage). Patient progressively deteriorated and arrived here already dehydrated with high grade fever. (emphasis supplied)
Emergency CT Scan of the brain revealed rounded masses in both thalamus on the brain; the larger mass was situated at the right.
Burr hole at the right parietal and drainage of the right thalamic abscess was done on June 26, 1995. Repair of shallow fornix of left eye and biopsy was done for culture studies thereafter.
Mr. De Lara stayed in the hospital for 33 days and was still in
bedridden state when discharge. He
became ambulant on mid-August 1996 but his cerebral functions (cognitive and
behavioral) remain impaired.
This is his 18th month of illness. His admission last June 24, 1995 is
considered catastrophic. He now can be
classified under partial permanent disability and is not fit to go back to his
previous work due to his mental state.[16] (emphasis
supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Thus,
the medical certificate of Dr. Domingo-Reyes is more than sufficient basis for
the award of disability benefits in the amount of $25,000.00 in favor of
private respondent.
Sickness
wages
Petitioners assert that
the award of $1,137.00, representing the balance of the sickness wages owed to
private respondent, is erroneous and in absolute disregard of their documentary
evidence - particularly the three check vouchers in the total amount of
P89,354.80, all issued in 1995 in favor of either private respondent or his
wife, and the “Sickwages Release & Quitclaim” - which, according to
petitioners, taken together would prove that they had paid private respondent
the total amount of P89,354.80, or $3,480.00, corresponding to the 120 days
sickness wages as required under the Standard Employment Contract.
Contrary to petitioners’
assertions, the labor arbiter held that only P49,546.00 ($1,943.00) was paid by
petitioners and that private respondent is still entitled to the balance of the
sickness wages in the amount of $1,537.00.
According to the labor arbiter, petitioners failed to prove that they
had paid this amount to private respondent, notwithstanding the document
entitled “Sickness Release & Quitclaim” introduced by petitioners in
evidence, which was not given credence.[17] The NLRC and the Court of Appeals concurred
with the labor arbiter on this issue.
The appellate court held that the documentary evidence of petitioners
was insufficient to support their contentions.[18]
The Supreme Court has
always accorded respect and finality to the findings of fact of the NLRC,
particularly if they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter, when supported
by substantial evidence. The reason for
this is that a quasi-judicial agency like the NLRC has acquired a unique
expertise because its jurisdiction is confined to specific matters.[19] Whether or not petitioners actually paid the
balance of the sickness wages to private respondent is a factual question. In the absence of proof that the labor
arbiter or the NLRC had gravely abused their discretion, the Court shall deem
conclusive and cannot be compelled to overturn this particular factual finding.[20]
Damages
We affirm the appellate
court’s finding that petitioners are guilty of negligence in failing to provide
immediate medical attention to private respondent. It has been sufficiently established that, while the M/V T.A.
VOYAGER was docked at the port of New Zealand, private respondent was taken
ill, causing him to lose his memory and rendering him incapable of performing
his work as radio officer of the vessel.
The crew immediately notified the master of the vessel of private
respondent’s worsening condition.
However, instead of disembarking private respondent so that he may
receive immediate medical attention at a hospital in New Zealand or at a nearby
port, the master of the vessel proceeded with the voyage, in total disregard of
the urgency of private respondent’s condition.
Private respondent was kept on board without any medical attention
whatsoever for the entire duration of the trip from New Zealand to the
Philippines, a voyage of ten days. To
make matters worse, when the vessel finally arrived in Manila, petitioners
failed to directly disembark private respondent for immediate hospitalization. Private respondent was made to suffer a wait
of several more hours until a vacant slot was available at the pier for the
vessel to dock. It was only upon the
insistence of private respondent’s relatives that petitioners were compelled to
disembark private respondent and finally commit him to a hospital.[21] There is no doubt that the failure of
petitioners to provide private respondent with the necessary medical care
caused the rapid deterioration and inevitable worsening of the latter’s
condition, which eventually resulted in his sustaining a permanent disability.
In light of the
foregoing, petitioners are liable for moral damages for the physical suffering
and mental anguish caused to private respondent.[22] There is no hard and fast rule in the
determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages, since each case
must be governed by its own peculiar circumstances.[23] In the present case, the Court considers the
amount of P50,000.00 in moral damages as proper.[24]
Meanwhile, exemplary
damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good,
pursuant to Article 2229 of the Civil Code.
They are imposed not to enrich one party or impoverish another but to
serve as a deterrent against or as a negative incentive to curb socially deleterious
actions. While exemplary damages cannot
be recovered as a matter of right, they need not be proved, although plaintiff
must show that he is entitled to moral, temperate, or compensatory damages
before the court may consider the question of whether or not exemplary damages
should be awarded.[25] In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be
granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.[26] Coming now to the case at bar, the appellate
court found that –
… negligence not only
exists but was deliberately perpetrated by petitioners by its arbitrary refusal
to commit the ailing private respondent to a hospital in New Zealand or at any
nearest port … which resulted to the serious deterioration of his health that
caused his permanent partial disability.
Such deprivation of immediate medical attention appears deliberate by
the clear manifestation from petitioners’ own words which states that, “the
proposition of the complainant that respondents should have taken the
complainant to the nearest port of New Zealand is easier said than done. It is worthy to note that deviation from the
route of the vessel will definitely result to loss of a fortune in dollars not
only to the respondents [petitioners herein] but likewise to the owners
of the cargoes being shipped by the said vessel.”
Petitioners
never denied making this statement.
Given the prevailing circumstances, the appellate court’s award of
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages is adequate, fair, and reasonable.[27]
Although the labor
arbiter awarded attorney’s fees, which award was subsequently affirmed by the
NLRC and the Court of Appeals, the basis for the same was not discussed in his
decision nor borne out by the records of this case, and should therefore be
deleted. There must always be a factual
basis for the award of attorney’s fees.[28] This is consistent with the policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate.[29]
WHEREFORE, the 1 December 1999 Decision and 11 February
2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED, with the modification
that petitioners must also pay private respondent P50,000.00 as moral damages
and the award of attorney’s fees is deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman),
Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo,
72-73.1
[2] Ibid.,
41-52.2
[3] First
Division, composed of Commissioners Vicente S.E. Veloso, ponente;
Rogelio I. Rayala, presiding commissioner; and Alberto R. Quimpo.
[4] Rollo,
54-65.
[5] Thirteenth
Division, composed of Justices Omar U. Amin, ponente; Hector L.
Hofilena, chairman; and Jose L. Sabio.
[6] Rollo,
71-89.
[7] Petitioners’
Memorandum, 11.
[8] Rollo,
49-51.
[9] Ibid.,
85-86.
[10] Labor
Code, Book IV, Title II, Chapter I, Article 167(u), (v).
[11] Civil
Code, Article 1370; Palmares v. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 422 (1998).
[12] Cruz
v. Court of Appeals, 293 SCRA 239 (1998).
[13] Words
and Phrases, Permanent Edition,“Designate,” vol. 12, 415 (1954). Citing State
v. Noah, 124 N.W. 1121, 1126, 20 N.D. 281; Colgrove v. U.S., C.A.
Cal., 176 F.2d 614, 617; Lankford v. Pope, 57 S.E.2d 538, 540, 206 Ga.
430; Thrailkill v. Smith, 138 N.E. 532, 534, 106 Ohio St. 1; Hall v.
Cotton, 180 S.W. 779, 781, 167 Ky. 464, L.R.A.1916C, 1124; State ex rel. Rocky
Mountain Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Red Lodge, 83 P. 642, 643, 33 Mont.
345, quoting and adopting definition in Webst.Int.Dict.; Lowry v. Davis,
70 N.W. 190, 101 Iowa, 236, 239; Jewel Tea Co. v. City of Geneva, 291
N.W. 664, 669, 137 Neb. 768; St. Louis Police Relief Ass’n v. Tierney,
91 S.W. 968, 974, 116 Mo.App. 447.
[14] Rollo,
49-50, 86.
[15] Petitioners’
Memorandum, 12-13.
[16] Records,
154.
[17] Rollo,
51.
[18] Ibid.,
86-87.
[19] Travelaire & Tours Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 294 SCRA 505 (1998); Suarez v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 293 SCRA 496 (1998); Autobus Workers’
Union v. National Labor Relations Commission, 291 SCRA 219 (1998);
Prangan v. National Labor Relations Commission, 289 SCRA 142 (1998);
International Pharmaceuticals, Inc v. National Labor Relations Commission,
287 SCRA 213 (1998); Villa v. National Labor Relations Commission, 284
SCRA 105 (1998).
[20] Gandara
Mill Supply v. National Labor Relations Commission, 300 SCRA 702 (1998);
National Union of Workers in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 287 SCRA 192 (1998).
[21] Rollo,
72.
[22] Civil
Code, Article 2217.
[23] Philippine
National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 136 (1997).
[24] Ong
v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 387 (1999); Philtranco Service
Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 562 (1997).
[25] Del
Rosario v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 158 (1997).
[26] Civil
Code, Article 2231.
[27] Petitioners
have never questioned the jurisdiction of the labor arbiter or the NLRC over
private respondent’s claim for damages.
See Zamboanga v. Buat, 243 SCRA 47 (1995); Ocheda v.
Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 629 (1992).
[28] Congregation
of the Religious of the Virgin Mary v. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 385
(1998).
[29] Philtranco
Service Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, supra.