THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 133698. April 4, 2001]
ANTONIO TALUSAN and CELIA TALUSAN, petitioners, vs.
HERMINIGILDO*
TAYAG and JUAN HERNANDEZ, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
For purposes of real
property taxation, the registered owner of a property is deemed the taxpayer
and, hence, the only one entitled to a notice of tax delinquency and the
resultant proceedings relative to an auction sale. Petitioners, who allegedly acquired the property through an
unregistered deed of sale, are not entitled to such notice, because they are
not the registered owners. Moral
lessons: real property buyers must register their purchases as soon as possible
and, equally important, they must pay their taxes on time.
The Case
Before us is a Petition
for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
November 20, 1997 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
41586. The dispositive portion of the
challenged Decision is hereunder reproduced as follows:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision (dated February 4, 1993) of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 7) in Baguio City in Civil Case No. 1456-R is hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against plaintiffs/appellants.”
Also assailed is the
April 27, 1998 CA Resolution[2]which denied petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.
The questioned CA ruling affirmed
the Decision[3] of Branch 7 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baguio City in Civil Case No. 1456-R.
The RTC, in turn, dismissed an action for the annulment of the auction
sale of a condominium unit, covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651
and located in Building IV, Europa Condominium Villas, Baguio City.
The Facts
The CA summarized the
antecedents of this case in this wise:[4]
“On June 28, 1988, [herein petitioners] filed a complaint wherein they alleged, inter alia, that:
--They bought the subject property covered by Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651, from its former owner, Elias Imperial, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale:
--On October 15, 1985, ‘[herein Respondent] Juan D. Hernandez, x x x sued x x x in his capacity as City Treasurer of Baguio City, wrote a letter to the former owner Elias Imperial informing him that the above described property would be sold at public auction on December 9, 1985, x x x to satisfy the delinquent real estate taxes, penalties and cost of sale, and demanded payment of the sum of P4,039.80, representing total taxes due and penalties thereon;
--‘Elias Imperial and his entire family emigrated to Australia in 1974.’ Elias Imperial never authorized ‘a certain Dante Origan x x x to receive any letter or mail matter for and on his behalf;’
--[Respondent] Hernandez sold the above-described property to [Respondent] Tayag for P4,400.00 ‘without any notice to the former owner thereof, [or] to [petitioners], and without compliance with the provisions of PD No. 464, as evidenced by the Certificate of Sale;’
--A final bill of sale was later issued ‘in favor of the [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag.’ The assessed value alone of the said property is P37,310.00 and the fair market value of the same is more than P300,000.00 and both [respondents] knew these;
--The bid price of P4,400 ‘is so unconscionably low and shocking to the conscience,’ thus, the sale ‘for the alleged unpaid taxes in the sum of P4,039.79, including penalties’ is ‘null and void ab initio;’
--‘[Petitioners] have been in actual possession of the Unit in question, since they bought the same from its former owners, and their possession is open, public, continuous, adverse and in the concept of owners, while [Respondent] Hermegildo Tayag has never been in possession of the said property;’
--[Petitioners] through intermediaries offered ‘to pay to the [respondents] the sum of P4,400 plus all interests and expenses which [they] might have incurred x x x but said offer was rejected without any just [or] lawful cause.’
There is a need to issue a writ of preliminary injunction to ‘preserve the status quo.’
They asked for: moral damages of not less than P50,000.00; exemplary damages of not less than P20,000.00; attorney’s fee of P30,000.00, plus appearance fee of P2,000.00 for every appearance; and litigation expenses of not less than P5,000.00 to prosecute the case. (pages 3-8 of the Record)
On July 14, 1988, [Respondent] Hermenegildo Tayag filed his [A]nswer with [C]ounterclaim (pages 28-32 of the Record), wherein he substantially denied the allegations in the complaint and, at the same time, raised the following affirmative defenses, among others:
--‘(T)he ownership of the Condominium unit registered under Condominium Certificate of Title No. 651, Baguio City, has been consolidated in his name by virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x . The said decision has [become] final and executory as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;’
--[Petitioners have] no cause of action against him, he being a ‘buyer in good faith in a regular and lawful public bidding in which any person is qualified to participate.’
--The lower court has no jurisdiction over [petitioners’] claim ‘because the [petitioners] pray for the annulment of the Certificate of the Sale and the Final Bill of Sale, which was affirmed by virtue of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio, Branch 6, on September 16, 1987 x x x. The said decision has [become] final and executory as evidenced by the Certificate of Finality issued on October 8, 1987;’
--The public auction sale complied with ‘the requirements of Presidential Decree No. 464’ – hence, the same is ‘lawful and valid:’
--‘[Respondent] Tayag is not bound by the alleged [D]eed of [S]ale in favor of the [petitioners] by Elias [I]mperial, because it was not registered and recorded with the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City.’
[Respondent] Tayag then prayed for the award in his favor, of: moral damages of at least P50,000.00; exemplary damages; attorney’s fees in the sum of P10,000.00; and, expenses of litigation.
[Respondent] Hernandez likewise filed an [A]nswer on July 18. 1988, wherein he denied the material averments in the complaint and stated that ‘no irregularity or illegality was committed in the conduct of the proceedings with respect to the delinquent real property of Elias Imperial and the actuations of the defendant herein were all within the limits of his authority and in accordance with the provisions of the law pertaining to delinquent real property, particularly, P.D. 464 otherwise known as the Real Property Tax Code and therefore, no damages may be imputed against him.’ He also claimed, by way of affirmative defenses, that:
--The complaint states no cause of action against the [respondent] herein:
--‘[Petitioners] have not complied with x x x Section 83 of P.D. No. 464 x x x thus, the case cannot prosper;’
--‘Granting that a Deed of Sale was actually issued in favor of the plaintiffs [because of] the fact that it is unregistered, the same does not bind third persons including defendant herein.’”
In their Complaint,
petitioners alleged that on December 7, 1981, they had acquired the condominium
from Elias Imperial, the original registered owner, for P100,000. The sale was purportedly evidenced by a Deed
of Sale which, however, had not and thenceforth never been registered with the
Register of Deeds.
Petitioners also averred
that on December 9, 1985, Baguio City Treasurer Juan Hernandez sold the
property at a public auction due to nonpayment of delinquent real estate taxes
thereon. The property was sold to
Respondent Herminigildo Tayag for P4,400 which represented the unpaid
taxes.
Thus, petitioners filed a
Complaint seeking the annulment of the auction sale. They cited irregularities in the proceedings and noncompliance
with statutory requirements.
Dismissing the Complaint,
Branch 7 of the RTC of Baguio City cited the December 16, 1987 judgment of
Branch 6 of the same court in LRC Adm. Case No.207-R. This earlier Branch 6 Decision had consolidated ownership of the
condominium unit in favor of Respondent Tayag.
The Branch 7 Decision also cited the May 31, 1988 Order of Branch 5 of
the same court which had granted a Petition for the Cancellation of
Condominium Certificate of Title No.
651 in the name of Elias Imperial and directed the Register of Deeds to issue a
new Certificate of Title in the name of Respondent Tayag. According to the trial court, the Decision
in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R had already upheld the legality of the questioned
auction sale. Hence, to rule again on
the same issue would amount to passing upon a judgment made by a coequal court,
contrary to the principle of “conclusiveness of judgment.”
Ruling of the CA
The appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s ruling and ratiocination. The CA explained that LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R had already ruled
on the validity of the auction sale of the subject condominium unit. It further sustained the validity of that
sale, because the city treasurer complied with the requirements of notice,
publication and posting. It added that
“[i]f [petitioners] never received the notices sent to Elias Imperial, then
they have only themselves to blame for failing to register the deed of sale
between them and the former owner x x x.”
Rejecting petitioners’
contention that the purchase price was inadequate, the CA ruled that such
inadequacy could not nullify the auction sale.
It likewise held that petitioners had not established bad faith on the
part of respondents in conducting the auction sale. Finally, it agreed with the latter’s contention that the former
were “remiss in causing the registration of the sale in their favor of the
subject property and they likewise did not fulfill their obligation to pay
taxes. It [is] thus clear x x x they
should only have themselves to blame.
Laws exist to be followed, failing in which the price must be paid.”
Hence, this recourse.[5]
The Issues
Petitioners assigned the
following alleged errors for the consideration of this Court:[6]
“I. FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to consider that the petitioners were deprived of their right to due process in this case due to the gross and inexcusable negligence of their former counsel who failed to inform them of the decision in this case and protect their interest.
“II. SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to nullify the auction sale of the subject property of petitioners due to alleged tax delinquency when there was no compliance with the mandatory requirement of Section 46 of P.D. 464 that such notice of delinquency of the payment of the property tax should be published.
“III. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in failing to consider the lack of personal notice of the sale for public auction of the subject property to its owner which nullifies the said proceeding.
“IV. FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals grievously erred in holding that the decision of the trial court in the petition for the consolidation of the title case filed by the private respondent in LRC Admin. Case 207 is a bar to this proceeding.
“V. FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not nullifying the auction sale of subject property on equitable considerations.”
We deem it appropriate to
simplify the issues in this wise: (1) whether the RTC Decision in LRC Adm. Case
No. 207-R is a bar to this proceeding; and (2) whether the auction sale of the
subject condominium unit should be annulled on the grounds of (a)
non-publication of the notice of delinquency for the payment of property tax,
(b) lack of personal notice of the sale or public auction of the subject
property and (c) equitable considerations.
As a preliminary matter, we shall also consider petitioners’ submission
that they were deprived of due process because of their counsel’s failure to
inform them immediately of the receipt of the CA Decision.
Preliminary Matter:
Negligence of Petitioners’ Former Counsel
Petitioners aver that
their former counsel informed them of the CA Decision only on February 5, 1998,
more than two months after he had received a copy on December 3, 1997. According to petitioners, their former counsel’s
negligence effectively deprived them of their right to due process.
We disagree. Notwithstanding its late filing, their
Motion for Reconsideration was accepted and considered by the CA. Hence, this issue has become moot, a fact
which petitioners themselves admitted in their Memorandum: “As a matter of
fact, in the very resolution of the Court of Appeals of April 27, 1998 (Annex
‘C’ to Petition) denying the motion for reconsideration, wherein the matter of
inexcusable negligence of counsel in not informing petitioners immediately of
the decision of the court a quo, were among the grounds thereof, it was held
that the issues raised therein had already been considered in the Decision of
November 20, 1997. The Court of Appeals
obviously considered that the Motion for Reconsideration was validly filed by
petitioners so that the Court of Appeals favorably considered the plea of
petitioners to be afforded due process by acting on the Motion for
Reconsideration. Otherwise, it could
have just denied said Motion for late filing or simply noted the same without
action.”[7]
Moreover, petitioners
themselves declared in their Reply Memorandum[8] that this matter is no longer in issue: “At
any rate this issue was raised in the Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision of the appellate court and obviously it was favorably considered as
the said Court denied the merit of said Motion by stating that the issues
raised have already been treated in the Decision, instead of outrightly denying
the same for late filing. Hence, this
is no longer in issue in this proceeding.”[9]
First Issue:
Bar by Earlier Judgment
Petitioners contend that
the Decision in LRC Adm. Case No. 207-R, rendered by the Regional Trial Court
of Baguio City (Branch 6), did not preclude the filing of a separate action to
annul the auction sale. Citing Tiongco
v. Philippine Veterans Bank,[10] they aver that this RTC Branch had no
jurisdiction to rule on the validity of that sale. Hence, its Decision in the LRC case cannot bar the present
proceedings.
Petitioners’ reliance on Tiongco
is misplaced, considering that its factual incidents are different from those
of the present controversy. In that
case, the trial court was acting on a Petition for the Surrender of
Certificates of Title. In LRC Adm.
Case No. 207-R, the trial court was faced with a Petition for Consolidation
of Ownership. It had
jurisdiction to rule on all matters necessary for the determination of the
issue of ownership, including the validity of the auction sale.
Indeed, this Court in
several cases[11]has previously declared that a petition for
the surrender of the owner’s duplicate certificate involves contentious
questions which should be threshed out in an ordinary case, because the land
registration court has no jurisdiction to try them.
Presidential Decree (PD)
1529, however, intended to avoid a multiplicity of suits and to promote the
expeditious termination of cases. In
more recent cases,[12] therefore, the Court declared that
this Decree had eliminated the distinction between general jurisdiction vested in the regional trial court and the latter’s limited jurisdiction
when acting merely as a land registration court. Land registration courts, as such, can now hear and decide
even controversial and contentious cases, as well as those involving
substantial issues.[13]
Thus, petitioners err in
contending that the RTC is, in a land registration case, barred from ruling on
the validity of the auction sale. That
court now has the authority to act not only on applications for original
registration, but also on all petitions filed after the original registration
of title. Coupled with this
authority is the power to hear and determine all questions arising upon such
applications or petitions.[14] Especially where the issue of ownership is
ineluctably tied up with the question of registration, the land registration
court commits no error in assuming jurisdiction.[15]
It is equally important
to consider that a land registration court’s decision ordering the confirmation
and the registration of title, being the result of a proceeding in rem,
binds the whole world.[16] Thus, the trial court’s ruling consolidating
the ownership and the title of the property in the name of herein respondent is
valid and binding not only on petitioners, but also on everyone else who may
have any claim thereon.
Second Issue:
Validity of the Auction sale
Petitioners contend that
the auction sale was invalid, because several requisites regarding notice and
publication were not satisfied. We are
not convinced.
It has been held that matters
of notice and publication in tax sales are factual questions that cannot be
determined by this Court.[17] Moreover, a recourse under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, as in this case, generally precludes the determination of
factual issues. This Court will not, as
a rule, inquire into the evidence relied upon by the lower courts to support
their findings.[18] In this case, the CA had already ruled on
the question of compliance with the requirements of notice and publication in
this wise:
“In the case at bench, it cannot be denied that the requirements of
notice, publication and posting have been complied with by the public defendant
prior to the auction sale wherein the subject condominium unit was sold. x x x Ergo,
there was nothing irregular in the questioned public auction -- thus, the
validity of the same must be upheld in accordance with the aforementioned
cases.”[19]
The CA ruling
notwithstanding, we shall proceed to discuss these factual issues in order to
assure petitioners of a complete adjudication of their case, and not a mere
disposition of procedural technicalities.
The Non-Publication of
Notice of Real Property Tax Delinquency
Petitioners assert that
the tax sale should be annulled because of noncompliance with the requirement
of publication prescribed in Section 65 of PD 464.
In this regard, we note
that unlike land registration proceedings which are in rem, cases
involving an auction sale of land for the collection of delinquent taxes are in
personam. Thus, notice by
publication, though sufficient in proceedings in rem, does not as a rule
satisfy the requirement of proceedings in personam.[20] As such, mere publication of the notice of delinquency would not
suffice, considering that the procedure in tax sales is in personam. It was, therefore, still incumbent upon
the city treasurer to send the notice of tax delinquency directly to the
taxpayer in order to protect the interests of the latter.
In the present case, the
notice of delinquency was sent by registered mail to the permanent address of
the registered owner in Manila. In that
notice, the city treasurer of Baguio City directed him to settle the charges
immediately and to protect his interest in the property. Under the circumstances, we hold that the
notice sent by registered mail adequately protected the rights of the taxpayer,
who was the registered owner of the condominium unit.
For purposes of the real
property tax, the registered owner of the property is deemed the taxpayer. Hence, only the registered owner is entitled
to a notice of tax delinquency and other proceedings relative to the tax
sale. Not being registered owners of
the property, petitioners cannot claim to have been deprived of such
notice. In fact, they were not entitled
to it.
Lack of Personal Notice of
the Sale or of the Public Auction of the Subject Property
Petitioners also contend
that the registered owner was not given personal notice of the public
auction. They cite Section 73 of PD
464, the pertinent portion of which is reproduced hereunder:
“x x x. Copy of the notices shall forthwith be sent either by registered mail or by messenger, or through messenger, or through the barrio captain, to the delinquent taxpayer, at the address shown in the tax rolls or property tax records of the municipality or city where the property is located, or at his residence, if known to said treasurer or barrio captain. x x x.” (Underscoring supplied by petitioners in their Memorandum)
According to petitioners,
the notice of public auction should have been sent to the address appearing in
the tax roll or property records of the City of Baguio. That address is Unit No. 5, Baden #4105,
Europa Condominium Villas, Baguio City; not the known address or residence of
the registered owner at 145 Ermin Garcia Street, Cubao, Quezon City. They contend that notice may be sent to the
residence of the taxpayer, only when the tax roll does not show any address of
the property.
The above-cited
provision, however, shows that the determination of the taxpayer’s address to
which the notice may be sent is the treasurer’s discretionary prerogative. In this case, the city treasurer deemed it
best to send the notice of public auction to the residence of the
taxpayer. The former validly exercised
this option, inasmuch as the address of the latter was known to him. Moreover, it was more practical and
favorable to the registered owner that the notice of delinquency be sent to his
permanent residence in Manila, because he was using the subject condominium
unit merely as a vacation house and not as a residence.
This Court in Pecson
v. Court of Appeals[21] made a clear and categorical ruling on the matter, when it declared as
follows:
“Under the said provisions of law, notices of the sale of the public auction may be sent to the delinquent taxpayer, either (I) at the address as shown in the tax rolls or property tax record cards of the municipality or city where the property is located or (ii) at his residence, if known to such treasurer or barrio captain.” (emphasis supplied)
To reiterate, for
purposes of the collection of real property taxes, the registered owner of the
property is considered the taxpayer.
Although petitioners have been in possession of the subject premises by
virtue of an unregistered deed of sale, such transaction has no binding
effect with respect to third persons who have no knowledge of it.
The importance of
registration and its binding effect is stated in Section 51 of the Property
Registration Decree or PD 1529, which reads:
“Sec. 51. Conveyance
and other dealings by registered owner. - An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge
or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws. He may use such forms, deeds, mortgages,
leases or other voluntary instrument as are sufficient in law. But no deed, mortgage, lease or other
voluntary instrument, except a will purporting to convey or effect
registered land, shall take effect as a conveyance or bind the land, but
shall operate only as a contract between the parties and as evidence of
authority to the Registry of Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the Office of the Register of Deeds for the province or the city where the land lies.”
Thus, insofar as third
persons are concerned, it is the registration of the deed of sale that can
validly transfer or convey a person’s interest in a property.[22] In the absence of registration, the
registered owner whose name appears on the certificate of title is deemed the
taxpayer to whom the notice of auction sale should be sent. Petitioners, therefore, cannot claim to be
taxpayers. For this reason, the annulment
of the auction sale may not be invoked successfully.
The Annulment of the
Auction Sale on Equitable Considerations
As correctly pointed out
by respondents, equitable considerations will not find application, if the
statutes or rules of procedure explicitly provide for the requisites and
standards by which the matters at bench can be resolved.
While it may be assumed
that both petitioners and Respondent Tayag are innocent purchasers of the subject property, it is a well-settled
principle that between two purchasers, the one who has registered the sale in
one’s favor has a preferred right over the other whose title has not been
registered, even if the latter is in actual possession of the subject property.[23]
Likewise, we cannot help
but point out the fact that petitioners brought this misfortune upon
themselves. They neither registered the
Deed of Sale after its execution nor moved for the consolidation of ownership
of title to the property in their name.
Worse, they failed to pay the real property taxes due. Although they had been in possession of the
property since 1981, they did not take the necessary steps to protect and
legitimize their interest.
Indeed, petitioners’ suit
is now barred by laches.[24] The law helps the vigilant, but not those
who sleep on their rights, for time is a means of obliterating actions. Verily, time runs against the slothful and
the contemners of their own rights.[25]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and
the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman),
Vitug, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Sandoval-Gutierrez,
JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo,
pp. 47-59; penned by Justice Ramon Mabutas Jr. with the concurrence of Justices
Emeterio C. Cui (Division chairman) and Hilarion L. Aquino (member).
[2] Rollo, p. 76.
[3] Rollo,
pp. 77-93; written by Judge Clarence J. Villanueva.
[4] CA
Decision, pp. 1-3; rollo, pp. 47-49.
[5] The
case was deemed submitted for resolution on September 30, 1999, upon receipt by
this Court of Respondent Tayag’s Memorandum signed by Atty. Renato S. Rondez of
Rondez, Rondez and Gandeza Law Offices..
Received earlier were petitioners’ Memorandum (September 7, 1999) and
Reply Memorandum (September 30, 1999) signed by Attys. Emilio A. Gancayco
and C. Fortunato R. Balasbas of Gancayco, Balasbas &
Associates.
[6] Petition,
pp. 4-5; rollo, pp. 11-12; see also Petitioners’ Memorandum, pp.
3-4.
[7] Petitioners’
Memorandum, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 129-130.
[8] Rollo,
pp. 145-150.
[9]9 Reply Memorandum, p. 2; rollo, p.
146.
[10] 212 SCRA 176, August 5, 1992.
[11] See
Puguid v. Reyes, 20 SCRA 972, August 10, 1967; Tomada v. Tomada,
28 SCRA 1028, July 30, 1969; Santos v. Cruz, 52 SCRA 330, August 30,
1973.
[12] Estate
of the Late Mercedes Jacob v. CA, 283 SCRA 474, December 22,
1997; Ignacio v. CA, 246 SCRA 242, July 14, 1995; Quiroz v.
Munoz, 210 SCRA 60, June 18, 1992; Philippine National Bank v.
International Corporate Bank, 199 SCRA 508, July 23, 1991.
[13] Ignacio
v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 242, July 14, 1995.
[14] Ligon v. Court of Appeals, 244
SCRA 693, June 1, 1995.
[15] Vda. de Arceo v. Court of Appeals,
185 SCRA 489, May 18, 1990.
[16] Meneses
v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 162, July 14, 1995.
[17] De
Knecht v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 223, May 20, 1998.
[18] Banaag
v. Bartolome, 204 SCRA 924, December 20, 1991; Ching Sui Yong v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 191 SCRA 187, November 6, 1990.
[19] CA
Decision, p. 10; rollo, p. 56.
[20] Peña,
Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, 1988 ed., p. 373.
[21] 222
SCRA 580, 584, May 25, 1993, per Quiason, J.
[22] Vda.
de Alcantara v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 457, January 29, 1996.
[23] Tañedo
v. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 80, January 22, 1996.
[24] See
Garbin v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 187, February 5, 1996.
[25] Salandanan
v. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 671, June 5, 1998.