SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126480. August 10, 2001]
MARIA TIN @ MARIA TY @ MARIA DY, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
This petition assails the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24, 1996, affirming the decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, dated May 5, 1993, finding the
accused (now petitioner) Maria Tin @ “Maria Ty” @ “Maria Dy” guilty of estafa
and sentencing her to suffer imprisonment of six years and one day of prision
mayor as minimum to 20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum and to
pay the private complainant, Dr. Francisca M. Santiago, the amount of P280,000.00
plus 12 percent interest per annum from the filing of the information and P40,000.00
as attorney’s fees.
Petitioner was charged in
an Information which reads:
That, on or about February 8, 1980, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud one FRANCISCA M. SANTIAGO in the following manner, to wit: the accused received in trust from said Francisca M. Santiago several pieces of jewelry with an estimated value of more than P220,000.00 as collateral to the loan in the amount of P220,000.00 which the latter obtained from the accused, under the express obligation of returning the said pieces of jewelry to said Francisca M. Santiago immediately upon demand for redemption, but the said accused once in possession of the said pieces of jewelry far from complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed and refused, and still fails and refuses to do so despite repeated demands made upon her to that effect and with intent to defraud the said accused denied having received the said pieces of jewelry to the damage and prejudice of the said Francisca M. Santiago.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]
On arraignment,
petitioner pleaded not guilty.
At the trial, private
complainant Dr. Francisca Santiago testified that on February 8, 1980, she and
Aurora Jose went to Mady’s Pawnshop owned by petitioner to pawn some pieces of
jewelry. She initially asked for P250,000.00 but petitioner offered only
P220,000.00, P200,000.00 first and then the P20,000.00 a
week later. A list of the jewelries was
typewritten by a helper of the petitioner.
This list was signed by petitioner as evidence of her receipt of the said
jewelries.[2] Dr. Santiago also averred that from 1980 to
1982, she made 19 payments of various amounts totaling P95,600.00.[3] She said that the loan was under a
“white-paper” system where there is no maturity/expiration date and where the
jewelry can be redeemed anytime provided the interests were paid.[4]
On February 1, 1984, Dr.
Santiago said, she went to the pawnshop with a certain Mrs. Dava and a Mrs.
Zuñiga to redeem her jewelry. She
brought with her the amount of P450,000.00 to settle her loan. However, petitioner told her that the
jewelries were already sold.[5] This prompted Dr. Santiago to consult Atty.
German Abaya Sipin, who wrote to Maria Tin[6] asking her to allow Dr. Santiago to redeem
the pieces of jewelry. On March 2,
1984, petitioner replied through her counsel, Atty. Marcelo T. Dy, confirming
that Dr. Santiago has an unsettled obligation of P220,000.00
and demanding payment. The letter also
stated that no jewelries were received as collateral for the loan.[7] In a handwritten letter dated March 7, 1984,
Dr. Santiago pleaded for the redemption of her jewelries.[8] Maria Tin, also in a handwritten letter
dated March 16, 1984, replied that she merely acted as guarantor of the loan
and since she was made to pay the loan she now was demanding payment therefor.[9] In said letter, Tin narrated the
circumstances behind the loan, and alleged that it was another person who gave
the loan and received the jewelry as collateral.
Petitioner testified that
the real parties to the loan were Dr. Santiago and her daughter-in-law, Mia
Chan. She merely introduced them to one
another and it was Mia Chan who signed the acknowledgment receipt and who
actually received the pieces of jewelry.[10]
Mia Chan, for her part,
corroborated the testimony of petitioner, her mother-in-law. She stated that she was the one who extended
the loan to Dr. Santiago and that she merely asked petitioner to appraise the
pieces of jewelry for her. She also
requested petitioner to collect payments from Dr. Santiago. According to Mia
Chan, the loan was for a three-month term with 14 percent interest per annum.
She stated she signed the receipt upon request of Dr. Santiago.[11]
On May 5, 1993, the trial
court rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty. The dispositive portion of
the said decision reads:
From the foregoing, the court finds MARIA TIN, alias MARIA TY or MARIA DY, the accused, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of ESTAFA. Accused is hereby sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
Accused is hereby ordered to pay Dr. Francisca M. Santiago the amount of P280,000.00 plus 12% interest per annum from the filing of the Information and P40,000.00 as Attorney’s Fees.
Dr. Francisca M. Santiago is required to pay the docket fees of the civil aspect of this case.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioner appealed with
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision. Her Motion for
Reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner avers that the appellate court erred in:
I. … NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION’S EVIDENCE IS FULL OF LOOPHOLES AND SELF-CONTRADICTIONS, APART FROM BEING INHERENTLY INCREDIBLE, AND HENCE GROSSLY INSUFFICIENT FOR CONVICTION.
II. … RELYING ON WHAT IT PERCEIVED TO BE WEAKNESSES OF THE DEFENSE RATHER ON THE STRENGTH OF THE PROSECUTION’S CASE.
III. … NOT UPHOLDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S CONTENTION (A) THAT SANTIAGO LIED WHEN SHE SAID THAT IT WAS ONLY WHEN SHE ARRIVED AT MADY’S PAWNSHOP THAT SHE CAME TO KNOW FROM WHOM SHE WAS GOING TO OBTAIN A LOAN AND THAT IT WAS SANTIAGO WHO TYPED AND PREPARED EXH. “A” AND (B) THAT DRA. SANTIAGO HERSELF PREPARED EXH. “A” AND WROTE THE NAME “MARIA TIN” AS THE LENDER.
Essentially, in our view,
petitioner raises issues of fact by assailing the credibility of
witnesses. As a general rule, this
Court in a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court will review only errors
of law. It is not the function of this
Court to weigh the evidence on factual issues all over again.[13] However, there are certain exceptions to
this rule, one of which is when the judgment is based on misapprehension of
facts.[14] In this case, the decisions of both the
trial court and the Court of Appeals are allegedly based on misapprehensions of
vital facts, making their review necessary.
A conviction in this case
for estafa depends on three facts: (1) that accused was the one who extended
the loan; (2) that accused was the one who received the pieces of jewelry as
collateral for the loan she extended; and (3) that the loan was for an
indefinite term. These factual
circumstances must relate directly to the elements of the crime of estafa with
abuse of confidence under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code.[15]
Both trial and appellate
courts held that it was petitioner who extended the loan and who actually
received the jewelries from Dr. Santiago.
Their conclusion stemmed from the following circumstances:
(1) In a letter she wrote to Fiscal Jumino, one Aurora Jose who had allegedly introduced Dr. Santiago to Maria Tin and who was present when the transaction took place, corroborated Dr. Santiago’s testimony;
(2) The signature of
appellant [petitioner] appears on the document[16]
acknowledging receipt of the pieces of jewelry;
(3) Receipts evidencing payments made by Dr. Santiago and which appeared to be signed by the petitioner were not denied by the latter;
(4) Petitioner did not deny that she sent a note (Exh. “M-2”) to Dr. Santiago reminding her to update her payments, or else she would auction the pieces of jewelry.
A careful review of the
records, however, reveals that, first, it was erroneous for the Court of
Appeals to consider in evidence the letter which a certain Aurora Jose sent to
Fiscal Jumino.[17] Aurora Jose was never presented to testify
on the veracity of said letter, much less its contents. A private certification is hearsay where the
person who issued the same was never presented as a witness.[18] The same is true of letters. They are hearsay evidence. Here, Aurora Jose’s alleged letter is
obviously hearsay. While hearsay evidence may be admitted because of lack of
objection by the adverse party’s counsel, it is nonetheless without probative
value.[19]
Second, the signature appearing in the receipt,
Exhibit “A”, apparently differs from the specimen signatures provided by
petitioner Maria Tin in open court.[20] But it has striking and obvious similarities
to Mia Chan’s specimen signatures.[21] The differences and similarities are so
obvious to the eye. They could not be
casually disregarded. Expert
handwriting analysis is probably useful here, but it is not indispensable.[22] As said in People vs. Pagpaguitan, 315
SCRA 226:
When a writing in issue is claimed on the one hand and denied upon
the other to be the writing of a particular person, any other writing of that
person may be admitted in evidence for the purpose of comparison with the
writing in dispute. It is also
recognized that a comparison of writing is a rational method of investigation;
similarities and dissimilarities thus disclosed have probative value in the
search for truth. Thus, it has been
held that, where a comparison is permissible, it may be made by the court, with
or without the aid of expert witnesses.
The court may, in the exercise of its sound discretion, order a party to
write or sign his signature as a basis for comparison. For, the handwriting of a person is
characteristic of the person himself. Once admitted, the genuineness of other
offered writings alleged to be the work of the same writer becomes a question
for the trier of fact who may, but need not, be assisted in this task by
experts.[23]
In the present case, the
prosecution bears the burden of proving that the signature in Exhibit “A” was
the petitioner’s, not Mia Chan’s. This
the prosecution did not do.
Third, petitioner did not deny that she received
payments and made demands for payment from private complainant. They do not show, however, that she was the
one who extended the loan and accepted the jewelries. Note that even Mia Chan
received certain payments from Dr. Santiago, as shown by Exhibits “8”, “8-A”,
“10” and “10-A”. A certain “Viring” also received payment from Dr. Santiago.[24] These instances only prove that a person who
received payments from another is not necessarily the person who extended the
loan.
Fourth, Exhibit “M-2”[25] which the Court of Appeals considered proof
that petitioner was in possession of the jewelry, deserves serious scrutiny.
Said exhibit was not properly identified or introduced as evidence at the
trial. It was marked as an exhibit upon
mere manifestation of counsel.[26] It was not touched upon during the testimony
of the private complainant nor listed in the list of exhibits for the
prosecution,[27] hence deemed inadmissible in evidence.[28]
Fifth, Mia Chan’s admission, that she was the one
who extended the loan and received the jewelries, deserves weighty
consideration and could not be ignored.
That admission is one against self-interest, amounting to an
incriminatory statement, which the witness could not have volunteered if not
the truth.
Petitioner claims that
the loan was for a three-month period only.
But private complainant averred that it was extended under a so-called
“white-paper” system, or a loan with an indefinite term. Petitioner presented
her daughter-in-law, Mia Chan, to establish that the loan was only for a
three-month period. Private complainant
did not present evidence to substantiate her claim, other than her self-serving
testimony. Private complainant relied
on the acknowledgment receipt allegedly signed by petitioner in the presence of
two witnesses. However, the prosecution
did not present Aurora Jose, who allegedly witnessed the transaction. Nor did it present Mrs. Dava and Mrs.
Zuñiga who allegedly accompanied Dr. Santiago when the latter tried to redeem
her jewelries. While non-presentation of certain witnesses is not a valid
defense nor does it work against the prosecution’s cause,[29] this holds true only if the evidence of the
prosecution is sufficiently strong to overcome the presumption of innocence of
the accused. If the prosecution
evidence is not strong, then it becomes mandatory for the prosecution to
present evidence which can help further its case, or explain why such evidence
is not presented. When the sole testimony of the complainant is met by an
equally credible evidence of the defense, then the prosecution must present credible
corroborative witnesses to buttress its case.
Its failure to present corroborative witnesses, without any explanation
why they were not produced, weakens the testimony of the witness who named
those corroborating witnesses in her testimony.[30] In this case, the prosecution’s failure to
present the corroborative witnesses, without any explanation for their
non-appearance, makes private complainant’s testimony weak.
Further, since it was
private complainant who asserted that the loan was for an indefinite term under
the so-called “white-paper system” of the pawnshop, she had the burden of
proving that fact as true. In this she failed, and her failure undermines the
case for the prosecution.
Faced with two conflicting
versions, we are guided by the equipoise rule.
Under this rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise
or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having
the burden of proof loses.[31] The equipoise rule finds application if the
inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations,
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction.[32] Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof
to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. And in this case,
the petitioner must be declared innocent and set free.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 14818, affirming that of the Regional Trial Court in
Crim. Case No. 88-64598, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Maria Tin is ACQUITTED of
the charge against her under Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code, for
lack of evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman),
Mendoza, Buena, and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Records,
p. 1.
[2] TSN,
September 3, 1990, pp. 5-16.
[3] Records,
p. 243.
[4] TSN,
January 22, 1992, p. 31.
[5] Id.
at 31-32.
[6] Records,
p. 259.
[7] Id.
at 260.
[8] Id.
at 261.
[9] Id.
at 262.
[10] TSN,
August 19, 1992, pp. 3-4.
[11] TSN,
July 1, 1992, pp. 8-15.
[12] Records,
pp. 474-475.
[13] Co
vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 195, 200 (1995).
[14] Bautista
vs. Mangaldan Rural Bank, Inc., 230 SCRA 16, 19 (1994).
[15] The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence under
subdivision no. 1 (b), of Art. 315 are:
(1) That money, goods, or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or in commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;
(2) That there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such receipt;
(3) That such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and
(4) That there is a
demand made by the offended party to the offender. (Reyes, Revised Penal Code,
Book 2, 12th edition, pp. 716-717.)
[16] Records,
p. 242.
[17] CA
Decision, p. 5, CA Rollo, pp. 114-122.
[18] People
vs. Narciso, 262 SCRA 1, 8 (1996).
[19] De
la Torre vs. Court of Appeals, 294 SCRA 196, 204 (1998).
[20] Records,
back of p. 240.
[21] Records,
p. 241.
[22] People
vs. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676, 721 (1995).
[23] 315
SCRA 226, 241 (1999).
[24] Records,
p. 306.
[25] Id.
at 253.
[26] TSN,
January 29, 1992, p. 2.
[27] Records,
p. 197.
[28] General
Enterprises, Inc. vs. Lianga Bay Logging Company, Inc., 11 SCRA
733, 746 (1964).
[29] People
vs. Correa, 285 SCRA 679, 689 (1998).
[30] People
vs. Taneo, 284 SCRA 251, 273 (1998).
[31] Rivera
vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 673, 682 (1998).
[32] People
vs. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267, 307 (1998).