EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135413-15. November 15, 2000]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. AMER
MOYONG y TALORONG and JORRY VELASCO (at large), accused.
AMER MOYONG y TALORONG, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
VITUG,
J.:
Accused-appellant Amer
Moyong y Talorong was convicted, on three counts, of murder in a joint decision,
dated 17 August 1988, rendered by the Regional Trial Court ("RTC") of
Cavite City, Branch 88, in Criminal Cases No. 27-98, No. 28-98 and No. 29-98.
The three informations
filed against accused-appellant and his co-accused Jorry Velasco were worded
uniformly, except for the names of the victims, viz:
"That on or about December 7, 1997, in the City of Cavite, Republic of the Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, armed with a knife and an ice pick, acting with treachery and evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior strength with nighttime purposely sought to facilitate the commission of the offense, conspiring, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and repeatedly stab with their weapons NORMITA BAWAR y MADLANGBAYAN [JOSELITO AQUINO y ESTEBAN; PASCUAL BAWAR y AMON], hitting and inflicting upon the latter multiple stabbed and punctured wounds in the different parts of the body which caused the latter's instantaneous death.
"CONTRARY TO LAW."[1]
Amer
Moyong pled "not guilty" upon arraignment.[2]
After trial, the court a
quo promulgated its decision finding accused Moyong guilty and pronouncing
on him a death sentence; thus:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this court hereby finds the accused Amer Moyong y Talorong guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as charged in the three (3) Informations, qualified by treachery and aggravated by evident premeditation and scoffing or outraging at the corpses of the victims, and accordingly hereby sentences him to suffer the supreme penalty of death in each of the three (3) cases, and is hereby ordered to pay the heirs of the victims separate amounts of P50,000.00 each or a total of P150,000.00 as death indemnity.
"SO ORDERED."[3]
The records of the case
have been forwarded to this Court for review.
Accused-appellant, in his appeal brief, posits a lone but a familiar
all-embracing assignment of error, to wit:
"THE LOWER COURT HAS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN NOT ABSOLVING AND
EXCULPATING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIMES CHARGED HEREIN."[4]
The evidence presented by
the prosecution incriminating accused-appellant are narrated by the Office of
the Solicitor General in the People's Brief.
At around 3:45 in the
morning of 07 December 1997, Bayani Panganiban, Chief Barangay Tanod of
Barangay 39 in Cavite City, was on duty at the barangay hall when he was
alerted by a male helper from "Our Inn Hotel and Restaurant" about an
on-going "trouble" at the establishment. Panganiban, together with two tanods, responded and proceeded to
the scene. Standing in front of the
hotel, the responding barangay officials called out the name of hotel owner
Pascual Bawar. Hearing no answer from
Bawar and suspecting that something was wrong, Panganiban, used his VHF/UHF
radio to call for police assistance.
Meanwhile, Panganiban and his fellow tanods requested some members of
the local Citizen's Crime Watch, as well as a number of tricycle drivers, to go
around the hotel and guard possible escape routes of malefactors.
Joselito Jaro, a tricycle
driver, and his companions stationed themselves at the back of the hotel along
Molina Street. The people who had by
then gathered in the area cried out that there was a man at the rooftop. Jaro, together with two others, climbed to
the roof of a nearby house. Searching
the premises with his flashlight, Jaro saw accused-appellant Amer Moyong crawling
from a small opening near the fire exit of the hotel. In no time, accused-appellant was apprehended and detained at the
barangay hall. His pair of pants, shirt
and sandals were stained with blood.
Minutes later, PO3 Enrico
Rosal, accompanied by other police officers, arrived at the scene. Inside the hotel, they found Pascual Bawar
at the hallway in the second floor dead with multiple stab wounds. Nearby, they found Normita Bawar at the
doorway of Room 113 and Joselito Aquino, the hotel cashier, lying on the bed,
both also dead, with multiple stab wounds.
In the hallway were prints of blood caused by the footwear worn by the
assailant or assailants. The police
officers were informed that a suspect was already in the custody of barangay
officials. Later, at the police
station, PO3 Rosal saw accused-appellant Amer Moyong, stained with blood, taken
in for investigation.[5]
Dr. Regalado Sosa, the
health officer of Cavite City, conducted an autopsy on the cadaver of Joselito
Aquino on 07 December 1997 and found twelve stab, incised and punctured wounds
on the victim. A knife and an ice-pick
were found to have been used in the killing.
Dr. Abe Escario, on the same day, performed an autopsy on the remains of
Pascual and Norma Bawar. Pascual
sustained 17 stab and punctured wounds while Norma Bawar suffered from 12 stab
and punctured wounds.
SPO4 Virgilio Pilapil, an
investigator of the Cavite City Police Force, stated that, on 12 December 1997,
he took the written statements of Amer Moyong who was assisted by a PAO field
lawyer.
Accused-appellant bewails
his conviction and instead attributes the death of the three victims to his
co-accused Jorry Velasco.
Accused-appellant would
insist he was taking a bath inside the hotel room where he and Jorry Velasco
checked-in when the latter ran berserk and stabbed the three victims to
death. Accused-appellant himself was
shocked to see that Jorry had attacked the three victims. Accused-appellant was threatened by Jorry to
stab Pascual Bawar, who apparently was dead by then, in order "to mess
things up." Soon, accused-appellant
lost his composure, panicked and hid himself in a nearby rooftop. It was Jorry Velasco, accused-appellant
claimed, not he, who had an axe to grind against the victims for having been
maltreated by the Bawar spouses.
Admittedly, there were no
eyewitnesses to the killing of the three victims. In convicting accused-appellant, the trial court relied on
circumstantial evidence.
A conviction based on
circumstantial evidence would be proper if its requisites concur, i.e., (1)
there is more than just one circumstance in attendance; (2) the facts from
which inferences can be derived are adequately proven; and (3) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable
doubt.[6] These circumstances must be consistent with
the hypothesis that the accused is guilty of the crime sought to be established
and can lead to no rational assumption that may be congruent with the innocence
of the accused.[7]
The prosecution succeeded
in putting up together not one but several pieces of circumstantial
evidence. (1) Accused-appellant, along
with Jorry Velasco, admittedly checked-in and stayed at Room 113 of the
"Our Inn Hotel and Restaurant" where the bloodied remains of the
three victims were found; (2) accused-appellant was in the hotel when the
killings occurred; (3) not long after, accused-appellant was seen crawling out
from the hotel through an opening near the fire exit located at the rooftop of
the building; (4) accused-appellant was accosted while attempting to flee from
the scene of the crime; (5) accused-appellant's t-shirt, pair of pants and
sandals were stained with blood; and (6) the nature and number of the stab
wounds sustained by the three victims were consistent with the findings of the
police in their ocular investigation and the results of autopsy performed on
the remains of the victims.
In convicting
accused-appellant for murder, the trial court saw the attendance of treachery
and evident premeditation in the commission of the crime as so alleged in the
Information. These qualifying
circumstances, to be aptly appreciated, should first be firmly established and
not merely to be supposed or speculated.
No eyewitness to the killing was presented and no specific evidence was
shown on how the killings might have actually transpired. Whether there was provocation on the part of
the victims, or whether the attack was sudden and unexpected, or whether the
victims were forewarned of an impending danger, matters that would be essential
in considering treachery, had not been ascertained.[8] Neither could evident premeditation be
appreciated absent any showing of (1) the time when the accused was determined
to commit the crime, (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to
his determination, and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution that allowed him to reflect upon the consequences
of his act.[9]
Nor could the Court
consider the circumstances of abuse of superior strength and nocturnity. Mere superiority in number, even assuming it
to be a fact, would not necessarily indicate the attendance of abuse of
superior strength. The prosecution
should still prove that the assailants purposely used excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the persons attacked. Nocturnidad, upon the other hand,
would be a modifying element only when (1) it was especially sought by the
offender; or (2) the offender took advantage of it; or (3) it facilitated the
commission of the crime by ensuring the offender's immunity from identification
or capture.[10] The mere fact that the killing was committed
at night would not suffice to sustain nocturnity for, by and of itself.[11]
The law[12] would consider to be an aggravating
circumstance a situation where the wrong done in the commission of the crime
was "deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its
commission." While the victims
indeed suffered from several stab wounds, this fact alone, however, absent any
other showing, could make it certain that the wounds were inflicted to
intentionally augment the suffering of the victims.[13] Similarly, it would not be right to
conjecture that the mop handle found in the mouth of one of the victims was
meant to mock or outrage his corpse.
Absent any qualifying
circumstance, the killing constituted, not murder, but merely one of homicide
for which commission Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the
penalty of reclusion temporal.
Absent either an aggravating or a mitigating circumstance, reclusion
temporal must be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty that can be
meted out on the offender would be anywhere within the range of prision
mayor, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum.
The Court sustains the
civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court for each offense.
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Amer Moyong y Talorong is
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of the crime of HOMICIDE, defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, in each of the three
criminal cases, and he is hereby sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging
from nine (9) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
sixteen (16) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal,
as maximum, in each of the three cases.
The award by way of civil indemnity of P50,000.00 to the heirs of each
of the victims, namely Pascual Bawar, Normita Bawar and Joselito Aquino, or a
total liability against accused-appellant of P150,000.00 civil indemnity is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., on leave.
[1] Records
of Crim. Case No. 27-98, p. 1.
[2] Jorry
Velasco, his co-accused, has to date remained at large.
[3] Rollo,
p. 38.
[4] Rollo,
p. 58.
[5] TSN,
06 April 1998, pp. 2-29.
[6] People
vs. Sanchez, 298 SCRA 48; People vs. Mendoza, 284 SCRA 705;
People vs. Bato, 284 SCRA 223; People vs. Olivarez, 299 SCRA 635.
[7] People
vs. Llaguno, 285 SCRA 124; People vs. Mijares, 297 SCRA 520.
[8] People
vs. Demonteverde, 290 SCRA 175; People vs. Bautista, 254 SCRA
621.
[9] People
vs. Villamor, 292 SCRA 384.
[10] People
vs. dela Cruz, 291 SCRA 164.
[11] People
vs. Belo, 299 SCRA 654.
[12] Article
14, paragraph 21, Revised Penal Code.
[13] People
vs. Ilaoa, 233 SCRA 231; People vs. Ferrer, 255 SCRA 19; People vs.
Sion, 277 SCRA 127.