EN BANC
[G.R. No. 139853.
September 5, 2000]
FERDINAND THOMAS M. SOLLER, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PINAMALAYAN, ORIENTAL MINDORO (Branch 42) and ANGEL M. SAULONG, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This special civil action
for certiorari seeks to annul the resolution promulgated on August 31,
1999, in COMELEC special relief case SPR No. 10-99. The resolution dismissed petitioner's petition to set aside the
orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, dated
October 1, 1998 and February 1, 1999, which denied petitioner’s motion to
dismiss the election protest filed by private respondent against petitioner and
the motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Petitioner and private
respondent were both candidates for mayor of the municipality of Bansud,
Oriental Mindoro in the May 11, 1998 elections. On May 14, 1998, the municipal board of canvassers proclaimed
petitioner Ferdinand Thomas Soller duly elected mayor.
On May 19, 1998, private
respondent Angel Saulong filed with the COMELEC a "petition for annulment
of the proclamation/exclusion of election return".1 [Rollo, pp. 72-81.] On May 25, 1998, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, an election protest against petitioner
docketed as EC-31-98.
On June 15, 1998,
petitioner filed his answer with counter-protest. Petitioner also moved to dismiss private respondent's protest on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, forum-shopping, and failure to state cause
of action.2 [Id. at 87-100, 114-117.]
On July 3, 1998, COMELEC
dismissed the pre-proclamation case filed by private respondent.
On October 1, 1998, the
trial court denied petitioner's motion to dismiss. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but said motion was
denied. Petitioner then filed with the
COMELEC a petition for certiorari contending that respondent RTC acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in not
dismissing private respondent's election protest.
On August 31, 1999, the
COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioner's suit. The election tribunal held that private respondent paid the
required filing fee. It also declared
that the defect in the verification is a mere technical defect which should not
bar the determination of the merits of the case. The election tribunal stated that there was no forum shopping to
speak of.
Under the COMELEC Rules
of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of its en banc ruling is
prohibited except in a case involving an election offense.3 [Section
1 (d), rule 13, 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended.] Since the present controversy involves no
election offense, reconsideration is not possible and petitioner has no appeal
or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Accordingly, petitioner properly filed the
instant petition for certiorari with this Court.
On September 21, 1999, we
required the parties to maintain the status quo ante prevailing as of
September 17, 1999, the date of filing of this petition.
Before us, petitioner
asserts that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction:
[I]
... IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT RTC'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S ELECTION PROTEST DESPITE HIS (sic) LACK OF JURISDICTION OVER THE SAME BY REASON OF THE FAILURE OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT TO PAY ALL THE REQUISITE FILING FEES.
[II]
... IN AFFIRMING RESPONDENT'S RTC'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S ELECTION PROTEST DESPITE THE INSUFFICIENCY OF HIS PETITION IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE AND ITS FAILURE TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION.
[III]
...IN AFFIRMING
RESPONDENT RTC'S REFUSAL TO DISMISS THE ELECTION PROTEST BELOW ON THE GROUNDS
OF FORUM-SHOPPING AND FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR REQUIRING
A TRUTHFUL CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING DESPITE INCONTROVERTIBLE
EVIDENCE THEREOF.4 [Rollo, p.
28.]
In our view,
notwithstanding petitioner's formulation of issues, the principal question
presented for our resolution is whether or not public respondent COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
not ordering the dismissal of private respondent's election protest.
At the outset, even if
not squarely raised as an issue, this Court needs to resolve the question
concerning COMELEC's jurisdiction.
Unless properly resolved, we cannot proceed further in this case.
Section 3, Subdivision C
of Article IX of the Constitution reads:
"The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two
divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite the
disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision
shall be decided by the Commission en banc."
Thus, in Sarmiento vs.
COMELEC5 [212
SCRA 307, 313 (1992).] and in subsequent cases,6 [Abad
vs. COMELEC, GR-128877, December 10, 1999; Zarate vs. COMELEC,
GR-129096, November 19, 1999.]
we ruled that the COMELEC, sitting en banc, does not have the requisite
authority to hear and decide election cases including pre-proclamation
controversies in the first instance.
This power pertains to the divisions of the Commission. Any decision by the Commission en banc as
regards election cases decided by it in the first instance is null and void.
As can be gleaned from
the proceedings aforestated, petitioner's petition with the COMELEC was not
referred to a division of that Commission but was, instead, submitted directly
to the Commission en banc. The
petition for certiorari assails the trial court's order denying the
motion to dismiss private respondent's election protest. The questioned order of the trial court is
interlocutory because it does not end the trial court's task of adjudicating
the parties' contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as
regards each other.7 [Atienza
vs. Court of Appeals, 232 SCRA 737, 744 (1994).] In our view, the authority to resolve
petition for certiorari involving incidental issues of election protest,
like the questioned order of the trial court, falls within the division of the
COMELEC and not on the COMELEC en banc.
Note that the order denying the motion to dismiss is but an incident
of the election protest. If the
principal case, once decided on the merits, is cognizable on appeal by a
division of the COMELEC, then, there is no reason why petitions for certiorari
relating to incidents of election protest should not be referred first to a
division of the COMELEC for resolution.
Clearly, the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of petitioner's petition in the first instance.
Since public respondent
COMELEC had acted without jurisdiction in this case, the petition herein is
without doubt meritorious and has to be granted. But in order to write finis to the controversy at bar, we
are constrained to also resolve the issues raised by petitioner, seriatim.
Petitioner contends that
private respondent's protest should have been dismissed outright as the latter
failed to pay the amount of P300.00 filing fee required under the COMELEC
rules.8 [Id., at 605, 612.] Petitioner's contention is supported by
Section 9, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure9 [Filing
fee. --- No protest, counter-protest, or protest-in-intervention shall be given
due course without the payment of a filing fee in the amount of three hundred
pesos (P300.00) for each interest.
Each interest shall further pay the
legal research fee as required by law.
If a claim for damages and attorney’s fees are set forth in a
protest, counter-protest or protest-in-intervention, an additional filing fee
shall be paid in accordance with the schedule provided for in the Rules of
Court of the Philippines.] and
corresponding receipts10 [Rollo, pp. 112-113, 229, 271, 315, 331, 333, 404,
407.] itemized as follows:
P368.00 - Filing fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7023752;
P 32.00 - Filing fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7022478;
P 46.00 - Summons fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 7023752;
P 4.00 - Summons fee in EC 31-98, O.R. 4167602;
P 10.00 -- Legal Research Fund fee, O.R. 2595144, and;
P 5.00 -- Victim Compensation Fund, O.R. 4167979
-----------
P465.00
Close scrutiny of the
receipts will show that private respondent failed to pay the filing fee of
P300.00 for his protest as prescribed by the COMELEC rules. The amount of P368.00 for which OR 7023752
was issued for the Judiciary Development Fund as shown by the entries in the
cash book of the clerk of court.11 [Id. at 331.] Thus, only P32.00 with OR 7022478 credited to the general fund could
be considered as filing fee paid by private respondent for his protest. A court acquires jurisdiction over any case
only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee.12 [Suson
vs. Court of Appeals, 278 SCRA 284, 291 (1997).] Patently, the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over private respondent's election protest. Therefore, COMELEC gravely erred in not
ordering the dismissal of private respondent's protest case.
We have in a string of
cases 13 [Miranda
vs. Castillo, 274 SCRA 503 (1997); Loyola vs. COMELEC, 337 Phil
134 (1997); Gatchalian vs. Court of Appeals, 315 Phil 195 (1995);
Pahilan vs. Tabalba, 230 SCRA 205 (1994).] had the occasion to rule on this matter. In Loyola vs. COMELEC,
the clerk of court assessed private respondent therein the incorrect filing
fee of P32.00 at the time of filing of the election protest. Upon filing his counter-protest, petitioner
was assessed to pay the same amount.
Subsequently, the trial court remedied the situation by directing the
parties to pay the balance of P268.00.
On review, we held that the lapse was not at all attributable to private
respondent and there was substantial compliance with the filing fee
requirement. The error lies in the
Clerk's misapplication and confusion regarding application of Section 9 of Rule
35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure and this Court's resolution dated
September 4, 1990 amending Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. An election protest falls within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, in which case the
Rules of Court will apply, and that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is primarily
intended to govern election cases before that tribunal. But the Court declared that this decision
must not provide relief to parties in future cases involving inadequate payment
of filing fees in election cases. Our
decisions in Pahilan and Gatchalian bar any claim of good faith,
excusable negligence or mistake in any failure to pay the full amount of filing
fees in election cases.
In Miranda vs.
Castillo, private respondents each paid per assessment the amount of
P465.00 as filing fees. Of this amount,
P414.00 was allocated for the JDF, P 10.00 for legal research fund, P5.00 for
victim compensation fee, and only the amount of P32.00 was regarded as filing
fee. The Court considered the amount as
partial payment of the P300.00 filing fee under the COMELEC rules and required
payment of the deficiency in the amount of P268.00. But then again, the Court reiterated the caveat that in
view of Pahilan, Gatchalian, and Loyola cases we would no longer
tolerate any mistake in the payment of the full amount of filing fees for
election cases filed after the promulgation of the Loyola decision on
March 27, 1997.
Clearly then, errors in
the payment of filing fees in election cases is no longer excusable. And the dismissal of the present case for
that reason is, in our view, called for.
Besides, there is another
reason to dismiss private respondent's election protest. We note that the verification of aforesaid
protest is defective. In the
verification, private respondent merely stated that he caused the preparation
of his petition and he has read and understood all the allegations therein.14 [Rollo, p. 85.] Certainly, this is insufficient as private respondent failed to state
that the contents of his election protest are true and correct of his persoral
knowledge.15 [A.M.
No. 00-2-10-SC, effective 1 May 2000 provides that “a pleading is verified by
an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and that the allegations
therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based on authentic
records."] Since the
petition lacks proper verification, it should be treated as an unsigned
pleading and must be dismissed.16 [Section
4, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.]
Further, we find that
private respondent did not comply with the required certification against forum
shopping. Private respondent
successively filed a "petition for annulment of the proclamation/exclusion
of election return" and an election protest. Yet, he did not disclose in his election protest that he earlier
filed a petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion of election returns.
It could be argued that
private respondent's petition for annulment of proclamation/exclusion of
election returns was a pre-proclamation case.
The issues raised in that petition pertain to the preparation and
appreciation of election returns and the proceedings of the municipal board of
canvassers. But note that such petition
was filed after the proclamation of petitioner as the winning candidate, thus,
the petition was no longer viable, for pre-proclamation controversies may no
longer be entertained by the COMELEC after the winning candidates have been
proclaimed. It might even be claimed
with some reason that private respondent, by resorting to the wrong remedy,
abandoned his pre-proclamation case earlier filed.17 [Laodenio
vs. COMELEC, 276 SCRA 705, 713-714 (1997).]
Nonetheless, private
respondent's belief that he no longer had a pending case before the COMELEC
because he deemed it abandoned upon filing of his protest is not a valid reason
for non-disclosure of the pendency of said pre-proclamation case. Note that the
COMELEC dismissed private respondent's pre-proclamation case only on July 3,
1998. Before the dismissal, said case
was legally still pending resolution.
Similarly, the fact that private respondent's protest was not based on
the same cause of action as his pre-proclamation case is not a valid excuse for
not complying with the required disclosure in the certification against forum
shopping. The requirement to file a
certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory. Failure to comply with this requirement cannot be excused by the
fact that a party is not guilty of forum shopping. The rule applies to any complaint, petition, application or other
initiatory pleading, regardless of whether the party filing it has actually
committed forum shopping. Every party
filing any initiatory pleading is required to swear under oath that he has not
and will not commit forum shopping.
Otherwise we would have an absurd situation, as in this case, where the
parties themselves would be the judge of whether their actions constitute a
violation of the rule, and compliance therewith would depend on their belief
that they might or might not have violated the requirement. Such interpretation of the requirement would
defeat the very purpose of the rule.18 [Melo
vs. Court of Appeals, GR-123686, November 16, 1999, p. 7.]
Taking into account all
the foregoing circumstances in this case, we are persuaded that respondent
Regional Trial Court erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in failing
to dismiss private respondent's election protest against petitioner. And to reiterate, respondent COMELEC en
banc had no jurisdiction to affirm the refusal of respondent trial court to
dismiss private respondent's election protest.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed RESOLUTION of public
respondent COMELEC is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on September
21, 1999, is made permanent. The
Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro, Branch 42, is hereby
ordered to DISMISS election protest EC No. 31-98. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., no part.