SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137509. August 15, 2001]
PEVET ADALID FELIZARDO, RONEMAR FELIZARDO, PERFECTO ADALID and VENERANDA ADALID, petitioners, vs. SIEGFREDO FERNANDEZ, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari
from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 46748, which
affirmed the judgment of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), upholding the ruling of its Regional Adjudicator in DARAB Case No. X
(07) 818.
The petition stems from a
complaint[1] for illegal ejectment, reinstatement, and damages
filed by respondent Siegfredo Fernandez against petitioners Ronemar and Pevet
Adalid Felizardo (Felizardos) and Perfecto and Veneranda Adalid (Adalids),
owners of a two-hectare agricultural land situated in Barangay Garang, Tangub
City, Province of Misamis Occidental, of which 1.5 hectares tenanted by
respondent’s father used for planting coconut and corn since the early 1930’s.
In 1981, when Policarpo
was already 74 years old, the task of working on the tenanted land fell on his
son, respondent Siegfredo, who was the only member of the household then living
with Policarpo. For close to 15 years and even while his father was still
alive, Siegfredo cultivated the land, harvested the coconuts, and sold the
copra to buyers in Tangub City. During those years, the “pesadas” were placed
in Siegfredo’s name and the latter observed the same 1/3-2/3 sharing
arrangement of the copra produce with the landowners, as his father previously
did.
After Policarpo passed
away on August 31, 1995, the Felizardos and Adalids—children of the landowners
and acting as attorneys-in-fact of the Adalids who were then already residing
in Los Angeles, California, U.S.A— sought to eject Siegfredo from the land he
was tilling. The Felizardos refused to
recognize Siegfredo as the lawful successor to Policarpo’s tenancy rights and
instead, appointed Asuncion Fernandez Espinosa, Siegfredo’s 65-year old elder
sister, as tenant.
Subsequently, in October
1995, the Felizardos and Adalids brought criminal charges against Siegfredo for
usurpation and qualified theft before the regular courts. While these cases were pending, the
landowners harvested the coconuts on November 6, 1995, sold the same and
excluded Siegfredo in the sharing arrangement of 1/3-2/3 scheme.[2]
Siegfredo then filed this
present case before the Regional Adjudication Board (Region 10) of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) against the Adalids and Felizardos.
Siegfredo alleged that by virtue of successional tenancy rights, he is the
lawful tenant of the land. He pointed out that he substituted his father and
assumed cultivation of the land for 15 long years without objection from the
landowners. Therefore, he became a bona fide tenant and could not be ejected
because he is the lawful tenant.
Siegfredo also claimed
that there is no other qualified successor to his father’s leasehold right
because all his eight elder siblings were no longer members of Policarpo’s
immediate farm household. Asuncion, in particular, was already of advanced age
and could not be expected to work on the land personally. She lived elsewhere
in Tangub City and has never helped their father in the farm nor been a
farmworker in her entire life.[3]
On the other hand, the
Felizardos and Adalids denied Siegfredo’s tenancy status and insisted that
after Policarpo’s death, they had the right to choose who among the Fernandez
siblings would succeed Policarpo in the latter’s agricultural leasehold rights.
They asserted that the right to choose the agricultural lessor belonged to the
landowner in accordance with Section 9 of Republic Act No. 3844 or the
Agricultural Land Reform Code.[4] They stressed that
they have already appointed Asuncion to continue Policarpo’s agricultural lease
on September 22, 1995. A leasehold contract was also entered into on October
24, 1995 between Asuncion and the landowners, copy of which was already
furnished to the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) in Tangub City.[5]
On March 26, 1996, the
Regional Adjudicator ruled in favor of Siegfredo and disposed of the case thus:
WHEREFORE, decision is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the immediate reinstatement of complainant as the Bonafide tenant-lessee to the subject landholding;
2. Ordering the cancellation of the existing leasehold contract between defendants and one Asuncion Espinosa, and in lieu thereof, the execution of a leasehold contract as between herein complainant and defendants;
3. Ordering the respondents to account for and pay to the complainant his share or the amount in excess of his rentals after deducting the expenses in the harvest of November, 1995 and February 1996 based on the “pesadas” from the copra buyer;
4. Ordering respondents to pay the amount of P10,000 as in (sic) Attorney’s Fees and the amount of P5,000 as litigation expenses.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The Regional Adjudicator
held that the landowner’s right to choose a lessor under Section 9 of R.A. No.
3844 is circumscribed by the requirements that the prospective lessor must be
able to cultivate the land personally and be a member of the original tenant’s
immediate farm household. Based on these factors, the Adjudicator declared that
Asuncion does not qualify to take over Policarpo’s leasehold right. Moreover, the Adjudicator noted that the
landowners did not object to Siegfredo’s tillage of the land and they accepted
their share in the harvest proceeds from Siegfredo for 15 years. According to the Adjudicator, they impliedly
consented to the new tenancy relationship under Section 7 of Republic Act No.
1199[7]or the Agricultural
Tenancy Act, as amended.
On appeal to the DARAB,
where the case was docketed as DARAB Case No. 4983, the Board affirmed the
findings of the Regional Adjudicator.[8] The Court of
Appeals, to which the case was subsequently elevated, agreed with the DARAB.[9]
Hence, this recourse.
Petitioners submit the
following questions of law for our resolution:
1. Whether or not under the law the right to choose to succeed the tenancy right of a tenant belongs to the landowner or not (sic).
2. Whether or not
respondent Siegfredo Fernandez during the lifetime of his father can already be
considered as a tenant as allegedly he was already the one doing the duties of
his father until his death in 1995.[10]
The issue to be
determined in this case is whether Siegfredo has acquired the status of
agricultural tenant which would preclude petitioners from exercising their
right to choose Asuncion as Policarpo’s successor after the latter’s death.
Petitioners mainly
contend that their right to choose a tenant successor under Section 9 of RA No.
3844 is subsisting, despite the fact that Siegfredo took over his father’s
landholding as early as 1981. They
maintain that they did not object to Siegfredo’s personal cultivation of the
land for 15 years because they believed that during that period, Siegfredo was
merely aiding Policarpo as member of the latter’s immediate farm
household. They argue that could not be
construed as having impliedly consented to a leasehold relation with Siegfredo
under Section 7 of R.A. No. 1199, since Policarpo was then still alive and was
not declared to be permanently incapacitated.
Respondent, on the other
hand, insists that he is the sole qualified successor to Policarpo’s leasehold,
being the only immediate member of the farm household who personally cultivated
the land during the latter’s lifetime.
According to respondent, the landowner concededly has the right to
choose a tenant successor under Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844, but only if there
were two or more qualified prospective lessors from among the original tenants’
descendants. Besides, according to
respondent, petitioners did not question his assumption of Policarpo’s leasehold
obligations for many years. Consequently, he concludes that they could not now
belatedly deny his status as tenant of the land.
As found by the appellate
court and the proper agencies below, the evidence on record strongly suggests
that respondent became Policarpo’s tenant successor by implied consent of
petitioners. On this point, we are in
agreement.
Petitioners assert that
for 15 years, they thought that respondent was merely helping Policarpo in the
latter’s personal cultivation of the land.
In our view, however, the period of 15 years is too long a time to hold
on to such a thought which appears to be only an unverified assumption. The
undisputed fact, as found by the DARAB, is that respondent worked on the land
since 1981 because his father could no longer do so. Respondent did not merely
aid his father in the latter’s farm work, but completely took over that work since
Policarpo was already very old and incapable to continue farming. Section 5 (p)[11] of R.A. No. 1199
defines “incapacity” as any cause or circumstance which prevents the tenant
from fulfilling his contractual obligations. Respondent fully assumed his
father’s leasehold obligations for 15 years precisely because Policarpo could
no longer perform his duties as petitioners’ tenant and respondent is the only
member remaining of the original tenant’s immediate farm household.
The Regional Adjudicator
correctly took judicial notice of the fact that at the age of 74 Policarpo was
not able and could not reasonably be expected to till the land anymore.[12] Petitioners were not unaware of this circumstance
since they already dealt with, and received the land’s proceeds from
respondent. The incapacity of Policarpo to attend to farm work had been evident
to petitioners. The prevailing situation in the farm and the length of time
which had lapsed from the time respondent assumed the tenancy work until his
father’s death amply support that conclusion.
A tenancy relationship
may be established either verbally or in writing, expressly or impliedly, in
accordance with Section 7 of R.A. No. 1199. As aptly held by the Regional
Adjudicator:
…the transfer and/or delega tion of such tenancy obligations to
herein complainant [respondent] was in conformity to the general practice among
farmers, especially so in the case of complainant who had been assisting his
father in the farmworks (sic). When defendants failed to intervene or object to
this development, and continued to accept their shares as proferred by the new
cultivator, they have thereby impliedly consented to it giving rise to the new
tenancy relationship with the complainant.[13]
Although petitioners did
not expressly give their consent to a leasehold relation with respondent, in
our view petitioners consented to the tenancy albeit impliedly by allowing
respondent to cultivate the landholding in question and by receiving from him
the landowner’s share of the harvest over a considerable length of time.
While it is true that
Section 9 of R.A. No. 3844 gives the lessor/landowner the right to choose a
tenant successor in case of death or incapacity of the original tenant, in this
case we agree that said right could no longer be exercised by petitioners. Not
only have they allowed the lapse of a long period of time before attempting to
exercise said right, it was also found that the successor they had allegedly
chosen, Asuncion Fernandez Espinosa, was not qualified to succeed Policarpo
because (a) she was no longer a member of the latter’s immediate farm
household; and (b) she could not and did not, at any time, personally cultivate
the land as shown by her unexplained absence during the harvests subsequent to
respondent’s dispossession. Note also
that in 1995, she was already 65 years old.
Moreover, we agree that
to recognize petitioners’ right to choose the tenant at this point could result
in material loss, grave damage and great injustice to respondent. Accordingly,
we find applicable in this instance the equitable principle of estoppel by
laches in respondent’s favor.
Laches is defined as the
failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do
that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done
earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled thereto has either
abandoned or declined to assert it. The principle of laches is based on grounds
of public policy which requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement
of stale claims. It is principally
directed against the unfairness of permitting an alleged right or claim to be
enforced.[14] It concerns itself
with whether or not by reason of long inaction or inexcusable neglect, a person
claiming a right should be barred from asserting the same, because to allow him
to do so would be unjust to the person against whom such right is sought to be
enforced.[15]
In the present case,
allowing petitioners to dispossess respondent would clearly prejudice the
tiller, who poured time and energy to ensure that his father’s leasehold
remained productive not merely for respondent’s advantage, but for petitioners’
as well. For almost 15 years,
petitioners did not object to respondent’s farm work which accrued to their own
benefit. It would thus be utterly
unfair for petitioners now to eject respondent from the land he has been
tilling for 15 years, simply because of petitioners’ choice of respondent’s
sister, Asuncion, as Policarpo’s successor.[16] Besides, as
correctly observed by the Regional Adjudicator, to give petitioners the right
to exercise that choice would merely result in the unnecessary displacement of
respondent who, after years of labor, now has an undeniable stake on the land.
Given the practical circumstances as well as the legal and equitable
considerations in this case, we are in agreement with the Court of Appeals, the
DARAB, and the Regional Adjudicator that respondent’s leasehold rights deserve
to be protected and maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 46748 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman),
Mendoza, Buena, and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] CA
Records, pp. 31-35.
[2] Id.
at 74-75.
[3] Id.
at 43.
[4] SEC. 9. Agricultural Leasehold Relation Not
Extinguished by Death or Incapacity of the Parties.- In case of death or
permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee to work his landholding, the
leasehold shall continue between the agricultural lessor and the person who can
cultivate the landholding personally, chosen by the agricultural lessor within
one month from such death or permanent incapacity, from among the following:
(a) the surviving spouse; (b) the eldest direct descendant by consanguinity;
(c) the next eldest descendant or descendants in the order of their age: Provided,
That in case the death or permanent incapacity of the agricultural lessee
occurs during the agricultural year, such choice shall be exercised at the end
of that agricultural year: Provided, further, That in the event
the agricultural lessor fails to exercise his choice within the periods herein
provided, the priority shall be in accordance with the order herein
established.
In case of death or permanent incapacity of the
agricultural lessor, the leasehold shall bind his legal heirs.
[5] Supra,
note 1 at 64-65.
[6] Id.
at 83-84.
[7] SEC.
7. Tenancy Relationship; How Established; Security of Tenure.- Tenancy
relationship may be established either verbally or in writing, expressly or
impliedly. Once such relationship is established, the tenant shall be entitled
to security of tenure as hereinafter provided.
[8] Supra,
note 1 at 14-19.
[9] Rollo,
pp. 20-26.
[10] Id.
at 5.
[11] SEC.5. Definition of Terms.- As used in this
Act:
x x x
(p) Incapacity means any cause or circumstance which prevents the tenant from fulfilling his contractual obligations and those imposed by this Act.
x x x
[12] Supra,
note 1 at 82.
[13] Ibid.
[14] See
Heirs of Pedro Lopez vs. De Castro, 324 SCRA 591, 614-615 (2000), citing
Catholic Bishop of Balanga vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 112519, 332
Phil. 206, 218-219 (1996); 264 SCRA 181, 192-194 (1996).
[15] See
Heirs of Teodoro Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 172, 182
(1998), citing Pabalate vs. Echarri, Jr., No. L-24357, 37 SCRA
518, 521-522 (1971).
[16] The
petitioners’ right to choose the successor of the original tenant is not
perpetually barred; provided, the terms and circumstances of Sec. 9, Rep. Act
3844 is adhered to in good faith and not to circumvent the same. The right of a landowner is also protected
under the law.