SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129892. October 16, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO
BARRO, JR.,[1]
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
For review is the
decision of the Court of Appeals,[2] in CA-G.R. No. 18290, which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32,
convicting appellant of the crime of murder.
The Court of Appeals increased the penalty to reclusion perpetua and
accordingly certified the case to this Court for review, pursuant to Rule 124,
Section 13, of the Rules of Court.
The case for the
prosecution, as summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General, is as
follows:[3]
“At about 10:30 o’clock in the evening of 31 October, 1992, witness Villaruel was in his house, with his family, in La Purisima Nuevo, Ocampo, Camarines Sur; some fifty meters away from his house, was the house of Pedro Largo, where in the vacant pig-pen, four persons were having a drinking spree (tsn, May 13, 1994, p. 3); these four were Pedro Largo, Dennis Cano, Ruben Barro and one nicknamed ‘Onong’ (tsn, may 13, 1994, pp. 3 & 4); the drinking partners were talking in a loud voice, impelling Villaruel to go down his house, going in the direction of his neighbor’s pig-pen where the rowdy drinkers were, but on his way, he notice Ruben Barro and ‘Oneng’ leave the two namely, Pedro Largo and Dennis Cano sitting side by side, with Dennis Cano’s back resting on the cemented wall of the pen (tsn, May 13, 1994, pp. 8 & 11); with his back resting on the wall of the pig-pen; Dennis Cano was suddenly attacked from behind by Rodolfo Barro Jr. with a bladed instrument about a foot long, hitting the former with that first stab just below the left scapula (tsn, May 13, 1994, pp. 5 & 11); the second stab wound inflicted on Cano by Barro Jr. found its mark about 8 inches below the left armpit (tsn, January 20, 1994, pp. 4 & 7; tsn, August 4, 1994, p. 4); even as Cano had already sustained two stab wounds, he still managed to walk in the direction of the house of Pedro Largo some four meters away, where he collapsed (tsn, May 13, 1994, pp. 13 & 15); Pedro Largo and the father of Dennis Cano brought the wounded Dennis Cano by jeep to the Camarines Sur Regional Hospital in Naga City, where, in spite of medical attendance, Cano expired on 6 November, 1992 (tsn, January 20, 1994; pp 6 & 7; tsn, May 13, 1994, p. 6); there is no dispute that Cano died of the stab wounds inflicted on him by Rodolfo Barro, Jr. on the night of 31 October 1992 (tsn, January 20, 1994, p. 7).”
Appellant relied on
outright denial and alibi for his defense,[4] thus:
“Accused Rodolfo Barro, Jr. denied having anything to do with the killing of Dennis Cano. He testified that on the alleged date and time of the stabbing incident, he was at Buang, Tabaco, Albay where he permanently resides. He did not know the victim and had never been to La Purisima, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. And that before his arrest, he had been residing in Buang, Tabaco, Albay, with his family and worked as a permanent laborer in the land owned by Danilo Bonita. (TSN, August 18, 1994, pp. 2-4)
Danilo Bonita corroborated the foregoing testimony of accused Rodolfo Barro, Jr. (TSN, October 4, 1994, pp. 3-5)”
We shall now review the
proceedings below and the evidence offered by the prosecution as well as the
defense. On February 2, 1993, the
following Information for murder was filed against appellant:[5]
“That on or about the 31st day of October, 1992 in Barangay La Purisima Nuevo, Municipality of Ocampo, Province of Camarines Sur, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with a double bladed weapon, one DENNIS CANO, thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds on his body which caused his death, to the damage and prejudice of the offended party in such amount as maybe proven in court.
ACTS CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Upon arraignment,
appellant entered a plea of not guilty.[6]
During trial, the
prosecution presented the following witnesses:
(1) Pedro Largo, the remaining companion of the victim when he was
stabbed, who witnessed the stabbing incident, (2) Renato Villaruel, Largo’s
neighbor, who also witnessed the stabbing incident, (3) Federico Cano, father
of the victim, and (4) Dr. Jullie Sy, a resident physician at the Bicol
Regional Hospital, Naga City, who conducted the autopsy on the body of the
victim.
Pedro Largo testified
that he knew appellant because the latter used to work at their farm. After the
drinking session, Largo and the victim remained seated at a table facing each
other. An electric bulb hung overhead.
While Largo and the victim were swapping stories, appellant suddenly
came up behind the victim and stabbed him with a sharp bladed weapon. Largo testified that he recognized
appellant, who was wearing a black t-shirt.
After stabbing the victim, appellant ran away.[7]
Renato Villaruel, Largo’s
neighbor, testified that he was about to approach the drinking session to
verify what the loud noise was all about when he saw two persons get up and
leave the group. The remaining two were
Largo and the victim. When he was about
10 meters away, he saw appellant approach the victim from behind and stab him
twice with a bladed instrument. After
stabbing the victim, appellant immediately ran away. Villaruel helped Largo bring the victim to the hospital.[8]
Federico Cano testified
as to the expenses incurred as a result of the death of his son.
The autopsy report
revealed that the victim sustained two stab wounds - “3.2 cm. left infra
scapular area” and “3 cm. level of the 9th intercostal space, 8 cm. lateral
aspect left to the vertebra,” and that the second stab wound penetrated the
thoracic and abdominal cavity. The
victim also suffered from a cerebral edema as a result possibly of an
inflammation or a fall.[9]
For the defense,
appellant and Danilo Bonita testified.
Appellant denied knowing the victim or prosecution witnesses Largo and
Villaruel. He claimed that he had never
gone to La Purisima Nuevo, Ocampo, Camarines Sur in his entire life. However, he does not know why the
prosecution witnesses would point to him as the assailant in this case.[10]
Danilo Bonita testified
that appellant was a laborer in his plantation in Buang, Tabaco, Albay from
1991 up to August 1993 when the latter was arrested. On October 31, 1992, the day of the incident, appellant was then
working for him. However, when pressed
by the Court to present proof, Bonita could not present any record showing that
appellant was employed as his laborer.[11]
On rebuttal, the
prosecution presented Rogelio Largo to debunk appellant’s testimony that he had
never been to La Purisima, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. Rogelio testified that he hired appellant as a laborer in his
riceland located in said place from June of 1992 until the end of October
1992. He likewise presented in court a
notebook prepared by his wife indicating that on October 31, 1992, they paid
the salary of appellant for the day.[12]
On sur-rebuttal,
appellant claimed that the testimony of Rogelio Largo was false. He denied even knowing the latter or even
having any misunderstanding with him.
He insisted that he never went to La Purisima at anytime in 1992.[13]
On February 2, 1995, the
trial court rendered a decision[14] convicting appellant of the crime of murder,
disposing thus:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered, finding the accused Rodolfo Barro, Jr. also known as Arnulfo Barro, guilty, beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, defined and penalized under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 17 years, 4 months, and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum to 26 years 8 months and 1 day of Reclusion Perpetua, medium period as the maximum, to indemnify the heirs of Dennis Cano the sum of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos, as indemnity for his death, plus the sum of Thirty Four Thousand, Two Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Ten Centavos (P34,261.10) as actual and consequential damages, with all the accessories of the law, plus costs; the accused is credited in full for his preventive detention.
SO ORDERED. Given this 2nd day of February, 1995 at Pili, Camarines Sur.”
On appeal, the appellate
court rendered its decision[15] affirming the judgment of the trial court
but, as already stated, increasing the penalty to reclusion perpetua. Our primary concern now is whether the
imposition of this penalty, as well as the finding of guilt of appellant, is
proper.
In our Resolution dated
November 17, 1997,[16] the Court resolved to grant the
Manifestation filed by the Public Attorney’s Office adopting the appellant’s
brief filed before the CA as its appellant’s brief and submitting the case for
decision.
Appellant contends[17]that the trial court erred in:
I. ... GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE INCONSISTENT IF NOT CONFLICTING TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES ANENT THE STABBING INCIDENT IN QUESTION AND IN DISREGARDING THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE DEFENSE.
II. ... HOLDING THAT TREACHERY WAS PRESENT IN THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME ASCRIBED AGAINST APPELLANT.
III. ...RENDERING A VERDICT OF CONVICTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE GUILT OF APPELLANT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
In his brief, appellant
assails the credibility of prosecution witness Villaruel by pointing out the
following inconsistencies between his sworn statement and his testimony in
court. First, in his sworn
statement, Villaruel stated that the victim was stabbed while the latter was
walking with Pedro Largo. But on the
witness stand, Villaruel testified that the victim was seated when he was
stabbed. When asked about the
inconsistency, Villaruel explained that his earlier statement was
incorrect. Second, Villaruel
stated in his affidavit that Ruben Barro and Oning Divinaflores were with the
victim when the latter was stabbed and that the two ran away with appellant
after the stabbing incident. But
Villaruel testified later on that Ruben and Oning left as he was approaching
the group. Further, during direct
examination, Villaruel testified that he witnessed the actual stabbing, but on
cross-examination, he testified that he did not notice the stabbing incident
until the victim uttered that he was stabbed.
Appellant likewise
assails the credibility of prosecution witness Largo by pointing out the
following inconsistencies in his testimony:
First, on direct examination, Largo testified that there was a
heated altercation between the victim and appellant prior to the stabbing
incident. On cross, Largo testified
that there was no such altercation. Second,
during preliminary examination, Largo testified that they drank gin, while on
the stand, he testified that they drank 3 bottles of “beer grande” and 3
bottles of gin. Further, in his sworn
statement, Largo testified that he saw appellant stab the victim with his right
hand, while on the stand, Largo testified that appellant stabbed the victim
with both hands. Further, in his sworn
statement, Largo testified that the weapon was double-bladed, while on the
stand, he said it was single bladed only.
When confronted by the trial judge, Largo could not explain these
inconsistencies.
Appellant further claims
that Rogelio Largo’s testimony that appellant was his laborer has no basis,
since the notebook presented in court did not contain the signature of appellant
that he indeed received payment for his services.
Lastly, appellant
contends that even assuming that he stabbed the victim, their prior argument
negates the finding of treachery. He
should therefore be found guilty only of homicide.
The OSG, in praying for
the affirmance of the judgment, contends that the alleged inconsistencies in
the aforementioned testimonies, particularly what liquor the victim and the
witnesses were drinking, whether the knife was single or double bladed, or
whether appellant used his right hand or both hands in stabbing the victim,
pertain to minor matters which do not detract from the veracity of their
testimonies. Instead, they should be
considered badges of truth considering the natural fallibility of human
perceptions. Further, what Largo actually testified was that there was a prior
altercation between the victim and appellant a long, long time ago, not on the
night of the murder. As to the actual
position of the victim when he was stabbed, Villaruel clarified that the victim
was seated but was still able to walk a few steps after he was stabbed. Further, the OSG contends that appellant’s
defense of alibi cannot prevail over his positive identification by two
prosecution witnesses. Lastly,
treachery clearly attended the killing as the attack on the victim was sudden
and from behind.
The issues now before us
pertain to the credibility of witnesses and the existence of treachery.
When the issue is one of
credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings
of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to
decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. The rule admits of certain exceptions, namely: (1) when patent inconsistencies in the
statements of witnesses are ignored by the trial court, or (2) when the
conclusions arrived at are clearly unsupported by the evidence.[18] The Court is likewise not precluded from
making its own assessment of the probative value of the testimony of the
witnesses on the basis of the transcript of stenographic notes (TSNs) thereof.[19] After conducting a thorough review of the
records, including the transcripts of stenographic notes we find no cogent
reason to reverse the findings of the trial and appellate courts. In this case,
the minor consistencies pointed out by appellant do not refer to the crux of
the matter, which is the positive identification of appellant as the one who
stabbed the victim from behind, twice.
Minor and inconsequential flaws in the testimony of witnesses strengthen
rather than impair their credibility.[20] The test is whether their testimonies agree
on the essential facts and substantially corroborate a consistent and coherent
whole.[21] Contradictions between the contents of an
affiant’s affidavit and his testimony on the witness stand do not always
militate against the witness' credibility because it has long been within
judicial notice that affidavits, which are usually taken ex parte are
often incomplete and inaccurate.[22] Further, appellant testified that he could
not think of any reason why the prosecution witnesses would falsely implicate
him in the commission of the crime.[23] Absent any evidence showing any reason or
motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no
such improper motive exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of full
faith and credit.[24]
Appellant’s defense of
denial and alibi must fail in the face of his positive identification by no
less than two eyewitnesses,[25] both of whom are known to him. For the
defense of alibi to prosper, the requisites of time and place must be strictly
met.[26] These, appellant failed to prove. Not only
that, no less than three eyewitnesses placed him at the locus criminis
at the time of the incident. To all
their positive testimonies, appellant simply made a blanket denial, stating
that he does not know them, and that he was not there.
As observed in People
v. Ganan, Jr.[27]
“The experience of courts and the general observation of humanity teaches us that the natural limitations of our inventive faculties are such that if a witness undertakes to fabricate and deliver in court a false narrative containing numerous details, he is almost certain to fall into fatal inconsistencies, to make statements which can be readily refuted, or to expose in his demeanor the falsity of his message.
For this reason it will be found that perjurers usually confine themselves to the incidents immediately related to the principal fact about which they testify, and when asked about collateral facts by which their truthfulness could be tested, their answers not infrequently take the stereotyped form of such expression as ‘I don’t know’ or ‘I don’t remember.’”
Regarding treachery, we
find that both the trial and appellate courts properly appreciated the
existence of treachery. Contrary to the
assertion of appellant, the killing was not preceded by a quarrel. While prosecution witness Largo stated that
“he heard from other people that appellant and the victim had a previous
altercation a long, long time ago,” such testimony is hearsay. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or
not, possesses no probative value unless the proponent can show that the same falls
within the exception to the hearsay rule.[28] Considering both the evidence of the
prosecution and the defense, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held
that:
“... It is established beyond reasonable doubt that
accused-appellant suddenly appeared behind the victim and stabbed the latter.
There is treachery when the attack on the victim was sudden and unexpected and
from behind and without warning with the victim’s back turned towards his
assailant. (People v. Boniao, 217 SCRA 653, 655).”[29]
Where the accused’s
attack was so sudden and launched from behind that the victim was caught off
guard without an opportunity to defend himself,[30] treachery is present. Treachery having attended the killing, the
crime was correctly characterized as murder.
However, evident premeditation, though alleged in the Information, was
not sufficiently proved by clear and convincing evidence.
At the time of the
commission of the crime on October 31, 1992, the penalty for murder was reclusion
temporal to death. There being no
mitigating nor aggravating circumstance, the Court of Appeals correctly held
that the penalty to be imposed on appellant should be reclusion perpetua.
As to the award of
damages, the amount of actual damages is supported by receipts and should be
sustained. However, while the father of
the victim testified as to the actual damages sustained as a result of the
death of the victim, he did not testify as to moral damages. Hence, for lack of
competent proof, we cannot award moral damages.[31]
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 18290 is hereby affirmed. Appellant RODOLFO BARRO, JR. is hereby
found guilty of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, and ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000.00 as indemnity, and P34,261.10 as actual damages. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman),
Mendoza, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Buena, J., no part.
[1]
The records did not indicate his middle name or initial.1 accused-appellant
[2]
Penned by Associate Justice Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez, concurred in by
Associate Justices Arturo B. Buena and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., of the Third
Division.
[3]
Appellee’s Brief, CA Rollo, pp. 48-49.
[4]
Appellant’s Brief, CA Rollo, p. 25.
[5]
Records, p. 1.
[6]
Id. at 60.
[7]
TSN, January 20, 1994, pp. 2-25; TSN, May 13, 1994, p. 3.
[8]
TSN, May 13, 1994, pp. 3-20.
[9]
TSN, August 4, 1994, pp. 2-6; Autopsy Report, Exhibit “C,” Records, p. 13. The public prosecutor manifested that the
Autopsy Report was mistakenly marked as Exh. “A” and should have been marked as
Exh. “C.”
[10]
TSN, August 18, 1994, pp. 2-5.
[11]
TSN, October 4, 1994, pp. 3-9; October 28, 1994, p. 2.
[12]
TSN, November 16, 1994, pp. 2-4, 10-14.
[13]
TSN, December 6, 1994, pp. 2-4.
[14]
Records, pp. 165-166.
[15]
CA Rollo, pp. 70-77.
[16]
Rollo, p. 8.
[17]
CA Rollo, p. 22.
[18]
People v. Acaya, G.R. No. 108381, March 7, 2000, p. 6.
[19]
Id. at 7.
[20]
People v. Sabalones, 294 SCRA 751, 794 (1998).
[21]
People v. Realin, 301 SCRA 495, 511 (1999).
[22]
People v. Tanilon, 293 SCRA 220, 229-230 (1998).
[23]
TSN, August 18, 1994, p. 5.
[24]
People v. Rendoque, G.R. No. 106282, January 20, 2000, pp. 10-11.
[25]
People v. Quillosa, G.R. No. 115687, February 17, 2000, p. 9.
[26]
Ibid.
[27]
265 SCRA 260, 287 (1996), citing U.S. v. Burns, 41 Phil. 418 (1921).
[28]
People v. Villaviray, 262 SCRA 13, 20 (1996).
[29]
Rollo, p. 74.
[30]
People v. Flores, G.R. No. 129284, March 17, 2000, p. 12.
[31]
People v. Espina, G.R. No. 123102, February 29, 2000, p. 13.