FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137980. November 15, 2000]
TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP., petitioner, vs. BANCO
FILIPINO SAVINGS AND MORTGAGE BANK, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is respondent’s
Motion for Reconsideration of our Decision dated June 20, 2000.
Respondent argues that
the complaint for ejectment below was not based on non-payment of rentals but
on the alleged expiration of respondent’s lease contract with petitioner and
the former’s refusal to accept and comply with the new rental rates and
conditions. According to respondent,
there was no allegation in the complaint of any failure on its part to pay any
of the monthly rentals stipulated in the contract of lease and the same, not
having been raised as an issue, should not have been passed upon by this Court.
The records, however,
show that the issue of non-payment of rentals was, in fact, consistently raised
from the Municipal Trial Court all the way to this Court. Indeed, petitioner’s Position Paper before
the Municipal Trial Court dedicates an entire portion to respondent’s
“Violation of Terms and Conditions”, inclusive of its unpaid rentals. There, petitioner argued as follows –
“Assuming for the sake of argument that the original lease contract
subsists, still the ground for ejectment of non-payment of rental holds. It should be borne in mind that since
April, 1994, defendant has not paid plaintiff a single cent. If, according to defendant, the original
lease contract subsists then, it should have continued to pay the amount of
P20,500.00 per month stipulated thereon.”[1] (underscored
in the original)
This allegation of
non-payment of rentals was in petitioner’s petition for review filed with the
Court of Appeals,[2] as well as in the instant petition for
review[3] before us.
Next, respondent assails
the application of its security deposit of P1,020,000.00 to rentals for the
period of August, 1985 to November, 1989 as erroneous, since the same period
only covers 52 months, while the amount of P1,020,000.00 would only account for
49.76 months. A cursory study of
Annexes “K” and “L” of the Affidavit of Elizabeth Palma,[4] referred to in our Decision,[5] readily reveals that the rentals due on the
leased property for the period of August, 1985 to November, 1989 was
P1,066,000.00. Hence, the whole amount
of P1,020,000.00 given by respondent as security deposit was sufficient to
cover the rentals, still leaving a balance of P46,000.00. This amount, together with outstanding
rentals on other properties likewise leased by respondent from petitioner, was
paid for by respondent’s liquidator as part of its payment of P5,232,325.00.
Respondent also contends
that the application of its security deposit was improper since it was not
authorized under the provisions of the lease contract, and thus amounted to a
unilateral amendment of the same. This
is untenable. The stipulation in the
lease contract that the security deposit shall be applied to the rentals due
from the 11th to the 20th years of the lease presupposes that rental payments
up to the 10th year are up to date. But
this was not the case here. In fact,
respondent had an outstanding account of P1,066,000.00 representing unpaid rent
for the period of August, 1985 to November, 1989, or from 5th to the 8th years
of the lease term. Had the security
deposit not been applied for that period, respondent would have been subject to
immediate ejectment. Precisely, the
security deposit was applied for the said period to cover for the unpaid
rentals and to avoid immediate ejectment for non-payment of rentals. Respondent’s insistence that the security
deposit be applied to the 11th to 20th years of the lease as stipulated should
thus fail.
In demanding that its
security deposit be applied to the rentals for the 11th to the 20th years,
respondent conveniently overlooks its unpaid obligations for the earlier period
for which the said security deposit was actually applied. Does it expect to have such unpaid rentals
merely written off? Evidently, that is
exactly what respondent intended. Respondent
also argues in its present Motion for Reconsideration that, inasmuch as it was
closed and under receivership, it should not be answerable for its unpaid
rentals over the leased premises during such time, passing the responsibility
instead to the Central Bank.
Respondent relies on the argument that its closure and consequent lack
of access to its funds to pay off its obligations, including the rentals on the
leased premises, was a fortuitous event which should excuse it from
liability. Granting, without conceding,
that liability should not lie with respondent for unpaid rentals on the leased
premises while it was under control of the Central Bank, this matter is not an
issue in the instant case, where the subject matter is merely ejectment. As the lessee of the premises, respondent
had the exclusive obligation to settle any unpaid rentals. Petitioner dealt directly with respondent,
and therefore had the right to enforce the lease contract against respondent
only. Any right of action that
respondent may have against the Central Bank is a matter that can be best
ventilated in the proper forum.
The fact that the application
of respondent’s security deposit was effected by and between petitioner and
respondent’s liquidator does not have any bearing on its validity, as the basic
premise for its operation remains the same.
Finally, we reject
respondent’s argument that the principle of res judicata should equally
apply to the issue of rent payment. As
we have already clearly set out in the challenged Decision, “respondent’s
failure to pay any rentals beginning April 1994, which provided ground for its
ejectment from the premises, justifies our departure from the outcome of G.R.
No. 129887.”[6]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED WITH FINALITY for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo,
JJ., concur.