FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141060. September
29, 2000]
PILIPINAS BANK, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, HON. ELOY R. BELLO, In his capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC‑Manila,
Branch 15, And MERIDIAN ASSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before this Court is a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
Sixth Division, dated July 30, 1999 in CA‑G.R. S.P. No. 29749[1]
which dismissed petitioner Pilipinas Bank's petition for certiorari,[2]
and the Resolution, dated September 17, 1999[3]
denying petitioner's Urgent Motion
for Extension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration,
Manifestation and Motion to Admit Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case
are as follows:
On January 8, 1995,
petitioner obtained from private respondent Meridian Assurance Corporation a
Money Securities and Payroll Comprehensive Policy which was effective from
January 13, 1985 to January 13, 1986.
On November 25, 1985, at about 9:15 a.m., while the policy was in full
force and effect, petitioner's armored vehicle bearing Plate No. NBT 379 which
was on its way to deliver the payroll withdrawal of its client Luzon
Development Bank ACLEM Paper Mills, was robbed by two armed men wearing police
uniforms along Magsaysay Road, San Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna. Petitioner's driver, authorized teller and
two private armed guards were on board the armored vehicle when the same was
robbed. The loss suffered by petitioner
as a result of the heist amounted to P545,301.40.
Petitioner filed a
formal notice of claim under its insurance policy with private respondent on
December 3, 1985, invoking Section II of the Policy which states:
Section II‑MONEY AND SECURITIES
OUTSIDE PREMISES
The Company will subject to the Limits of
this Section as hereinafter provided indemnify the insured against loss by any
cause whatsoever occuring (sic) outside the premises of Money and Securities in
the personal charge of a Messenger in transit on a Money Route x x x.[4]
and the warranty/rider attached to the
Policy which provides that‑
WARRANTED that in respect of PILIPINAS BANK Head Office and
all its branches, pick‑up and/or deposits and withdrawals without the use
of armored car, company car, or official's car shall be covered by this policy.
x x x[5]
Private respondent
denied petitioner's claim and averred that the insurance does not cover the
deliveries of the withdrawals to petitioner's clients.
Petitioner thereafter
filed a complaint against private respondent with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. Private respondent filed a
motion to dismiss which was later granted by the RTC. Petitioner then moved to reconsider the trial court's order, but
the same was denied.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed
a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals assailing the RTC's order dismissing the complaint.[6]
The appellate court granted the petition and remanded the case to the RTC for
further proceedings. Private respondent
filed with this Court a petition for review of the appellate court's decision,
but the same was dismissed in a Resolution dated July 5, 1989.
After the case was
remanded to the RTC and the latter set the case for pre‑trial, petitioner
filed its Pre‑Trial Brief, stating among others, that it would present as
one of its witnesses Mr. Cesar R. Tubianosa to testify on the existence and due
execution of the insurance policy, particularly on the negotiations that were
held prior to the execution thereof, including negotiations that led to the
attachment warranties, to prove that the loss subject of petitionerss claim is
covered by the Policy. Petitioner
identified the issues of the case as follows:
1. Whether
or not the loss due to the hold‑up/robbery is covered by the Insurance
Policy;
2. In
the affirmative, whether or not, defendant is liable to plaintiff for said
loss, inclusive of other damages prayed for in the Complaint.
On September 18, 1991,
when petitioner was about to present Mr. Tubianosa to testify, private
respondent objected and argued that said witness testimony regarding the
negotiations on the terms and conditions of the policy would be violative of
the best evidence rule. However,
private respondents objection was overruled and Tubianosa was allowed to take
the stand. Private respondent again
objected to the questions regarding the negotiations on the terms and
conditions on the policy, and the trial court sustained the objection in part
and overruled it in part by allowing petitioner to adduce evidence pertaining
to the negotiations other than what appears in the insurance policy. Tubianosas testimony was completed on said
date.
On June 18, 1992,
petitioner filed a Motion to Recall Witness, praying that it be allowed to recall Tubianosa to testify on the
negotiations pertaining to the terms and conditions of the policy before its
issuance to determine the intention of the parties regarding the said terms and
conditions. Private respondent objected
thereto, on the ground that the same would violate the parol evidence rule.
The RTC issued an Order
dated July 24, 1999, denying petitioners motion to recall Tubianosa to the
witness stand, ruling that the same would violate the parol evidence rule. Petitioners motion for reconsideration was
also denied by the lower court.
On December 21, 1992,
petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals assailing the aforementioned Orders of the RTC. In its Decision dated July 30, 1999, the
appellate court dismissed the petition and held that there was no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of respondent judge.
It held that there is no ambiguity in the provisions of the Policy which
would necessitate the presentation of extrinsic evidence to clarify the meaning
thereof. The Court of Appeals also
stated that petitioner failed to set forth in its Complaint a specific
allegation that there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the insurance policy which
would warrant the presentation of further evidence to clarify the intent of the
contracting parties.
Hence, the present
petition.
We find no cogent
reason to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners Complaint
merely alleged that under the provisions of the Policy, it was entitled to
recover from private respondent the amount it lost during the heist. It did not allege therein that the Policys
terms were ambiguous or failed to express the true agreement between itself and
private respondent. Such being the
case, petitioner has no right to insist that it be allowed to present
Tubianosas testimony to shed light on the alleged true agreement of the
parties, notwithstanding its statement in its Pre‑Trial Brief that it was
presenting said witness for that purpose.
Section 9, Rule 130 of
the Revised Rules of Court expressly requires that for parol evidence to be
admissible to vary the terms of the written agreement, the mistake or
imperfection thereof or its failure to express the true agreement of the
parties should be put in issue by the pleadings.[7]
As correctly noted by
the appellate court, petitioner failed to raise the issue of an intrinsic
ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the terms of the Policy, or of the
failure of said contract to express the true intent and agreement of the
parties thereto in its Complaint. There
was therefore no error on the part of the appellate court when it affirmed the
RTCs Order disallowing the recall of Tubianosa to the witness stand, for such
disallowance is in accord with the rule that when the terms of an agreement
have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors‑in‑interest,
no evidence of such other terms other than the contents of the written
agreement.[8]
The rationale behind
the foregoing rule was explained in Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals,[9]
where we stated:
The
parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private respondents oral testimony on the alleged
conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case,
depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or
documentary evidence. Spoken words
could be notoriously undesirable unlike a written contract which speaks of a
uniform language. Thus, under the
general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, when the terms of
an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain
all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other
than the contents thereof. xxx.[10]
WHEREFORE,
the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno,
Pardo, and Ynares‑Santiago, JJ., concur.