EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129532. October 5, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. VICENTE
HILOT (Deceased) and PATROCINIO BIHAG, JR., accused,
PATROCINIO
BIHAG, JR., accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING,
J.:
For automatic review is the
decision[1] dated March 18, 1997, of the Regional Trial
Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. 1275, finding
appellant Patrocinio Bihag, Jr., guilty of murder, with the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling, and sentencing him to death.
In an Information dated
June 27, 1996, Vicente Hilot and Patrocinio Bihag, Jr., were charged with
murder, allegedly committed as follows:
“That on or about the 14th day of March 1996, at or about 10:45 in the evening, in barangay San Juan, municipality of Panaon, province of Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with intent to kill and armed with bladed weapons, entered the residence of one Gedie Galindo, and once inside, taking advantage of nighttime and with treachery, did then and there attack, assault, stab and wound said Gedie Galindo, thereby inflicting upon him with (sic) fatal wounds on different parts of his body which caused the immediate death of said Gedie Galindo.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying circumstance of treachery, and
the aggravating circumstances of nighttime and dwelling of the offended party.”
[2]
Arraigned on August 20,
1996, appellant entered a plea of not guilty to the charge. His co-accused, Hilot, who fled to Mindanao
after the incident, died on June 1, 1996 in Pagadian City.[3]
The facts, as established
during the trial, are as follows:
On March 14, 1996, at
about 6:00 P.M., spouses Gerundino Galindo and Edna Ho Galindo had finished
supper. Like most residents of sitio
Conalum, barangay San Juan, Panaon, Misamis Occidental, they slept early. They left two kerosene-fueled “vigil” lamps
burning in the kitchen and dining area.
At around 10:45 P.M. Edna was suddenly awakened by the loud cry for help
from their eldest son, Gedie. She woke
her husband up. Gerundino rushed to the
kitchen. There, Gerundino saw a
bloodied Gedie grappling with Vicente Hilot.
The latter was holding a bloodstained hunting knife. Gerundino lost no time in rushing to aid his
wounded son. He grabbed a fistful of
Hilot’s hair, disarmed, and pinned him to the floor. Meanwhile, Gedie, who was stabbed in the chest, moved back to
lean on the kitchen wall. Suddenly, the
kitchen door opened and Gerundino saw appellant Patrocinio Bihag, Jr., enter
with a hunting knife. Before Gerundino could react, Bihag stabbed Gedie in the
neck. Gerundino let go of Hilot and
went to assist his son. The stab wound
was fatal. Hilot and Bihag, immediately
fled.[4] Edna had followed her husband to the kitchen
and there witnessed the stabbing of her son.[5]
Gerundino’s sister and
neighbor, Saturnina Galindo, also heard Gedie’s shout for help. She grabbed a flashlight and rushed to find
out what was happening. She saw Bihag
jump out of her brother’s house holding a bloody knife followed by Hilot. She rushed to Gerundino’s house where she
saw Gedie’s parents carrying his limp body.
Prosecution witness Dr.
Arden C. Mangubat, Municipal Health Officer of Panaon, Misamis Occidental,
conducted an autopsy that showed Gedie had sustained two wounds, one in the
neck and another in the chest. The
wounds were of the same size and possibly caused by the same knife.[6] According to Dr. Mangubat, the neck wound
was most likely the fatal one, since it penetrated the trachea, the air passage
to the lungs.[7]
During his trial
appellant Bihag put up the defense of alibi.
He said that on the night of the alleged murder he was at his residence
in barangay Talic, Oroquieta City, with his common law wife, Melba.[8] He was receiving - tallying bets in “masiao,”
a game of chance. The following day,
they went to Sinacaban, Misamis Occidental where they operated another gambling
game, “hantak.” He had been “hantak” operator for the past ten years. On cross-examination appellant said that
when he learned he was a suspect in the killing of Gedie, he went to see Mayor
Francisco Paylaga of Panaon, Misamis Occidental. The mayor said not to worry about the case.[9] As a result, he did not bother to verify
from the police why he was a suspect.
He did not secure affidavits from witnesses regarding his whereabouts at
that time of the Gedie’s death.
Appellant insists that the only reason he was charged in this case for
murder is his close relationship with co-accused Hilot.
Defense witness Dioscoro
Tañedo[10] corroborated appellant’s alibi. Tañedo
narrated that while appellant’s wife was busy attending to bettors and waiting
for the tally sheets, he and appellant had a drinking spree, which lasted from
7:00 to 10:30 p.m. He said appellant
never left the building where they were staying in separate apartments.[11] Witnesses Josephine Tañedo, Disocoro’s wife,
corroborated his story concerning appellant’s whereabouts.[12] Appellant’s spouse, Melba took the stand to
confirm Mrs. Tañedo’s story.[13]
The prosecution presented
Diosdado Luminot as rebuttal witness.
He said he was on his way home that fateful evening at approximately
midnight when he met appellant and Hilot walking away from the Gerundino house. Both were holding bloody knives. He greeted them but got no response. Upon reaching Gerundino’s place, he noticed
several persons there. He was told that
there was a robbery in Gerundino’s house.[14]
The trial court convicted
appellant, disposing as follows:
“WHEREFORE, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder committed with one aggravating circumstance present without a mitigating circumstance to offset it, the Court hereby sentences accused Patrocinio Bihag, Jr., to suffer the penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the late Gedie Galindo the amount of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P15,000.00 for burial expenses and compensatory damages, P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees and P2,000.00 for litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
The records of the case including the transcript of stenographic notes are hereby ordered forwarded to the Honorable Supreme Court for automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659.”
SO ORDERED.[15]
The trial court held that
the killing of Gedie Galindo was qualified by treachery, with the aggravating
circumstance of nighttime absorbed by treachery. It also found the aggravating circumstance of dwelling present,
since the killing took place inside the victim’s house.
Now before us, appellant
assigns the following errors:
1
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.
2
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PARENTS OF THE DECEASED DID NOT ACTUALLY IDENTIFY THE CULPRITS THAT WOUNDED THEIR SON
3
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED
4
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS IN TALIC, OROQUIETA CITY AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT.
The appeal boils down to
the issue of the identification of the appellant Patrocinio Bihag, Jr., as one
of the assailants, which in turn hinges on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses as well as the tenability of appellant’s alibi.
In convicting appellant,
the trial court relied upon the positive identification of appellant by the
victim’s parents. Appellant claims that
the witnesses were mistaken since the scene of the crime was allegedly unlit at
the time of the incident.
For the State, the Office
of the Solicitor General, in turn, argues that appellant’s claim lacks
merit. To assail the positive
identification made by the Galindos solely because of poor lighting is
unconvincing. That two kerosene lamps
lighted the scene of the crime, sufficient for the witnesses to identify the
malefactors, was not rebutted successfully by the defense.
Jurisprudence has held
that the light cast by a petroleum lamp[16] is more than sufficient for categorical
identification of a felon. Where two
kerosene lamps furnished the illumination, as in this case, the positive
identification of the culprit becomes even more difficult to impeach[17] and thus should be accepted.
Appellant, however, lays
stress on the fact that when the police initially investigated the killing,
Gerundino failed to name the killers of his son. It was only on March 18, 1996 or four days later, that the
parents implicated him. He insists that
this belated identification is highly suspect.
The Solicitor General
argues the Galindos’ withholding of perpetrators’ names should not detract from
their positive identification of appellant.
The Galindos initially wanted to avenge their son’s death, motivating
them to keep to themselves the assailants’ identities. That the parents later changed their minds
does not detract from their positive identification of appellant as one of the
assailants.
Delay of a witness in
reporting the crime to police authorities, when adequately explained, does not
impair the witness’ credibility nor render his testimony biased or destroy its
probative value.[18] Fear of reprisal,[19] death threats,[20] the resulting mental shock or disturbance as
a result of having experienced or witnessed a violent crime,[21] and even a natural reluctance not to be
involved in a criminal case[22] have been accepted as adequate explanations
for the delay in reporting crimes.
Moreover, there is no rule that the suspect in a crime should be
hurriedly named by a witness.[23]
Positive identification
of a culprit is of great weight in determining whether an accused is guilty or
not.[24] Our review of the evidence shows that the
Galindos did not err in pointing to appellant as one of the perpetrators of the
crime. He was well known in their place
because he was a “hantak” operator.
The defense admitted appellant had long known Gerundino.[25] There was no bad blood between them,[26] and there was no reason for the Galindos to
falsely accuse appellant. Furthermore,
two other witnesses - -Luminot and Saturnina - - corroborated the testimony
concerning appellant’s presence at the locus criminis. Appellant as well as his co-accused held a
knife, according to Luminot. No ill
motive was attributed to these witnesses that could make them falsely testify
against appellant. Thus, we find no
cogent reason to overturn the trial court’s holding that appellant was
positively and unequivocally identified as one of the victim’s assailants.
Appellant next insists
that the trial court erred in disregarding his alibi, inasmuch as disinterested
witnesses corroborated it.
In finding appellant’s
alibi less than foolproof, the trial court observed:
“It is of judicial knowledge that the asphalted road between
Oroquieta City and Panaon, Misamis Occidental, has a distance of about 15
kilometers. One traveling in a motor
vehicle at even a regular speed can reach one of these two places from the
other in less than 30 minutes. Assuming
that the accused was in Talic, Oroquieta City, on March 14, 1996, having
allegedly had (sic) a drinking spree with Dioscoro Tañedo between 7:00 o’clock
to 10:30, more or less, in the evening as he wants the Court to believe, there
was no physical impossibility for him to be at the scene of the crime in San
Juan, Panaon, Misamis Occidental, at about 10:45 P.M.”[27]
This Court has ruled
consistently that alibi is an inherently weak defense[28] and should be rejected when the identity of
the accused is sufficiently and positively established by the prosecution.[29] Moreover, for alibi to overcome the
prosecution’s evidence, the defense must successfully prove the element of physical
impossibility of the accused’s presence at the crime scene at the time of the
perpetration of the offense.[30] Physical impossibility in relation to alibi
takes into consideration not only the geographical distance between the scene
of the crime and the place where accused maintains he was, but more
importantly, the accessibility between these points.[31] In this case, the element of physical
impossibility of appellant’s presence that fateful night at the crime scene has
not been established.
In finding that treachery
attended the killing of Gedie, the trial court stated:
“The Court finds and entertains no doubt that accused Patrocinio
Bihag, Jr., is criminally liable for the death of Gedie Galindo. The crime of murder was committed with the
qualifying circumstance of treachery.
At the time Patrocinio Bihag, Jr., suddenly inflicted the fatal wound at
the base of the neck of the victim, Gedie Galindo was already wounded by
Vicente Hilot on the chest, bleeding, unarmed and defenseless, leaning helpless
against the wall near the door of the kitchen.”[32]
However, after close
scrutiny of the records, we are not fully persuaded that treachery qualified
the crime. For treachery to be
appreciated, two essential elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of execution that gives the person
attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) the said
means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. What is decisive is that the execution of
the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or retaliate.[33] In this case, there is no clear showing that
Gedie could not defend himself when he was attacked. Note that there were two stabbing incidents, the first by Hilot
and the second by Bihag. The time
elapsed between the first and second incidents, however, was not
significant. For Gerundino immediately
rushed to the kitchen in response to Gedie’s cry for help. Hilot had wounded Gedie in the chest.
Nonetheless, Gedie continued his struggle against Hilot. Gedie was aided then by his father who had
grabbed, disarmed and pinned Hilot to the floor. Gedie backed up against the kitchen wall. This was when the kitchen door opened and
appellant appeared and stabbed Gedie in the neck. Although wounded, it was not established that Gedie was already
incapacitated from offering any resistance or defense, particularly with the
aid of his father, when the second stabbing occurred. He had, after all, just fought Hilot valiantly. He had to be on guard against the
possibility that the latter might get loose from Gerundino’s hold. Nor could he discount the possibility that
Hilot had a confederate waiting to join the assault. In short, the victim was aware of further dangers to life and
limb. The fact that the attacker used a
bladed weapon did not per se make the attack treacherous. Treachery must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence or as conclusively as the killing itself.[34] Any doubt as to the existence of treachery
must be resolved in favor of the accused.[35] Absent clear and convincing proof of
treachery, appellant can only be convicted of homicide.
The trial court found the
aggravating circumstance of dwelling to be present “as the killing took place
in the house of the deceased.”[36] The information alleged that the accused
“entered the residence of one Gedie Galindo, and once inside…did then and there
assault, stab and wound said Gedie Galindo.” The records show that the victim
was killed in the kitchen of his parents’ house, the kitchen being one of the
rooms in said house. Note that what the
prosecution’s evidence shows is that the house where the killing took place was
not owned by the victim, but rather by his parents. However, it is not necessary under the law that the victim owns
the place where he lives or dwells. It
is settled that for dwelling to be appreciated, the victim need not be the
owner of the dwelling.[37] Regardless of whether the victim was a
lessee, a boarder, a bedspacer,[38] or even an invited guest,[39] the place is his home, the sanctity of which
the law seeks to protect and uphold. In
People v. Sto. Tomas, 138 SCRA 206 (1985), where the victim was
killed in her mother’s house where she was temporarily staying, this Court held
dwelling to be aggravating. Here, the
victim was killed in his parents’ house, which for all intents and purposes was
his home. We agree with the court a
quo that dwelling aggravated the offense. Contrary to appellant’s
assertions, the prosecution has more than overcome his presumed innocence. Nonetheless, as earlier elucidated, he can
only be found guilty of homicide aggravated by the circumstance of
dwelling. Homicide is punished by reclusion
temporal, which ranges from a minimum of twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to a maximum of twenty (20) years.
Under Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, where the penalty prescribed
by law contains three periods, and only an aggravating circumstance is present
in the commission of the act, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum
period. Further, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be within the range of prision
mayor as a minimum to reclusion temporal in its medium period as the
maximum.
Concerning damages, the
trial court awarded “P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P15,000.00 for burial expenses and compensatory damages,
P10,000.00 as attorney fees and P2,000.00 for litigation expenses and to pay
the costs.”[40] We find, however, that in awarding actual
damages, the court a quo relied only on the testimony of Edna Ho Galindo
as regarding expenses incurred for the wake and burial of the victim.[41] No receipts were presented to support her
claims. But in this regard, courts will
recognize only substantiated expenses, which have been genuinely incurred in
connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim.[42] Thus, the award of “P15,000.00 for burial
expenses and compensatory damages” ought to be deleted, for being unsupported
by the sufficient evidence. But the
presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling warrants the imposition of
exemplary damages.[43] Such award is within the Court’s discretion,
as part of the civil liability that may be imposed upon the appellant.[44]
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 26, in Criminal Case No. 1275, is hereby
MODIFIED. Appellant Patrocinio
Bihag, Jr., is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide,
committed with the generic aggravating circumstance of dwelling and hereby
sentenced to suffer a prison term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law. The award of P15,000.00 for burial expenses
and compensatory damages is DELETED, but appellant is ordered to pay the
heirs of the victim the sum of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to
the P50,000.00 as death indemnity. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De
Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo,
pp. 15-21.
[2] Records,
p. 1
[3] Id.
at 29; TSN, November 5, 1996, p. 6.
[4] TSN,
November 5, 1996, pp. 3-6; TSN, December 12, 1996, pp. 3-6.
[5] TSN,
December 12, 1996, pp. 3-6.
[6] Exhibits
“A” and “A-2”, Records, p. 8.
[7] TSN,
November 12, 1996, p. 8.
[8]
Also spelled as “Melva” in the records.
[9] TSN,
January 10, 1997, pp. 20-21.
[10] Sometimes
spelled “Tañego” in the records.
[11] TSN,
January 31, 1997, pp. 6-7, 11.
[12] TSN,
January 31, 1997, p. 18.
[13] TSN,
February 7, 1997, p. 4.
[14] TSN,
February 7, 1997, pp. 18-20.
[15] Rollo,
p. 21.
[16] People
v. Quinevista, Jr., 244 SCRA 586, 593-594 (1995) citing People v.
Ching, 240 SCRA 267 (1995), People v. Nopia, 113 SCRA 599 (1982).
[17] People
v. Gaspasin, 145 SCRA 178, 191 in relation to 182 (1986).
[18] People
v. Padao, 267 SCRA 64, 76 (1997); People v. Alcantara, 254 SCRA
384 (1996).
[19] People
v. Castillo, 261 SCRA 493, 500-501 (1996).
[20] People
v. Leoterio, 264 SCRA 608, 615 (1996).
[21] People
v. Repollo, et al., G.R. No. 134631, May 4, 2000, p. 10.
[22] People
v. Navarro, 297 SCRA 331, 350
(1998).
[23] People
v. Queliza, 279 SCRA 145, 157 (1997).
[24] People
v. Monieva, G.R. No. 123912, June 8, 2000, p. 10.
[25] TSN,
January 10, 1997, p. 16.
[26] Id.
at 18.
[27] Rollo,
p. 18.
[28] People
v. Milliam, et al., G.R. No. 129071, January 31, 2000, p. 12.
[29] People
v. Dando, G.R. No. 120646, February 14, 2000, p. 18 citing People v.
Salvador, 279 SCRA 164 (1997).
[30] People
v. Suitos, G.R. No. 125280, March 31, 2000, pp. 8-9, citing People v.
Henson, 270 SCRA 634 (1997).
[31] People
v. Gomez, G.R. No. 132171, May 31, 2000, p. 5.
[32] Rollo,
p. 37.
[33] People
v. Marcelino, et al., G.R. No. 126269, October 1, 1999.
[34] People
v. Orio, G.R. No. 128821, April 12, 2000.
[35] People
v. Santos, G.R. No. 122935, May 31, 2000.
[36] Rollo,
p. 37.
[37] People
v. Badilla, 185 SCRA 554, 570 (1990).
[38] People
v. Parazo, 272 SCRA 512, 524 (1997), citing People v. Daniel, 86
SCRA 511 (1978).38
[39]39 People
v. Balansi, 187 SCRA 566, 575 (1990); People v. Basa, 83 Phil.
622 (1949).
[40] Supra
note 20.
[41] TSN,
December 12, 1996, pp. 7-8.
[42] People
v. Rios, G.R. No. 132632, June 19, 2000, p. 15.
[43] People
v. Rios, supra, at 14, citing People v. Esguerra, 326
Phil. 670, 679 (1996).
[44] Civil
Code, Art. 2230.