EN BANC
[G.R. No. 132603. September 18, 2000]
ELPIDIO M. SALVA, VILMA B. DE LEON, CLEMENTE M. MATIRA, REGION P.
DE LEON, MARILOU C. DE LEON, JAIME RELEVO, JOEY S. VERGARA, CARMENCITA A. SALVA,
DIONISIO B. DE LEON, JORGE S. VERGARA, GORGONIO B. DE LEON, AND OTHERS TOO
NUMEROUS TO ENUMERATE AS A CLASS SUIT, petitioners, vs. HON. ROBERTO L.
MAKALINTAL, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. XI, Balayan, Batangas;
HON. SANGGUNIANG PANGLALAWIGAN OF BATANGAS, BATANGAS CITY; HON. SANGGUNIANG
PANGBAYAN, CALACA, BATANGAS; and HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
BUENA, J.:
This
is an appeal by certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Order dated February
25, 1998,[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch
XI,[2] in Civil Case No. 3442, denying the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to enjoin the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) from holding the plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The facts are
undisputed.
On February 23, 1998,
petitioners, as officials and residents of barangay San Rafael, Calaca, Batangas, filed a class suit against
the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of
Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of
Calaca, Batangas, and the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), docketed as Civil
Case No. 3442, before the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI,
for annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, series of 1997, both
enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No. 2987, series of
1998, with prayer for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order. Ordinance No. 05[3] declared the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly
instructed the COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite as provided under
Sections 9 and 10 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local
Government Code of 1991.[4] On the other hand, Resolution No. 345[5] affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby
overriding the veto[6] exercised by the governor of Batangas.[7] Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the governor of Batangas for
being ultra vires,
particularly, as it was not shown that the essential requirements under Section
9, in relation to Section 7, of Republic Act No. 7160, referring to the
attestations or certifications of the Department of Finance (DOF), National
Statistics Office (NSO) and the Land Management Bureau of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), were obtained. Pursuant to the foregoing ordinance and
resolution, on February 10, 1998, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2987,
providing for the rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required
plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998, to decide the issue of the abolition
of barangay San
Rafael and its merger with barangay Dacanlao, Calaca, Batangas.[8] Simultaneous with the filing of the action before the trial
court, petitioners also filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order to
enjoin respondents from enforcing Ordinance No. 05, Resolution No. 345, and
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987.
In an Order dated
February 25, 1998, the trial court denied the ex parte motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction for lack of jurisdiction. According to the trial court, the temporary
restraining order/injunction sought by petitioners is directed only to COMELEC
Resolution No. 2987. The trial court
ruled that any petition or action questioning an act, resolution or decision of
the COMELEC must be brought before the Supreme Court.[9]
On February 27, 1998, petitioners
filed the instant petition with prayer for a temporary restraining order,
without filing a motion for reconsideration of the trial courts Order dated
February 25, 1998, claiming the urgency or immediate necessity to enjoin the
conduct of the plebiscite scheduled on February 28, 1998.[10]
In a Resolution dated
March 10, 1998, the Court directed the parties to maintain the status
quo prevailing at the time of the filing of
the petition.[11]
On August 28, 1998, the
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment, declaring that he concurs with petitioners
cause and recommending that the instant petition be given due course.[12] Consequently, the Court further resolved on September 29,
1998 to require the COMELEC and the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas to submit their own Comment on the petition.
In a Resolution dated
June 15, 1999, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and
require the parties to submit their respective memoranda.[13]
In their Memorandum
filed on October 26, 1999, petitioners submitted the following issue for the
resolution of this Court:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO
ENJOIN THE COMELEC FROM IMPLEMENTING ITS RESOLUTION NO. 2987, SERIES OF 1998,
WHICH PROVIDED FOR THE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE CONDUCT OF THE PLEBISCITE
SCHEDULED ON FEBRUARY 28, 1998 TO DECIDE ON THE ABOLITION OF BARANGAY
SAN RAFAEL AND ITS MERGER WITH BARANGAY DACANLAO, CALACA, BATANGAS,
PENDING THE DETERMINATION OF CIVIL CASE NO. 3442 FOR THE ANNULMENT OF ORDINANCE
NO. 05, RESOLUTION NO. 345 AND COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2987.[14]
First,
petitioners contend that the assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, of the
Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch XI, encourages multiplicity of
suit[s] and splitting a single cause of action, contrary to Section 3, Rule 2,
of the Rules of Court.[15] Petitioners maintain that since COMELEC Resolution No. 2987
was only issued pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 of the Sangguniang
Panglalawigan of Batangas, the
propriety of the issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is dependent upon the
validity of the Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345.[16] And considering that the jurisdiction of the trial court to
hear and determine the validity of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345 is
not disputed, the assailed Order dated February 25, 1998, directing petitioners
to seek the preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order before
this Court, advances multiplicity of suits and splitting a single cause of
action.
Second,
petitioners assert that when the COMELEC exercises its quasi‑judicial
functions under Section 52 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881), its acts are subject to the exclusive review by this
Court; but when the COMELEC performs a purely ministerial duty, such act is
subject to scrutiny by the Regional Trial Court,[17] citing Filipinas Engineering
and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135
SCRA 25 [1985]), thus:
It cannot be gainsaid that the powers
vested by the Constitution and the law on the Commission on Elections may
either be classified as those pertaining to its adjudicatory or quasi‑judicial
functions, or those which are inherently administrative and sometimes
ministerial in character.[18]
Corollary thereto, petitioners
submit that [t]he conduct of [a] plebiscite, pursuant to Ordinance No. 05 and
Resolution No. 345, is not adjudicatory [or quasi‑judicial] in nature but
simply ministerial or administrative in nature [and only] in obedience to the
aforesaid Ordinance and Resolution, citing Garces vs. Court of
Appeals, 259 SCRA 99 (1996), thus:
xxx To rule otherwise
would surely burden the Court with trivial administrative questions that are
best ventilated before the RTC [Regional Trial Court], a court which the law
vests with the power to exercise original jurisdiction over all cases not
within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body
exercising judicial or quasi‑judicial functions.[19]
Lastly, petitioners
allege that while the plebiscite sought to be enjoined has already been
conducted on February 28, 1998, the instant petition is far from being moot and
academic, claiming that the actual holding of the said plebiscite could not
validate an otherwise invalid ordinance and resolution;[20] that there are still substantial matters to be resolved;[21] assuming arguendo that this petition has become moot and academic, courts will decide a question otherwise moot
and academic if it is capable of repetition, yet evading review;[22] and finally, petitioners maintain that this Court has
resolved to require the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition, that
is, a day before the plebiscite was scheduled to be conducted.[23]
Concurring with
petitioners arguments, the Solicitor General, in his Memorandum filed on
September 7, 1999, asserts that xxx. [i]t is already settled in this
jurisdiction that what is contemplated by the terms any decision, order or
ruling of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari to this Honorable Court, as provided under Section 7,
Article IX‑A of the [1987] Constitution, are those that relate to the
COMELECs exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi‑judicial
powers involving elective regional, provincial and city
officials. (Citations omitted.)[24]24 The Solicitor General further argues that the issuance of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 is a ministerial duty of the COMELEC in the
exercise of its administrative functions, hence, it is submitted that the
aforecited constitutional provision is inapplicable.
Public respondent
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), on the other hand, submits that the power to
review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to this Court,
citing the earlier cases of Zaldivar vs. Estenzo (23 SCRA 533, 540‑541 [1968]); Luison
vs. Garcia (L‑10916, May 20,
1957); Macud vs.
COMELEC (23 SCRA 224 [1968]); and Aratuc
vs. COMELEC (88 SCRA 251, 272
[1979]);[25] thus:
xxx.
For even without the express constitutional prescription that only this
Court may review the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission on
Elections, it is easy to understand why no interference whatsoever with the
performance of the Commission on Elections of its functions should be allowed unless
emanating from this Court. The
observation of Acting Chief Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Albano v. Arranz while not
precisely in point, indicates the proper approach. Thus: It is easy to
realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance of each and
every province were to arrogate unto itself the power to disregard, suspend, or
contradict any order of the Commission on Elections; that constitutional body
would be speedily reduced to impotence.[26]
The COMELEC further
argues that if a Regional Trial Court does not have jurisdiction to issue writs
against statutory agencies of government like the ones cited above [referring
to the former Court of Industrial Relations, Philippine Patent Office, Public
Service Commission, Social Security Commission, National Electrification
Administration and Presidential Commission on Good Government], a fortiori it can not have any such jurisdiction over the Commission
on Elections, a constitutional independent body expressly clothed by the 1987
Constitution with, among others, quasi‑judicial functions and tasked with
one of the most paramount aspects of a democratic government. xxx.[27] Finally, the COMELEC contends that the temporary
restraining order sought by petitioners has been rendered moot and academic by
the actual holding of the plebiscite sought to be enjoined.[28]
The appeal is
meritorious.
Section 7, Article IX‑A
of the 1987 Constitution provides in part that:
SEC. 7.
xxx. Unless otherwise provided
by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved
party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
In Garces
vs. Court of Appeals (259 SCRA 99 [1996])
and Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer (135 SCRA 25 [1985]), we found occasion to interpret the
foregoing provision in this wise:
xxx.
What is contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions of
the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law
are those rendered in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken
cognizance of by the said body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi‑judicial
powers.[29]
In Filipinas, we have likewise
affirmed that the powers vested by the Constitution and the law on the
Commission on Elections may either be classified as those pertaining to its
adjudicatory or quasi‑judicial functions, or those which are inherently
administrative and sometimes ministerial in character.[30]
As aptly explained by
the Solicitor General, in the instant case, after the COMELEC ascertained the
issuance of the ordinance and resolution declaring the abolition of barangay San Rafael, it issued COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 calling for
a plebiscite to be held in the affected barangays, pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 7160. We agree with the Solicitor
General that xxx. [t]he issuance of
[COMELEC] Resolution No. 2987 is thus a ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is
enjoined by law and is part and parcel of its administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary
authority on the part of respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its
adjudicatory or quasi‑judicial power to hear and resolve controversies
defining the rights and duties of party‑litigants, relative to the
conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election
laws. (Citation omitted.)[31] Briefly, COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the
rules and regulations governing the conduct of the required plebiscite, was not
issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi‑judicial functions but merely as an
incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of
plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a final order
reviewable by certiorari by
this Court. Any question pertaining to
the validity of said resolution may be well taken in an ordinary civil action
before the trial courts.
Even the cases cited by
the public respondent in support of its contention that the power to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987
solely belongs to this Court are simply
not in point. Zaldivar
vs. Estenzo[32] speaks of the power of
the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws relative to the conduct of
elections to the exclusion of the judiciary.
In the present case, petitioners are not contesting the exclusive
authority of the COMELEC to enforce and administer election laws. Luison
vs. Garcia[33] refers to this Courts power to review administrative decisions,
particularly referring to a COMELEC resolution declaring a certain
certificate of candidacy null and void, based on Article X, Section 2 of the
1935 Constitution. In Macud
vs. COMELEC,[34] we reiterated that when a board of canvassers rejects an election
return on the ground that it is spurious or has been tampered with, the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to the COMELEC for appropriate relief,
and if the COMELEC sustains the action of the board, the aggrieved party may
appeal to this Court. In both Luison and Macud, the assailed COMELEC resolutions fall within the purview
of final orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by this Court.
In view of the
foregoing, public respondents other contentions deserve scant consideration.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby GRANTED, and the assailed
Order dated February 25, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan,
Batangas, Branch XI is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. The Regional Trial Court of Balayan,
Batangas, Branch XI is ordered to proceed with dispatch in resolving Civil Case
No. 3442. The execution of the result
of the plebiscite held on February 28, 1998 shall be deferred depending on the
outcome of Civil Case No. 3442.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Gonzaga‑Reyes,
and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., no
part, was Comelec Chairman at the time.
Ynares‑Santiago, J., on leave.