EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132725. September 28, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO QUILATAN, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
PER
CURIAM:
ARMANDO QUILATAN was
charged with incestuous rape and found guilty by the trial court. He was sentenced to death. He is now before us on automatic review.
The Information alleged
that on 19 July 1995 the accused by means of force and intimidation willfully
and feloniously had carnal knowledge of his own 13-year old daughter, Oliva
Quilatan.[1] On 23 February 1997 the trial court found
him guilty of rape as defined in Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Sec. 11 of RA 7659, and sentenced him to death. He was also ordered to pay Oliva Quilatan P200,000.00 for
moral and exemplary damages.[2]
The evidence shows that
in the early morning of 19 July 1995, Oliva Quilatan, then 13 years old, was
sleeping with her younger brothers and sisters in their house at Block 37,
Welfareville, Mandaluyong City, when she was awakened by her father, the accused
Armando Quilatan. Oliva's mother,
Elenita, had left the house earlier to go to the market. With his wife gone the accused then told
Oliva to undress. Although she wanted
to shout for help she was prevented from doing so by her father who threatened
to kill her and all her younger siblings if she did. Oliva had no choice; she had to remove her clothes. The accused touched the different parts of
her body. He made her lie down and then
went on top of her. He inserted his
penis into her vagina; she felt pain.
The incident was not
Armando's first sexual assault on his daughter. The first was on the occasion of Oliva's 11th birthday on 13 May
1993. Her mother at that time had left
her father and settled in Caloocan City because he was beating her. Oliva was raped by her father for the second
time on 14 July 1995. Every time the
accused would abuse Oliva he would threaten to "kill them all" if she
would reveal to anyone what he was doing to her.[3]
Elenita Quilatan narrated
that there was another incident when in the morning of 18 July 1995 she found
the accused no longer beside her. To
her surprise she saw him lying beside their daughter Oliva. When she asked Armando the reason for his
action he just kept silent. Offended by
what she saw she dashed out of the house.
The accused followed her and promised not to abuse Oliva again. Elenita then asked her daughter about her
father's abuses and Oliva revealed her painful and harrowing experiences, with
her father. On 20 July 1995 Elenita and
Oliva went to the police station and filed their sworn statements charging
Armando Quilatan with rape.[4]
Dr. Jesusa N. Vergara of
the PNP Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame conducted a medical examination of Oliva
and found her hymen with shallow healed lacerations at 3 o'clock and 6 o'clock
positions, as well as a deep healed laceration at 9 o'clock position.[5]
The accused interposed
denial for his defense. He alleged that
when he was still working abroad he learned from a neighbor, whose name he
could not recall, that his wife Elenita had a paramour. He confronted her sometime in March 1993
about the P9,000.00 he was sending her every month. When she could not answer him he slapped
her. Immediately after, his wife
together with all their children left him. But two (2) months later they all
returned to their house.
The prosecution presented
as its rebuttal witness Brenda Quilatan, 8-year old sister of
Oliva. Brenda claimed that she saw her
father sexually abuse her sister Oliva twice.
She said that one afternoon "a long time ago," she saw her
father "play" with the breasts of Oliva who was crying and saying
"tama na, po." The accused brought Oliva upstairs and then
laid on top of her. Brenda, in another
incident, saw her father pumping on top of Oliva who was already naked.[6]
Convinced beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused Armando Quilatan did rape his 13-year old
daughter Oliva on 19 July 1995 the trial court convicted him as charged and
sentenced him to death.
The accused now contends
in his Brief that the trial court gravely erred in convicting him of rape as
the testimonies of the victim and other prosecution witnesses were riddled with
inconsistencies on material matters which render them unworthy of belief. He cited the following: (a) Oliva testified that she was raped at 3
o'clock in the morning of 19 July 1995, but when she said that her mother was
not around as she left for the market at 5 o'clock, she changed her testimony
and explained that the rape occurred after 5 o'clock; (b) In her sworn
statement before the police, she alleged that the accused was unable to insert
his penis into her vagina, which is contradictory to her testimony in court
that the accused was able to penetrate her as she felt pain; (c) The testimony
of Dr. Vergara disclosed that no rape could have taken place on 19 July 1995
because the laceration was already healed; and, (d) according to Elenita
Quilatan, she saw the accused lying beside Oliva on 18 July 1995, which is
inconsistent with Oliva's testimony that she was raped on 13 March 1993, 14
July 1995 and 19 July 1995.
We find the arguments of
the accused bereft of merit. Courts
usually give credence to the testimony of a girl who is a victim of sexual
assault, particularly if it constitutes incestuous rape because, normally, no person
would be willing to undergo the humiliation of a public trial and testify on
the details of her ordeal, especially in the hands of her own father, were it
not to condemn a grievous injustice.[7] The bare denial of the accused cannot
overcome the categorical testimony of the victim. Denial, when unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, as
in this case, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no greater
evidentiary value than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.[8]
The record shows no
material inconsistencies in the testimonies of the victim and her mother and
younger sister to justify a reversal of her father's conviction. As long as the inaccuracies concern only
minor matters, the same do not affect the credibility of witnesses. Truth-telling witnesses are not always
expected to give error-free testimonies considering the lapse of time and the
treachery of human memory. Inaccuracies
may in fact suggest that the witnesses are telling the truth and have not been
rehearsed.[9]
Oliva's testimony given in a categorical,
straightforward, spontaneous and candid manner, as observed by the trial court,
is worthy of faith and belief. The
crying of the victim during her testimony is evidence of the credibility of the
rape charge which is a matter of judicial cognizance.[10] Oliva's narration of the sexual assault upon
her by her father was direct, clear and convincing -
Q: Oliva, do you know accused in this case; Mr. Armando Quilatan
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know him?
A: He is my father, sir.
Q: Do you still remember the incident or what happened on July 19, 1995, particularly at dawn?
A: Yes, sir x x x x On that day, my mother was not in the house, she went to the market and all my brothers and sisters are (sic) sleeping and he woke me up because one of my sister(s) was crying.
Q: Who was that who woke you up while you were sleeping?
A: My father, sir.
Q: And as soon as you were awaken(ed), what did your father do if he did anything?
A: He told me to undress, sir.
Q: What did you do?
A: I wanted to speak out but he told me that if I will (sic) shout or if I will (sic) report to my mother or to the police he will (sic) kill us all.
Q: And after that what happened?
A: That was when he started touching me and even if I wanted to shout I cannot (sic) because I was afraid of him and he was threatening me.
Q: When he started touching you as you said and you could not shout, what did you do?
A: I did not talk anymore.
Q: And what did he do to you?
A: He asked me to undress, sir.
Q: Did you undress? x x x x
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when you were already undressed, what did your father do?
A: He (laid) me down, sir.
Q: After your father laid you down, what did he do next?
A: He went on top of me, sir.
Q: When he was already on top of you, what did he do if he did anything?
A: He inserted his penis in my vagina.
Q: What did you do when you felt that he inserted his penis in your vagina?
A: I was hurt, sir.
Q: And what did you tell your father when he was doing that to you.
A: I was not able to speak, sir.
COURT: Make it on record
that the witness is shedding tears.[11]
Initially Oliva stated on
the witness stand that she was raped at 3 o'clock in the morning of 19 July
1995; however, she corrected herself and declared categorically that the rape
happened after 5 o'clock in the morning because at that time her mother had
already gone to the market.[12] A witness is not expected to remember an
occurrence with perfect recollection of minor and minute details. A mis-estimation of time is too immaterial
to discredit the testimony of a witness especially where the time is not an
essential element nor has any substantial bearing on the fact of the commission
of the offense.[13] What is decisive in a rape charge is the
complainant's positive identification of the accused as the malefactor.[14]
The testimony of the
victim's mother that she saw the accused lying beside Oliva on 18 July 1995 did
not in anyway negate the commission of the rape on 19 July 1995 for these may
be separate incidents; after all, the accused is not charged for raping his
daughter on 18 July 1995. It could have
been mentioned to show the propensity of the accused to molest Oliva. Besides, slight variations in the
testimonies of witnesses as to minor and inconsequential details or collateral
matters do not affect their credibility as variations in fact may be indicative
of truth. As long as the testimonies of
the witnesses corroborate each other on material points pertaining to the
commission of rape, minor discrepancies cannot destroy their credibility. Settled is the rule that the date of the
occurrence of the rape is not an essential element of the commission of rape.[15] The argument of the accused that no rape
could have been committed against Oliva on 19 July 1995 because the laceration
was already healed when she was medically examined on 20 July 1995 cannot be
sustained. Hymenal laceration is not an
element of rape. It is sufficient that
there was sexual congress, and that this was consummated by the slightest
introduction of the male organ into the labia of the pudemdum.[16]
This Court perceives no
merit in the story of the accused that the charge levelled against him was but
a retaliatory move on the part of his wife who suffered maltreatment from
him. In a long line of cases, this
Court has consistently ruled that such a defense is simply unbelievable and too
unnatural to deserve faith and credit.
It is hard to fathom that a parent would use her offspring as engine of
malice especially if the same would subject the latter to humiliation, nay,
stigma. No mother in her right mind
would expose her daughter to the disgrace and trauma resulting from a
prosecution for rape if she was not genuinely motivated by a desire to
incarcerate the person responsible for her daughter's defilement. Consequently, as the defense utterly failed
to prove that the principal witnesses for the People were improperly
motivated, the presumption is that they were not so moved, and therefore, their
testimony is entitled to full faith and credence.
The Court finds that the
accused was correctly meted the supreme penalty of death, pursuant, to Art. 335
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659 and RA 8353, providing that
the death penalty shall be imposed upon the perpetrator if the crime of rape is
committed with any of the following aggravating/ qualifying circumstances: x x x x when the victim is under eighteen
(18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree
or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim.
This Court observes that
the trial court did not award any indemnity to Oliva for the physical abuse she
suffered although it granted her P200,000.00 by way of moral and
exemplary damages. In People v.
Prades[17] we reiterated that civil indemnity is mandatory upon the finding of the
fact of rape; it is distinct from and should not be denominated as moral
damages which is based on different jural foundations and assessed by the court
in the exercise of sound discretion. If
the crime of rape is committed or effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by law, the indemnity
for the victim shall be P75,000.00.
Moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in the criminal
proceeding, in such amount as the court may deem just, without the need for
pleading or proof of the basis thereof as has heretofore been the practice.[18] With regard to exemplary damages, the same
may be awarded in criminal cases committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances.[19] We find that the award by the trial court of
moral and exemplary damages in the amount of P200,000.00 should be split
into P150,000.00 for moral damages and P50,000.00 for exemplary
damages, the total amount of P200,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages
not being disputed by the accused-appellant and is a factual matter binding on
this Court.
Four (4) Members of this
Court maintain their position that RA 7659 is unconstitutional insofar as it prescribes
the death penalty. Nonetheless, they
submit to the ruling of the majority that the law is constitutional and the
death penalty should be imposed in this case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City finding the accused ARMANDO QUILATAN guilty of Incestuous Rape and
imposing on him the DEATH penalty is AFFIRMED, with the modification
that the accused is ordered to pay his victim Oliva Quilatan the amounts of P75,000.00
for civil indemnity and P200,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages.
Let the records of this
case, upon finality of this Decision, be forwarded to His Excellency, the
President, for the possible exercise of his pardoning power. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Records,
p. 1.
[2] Decision penned by Judge Pablito M. Rojas, RTC-Br. 70,
Pasig City.
[3] TSN,
29 October 1996, pp. 3-17.
[4] TSN,
10 February 1997, pp. 3-8.
[5] Records, p. 9.
[6] TSN,
21 July 1997, pp. 4-12.
[7] People
v. Lusa, G.R. No. 122246, 27 March 1998, 288 SCRA 296.
[8] People v. Lustre, G.R. 134562, 6 April 2000.
[9] People v. Ebrada, G.R. No. 122774, 25 September
1998, 296 SCRA 353.
[10] People
v. Ramos, G.R. No. 129439, 25 September 1998, 296 SCRA 559.
[11] TSN, 29 October 1996, pp. 3-4.
[12] Id.,
p. 5.
[13] People
v. Alfeche, G.R. No. 124213, 17 August 1998, 294 SCRA 352.
[14] People v. Bernaldez, G.R. No. 109780, 17 August
1998, 294 SCRA 317.
[15] People v. Malapo, G.R. No. 123115, 25 August
1998, 294 SCRA 579.
[16] People v. Garcia, G.R. Nos. 120387-88, 31 March
1998, 288 SCRA 382.
[17] G.R.
No. 127569, 30 July 1998, 293 SCRA 411.
[18] Ibid.
[19] People
v. Estares, G.R. No. 121878, 5 December 1997, 282 SCRA 524.