MENDOZA, J., concurring:
For
the reasons given in my concurring opinion in these cases, I am of the opinion
that, having lost the public trust and the support of his own cabinet, the
military and the national police, petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada became
personally disabled from continuing as President of the Philippines and that
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, being then the Vice-President, legally
succeeded to the presidency pursuant to Art. VII, §8 of the Constitution.
My
concern in this separate opinion is with petitioner’s claim in G.R. Nos.
146710-15 that he must be deemed acquitted of the charges against him because
the Senate impeachment proceedings against him were terminated not at his
instance, and, consequently, he cannot be prosecuted again for the same offense(s)
without violating his right not to be placed in double jeopardy.
Petitioner
cites Art. XI, §3(7) of the Constitution which provides that-
Judgement in cases of impeachment shall not extend further then removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution, trial and punishment according to law.
Petitioner
argues that the purpose of the provision allowing subsequent prosecution and
trial of a party convicted in an impeachment trial is precisely to preclude a
plea of double jeopardy by the accused in the event he is convicted in the
impeachment trial.
Petitioner’s
contention cannot be sustained. In the
first place, the impeachment proceedings against petitioner were terminated for
being functus officio, since the primary purpose of impeachment is the
removal of respondent from office and his disqualification to hold any other
office under the government.
In
the second place, the proviso that an impeached and convicted public official
would “nevertheless” be subject to criminal prosecution serves to qualify the
clause that “judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than
removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the Republic
of the Philippines.” In other words, the public official convicted in an
impeachment trial is nevertheless subject to criminal prosecution because the
penalty which can be meted out on him cannot exceed removal from office and
disqualification to hold office in the future.
Consequently, where, as in this case, the impeachment proceedings did
not result in petitioner’s conviction, there can be no objection to his
subsequent trial and conviction in a criminal case. The rule that an impeachable officer cannot be criminally
prosecuted for the same offenses which constitute grounds for impeachment
presupposes his continuance in office.[1] as Professor Tribe has written:
. . .[I]t should also be possible for an
official to be acquitted by the Senate in an impeachment trial but subsequently
convicted of the same underlying acts in a federal court. The Senate’s acquittal, after all, could
well represent a determination merely that the charged offenses were not
impeachable, or that the nation would be harmed more than protected by
pronouncing the official guilty.[2]
Hence,
the moment he is no longer in office because of his removal, resignation, or
permanent disability, there can be no bar to his criminal prosecution in the
courts.
Indeed,
tested by the ordinary rules of criminal procedure, since petitioner was
neither convicted nor acquitted in the impeachment proceedings, nor the case
against him dismissed without his consent, his prosecution in the Sandiganbayan
for the same offense for which he was impeached cannot be barred.[3]
For
these reasons, I concur in the denial of the motions for reconsideration filed
on behalf of petitioner in these cases.