FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001]
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner, vs. SUSAN YEE
CARIÑO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
J.:
The issue for resolution
in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by
the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, whose “death benefits” is now the subject
of the controversy between the two Susans whom he married.
Before this Court is a
petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
51263, which affirmed in toto the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of
the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first was on
June 20, 1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cariño (hereafter referred to as
Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee
Cariño; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan Yee
Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their
almost ten year cohabitation starting way back in 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S.
Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. He passed away on
November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and
burial expenses. Both petitioner and
respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect
a total of P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and]
Pag-ibig,”[3] while respondent Susan Yee received a total
of P21,000.00 from “GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).”[4]
On December 14, 1993,
respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money
against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be
ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six
thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death
benefits” which she (petitioner) received from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation,
NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner failed to
file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee
admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence
of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
She, however, claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage
and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of the deceased, where she
met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for collection of sum
of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased
is void ab initio because the same was solemnized without the required
marriage license. In support thereof,
respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the
petitioner which bears no marriage license number;[5] and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994,
from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads –
This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage
license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married
in this municipality on June 20, 1969.
Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copy or transcription of
Marriage License number from the records of this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee
Cariño for whatever legal purpose it may serve.[6]
On August 28, 1995, the
trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the
form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus
attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.[7]
On appeal by petitioner
to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision
of the trial court. Hence, the instant
petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO
HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY
CODE.[8]
Under Article 40 of the
Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law,
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void.[9] However, for purposes other than remarriage,
no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited
to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child,
settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for
that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the
death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to
question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the
determination of the case.[10] In such instances, evidence must be adduced,
testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a
previous marriage an absolute nullity.
These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.[11]
It is clear therefore
that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity
of the two marriages in this case, as the same is essential to the
determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of
the deceased.
Under the Civil Code,
which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite
of marriage,[12] and the absence thereof, subject to certain
exceptions,[13] renders the marriage void ab initio.[14]
In the case at bar, there
is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall
within the marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was
indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract
of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified
by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no
record of such marriage license. In Republic
v. Court of Appeals,[15] the Court held that such a certification is
adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in
the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of
all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the
presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been
sufficiently overcome. It then became
the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they
secured the required marriage license.
Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner
could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage
license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the
issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put her case in
jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity
of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil,
therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased,
having been solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being
one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is
undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow from
the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and
the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death benefits”
under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family
Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party
can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the second marriage would also be
void.
Accordingly, the
declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of
the deceased with respondent Susan Yee.
The fact remains that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao
and the deceased void. Hence, the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise, void ab
initio.
One of the effects of the
declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the
spouses according to the applicable property regime.[16] Considering that the two marriages are void ab
initio, the applicable property regime would not be absolute community or
conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of
Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without
Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the
Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages,
adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships
where both man and woman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of
the same married man,[17] -
“... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...”
In
this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual
joint contribution shall belong to the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party
belong to him or her exclusively. Then
too, contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or
spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime.[18]
Considering that the
marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage,
having been solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then
presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the deceased), the application of
Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00
from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation,
Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from
governmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof
to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or
industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not owned in common by respondent
and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By
intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shall pass to
his legal heirs. And, respondent, not
being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.
As to the property regime
of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code
governs. This article applies to unions
of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to
contract marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons,
like the absence of a marriage license.
Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and
a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each
other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal shares and
the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained by their
joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal
shares. For purposes of this Article, a
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any
property shall be deemed to have contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof
if the former’s efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and
of the household.
x x x x x x x
x x
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good
faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall be
forfeited in favor of their common children.
In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take
place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article
148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party
during the cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will
be divided equally between them, even if only one party earned the wages and
the other did not contribute thereto.[19] Conformably, even if the disputed “death
benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article
147 creates a co-ownership in respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to
share one-half thereof. As there is no
allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage
are presumed to be in good faith. Thus,
one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shall go to the
petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining
to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs,
namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision
of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de
Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance System,[20] where the Court awarded one-half of the
retirement benefits of the deceased to the first wife and the other half, to
the second wife, holding that:
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been
dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established by that
marriage has not ceased. Nor has the
first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under
the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she
survive him. Consequently, whether as
conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she
has an interest in the husband’s share in the property here in dispute....” And
with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although
the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated
while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial
declaration of such nullity. And
inasmuch as the conjugal partnership formed by the second marriage was
dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, “[t]he only just and
equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second
wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired by her and her husband,
and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the
first marriage.”[21]
It should be stressed,
however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a
prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the
Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing
property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of
Appeals,[22] however, the Court, construing Article 40 of
the Family Code, clarified that a prior
and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition
precedent only for purposes of remarriage.
That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a
second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the
first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void.
The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void
because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or
invalidity or their marriage. However,
for purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of
sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate
judicial declaration of nullity is necessary.
All that a party has to do is to present evidence, testimonial or
documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights
flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the
court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on
the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the
parties in accordance with the applicable laws and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog,[23] the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a
suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. This is
without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of
declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause “on the basis of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void” in Article 40 of the
Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for
purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 which affirmed the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent
the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.
(Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Puno J., on official leave.
[1] Rollo,
pp. 43-47.
[2] Rollo,
pp. 49-55.
[3] Exhibit
“F”, Records, p. 38.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Exhibit
“D-1”, Records, p. 36
[6] Exhibit
“E”, Records, p. 37.
[7] Rollo,
p. 55.
[8] Rollo,
p. 18.
[9] Domingo
v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993].
[10] Niñal,
et al., v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000.
[11] Domingo
v. Court of Appeals, supra.
[12] ART. 53. No
marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2) Their consent, freely given;
(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4) A
marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
[13] ART.
58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this
Title, but not those under Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without
a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the municipality
where either contracting party habitually resides.
[14] ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from
the beginning:
x x x x x x x x x
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;
x x x x x x x x x
[15] 236
SCRA 257, 261-262; citing the Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 29.
[16] Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2),
(3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also apply in proper
cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by
final judgment under Articles 40 and 45.
The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.
x x x x x x x x x
Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects:
x x x x x x x x x
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
x x x x x x x x x
Art. 44. If both
spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be
void ab initio and all donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by operation of law.
[17] Sempio-Diy,
Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 233-234 (1995).
[18] Id.,
p. 234.
[19] Id.,
p. 230.
[20] 37
SCRA 316 [1971].
[21] Id.,
p. 326.
[22] Supra.
[23] Supra.