FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 134406. November 15, 2000]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner, vs. SPOUSES FRANCISCO and MERCED RABAT, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE,
JR., C.J.:
In its petition for
review, petitioner Philippine National Bank (hereafter PNB) seeks the reversal
of the decision of 29 July 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 49800,[1] which affirmed the decision of 14 June 1994
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 92-61122.[2]
The factual and
procedural antecedents which gave rise to this appeal are hereunder summarized.
On 25 August 1979,
respondent spouses Francisco and Merced Rabat (hereafter RABATs) applied for a
loan with PNB.[3] Subsequently, the RABATs were granted on 14
January 1980 a medium-term loan of P4.0 Million to mature three years from the
date of implementation.[4]
On 28 January 1980, the
RABATs signed a Credit Agreement and executed a Real Estate Mortgage[5] over twelve (12) parcels of land which
stipulated that the loan would be subject to interest at the rate of 17% per
annum, plus the appropriate service charge and penalty charge of 3% per annum
on any amount remaining unpaid or not renewed when due.[6]
On 25 September 1980, the
RABATs executed another document denominated as "Amendment to the Credit
Agreement" purposely to increase the interest rate from 17% to 21% per
annum, inclusive of service charge and a penalty charge of 3% per annum to be
imposed on any amount remaining unpaid or not renewed when due.[7] They also executed another Real Estate
Mortgage[8] over nine (9) parcels of land as additional
security for their medium-term loan of Four Million (P4.0 M).[9] These parcels of land are agricultural,
commercial and residential lots situated in Mati, Davao Oriental.
The several availments of
the loan accommodation on various dates by the RABATs reached the aggregate
amount of THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTEEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED EIGHTY (P3,517,380),
as evidenced by the several promissory notes,[10] all of which were due on 14 March 1983.
The RABATs failed to pay
their outstanding balance on due date.
In its letter[11] of 24 July 1986, in response to the letter
of the RABATs of 16 June 1986 requesting for more time within which to arrive
at a viable proposal for the settlement of their account, PNB informed the
RABATs that their request has been denied and gave the RABATs until 30 August
1986 to settle their account. The PNB
sent the letter to 197 Wilson Street, San Juan, Metro Manila.
For failure of the RABATs
to pay their obligation, the PNB filed a petition for the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgage executed by the RABATs. After due notice and publication, the
mortgaged parcels of land were sold at a public auction held on 20 February
1987 and 14 April 1987. The PNB was the
lone and highest bidder with a bid of P3,874,800.00.[12]
As the proceeds of the
public auction were not enough to satisfy the entire obligation of the RABATs,
the PNB sent anew demand letters. The
letter dated 15 November 1990[13] was sent to the RABATs at 197 Wilson Street,
San Juan, Metro Manila; while another dated 30 August 1991[14] was sent to the RABATs at 197 Wilson Street,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila, and also in Mati, Davao Oriental.
Upon failure of the
RABATs to comply with the demand to settle their remaining outstanding
obligation which then stood at P14,745,398.25,[15] including interest, penalties and other
charges, PNB eventually filed on 5 May 1992 a complaint for a sum of money
before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 92-61122, which was assigned to
Branch 14 thereof.
The RABATs filed their
answer with counterclaim[16] on 28 July 1992 to which PNB filed its Reply
and Answer to Counterclaim.[17] On 2 January 1993, the RABATs filed an
amended answer.[18] The RABATs admitted their loan availments
from PNB and their default in the payment thereof. However, they assailed the validity of the auction sales for want
of notice to them before and after the foreclosure sales.
They further added that
as residents of Mati, Davao Oriental since 1970 up to the present, they never
received any notice nor heard about the foreclosure proceeding in spite of the
claim of PNB that the foreclosure proceeding had been duly published in the San
Pedro Times, which is not a newspaper of general circulation.
The RABATs likewise
averred that the bid price was grossly inadequate and unconscionable.
Lastly, the RABATs
attacked the validity of the accumulated interest and penalty charges because
since their properties were sold in 1987, and yet PNB waited until 1992 before
filing the case. Consequently, the
RABATs contended that they should not be made to suffer for the interest and
penalty charges from May 1987 up to the present. Otherwise, PNB would be allowed to profit from its questionable
scheme.
The PNB filed on 5
February 1993 its Reply to the Amended Answer and Answer to Counterclaim.[19]
After appropriate
proceedings, the trial court rendered on 14 June 1994 a decision,[20] whose dispositive portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint.
On the counterclaim, the two (2) auction sales of the mortgaged properties are hereby set aside and ordering the plaintiff to reconvey to the defendants the remaining properties after the sale [of] sufficient properties for the satisfaction of the obligation of the defendants.
The parties will bear their respective cost.
So ordered.
The trial court addressed
these five issues:
1. The validity of the foreclosure proceedings;
2. The validity of the auction sales;
3. The validity of the penalty charges and the interest charged by the plaintiff;
4. Whether or not the defendants should be liable for the interests and penalty charges from the date of the auction sales up to the filing of this case; and
5. Whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to deficiency judgment.
The first issue was
resolved against the RABATs who claimed that the foreclosure was void due to
lack of notice to them at their address in Mati, Davao Oriental, and that there
was no publication of the notice in a newspaper of general circulation. It held that the mortgage contract did not
specifically require that personal service of notice of foreclosure sale be
given to them and that the San Pedro Times which published the notice of
foreclosure sale is a newspaper of general circulation as certified by the
Sheriff and as shown in the affidavit of its publisher.
Nevertheless, the trial
court agreed with the RABATs that the two auction sales were void in view of
the gross inadequacy of the price, which is shocking to the conscience. It ratiocinated thus:
Certainly, the price of P6.00/sq.m. for the properties sold
in the first auction sale and P3.00/sq.m. for the properties sold in the
second auction sale are too low as compared with P80.00 which according
to Atty. Sibala was the price per square meter of the properties in 1986.
The evidence show that the foreclosed propert[ies] are near the
Municipal building, public market, provincial capital of Davao Oriental, the
provincial hospital of Davao Oriental, and the Sibala Village Subdivision
wherein the last sold at P200.00 per square meter. The prices paid for are indeed too low as
[to] be shocking to the conscience.
On the third and fourth
issue, the trial court ruled:
… although the movant’s properties were sold in 1987, the plaintiff waited until 1992 before filing this case, hence, the tremendous accumulation of interest and penalty charges. The plaintiff has not given any plausible explanation for the delay, hence, it may be presumed that the plaintiff had deliberately delayed the filing of this case in order that it can collect more interest and penalty charges. Consequently, the defendants should not be made to suffer for the interest and penalty charges from May 1987 up to the present. Otherwise, the plaintiff would be allowed to profit from its questionable scheme. Therefore, the defendants should not only be made to answer for their loan in the amount of P4,000,000.00 plus interest up to May 1987.
The defendants further
claim that the interest and penalty charges should be 21% and 3% respectively
pursuant to the provision of the amended credit accommodation; that the
acceleration close should not be enforced as it is in nature of a contract of
adhesion. The amendment to the credit
accommodation is not a contract of adhesion.
A contract of adhesion is one solely prepared by one of the parties
where the other party had no participation, but merely gives his asset [sic] by
adhering thereto. It is a take it or
leave it situation. Standardized
contract form offered to consumers of goods and services on essentially (take
it or leave it) basis without affording consumer realistic opportunity to
bargain and under such conditions that consumers cannot obtain desires products
or services except by acquiescing in form contract. Distinctive feature of adhesion contract is that weaker party has
no realistic choice up to its term.
(Cubic Corporation versus Marty, Dist., 185 C.A. 3d 438-229 Cal/Rptr.
828, 833; Standard Oil Co. of California versus Perkins, C.A. Or. 347 F. 2d
379, 383.).
Anent the last issue, the
trial court ruled that while a mortgagee is entitled to a deficiency judgment,
it would be premature to adjudge it in the case since the two auction sales in
question are null and void.
Only PNB appealed
from the judgment to the Court of Appeals.
Its appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 49800.
In its Appellant’s Brief
filed in CA-G.R. CV No. 49800, PNB raised the following issues:[21]
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NULLIFYING THE SHERIFF'S AUCTION SALE ON THE GROUND THAT THE PNB'S WINNING BID IS VERY LOW
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES ARE NOT LIABLE TO PAY INTEREST AND PENALTY CHARGES AFTER THE AUCTION SALES UP TO THE FILING OF THIS CASE.
In their Appellees’
Brief,[22] the RABATs prayed for the appellate court to
affirm in toto the decision of the trial court.
On 29 June 1998, the
Court of Appeals rendered a decision[23] affirming the trial court's ruling
nullifying the auction sales, but on a different ground.
The Court of Appeals
discovered that the RABATs did not actually receive personal notices concerning
the foreclosure proceedings. Hence,
they could not have known of said foreclosure sales. It pronounced and decreed, thus:
An examination of the exhibits show that the defendant-appellees given address is Mati, Davao Oriental and not 197 Wilson Street, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila as alleged by the plaintiff-appellant (Exhibit C to J, pp. 208, 217, 220, 229, 236-239, Records). Records further show that all subsequent communications by plaintiff-appellant was sent to defendant-appellees address at Wilson Street, Greenhills, San Juan. This was the very reason why defendant-appellees were not aware of the foreclosure proceedings.
As correctly found out by the trial court, there is a need for the setting aside of the two (2) auction sales hence, there is yet no deficiency judgment to speak of.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court dated 14 June 1994, is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Unsatisfied with the
decision, the PNB seasonably filed before us the present petition raising the
lone issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS MAY REVIEW AND PASS UPON THE TRIAL COURT’S FINDING AND CONCLUSION ON AN ISSUE WHICH WAS NEVER RAISED ON APPEAL, AND, THEREFORE, HAD ATTAINED FINALITY
In support thereof, PNB
argues:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS HAS SO FAR DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT DECIDED AND RESOLVED A QUESTION/OR ISSUE NOT RAISED IN PETITIONER PNB’S APPEAL;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT REVERSED THE FINDING AND CONCLUSION OF THE TRIAL COURT ON AN ISSUE WHICH HAD ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY.
PNB maintains that
pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 51 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure no error
which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity
of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered
unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent
on an assigned error and properly argued on the Brief, save as the court may
pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
PNB adds that nowhere in
its Appellant’s Brief did it raise the issue of "lack of notice" to
the RABATs. Such being the case, in addition
to the fact that the RABATs did not appeal from the decision, the trial court’s
rejection of the RABATs’ claim of lack of personal notice regarding the
foreclosure proceedings had already attained finality. The RABATs can no longer obtain from the appellate
court any affirmative relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the
court below.
PNB concludes that the
Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction when it resolved an issue which was not raised in the appeal and
the ruling on which by the trial court had already become final.
In their Comment filed on
18 November 1998, the RABATs assert that the petition is “procedurally
defective, presents no justiciable question and categorically frivolous.” They point out that while the petition is
designated as one under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, yet it is
predicated on grounds involving question of law and lack or excess of
jurisdiction, under Rule 65. The PNB
cannot be allowed to avail simultaneously of both remedies.
Anent the want of
justiciable question, the RABATs maintain that this case involves the simple
and fundamental issue of the validity of the auction sales conducted by PNB,
which hinges on compliance “with the requirements set forth under Republic Act
(sic) 3135, governing extrajudicial foreclosure, as amended by Republic Act No.
4148 (publication, posting and notices) and the reasonableness of the bid
price,” which should be “considered jointly for a judicious resolution of the …
controversy/issue.”
Consequently, the RABATs
conclude that the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for ruling on a material
fact whose consideration is essential to a complete determination of the rights
and obligations of the parties.
On 16 March 1999, the PNB
filed its Reply to the Comment of the RABATs.
In our resolution of 21
April 1999 we gave due course to the petition and required the parties to
submit their respective memoranda which they complied with.
Section 8, Rule 51 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides:
SEC. 8. Questions that may be decided. -- No error which does not affect the jurisdiction over the subject matter or the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein will be considered unless stated in the assignment of errors, or closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in the brief, save as the court pass upon plain errors and clerical errors.
In his book,[24] Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado commented on
this section, thus:
1. Sec. 8, which is an amendment of the former Sec. 7 of this Rule, now includes some substantial changes in the rules on assignment of errors. The basic procedural rule is that only errors claimed and assigned by a party will be considered by the court, except errors affecting its jurisdiction over the subject matter. To this exception has now been added errors affecting the validity of the judgment appealed from or the proceedings therein.
Also, even if the error complained of by a party is not expressly stated in his assignment of errors but the same is closely related to or dependent on an assigned error and properly argued in his brief, such error may now be considered by the court. These changes are of jurisprudential origin.
2. The procedure in the Supreme Court being generally the same as that in the Court of Appeals, unless otherwise indicated (see Secs. 2 and 4, Rule 56), it has been held that the latter is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors on appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision of the case. Also, an unassigned error closely related to an error properly assigned (PCIB vs. CA, et al., L-34931, Mar. 18, 1988), or upon which the determination of the question raised by error properly assigned is dependent, will be considered by the appellate court notwithstanding the failure to assign it as error (Ortigas, Jr. vs. Lufthansa German Airlines, L-28773, June 30, 1975; Soco vs. Militante, et al., G.R. No. 58961, June 28, 1983).
It may also be observed that under Sec. 8 of this Rule, the appellate court is authorized to consider a plain error, although it was not specifically assigned by the appellant (Dilag vs. Heirs of Resurreccion, 76 Phil. 649), otherwise it would be sacrificing substance for technicalities.
It may at once be noticed
that the exceptions are for the benefit of the appellant and not for the
appellee.
The RABATs did not appeal
from the decision of the trial court.
As a matter of fact, in their Appellee’s Brief filed with the Court of
Appeals they prayed that said decision be affirmed in toto. As against the RABATs the trial court’s
findings of fact and conclusion are already settled and final. More specifically, they are deemed to have
unqualifiedly agreed with the trial court that the foreclosure proceedings were
valid in all respects, except as to the bid price.
On the other hand, PNB,
the sole appellant, never raised the issue of lack of personal notice to the
RABATs. Neither is such issue closely
related to or dependent on PNB's assigned error on appeal nor is it an exception
to Section 8 of Rule 51.
Needless to stress, the
Court of Appeals erred in resolving PNB’s appeal on the basis of an issue which
was not raised on appeal and whose resolution thereon by the trial court has
long become firm and final against the party adversely affected by the
resolution.
Even granting arguendo
that the issue of personal notice may be raised, still we cannot agree with the
Court of Appeals. In the first place,
in extrajudicial foreclosure sales, personal notice to the mortgagor is not
necessary.[25] Section 3 of Act No. 3135 reads:
Section 3. Notice shall be given by posting of the sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such notice shall be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the municipality or city.
Clearly
personal notice to the mortgagor is not required. Second, the requirements of posting and publication in a
newspaper of general circulation were duly complied with by the PNB as
correctly found by the trial court, to which we accord great respect. A question of non-compliance with the notice
and publication requirements of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale is a factual
issue and the resolution thereof by the trial court is binding and conclusive
upon us absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion.[26]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals of
29 July 1998 in CA-G.R. CV No. 49800 is hereby SET ASIDE. The Court of Appeals is directed to
DECIDE, with reasonable dispatch, CA-G.R. CV No. 49800 on the basis of the
errors raised by petitioner Philippine National Bank in its Appellant’s Brief.
No pronouncement as to
costs.
Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
[1] Rollo,
23-28; CA Rollo in CA-G.R. CV No. 49800, 85-90, Per Rivera, C., J.,
with the concurrence of Salas, B. and Villarama, M., JJ.
[2] Original
Record (OR), Civil Case No. 92-61122, 420-427.
Per Judge Inocencio Maliaman.
[3] Exhibit
“A,” OR, 205.
[4] Exhibit
“B,” Id., 207.
[5] Exhibits
“E,” “E-1” to “E-8,” Id., 220-228.
[6] Exhibit
“C,” “C-1,” and “C-2,” Id., 208-210.
[7] Exhibit
“D,” “D-1,” Id., 217-218.
[8] Exhibits
“F,” “F-1” to “F-6,” Id., 229-235.
[9] Supra
note 8.
[10] Exhibits
“G,” “H,” “I,” and “J”; OR, 236-239.
[11] Exhibits
“Q,” “Q-1” and “Q-2,” OR, 240.
[12] Exhibit
“K-K4,” Id., 242-246, Exhibit “L – L2,” Id., 247-249.
[13]
Exhibit “N”; 253.
[14] Exhibits
“O,” “O-1” and “O-2,” Id., 254-255.
[15] Exhibit
“M” to “M-2,” OR, 250-252.
[16] OR,
62-67.
[17] Id.,
79-82.
[18] OR,
116-126.
[19] Id.,
168-169.
[20] Supra
note 2.
[21] CA
Rollo, 24-35.
[22] CA
Rollo, 56-79.
[23] Supra
note 1.
[24] Remedial
Law Compendium, vol I (Sixth Revised Edition, 1997), 582-583.
[25] Olizon
v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 148 [1994]; Gravina v. CA, 220 SCRA
178 [1993]; Cortes v. IAC, 175 SCRA 545 [1989].
[26] Sulit
v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 441, 456 [1997], citing Community Savings
and Loans Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 564 [1987].