THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 139943. January 18, 2001]
MANUEL MIRALLES, petitioner, vs. Hon. SERGIO F. GO,
Chairman of the National Police Commission; and PABLO S. VILLANUEVA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Factual findings of
administrative agencies, especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
conclusive upon this Court. In the
present case, petitioner has not shown sufficient ground to warrant an
exception to the foregoing rule.
The Case
Filed before this Court
is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the May 25, 1999 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 42477. The CA had affirmed the ruling of the
Special Appellate Committee of the National Police Commission (SAC-Napolcom),
finding petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct and ordering
his dismissal from the service. The CA
ruled as follows:
“Premises considered, the petition is dismissed, without
pronouncement as to costs.”[3]
The Facts
The facts were adequately
summarized by the CA as follows:
"1. On December 7, 1977, an administrative complaint was filed before the Office of the Hearing Officer of NAPOLCOM against petitioner Manuel Miralles for Grave Misconduct committed as follows:
‘That on or about the 19th day of October 1977, in Quezon City Metro Manila, the above named respondent did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, without any just motive, and with intent to kill Patrolman NILO RESURRECION, assault, attack and wound the said Pat. Resurrecion with the use of firearms, directing the shots against the vital parts of the body of the latter and one Ernesto Mercullo, thereby inflicting upon them gunshot wounds which directly caused the death of Nilo Resurrecion and Ernesto Merculio, acts of the said respondent punishable by law and rules.’
(p. 1, Complaint, Annex ‘4’ of Petition)
“2. An investigation was conducted by Rogelio A. Ringpis, Hearing Officer No. 3 of NAPOLCOM, Manila (p. 2, Petition).
“3. After hearing, Hearing Officer Rogelio Ringpis submitted to the Chairman of NAPOLCOM an Investigation Report finding petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct (Double Homicide) and recommending his dismissal from the service.
“Pertinent portion of said Investigation Report is hereby quoted:
‘V. RECOMMENDATION:
‘WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found guilty of grave misconduct (Double Homicide) and there being no mitigating circumstances to offset the aggravating circumstance, it is respectfully recommended that the penalty of dismissal from the service be imposed with prejudice to reinstatement to the Integrated National Police.
‘SO RECOMMENDED.’
(p. 13, Report of Investigation, Annex ‘E’, Petition).
“4. On September 10, 1980, the Adjudication Board No. 15 of the NAPOLCOM rendered its Decision finding petitioner guilty of Grave Misconduct and dismissing him from the service with prejudice to reinstatement, thus:
‘WHEREFORE, this Board finds the herein Respondent in the above-entitled case guilty as charged and is hereby DISMISSED FROM THE SERVICE WITH PREJUDICE to reinstatement.
‘SO ORDERED.’
(p. 10, Decision, annex ‘F’, Petition)
“5. On April 20, 1981, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision but the same was denied by the Adjudication Board (p. 4, Petition).
“6. On September 23, 1981, petitioner appealed the aforestated Decision to the Special Appellate Committee of the NAPOLCOM (p. 4, Ibid).
“7. On June 6, 1983, [SAC-Napolcom] issued a Resolution which reads as follows:
‘On September 23, 1981, x x x Pat. Manuel Miralles filed a Notice of Appeal from the Decision finding him guilty of Grave Misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with prejudice. By virtue thereof, the record of the case was elevated to this Committee. Since then, however, up to the present or a period of more than one (1) year and seven (7) months, no appeal brief, memorandum or any pleading ha[s] been filed.
‘WHEREFORE, the Appeal is hereby DISMISSED for abandonment and lack of interest.
‘SO ORDERED.’
(Annex “J”, Petition)
“8. On August 30, 1983, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Manifestation praying that the dismissal of the Notice of Appeal be set aside and asking for time within which to submit his Memorandum.
“9. On September 27, 1983, petitioner submitted a Memorandum to [SAC-Napolcom].
“10. On April 26, 1984, [SAC-Napolcom] rendered its Decision affirming the Decision of the Adjudication Board.
“11. On June 30, 1984, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision.
“12. On October 30,
1989, [SAC-Napolcom] issued a Resolution denying his Motion for Reconsideration
for lack of merit.”[4]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals
ruled that petitioner’s recourse was premature, because the SAC-Napolcom’s
decision should have been appealed first before the Civil Service Commission,
pursuant to RA 6975.
Even if it would, as it
did, rule on the merits, the CA held that petitioner’s appeal must still
fail. This ruling was made in view of
the documents presented and the eyewitness account of Alejandro Lamsen, who
testified that he had seen petitioner shoot Pat. Nilo Resurreccion. The CA further
stated that petitioner had failed to substantiate his claim of self-defense.
Hence, this Petition.[5]
Issues
Petitioner presents the
following issues for our consideration:
“I
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the instant case which was elevated directly from the Napolcom in view of the fact that the Napolcom decision sought to be reviewed was rendered before the effectivity of R.A. No. 6975, otherwise known as the PNP law, which provides that such decisions should first be elevated to the Civil Service Commission before the Court of Appeals.
“II
Whether or not the dismissal of the petitioner from the service can be sustained on the basis of the evidence on record notwithstanding that the same overwhelmingly supports the dismissal of the instant administrative charge against the petitioner.
“III
Whether or not the
petitioner acted in self-defense when he killed Nilo Resurrecion.”[6]
In the main, two issues
are before us: (1) the propriety of the recourse to the CA and (2) the
sufficiency of the evidence against petitioner.
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is not
meritorious.
First Issue: Propriety
of the Recourse to the CA
Petitioner contends that
the CA erred in ruling that the SAC-Napolcom ruling should have been appealed
first to the DILG and then to the Civil Service Commission, pursuant to RA
6975. He maintains that the assailed
resolution of SAC-Napolcom had been issued on October 20, 1989, but that the
said law was promulgated only on January 2, 1991. That he received a copy of the Decision only on November 5, 1996
was due to the fault of the Napolcom.
Hence, he posits that his appeal should be governed by the law in effect
in 1989, not RA 6975 which became effective only in 1991.
We are not
persuaded. It is clear that petitioner
filed its appeal to the CA only on December 4, 1996. By then, the law in force, RA 6975, had already prescribed that
appeals from the Decision of the Napolcom should be lodged first with the DILG
and then with the Civil Service Commission.
It did not matter that the assailed Napolcom ruling had been promulgated
in 1989; petitioner did not receive it
at the time and, thus, could not have filed the appeal then. In other words, his right to appeal had not
yet vested on him. Verily, an appeal is
a statutory right, and one who seeks to avail oneself of it must comply with the
statute or the rule in effect when that right arose.[7] Since the rule on appeal had already been
modified at the time he received the assailed Resolution, he should have
followed the modified rule. We agree
with the following disquisition of the CA:
“Although the Special Appellate Committee of the NAPOLCOM, which was then still operating under the old PC/INP set-up, affirmed his dismissal from the police service on April 26, 1984 and denied his motion for reconsideration on October 20, 1989, the petitioner received notice of the denial only on November 5, 1996, and he filed the instant petition on December 4, 1996. By then, as aforesaid, R.A. 6975, an Act Establishing the Philippine National Police under a Reorganized Department of Interior and Local Government was already in full force and effect. Its Section 91 provides that, “The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the department.”
As expounded by the Supreme Court in Cabada vs. Alunan III, petitioner’s remedy at the first instance is appeal to the Secretary of the DILG and, thereafter, to the Civil Service Commission. Thus:
“x x x Complementary laws on discipline of government officials and employees must then be inquired into[,] considering that in conformity with the mandate of the Constitution that the PNP must be national in scope and civilian in character[, i]t is now a part, as a bureau, of the reorganized DILG. As such, it falls within the definition of the civil service in Section 2(1), Article IX-B of the Constitution. For this reason, Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 provides:
“SEC. 91. Application of Civil Service Laws. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department.
“The Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 in Subtitle A. title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. No. 292). Section 47 of Chapter 6 thereof provides, inter alia, That in cases where the decision rendered by a bureau or office is appealable to the Commission, the same may initially be appealed to the department and finally to the Commission.
“The rules and regulations implementing the Civil Service Law referred to in Section 91 of the DILG Act of 1990 is the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 known as the Administrative Code of 1987 promulgated by the CSC, Sections 31 and 32, Rule XIV of the said Rules provide as follows:
“SEC. 31. Except as otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, the Commission shall have the final authority to pass upon the removal, separation and suspension of all officers and employees in the civil service and upon all matters relating to the conduct, discipline and efficiency of such officers and employees.
“SEC. 32. The secretaries
and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and
municipalities shall have jurisdiction to Investigate and decide matters
involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their
jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is
suspension for not more than thirty (30) days or fine in an amount not
exceeding thirty (30) days’ salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau
or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same may be initially
appealed to the department, then to the Merit Systems Protection Board, and
finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory
except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory
only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.”[8]
In any event,
petitioner’s argument on this issue is moot, considering that the CA has
nonetheless resolved the merits of the case.
Second Issue: Sufficiency
of Evidence
As a rule, administrative
agencies’ factual findings that are affirmed by the Court of Appeals are
conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court.[9] Petitioner, however, now asks this Court to review the ruling of the
Napolcom hearing officer, the Napolcom Adjudication Board No. 15, the Napolcom
Special Appellate Committee and the Court of Appeals, all finding him
administratively liable for killing Pat. Nilo Resureccion and Ernesto
Merculio. He further contends that
these fact-finding administrative and judicial entities failed to appreciate
his claim of self-defense.
Documentary Exhibits
Petitioner specifically
maintains that the SAC-Napolcom “heavily relied on Exhibits ‘B’ to ‘O’,
notwithstanding the incontrovertible fact that they ha[d] not been properly
identified by the persons who executed them.
Hence, being hearsay, they are inadmissible in evidence.”[10]
The argument is not
persuasive. The bulk of these
documents,[11] except Exhibits “B” and “C,” are public
documents consisting of reports made by government officials in the performance
of their functions.[12] Hence, they are prima facie evidence of the
facts they stated.[13] We agree with the CA’s disquisition on this
point which we quote:
“We readily agree with the petitioner but only insofar as Exhibits ‘B’ and ‘C’ are concerned because, without the affiants taking the witness stand[,] the contents of their respective sworn statements relating to the sequence of events that led to the incident in question and the other details thereof are hearsay for lack of cross-examination.
“On the other hand, Exhibits ‘D’ to ‘O’ are official reports of public officials of their official acts or proceedings and as such are public documents which are prima facie evidence of the truth of the facts stated therein.
“We are not, of course, saying that Exhibits ‘B’ and ‘C’, the sworn statements of eye-witness, are not public documents for in fact they, too, are but there can be no escaping the primordial rule that the testimony of witnesses shall be given orally in open court and under oath or affirmation. Otherwise put, although a document may be subsumed under the category of a public document, if it is excluded by an exclusionary rule, it will be denied admission as evidence.”
Lamsen’s Testimony
But even without these
documents, petitioner would still be liable based on the testimony provided by
Alejandro Lamsen, a taxi driver who testified that he had seen petitioner, who
was his passenger at the time, pull out a gun and shoot Pat. Nilo Resureccion
three times in the chest. In open
court, Lamsen identified and readily pointed to petitioner as the shooter and
killer. The CA affirmed the finding of
the Napolcom hearing officer, Adjudication Board and Special Appeal Committee.
Petitioner claims,
however, that Lamsen was not credible because he subsequently recanted his testimony
“during cross-examination.” He argues:
“However, during cross-examination before the Napolcom hearing officer, he
recanted his previous statement and asseverated that upon hearing the first
gunshot, he immediately alighted from the taxi cab and ran away towards the
other street in the opposite direction, not looking back.”[14]
If the assertion of
petitioner were accurate, we would agree with his claim that the CA and the
Napolcom misappreciated a crucial piece of evidence. He, however, failed to understand the plain import of the proceedings
wherein the recantation had allegedly been made. Even a cursory perusal of the records indicates that it was
not made on cross-examination.
On the contrary, the
recantation was done when Lamsen appeared as a witness for the defense, after
he had testified for the complainants and been cross-examined as such. His subsequent testimony for the defense
was, however, rightly brushed aside, because he had failed to appear for
cross-examination despite due notice.
Indeed, the Napolcom Adjudication Board wrote: “However, he failed to appear for cross-examination despite due
notice at the later stages of the formal investigation prompting the
prosecution to move for the striking out of this portion of his testimony for
the defense from the records and which motion was granted by the Hearing
Officer.”[15] As the CA succinctly stated, “Lamsen’s testimony was stricken off the
records for he never appeared for cross-examination.”[16]
We note that petitioner
continues to insist that the recantation was made on cross-examination,
notwithstanding the clear and explicit rulings to the contrary, issued by the
CA and the Napolcom Special Appellate Committee, Adjudication Board and hearing
officer. Worse, nowhere in his
pleadings before us does he directly controvert or even recognize the existence
of the aforementioned rulings. Rather,
he blithely ignores so basic and so significant a point.
Third Issue: Self-Defense
Equally unmeritorious is
the contention that petitioner was able to establish the elements of
self-defense. In this light, he insists
that the CA and the Napolcom agencies should have given more credence to his
version rather than to that of the complainant, especially because Lamsen had
subsequently recanted his eyewitness testimony.
As stated at the outset,
factual findings of administrative agencies, specially when affirmed by the CA,
are conclusive on this Court.
Petitioner has not given sufficient reason to overturn the rejection of
his claim of self-defense. Apropos here are the following statements of the
SAC-Napolcom quoted by the CA:
“The testimony of the taxi driver, Alejandro Lamsen, which was taken immediately after the incident by police investigator Det. Enrique Madura of Quezon City Police Station, NPD, is deemed a more reliable version of the incident than that of respondent[,] as it was [a] true narration of what actually transpired at the scene of incident, [the] witness having had no ample time to concoct a different story to favor the assailant at the time.
“The claim of respondent in this case that he shot the victim in utter self-defense of his own person is devoid of any credit. After having admitted the wounding or killing of his adversary, he is to be held liable for the offense unless he establishes satisfactorily the fact of legitimate self-defense. In this particular case, the claim of the respondent is not supported by strong and convincing evidence required in proving self-defense. It is a settle[d] jurisprudence that he who seeks justification for his act must prove it to be so by clear and convincing evidence.
“[The f]oregoing considered, the evidence of the prosecution that Pat Resurreccion was shot by the respondent for no justifiable reason is entitled to much weight and credit, the victim at the time being in the act of performing a police duty.”
Dismissal of Criminal Case
Petitioner further
contends that the Quezon City RTC’s dismissal of the criminal case for homicide
instituted against him was “conclusive of his innocence.”[17]
His argument is bereft of
merit. An administrative proceeding is
different from a criminal case and may proceed independently thereof. Indeed,
the quantum of proof in the latter is different, such that the verdict in one
need not necessarily be the same as in the other. In a recent case, the Court explained this difference as follows:[18]
“It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.”
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman),
Vitug, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
J., no part – member of CA Div. which rendered the
assailed decision.
[1] Rollo, pp. 53-71.
[2] Former Special Seventh Division. The Decision
was written by Justice Salvador J. Valdez Jr., with the concurrence of Justices
Angelina S. Gutierrez (chairman and now a member of this Court) and Delilah
Vidallon-Magtolis (member).
[3] CA Decision, p. 19; rollo, p. 70.
[4] CA Decision, pp. 2-5; rollo, pp.
54-57. The CA adopted the narration of
facts made by the office of the solicitor general in its Comment before it.
[5] This case was deemed submitted for resolution
on September 14, 2000, upon receipt by this Court of petitioners’ Memorandum
signed by Attys. Arceli A. Rubin, Teresita S. de Guzman and Ramon E.A.
Gatchalian, all from the Public Attorney’s Office. Earlier, the OSG filed a Motion praying that its Comment be
treated as its Memorandum. The Comment
was signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Maria Aurora P.
Cortes and Sol. Rex Bernardo L. Pascual.
[6] Memorandum for Petitioner, pp. 4-5; rollo,
pp. 249-250. Upper case used in the
original.
[7] See Lazaro v. CA, GR No. 137761, April 6,
2000.
[8] CA Decision, pp. 6-8; rollo, pp.
58-60.
[9] See Vda. De Nazareno v. CA, 257 SCRA 589,
June 26, 1996.
[10] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 9; rollo,
p. 254.
[11] The documents
are as follows:
“Exhibit ‘B’ - Sworn Statement of Mr. Roberto
Caguioa y Sagum
“Exhibit ‘C’ - Sworn Statement of Pat. Filipino
de Leon y Bundang
“Exhibit ‘D’ - Arrest Report of Pat. Filipino de Leon
“Exhibit ‘E’ - Medico-Legal Certificate of N.V.
Resurreccion
“Exhibit ‘F’ - Necropsy Report No. N-77-1682
submitted by Dr. Romeo V. Bertulfo
“Exhibit ‘G’ - Necropsy Report No. N-77-1683
submitted by Dr. Bertulfo
“Exhibit ‘H’ - Chemistry Report No. 77-173
“Exhibit ‘I’ - Chemistry Report No. 77-7141
“Exhibit ‘J’ - Chemistry Report No. C-77-715
“Exhibit ‘K’ - Chemistry Report No. C-77-723
“Exhibit ‘L’ - Chemistry Report No. C-1237-77
“Exhibit ‘M’ - Chemistry Report No. C-12471-77
“Exhibit ‘N’ - Chemistry Report No. C-1248-77
“Exhibit ‘O’ - Ballistic Report No. B-165-77”
[12] Sec. 19 (a) of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
provides that public documents are “[t] written official acts, or records of
the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals,
and public officers, whether of the Philippines or of a foreign country.”
[13] Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
reads as follows: “Documents consisting of entries in public records made in
the performance of a duty by a public officer are prima facie evidence of the
facts therein stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a
third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of
the latter.”
[14] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 10; rollo,
p. 255. In his Petition, petitioner
also maintained that Lamsen had contradicted his testimony “on cross-examination.” (Petition for
Review, p. 3; rollo, p. 33.)
[15] Decision of the Napolcom Adjudication Board,
p. 8; rollo, p. 118.
[16] CA Decision, p. 17; rollo, p. 68.
[17] Petitioner’s Memorandum, p. 14; rollo,
p. 259.
[18] Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v.
Naldoza, 315 SCRA 406, 413, September 29, 1999, per curiam.