THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136843.
September 28, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. PEDRO ABUNGAN alias “Pedring,” RANDY PASCUA and ERNESTO RAGONTON Jr., accused;
PEDRO ABUNGAN alias “Pedring,” appellant.
R E S O L U T I O N
PANGANIBAN,
J.:
The death of the appellant
pending appeal and prior to the finality of conviction extinguished his
criminal and civil liabilities arising from the delict or crime. Hence, the criminal case against him, not
the appeal, should be dismissed.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is an appeal
filed by Pedro Abungan assailing the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Villasis,
Pangasinan, Branch 50,[2] in Criminal Case No. V-0447, in which he was
convicted of murder, sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and ordered to pay
P50,000 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased.
In an Information[3]dated March 9, 1993, Prosecutor I Benjamin R.
Bautista charged appellant, together with Randy Pascua and Ernesto Ragonton Jr.
(both at large), with murder committed as follows:
“That on or about the 4th day of August 1992, at Barangay Capulaan, Municipality of Villasis, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with long firearms, with intent to kill, with treachery, evident premeditation and superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot Camilo Dirilo, [Sr.] y Pajarito, inflicting upon him wounds on the different parts of his body x x x injuries [which] directly caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of his heirs.
“Contrary to Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code.”[4]
With the assistance of
Atty. Simplicio Sevilleja, appellant pleaded not guilty upon his arraignment on
April 30, 1993.[5] After trial on the merits, the trial court
rendered the assailed August 24, 1998 Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, his guilt having been established beyond reasonable doubt, the [Appellant] Pedro Abungan is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and such penalties accessory thereto as may be provided for by law.
The x x x [appellant] is hereby further ordered to indemnify the
heirs of Camilo Dirilo Sr. in the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00)
and to pay the costs.”[6]
Appellant, through
counsel, filed the Notice of Appeal on September 14, 1998. On January 9, 1999, he was committed to the
New Bilibid Prison (NBP) in Muntinlupa.
On October 26, 1999, he filed the Appellant’s Brief[7] before this Court. The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, submitted
the Appellee’s Brief[8] on February 4, 2000. The case was deemed submitted for resolution
on June 5, 2000, when the Court received the Manifestation of appellant stating
that he would not file a reply brief.
In a letter dated August
7, 2000,[9] however, Joselito A. Fajardo, assistant
director of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Appellant
Abungan had died on July 19, 2000 at the NBP Hospital. Attached to the letter was Abungan’s Death
Certificate.
Issue
The only issue before us
is the effect of Appellant Abungan’s death on the case and on the appeal.
This Court’s Ruling
The death of appellant on
July 19, 2000 during the pendency of his appeal extinguished his criminal as
well as his civil liability, based solely on delict (civil liability ex
delicto).
Main Issue: Effect of
Appellant’s Death During Appeal
The consequences of
appellant’s death are provided for in Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code,
which reads as follows:
“Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;
x x x x x x x
x x”
Applying this provision,
the Court in People v. Bayotas[10] made the following pronouncements:
“1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, ‘the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.’”
“2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of (the) accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) x x x x x x x x x
e) Quasi-delicts
“3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
“4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.”
In the present case, it
is clear that, following the above disquisition in Bayotas, the death of
appellant extinguished his criminal liability.
Moreover, because he died during the pendency of the appeal and before
the finality of the judgment against him, his civil liability arising from the
crime or delict (civil liability ex delicto) was also extinguished. It must be added, though, that his civil
liability may be based on sources of obligation other than delict. For this reason, the victims may file a separate
civil action against his estate, as may be warranted by law and procedural
rules.
Moreover, we hold that
the death of Appellant Abungan would result in the dismissal of the criminal
case against him.[11] Necessarily, the lower court’s Decision --
finding him guilty and sentencing him to suffer reclusion perpetua and
to indemnify the heirs of the deceased -- becomes ineffectual.
WHEREFORE, the criminal case (No. V-0447, RTC of
Villasis, Pangasinan) against Pedro Abungan is hereby DISMISSED and the
appealed Decision SET ASIDE.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman),
Vitug, Purisima, and
Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo,
pp. 15-36.
[2] Penned
by Judge Rosario C. Cruz.
[3] Rollo,
p. 9.
[4] Ibid.
[5] RTC
Records, p. 304.
[6] Rollo,
p. 36.
[7] The
Appellant’s Brief was signed by Atty. Simplicio M. Sevilleja.
[8] This
was signed by Asst. Sol. Gen. Mariano M. Martinez, Asst. Sol. Ben Magdangal M.
De Leon and Sol. Nyriam Susan O. Sedillo-Hernandez.
[9] Received
by the Court on August 8, 2000.
[10] 236
SCRA 239, September 2, 1994, per Romero, J. See also Villegas v. CA, 271 SCRA 148, April 11,
1997; People v. Sambulan, 289 SCRA 500, April 24, 1998; People v. Romero,
306 SCRA 90, April 21, 1999; People v. Enoja, GR No. 102596, December 17, 1999.
[11] While
we agree with the doctrinal ruling in Bayotas, we believe that the
disposition therein dismissing the appeal might have resulted from an
oversight. In doing so, the Court was
effectively affirming the trial court’s Decision, which had found Bayotas
criminally and civilly liable. Such
disposition is clearly contrary to the discussion in the body of the Bayotas
Decision quoted earlier in this Resolution that his death extinguished his
criminal as well as civil liabilities based on delict. Indeed, the only logical consequence of the
extinguishment of his criminal and civil liabilities was the dismissal of the case
itself, not of the appeal.