FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137908. November 22, 2000]
RAMON D. OCHO, petitioner, vs. BERNARDINO, ERNESTO,
PERFECTA, TEOSITA, MANUEL, EPIFANIO, JR. and DELFIN, all surnamed CALOS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioner Ramon D. Ocho
files this petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision, dated 27 August 1998, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 43976 insofar as it directed petitioner and Vicente Polinar to restore and
return to the government their respective subject lands as they are not
qualified to be farmer-beneficiaries under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law (Republic Act No. 6657). Likewise
sought to be reversed and set aside is the appellate court’s Resolution, dated 19
February 1999, which denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are
as follows:
Spouses Epifanio and
Valentina Calos (now both deceased), together with their children, Bernardino,
Ernesto, Teosita, Perfecta, Manuel, Epifanio, Jr., and Delfin, all surnamed
Calos (respondents), filed a complaint before the Department of Agrarian Reform
Provincial Adjudicator in Cagayan de Oro City entitled “Annulment of Deeds of
Assignment, Emancipation Patents and Transfer Certificate of Titles, Retention
and Recovery of Possession and Ownership.” Aside from herein petitioner, the
other respondents named therein were: Jenny Liza Dorman, Alejandro Capephe,
Susanito Capaphe, Apolonio Samellano, Vicente Polinar, Ambrocio Ricablanca,
Alberto Pasiliao, Procopio Tampepe, The Heirs of Pelagio Salmorin, Roberto
Salmorin, Margarito Noveno, Virgilio Hoy, Saturnino Medidas, Jr., Donato
Pasiliao, Jaime Dotosme, Amado Flores, Eliseo Arcojada, Silvino Dumaguing,
Gonzalo Go, the Land Bank of the Philippines, Register of Deeds of Bukidnon and
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Valencia, Bukidnon. The case was docketed as DARAB Case No.
(X)-014.
In their amended
complaint, the Caloses averred that their parents, Epifanio and Valentina, were
the original owners of a parcel of land with an area of 23.7109 hectares
located in Valencia, Malaybalay, Bukidnon (now Hagcol, Valencia, Bukidnon), and
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. P-2066 issued by virtue of
Homestead Patent No. V-42876 on 2 December 1955. Pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, the said land was placed
under the Operation Land Transfer and subsequently distributed to qualified
farmer-beneficiaries. The original
farmer-beneficiaries,[1] however, allegedly unlawfully conveyed their
respective rights over the lands granted to them to third persons. The amended complaint thus sought the
nullification of the Emancipation Patents and Transfer Certificates of Title
issued to these third persons, including petitioner, to wit:
1. TCT-No. ET-5217 issued by virtue of Emancipation Patent No. A-163402 issued on January 13, 1989, to Pelagio N. Salmorin Sr. containing an area of 25,586 square meters;
2. TCT-ET-5218 issued by virtue of Emancipation Patent No. A-162990 issued on January 13, 1989 to Susanito H. Capephe containing an area of 10,956 square meters;
3. TCT-No. ET-5219 issued by virtue of Emancipation Patent No. A-162995 issued on January 13, 1989 to Alejandro V. Capephe containing an area of 50,001 square meters;
4. TCT-No. ET-5221 issued by virtue of Emancipation Patent No. A-162997 issued on January 13, 1989 to Apolonio B. Samellano containing an area of 30,639 square meters;
5. TCT-No. ET-5222 issued by virtue of Emancipation Patent No. A-162991 issued on January 13, 1989 to Jennyliza B. Dorman with an area of 36,487 square meters;
6. TCT-No. ET-5223 issued by virtue of Emancipation Patent No. A-163405 issued on January 16, 1989 to Ramon D. Ocho with an area of 22,708 square meters;
7. TCT-No. ET-5224 issued by virtue of Emancipation Patent No. A-163403 issued on January 16, 1989 to Alberto F. Pasillao with an area of 400 square meters;
8. TCT-No. ET-5220 issued by virtue of Emancipation Patent No. A-162999 issued on January 13, 1989 to Ambrocio T. Ricablanca with an area of 1,181 square meters;
9. TCT-No. T-28281 to Vicente Polinar with an area of 600 square meters issued on 4 April 1989;
10. TCT-No. T-28282 to Vicente Polinar with an area of 2,061 square meters issued on April 4, 1989;
11. TCT-No. T-28283 to Vicente Polinar with an area of 600 square meters issued on 4 April 1989;
12. TCT-No. T-29284 to Vicente Polinar with an area of 1,568 square meters issued on April 4, 1989;
13. TCT-No. T-29605 with an area of 1,384 square meters of Gonzalo Go;
14. TCT-No. T-29606 with an area of 1,779 square meters of Gonzalo Go;
15. TCT-No. T-29607 with an area of 4,844 square meters of Gonzalo Go;
16. TCT-No. T-28288 to Vicente Polinar with an area of 1,720 square meters issued on April 4, 1989;
17. TCT-No. T-28289 to Vicente Polinar with an area of 1,663 square meters issued on April 4, 1989;
18. TCT-No. T-28290 to Vicente Polinar with an area of 5,145 square meters issued on April 4, 1989;
19. TCT-No. T-28291 to
Vicente Polinar with an area of 1,989 square meters issued on April 4, 1989.[2]
The Caloses also posited
in their amended complaint that the subject land was beyond the coverage of the
agrarian reform law as the same was covered by a homestead patent. Accordingly, they maintained that they have
the right to recover the homestead land of their deceased parents Epifanio and
Valentina.
After all the parties had
been heard, the Provincial Adjudicator rendered his decision, dated 24 May
1993, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES ABOVE CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. All Emancipation Patents, Certificates of Land Transfer, Transfer for Certificates of Titles or other titles issued involving the land under litigation, bearing Original Certificate of Title No. P-2066 issued by virtue of Homestead Patent No. V-42876, are hereby ordered cancelled and/or revoked for being null and void ab initio;
2. Defendant Vicente Polinar is hereby ordered to reimburse defendant Gonzalo Go for the amount he has paid for the purchase of the three (3) parcels of land herein involved, with interest and all expenses for the transfer of ownership;
3. Complainants are hereby ordered to reimburse the Land Bank of the Philippines for whatever amount they received as payment of the land in litigation;
4. The Land Bank of the Philippines is hereby ordered to pay the Complainants for whatever amortization amount the original beneficiaries paid to the LBP, representing rental of the land; and
5. All persons, respondents, beneficiaries or otherwise, in occupation, possession, cultivation or otherwise of subject land are hereby ordered to turn over the same land to the Complainants, and vacate subject land.
SO ORDERED.[3]
From the decision of the
Provincial Adjudicator, petitioner, together with Jennyliza Dorman, Alejandro
Capephe, Susanito Capephe, Apolonio Samellano, Saturnino Medidas, Jr., Amado
Flores, Vicente Polinar, Virgilio Hoy, Eliseo Arcojada, Ambrocio Ricablanca and
the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO), elevated the case to the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). The case was docketed as DARAB Case No. 1859
and consolidated with several other cases involving substantially similar facts
and issues. After considering the
pleadings filed by the parties, the DARAB reversed the decision of the
Provincial Adjudicator. With respect to
the case at hand, the DARAB upheld the validity of the Emancipation Patents and
their corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title, including that of
petitioner. The dispositive portion of
the decision of the DARAB reads:
WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors committed by the Honorable Adjudicator a quo, the decisions appealed from are hereby REVERSED as follows:
1. Maintaining the validity of all Emancipation Patents and their corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title which have been ordered cancelled;
2. Ordering the Register of Deeds for the Province of Bukidnon, as well as Zamboanga del Sur, with respect to the case of Moras, et. al. vs. Hon. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, DARAB Case No. 1781, not to cancel the subject Emancipation Patents;
3. Maintaining the validity of Certificates of Land Transfer issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform in the names of Defendants-Appellants and other identified tenants-beneficiaries who are Defendants-Appellants in those cases and they shall be maintained in their peaceful possession and cultivation, and if they have effectively been ejected, they shall be restored to their possession under the same terms and conditions prevailing at the time of their ejectment;
4. Ordering the DARAB Sheriffs for the Province of Bukidnon, and Zamboanga del Sur with respect to DARAB Case No. 1781, as well as the concerned Municipal Agrarian Reform Officers, with the assistance of the PNP Command in the locality concerned, if necessary, to implement this decision.
SO ORDERED.[4]
The Caloses then appealed
the decision of the DARAB to the CA.
The appellate court substantially affirmed the decision of the DARAB as
it (CA) upheld the titles over the subject lands of some of the respondents therein
except that of petitioner and of Vicente Polinar. The CA found that petitioner and Vicente Polinar are not
qualified to be farmer-beneficiaries as they are already owners of other
agricultural lands. Accordingly, the CA
ordered petitioner and Vicente Polinar to restore and return to the government
their respective subject lands. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED insofar as the petitioners and the following private respondents are concerned:
JENNY LIZA DORMAN, ALEJANDRO CAPEPHE, SUSANITO CAPEPHE, APOLONIO SAMELLANO, VIRGILIO HOY, SATURNINO MEDIDAS, JR., AMADO FLORES, ELISEO ARCOJADA, AMBROCIO RICABLANCA and the MUNICIPAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER,
The same judgment is REVERSED and SET ASIDE as to RAMON OCHO and VICENTE POLINAR, and another one entered directing the said respondents to restore and surrender to the government their landholdings under TCT No. ET-5223 in the case of Ramon Ocho and TCT Nos. T-28281, T-28282, T-28283, T-28284, T-28288, T-28289, T-28290 and T-282891 in the case of Vicente Polinar. The D.A.R. is directed to re-distribute the same to qualified beneficiaries, giving preference to herein petitioners.
The appeal is DISMISSED as to:
ALBERTO PASILIAO, ALEJANDRO TAMPEPE, HEIRS OF PELAGIO SALMORIN, DONATO PASILIAO, JAIME DOTOSME, SILVINO DUMAGUING and GONZALO GO.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Both the Caloses and
petitioner filed their respective motions for reconsideration but these were
denied by the CA for lack of merit in its Resolution of 19 February 1999.[6]
Petitioner now assails
the decision of the CA raising the following arguments:
I. The second action docketed as DAR Adm. Case No. (X)-014 filed by the Caloses before Honorable Provincial Adjudicator Fidel H. Borres, Jr. is barred by the Final Resolution rendered in their first action docketed as DAR Adm. Case No. 006-90 before DAR Provincial Legal Officer, Atty. Francisco L. Vasig, Jr.;
II. The Claim of the Caloses that Ramon Ocho is owner of three (3) parcels of land which matter was already determined and decided with finality in the Resolution of DAR Adm. Case No. 006-90 [cannot] be subject to review by any court; and
III. The Caloses in filing this second action
DAR Adm. Case No. (X)-014 after the Resolution in DAR Adm. Case No. 006-90 had
lapsed into Finality were engaged in Forum-Shopping.[7]
In support of the
foregoing arguments, petitioner avers that prior to the filing of the Caloses
of the complaint a quo, i.e., “Annulment of Deeds of Assignment,
Emancipation Patents and Transfer Certificate of Titles, Retention and Recovery
of Possession and Ownership,” they (Caloses) already instituted a complaint for
alleged “Anomalies/Irregularities in OLT Transfer Action and Other Related
Activities,” also involving the same parties and subject lands. The case was docketed as Adm. Case No.
006-90. The Hearing Officer in Adm.
Case No. 006-90 issued a Resolution, dated 11 February 1991, with the following
pertinent findings:
Complainant’s claim that Ramon Ocho is a big landowner or owns
other lands before acquiring the land now covered by TCT No. ET-5223 in his
name is untrue. The records show that
the parcel of land located at Impalutao, Impasugong, Bukidnon with an area of
50,000 square meters more or less, is owned by his daughter, Rona D. Ocho and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25754 in the name of the
latter. Likewise, the other parcel of
land situated in Malaybalay, Bukidnon with an area of 77,053 square meters is
owned by his son Rico D. Ocho being covered by TCT No. 25756 in the latter’s
name.[8]
Petitioner essentially
contends that the above findings constitute res judicata as the said
resolution already became final and executory and the issue of his ownership of
other agricultural lands may no longer be relitigated. The CA allegedly erred when it made a
finding that he (petitioner) is the owner of other agricultural lands and directed
him to return to the government his subject lands as he is not qualified to be
a farmer-beneficiary under R.A. No. 6657.
The instant petition is
meritorious.
The doctrine of res
judicata as embodied in Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.- The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
(a) x x x
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.
It must be pointed out at
this point that, contrary to the insistence of the Caloses, the doctrine of res
judicata applies to both judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.[9] The doctrine actually embraces two (2)
concepts: the first is “bar by prior
judgment” under paragraph (b) of Rule 39, Section 47, and the second is
“conclusiveness of judgment” under paragraph (c) thereof.[10] In the present case, the second concept –
conclusiveness of judgment – applies.
The said concept is explained in this manner:
[A] fact or question which was in issue in a former suit and was
there judicially passed upon and determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction, is conclusively settled by the judgment therein as far as the
parties to that action and persons in privity with them are concerned and
cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their
privies, in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on
either the same or different cause of action, while the judgment remains
unreversed by proper authority. It has
been held that in order that a judgment in one action can be conclusive as to a
particular matter in another action between the same parties or their privies,
it is essential that the issue be identical.
If a particular point or question is in issue in the second action, and
the judgment will depend on the determination of that particular point or
question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies will be
final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue
and adjudicated in the first suit. xxx[11]
Although the action
instituted by the Caloses in Adm. Case No. 006-90 (Anomalies/Irregularities in
OLT Transfer Action and Other Related Activities) is different from the action
in Adm. Case No. (X)-014 (Annulment of Deeds of Assignment, Emancipation
Patents and Transfer Certificate of Titles, Retention and Recovery of
Possession and Ownership), the concept of conclusiveness of judgment still
applies because under this principle “the identity of causes of action is not
required but merely identity of issues.”[12]
Simple put,
conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues
in another litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of
action. In Lopez vs. Reyes,[13] we expounded on the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment as follows:
The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts
or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly
applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of
litigation. Thus it extends to
questions ‘necessarily involved in an issue, and necessarily adjudicated, or
necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no specific finding may
have been made in reference thereto, and although such matters were
directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally
presented. Under this rule, if the
record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered
without deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled
that matter as to all future actions between the parties, and if a judgment
necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as the
judgment itself. Reasons for the
rule are that a judgment is an adjudication on all the matters which are
essential to support it, and that every proposition assumed or decided by the
court leading up to the final conclusion upon which such conclusion is based is
as effectually passed upon as the ultimate question which is solved.[14]
There is no question that
the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other agricultural lands had
already been passed upon by the proper quasi-judicial authority (the hearing
officer of the DAR) in Adm Case No. 006-90. Said decision became final and executory
when the Caloses failed to file an appeal thereof after their motion for
reconsideration was denied.[15] Applying the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment, the issue of whether petitioner is the owner of other agricultural
lands may no longer be relitigated.
As held in Legarda vs.
Savellano:[16]
xxx It is a general rule
common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn and deliberate
sentence of the law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact
or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and conclusive determination
of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been well said that this
maxim is more than a mere rule of law; more even than an important principle of
public policy; and that it is not too much to say that it is a fundamental
concept in the organization of every jural system. Public policy and sound practice demand that, at the risk of
occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some definite
date fixed by law. The very object for
which courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies.[17]
The findings of the
Hearing Officer in Adm. Case No. 006-90, which had long attained finality, that
petitioner is not the owner of other agricultural lands foreclosed any inquiry
on the same issue involving the same parties and property. The CA thus erred in still making a finding
that petitioner is not qualified to be a farmer-beneficiary because he owns
other agricultural lands.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is given
DUE COURSE. The Decision, dated 27
August 1998, and Resolution, dated 19 February 1999, of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED insofar as it directs petitioner Ramon Ocho to restore and
return to the government his subject land.
Petitioner’s TCT No. ET-5223 is hereby declared VALID.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
[1] Namely,
Pelagio Salmorin, Apolonio Salmorin, Roberto Salmorin, Margarito Noveno and
Procopio Tampepe.
[2] Rollo,
pp. 85-86.
[3] Id.,
p. 126.
[4] Id.,
pp. 196-197.
[5] Id., pp. 50-51.
Emphases in the original.
[6] Id.,
pp. 52-53.
[7] Id.,
pp. 21-22.
[8] Id.,
p. 67.
[9] A.G.
Development Corp. vs. CA, 281 SCRA 155, 160 (1997).
[10] Camara,
et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 310 SCRA 608 (1999).
[11] Calalang
vs. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, 231 SCRA 88 (1994).
[12] Id.,
p. 99.
[13] 76
SCRA 179 (1977).
[14] Id.,
p. 186-187. Emphasis supplied.
[15] Rollo,
pp. 79-80.
[16] 158
SCRA 194 (1988).
[17] Id.,
p. 200.