THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134958. January 31, 2001]
PATRICIO CUTARAN, DAVID DANGWAS and PACIO DOSIL, petitioners,
vs. DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT and NATURAL RESOURCES, herein represented by
SEC. VICTOR O. RAMOS, OSCAR M. HAMADA and GUILLERMO S. FIANZA, in his capacity
as Chairman of Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands (CSTFAL), Baguio
City, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition
for review of the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals on March 25, 1998 and the order dated August 5,
1998 in CA-G.R SP No. 43930, a petition for prohibition originally filed with
the appellate court to enjoin the respondent DENR from implementing DENR
Special Order Nos. 31, as amended by 31-A and 31-B, series of 1990, Special
Order No. 25, series of 1993 and all other administrative issuances relative
thereto, for having been issued without prior legislative authority.
In 1990 the Assistant
Secretary for Luzon Operations of the DENR issued Special Order no. 31[1] entitled “Creation of a Special Task force
on acceptance, identification, evaluation and delineation of ancestral land
claims in the Cordillera Administrative Region”. The special task force created
thereunder was authorized to accept and evaluate and delineate ancestral land
claims within the said area, and after due evaluation of the claims, to issue appropriate land titles (Certificate of
Ancestral Land Claim) in accordance with existing laws.[2] On
January 15, 1993 the Secretary of the DENR issued Special Order no. 25[3] entitled “Creation of Special Task Forces
provincial and community environment and natural resources offices for the
identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims
nationwide” and Department
Administrative Order no. 02,[4] containing the Implementing Rules and
Guidelines of Special Order no. 25.
In 1990, the same year
Special Order no. 31 was issued, the relatives of herein petitioners filed
separate applications for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) over the
land they, respectively occupy inside the
Camp John Hay Reservation. In 1996 the applications were denied by the DENR
Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands on the ground that the Bontoc
and Applai tribes to which they belong are not among the recognized tribes of
Baguio City. Also pursuant to the
assailed administrative issuances the Heirs of Apeng Carantes filed an
application [5] for certification of ancestral land claim
over a parcel of land also within Camp John Hay and overlapping some portions
of the land occupied by the petitioners. Petitioners claim that even if no
certificate of ancestral land claim has yet been issued by the DENR in favor of
the heirs of Carantes, the latter, on the strength of certain documents issued
by the DENR, tried to acquire possession of the land they applied for,
including the portion occupied by herein petitioners. Petitioners also allege
that the heirs of Carantes removed some of the improvements they introduced
within the area they actually occupy and if not for the petitioner’s timely
resistance to such intrusions, the petitioners would have been totally evicted
therefrom.
Hence, this petition for
prohibition originally filed with the Court of Appeals to enjoin the respondent
DENR from implementing the assailed administrative issuances and from processing
the application for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the
heirs of Carantes on the ground that the said administrative issuances are void
for lack of legal basis.
The Court of Appeals[6] held that the assailed DENR Special Orders
Nos. 31, 31-A, 31-B issued in 1990 prior to the effectivity of RA 7586 known
as the National Integrated Protected
Areas Systems (NIPAS) Act of 1992, are of no force and effect “for pre-empting
legislative prerogative” but sustained the validity of DENR Special Order No.
25, and its implementing rules (DAO No. 02, series of 1993) by the appellate
court on the ground that they were issued pursuant to the powers delegated to the DENR under section 13 of RA 7586,
which reads:
“Section 13. Ancestral Lands and Rights over Them.- Ancestral lands
and customary rights and interest arising therefrom shall be accorded due
recognition. The DENR shall prescribe rules and regulations to govern ancestral
lands within protected areas: Provided, that the DENR shall have no power to
evict indigenous communities from their present occupancy nor resettle them to
another area without their consent: Provided, however, that all rules and
regulations, whether adversely affecting said communities or not, shall be
subjected to notice and hearing to be participated in by members of concerned
indigenous community.”[7]
The petitioners filed
with this Court a petition for review of the appellate court’s decision on the
ground that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the validity of Special
Order No. 25 and its implementing rules. The petitioners seek to enjoin the respondent
DENR from processing the application for certificate of ancestral land claim
filed by the Heirs of Carantes.
Petitioners contend that in addition to the failure of the DENR to
publish the assailed administrative
issuances in a newspaper of general circulation prior to its implementation, RA
7586, which provides for the creation of a National Integrated Protected Areas
System, does not contain the slightest implication of a grant of authority to
the DENR to adjudicate or confer title over lands occupied by indigenous
communities. It is contended that the
said law only grants DENR administrative and managerial powers over designated
national and natural parks called “protected areas” wherein rare and endangered
species of plants and animals inhabit.[8] The petitioners further allege that the
subsequent passage of in 1997 of Republic Act 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, wherein the power to evaluate and issue
certificates of ancestral land titles is vested in the National Commission on
Indigenous Cultural Communities/ Indigenous People (NCIP) is unmistakable
indication of the legislature’s withholding of authority from the DENR to
confer title over lands occupied by indigenous communities.[9] Finally, the petitioners claim that the
validity of the questioned DENR special orders cannot be based on the
constitutional provisions regarding the protection of cultural communities as
the said provisions are policy statements to guide the legislature in the
exercise of their law-making powers and by themselves are not self-executory.
The Solicitor-General
filed memorandum in behalf of the respondent DENR praying for the affirmance of
the appellate court’s decision. The
respondent argues that the subject DENR special orders were issued pursuant to
the powers granted by RA 7586 to the DENR to protect the socio-economic
interests of indigenous peoples. The
land occupied by the petitioners is within a “protected area” as defined by the
said law and is well within the jurisdiction of the DENR. The respondent
likewise claims that the petitioners are estopped from contesting the validity
of the DENR administrative issuances considering that their relatives applied
for certificates of ancestral land claim (CALC) under the said special orders
which applications were, however,
denied. The petitioners should not be
allowed to challenge the same administrative orders which they themselves
previously invoked.
The respondents do not
contest the ruling of the appellate court as regards the nullity of Special
Order no. 31, as amended. The sole
issue before us concerns the validity of
DENR Special Order no. 25, series of 1993 and its implementing rules DAO
no. 02. The petitioners’ main contention
is that the assailed administrative orders were issued beyond the jurisdiction
or power of the DENR secretary under the NIPAS Act of 1992. They seek to enjoin the respondents from
processing the application for ancestral land claim filed by the heirs of
Carantes because if approved, the petitioners may be evicted from the portion
of the land they occupy which overlaps the land applied for by the Carantes
heirs.
From a reading of the
records it appears to us that the petition was prematurely filed. Under the undisputed facts there is as yet no
justiciable controversy for the court to resolve and the petition should have been dismissed by the appellate
court on this ground.
We gather from the
allegations of the petition and that of the petitioners’ memorandum that the
alleged application for certificate of ancestral land claim (CALC) filed by the
heirs of Carantes under the assailed
DENR special orders has not been granted nor the CALC applied for, issued. The
DENR is still processing the application of the heirs of Carantes for a
certificate of ancestral land claim, which the DENR may or may not grant. It is evident that the adverse legal
interests involved in this case are the competing claims of the petitioners and
that of the heirs of Carantes to possess a common portion of a piece of
land. As the undisputed facts stand
there is no justiciable controversy between the petitioners and the respondents
as there is no actual or imminent violation of the petitioners’ asserted right
to possess the land by reason of the implementation of the questioned
administrative issuances.
A justiciable controversy
has been defined as, “ a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interests”[10] which may be resolved by a court of law
through the application of a law.[11] Courts have no judicial power to review
cases involving political questions and as a rule, will desist from taking
cognizance of speculative or hypothetical cases, advisory opinions and in cases
that has become moot.[12] Subject to certain well-defined exceptions[13] courts will not touch an issue involving the
validity of a law unless there has been a governmental act accomplished or
performed that has a direct adverse effect on the legal right of the person
contesting its validity.[14] In the case of PACU vs. Secretary of
Education[15] the petition contesting the validity of a
regulation issued by the Secretary of Education requiring private schools to
secure a permit to operate was dismissed on the ground that all the petitioners
have permits and are actually operating under the same. The petitioners
questioned the regulation because of the possibility that the permit might be
denied them in the future. This Court held that there was no justiciable
controversy because the petitioners suffered no wrong by the implementation of
the questioned regulation and therefore, they are not entitled to relief. A
mere apprehension that the Secretary of Education will withdraw the permit does
not amount to a justiciable controversy. The questioned regulation in the PACU
case may be questioned by a private school whose permit to operate has been
revoked or one whose application therefor has been denied.[16]
This Court cannot rule on
the basis of petitioners’ speculation that the DENR will approve the
application of the heirs of Carantes.
There must be an actual governmental act which directly causes or will
imminently cause injury to the alleged legal right of the petitioner to possess
the land before the jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked. There is no showing that the petitioners
were being evicted from the land by the heirs of Carantes under orders from the
DENR. The petitioners’ allegation that
certain documents from the DENR were shown to them by the heirs of Carantes to justify eviction is vague, and
it would appear that the petitioners did not verify if indeed the respondent
DENR or its officers authorized the attempted eviction. Suffice it to say that by the petitioners
own admission that the respondents are still processing and have not approved
the application of the heirs of Carantes, the petitioners alleged right to
possess the land is not violated nor is in imminent danger of being violated,
as the DENR may or may not approve Carantes’ application. Until such time, the petitioners are simply
speculating that they might be evicted from the premises at some future time.
Borrowing from the pronouncements of this Court in the PACU case, “They (the
petitioners) have suffered no wrong under the terms of the law—and, naturally need
no relief in the form they now seek to obtain.”[17] If indeed the heirs of Carantes are trying
to enter the land and disturbing the petitioners possession thereof even
without prior approval by the DENR of the claim of the heirs of Carantes, the
case is simply one for forcible entry.
WHEREFORE, for lack of justiciable controversy, the
decision of the appellate court is hereby set aside.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman),
Vitug, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ., concur.
[1] Subsequently amended by 31-A and 31-B.
[2] Special Order
no. 31, as amended, series of 1990 states:
“In the interest of the service and consistent with the Constitutional mandate for the recognition and protection of the rights of the indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their socio-economic and cultural well-being, a Special Task Force that is responsible for acceptance, identification, evaluation, and delineation of ancestral land claims in the Cordillera Administrative Region is hereby created to be composed of the following:
xxx xxx xxx xxxx
The Special Task Force shall accept, identify, and evaluate all applications/petitions of ancestral land claims in the CAR and if found valid, delineate same by actual ground survey for plotting in a compilation map.
1. The Special Task Force shall coordinate with the Indigenous Community Affairs Division, Special Concerns Office, Regional Secretariat on Townsite Sales Applications and other actively involved concerned government agencies, private and/or non-governmental organizations on the verification of the authenticity of all ancestral land claims by taking into consideration the indigenous customs and practices regarding land use, ownership and management.
2. The compilation map of ancestral land claims prepared by the Survey Section, CENRO Baguio City together with all the pertinent documents thereof shall be turned over to the herein Special Task Force.
3. The Special Task Force shall prepare separate guidelines in the acceptance, identification, evaluation and delineation of ancestral land claims in Baguio City and the rest of the Cordillera Region. It shall classify the applications for ancestral land claims based on the prepared guidelines.
4. Paragraph 6 of DENR Special Order No. 31, Series of 1990 is hereby amended to read as follows:
“The Special Task Force after evaluating and delineating all
ancestral land claims shall recommend en banc to the Secretary of the DENR
through the Regional Executive Director of CAR and the indigenous community
Affairs Division, special concerns Office, for the issuance of Certificates of
Ancestral Domain/Land over those areas determined to be ancestral. “ (CA Rollo,
pp. 15-19).
[3] Special Order
no. 25, series of 1993 states:
“In the interest of the service and consistent with the Constitutional mandate for the recognition and protection of the rights of the indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands and domains to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being, a Provincial Special Task Force on Ancestral Domains and a Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands are hereby created in every Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) and Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO), respectively, where there is known to exist a concentration of said communities.
Each Provincial Task Force on Ancestral Domains shall effect the identification, delineation and recognition of ancestral domain claims of indigenous cultural communities in its area of jurisdiction as well as the formulation and execution of strategies and plans for the sustainable development of the natural resources in these territories. Accordingly, it shall determine, undertake and/or coordinate all activities necessary for the proper discharge of this function; provided, that the actual survey of ancestral domain claims shall be planned and executed by the Office of the Regional Executive Director concerned.
Likewise, each Community Special
Task Force shall, on the basis of applications filed by individual or
indigenous corporate (families or clans) claimants, cause the identification,
delineation and recognition of ancestral land claims in its area of
responsibility. For this purpose, it
shall undertake and/or coordinate all activities necessary for the proper
discharge of this function, including the investigation and ocular inspection
of such claims. (CA Rollo, pp. 20-37).
[4] “Pursuant to
Section 22, Article II; Section 5, Article XII and Section 6, Article XIII of
the 1987 Constitution which provide for the recognition and protection of the
rights of the indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to
ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being; Executive Order No. 192
which empowers DENR to exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and
disposition of all lands of the public domain; and R.A. No. 7586 which provides
for the due recognition of ancestral domains and other customary rights in
protected areas, the following rules and regulations are hereby promulgated for
the guidance of all concerned.”
xxxxxxx xxxxxxxx xxxxxxxx
Sec. 9. Issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims.-
The Community Special Task Force on Ancestral Lands shall prepare and submit to
the Provincial Special Task Force on Ancestral Domains a report on each and
every application surveyed and delineated. Thereafter the PSTFAD, after
evaluating the reports shall endorse valid ancestral land claims to the office
of the Regional Executive Director for further review and evaluation. Should
the office of the Executive Regional Director find such claims meritorious, it
shall endorse the same through the Special concerns Office to the Secretary for
the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims(CALC), declaring and
certifying the claim of each individual or corporate (family or clan) claimant
over ancestral lands.”
[5] Application no. BG-J-319.
[6] Montoya, J., ponente, JJ.
Vidallon-Magtolis and Cosico, concurring.
[7] Court of Appeals decision, pp. 4-5.
[8] Sections 2 and 10, RA 7586. (1992).
[9] Sections 38, 42 (e).
[10] Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 1962,ed.,
quoting from the U.S. Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, p. 360.
[11] Macasiano vs. National Housing
Authority, 224 SCRA 238; Bernas, The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines: A Commentary, vol. II, 1988 ed., pp. 274-275.
[12] Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1998 ed.,
p.257-259.
[13] Solicitor-General vs. MMA, December
11, 1991; Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392.
[14] Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 678.
[15] 97 Phil.806.
[16] Bernas, supra.
[17] PACU, supra., at p. 810.