EN BANC
[G.R. No. 129299. November 15, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODOLFO
OLING MADRAGA, accused-appellant.
D E C I S I O N
BUENA, J.:
Before the Court, for its
automatic review, is the Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Isabela,
Basilan, Branch 2, in Criminal Case No. 2511-599, which has found herein
accused-appellant, Rodolfo Oling Madraga, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of rape committed against his 16-year old daughter. The death sentence having been decreed by
the trial court, the records of the case have, accordingly, been elevated to
this Court.
Rodolfo Oling Madraga was
charged with two (2) counts of rape committed against his own 16-year old
daughter, Fe C. Madraga. One was
committed on May 19, 1995 (Crim. Case No. 2511-599), and the other one on
August 24, 1996 (Crim. Case No. 2515-602).[2]
At the arraignment on
November 4, 1996, accused-appellant, with the assistance of Atty. Antonio D.
Banico, entered separate pleas of not guilty for each case. Thereafter, the trial proper of the cases
was set to November 18, 19, and 20, 1996.[3]
On November 18, 1996,
Atty. Banico, counsel for the accused, moved that they be given time up to
December to talk with complainant’s mother so that the accused will plead
guilty to the first case, but will seek for the dismissal of the second
case. The complainant’s mother, who was
in Court, manifested that she does not agree to the proposition. Trial of the cases was re-set to December 2,
3 & 4, 1996.[4]
On December 2, 1996,
counsel for the accused manifested that the accused was willing to enter a plea
of guilty to the crime of rape, which was committed in the month of May, 1995,
provided that the other case be tried on another date.
Thus, accused pleaded
guilty in Criminal Case No. 2511-599 upon the following complaint:
“The undersigned complainant, a minor of sixteen (16) years of age, under oath, accuses her father, Rodolfo Oling Madraga, of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:
“That sometime in the month of May, 1995, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, viz., at Barrio Militar, Barangay Menzi, Municipality of Isabela, Province of Basilan, Philippines, the above-named accused who was under the influence of liquor, entered the room of the undersigned complainant, who was then sleeping, and by means of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously remove the short pant (sic) and panty of the undersigned complainant, lay on top of her and insert his penis inside her vagina, and succeeded in having carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant, against her will.
“Contrary to law.”[5]
Thereafter, the
prosecution presented its evidence which consisted of the private complainant’s
testimony and the medical certificate issued by Dr. Nilo Barandino.
Private complainant’s
testimony revealed that:
“Fe Madraga, 16 years old, is the daughter of Rodolfo Madraga, a tricycle driver (TSN, December 2, 1996, pp. 4-5). Her mother, Flordelina Madraga, was in Sabah, Malaysia, working as a domestic helper.
“When her mother left for Malaysia, Fe and her brothers and sisters stayed with their grandfather, Luis Cotamco Sr., at Calle Bisaya (Ibid., p. 5). On the other hand, Rodolfo Madraga remained at the family residence at Barrio Militar, Menzi, Isabela, Basilan Province (Ibid, p. 6).
“Sometime in January 1995, Rodolfo Madraga took his children from their grandfather and forced them to stay with him at the family residence (Ibid, pp. 6 & 7).
“Sometime in May 1995, at 12:00 midnight, Rodolfo Madraga sexually abused her (sic) 16-year old daughter, Fe Madraga, in one of the rooms of the family residence. (Ibid, pp. 7-8)
“On the third night after the rape, Rodolfo Madraga repeated his bestial act toward her (sic) own daughter and did it every night thereafter (Ibid, p. 9).
“On August 24, 1996, Flordelina Madraga arrived from Malaysia (Ibid, p. 10). The presence of her mother gave Fe Madraga enough courage to report to her the sexual abuses committed against her by her father (Ibid).
“Fe Madraga was brought to the doctor, and her medical examination confirmed that she was sexually molested (Ibid; Exhibits A, A-1, A-2 and B).
“Fe Madraga, reported the matter to the police authorities (Ibid,
p. 13).”[6]
On December 10, 1996, the
trial court rendered its Decision,[7] the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused, RODOLFO OLING MADRAGA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of committing the said crime of RAPE against his own daughter, who is only more than 16 years old at the time of the commission of the offense. And hereby sentences said accused to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH.
“The plea of guilty of the accused being offset by his being drunk during the commission of the crime, which according to the complainant, her father is not a habitual drinker, cannot be taken into consideration in his favor.
“The penalty imposable for the crime of Rape especially if it is committed by the accused against his children is really harsh. In fact this Presiding Judge was a little bit reluctant to impose that extreme penalty of death upon the accused, but since it is the mandate of the law, then the Court when the evidence warrant must have to obey its command. And besides, the Court cannot cleanse its conscience if the perpetrator of the crime of rape committed against his own blood would be able to escape the punitive sanction of the law.
“And as this Court had repeatedly pronounced over and over again, under no circumstance, shall a father use his own daughter as a vehicle to satisfy his bestial instinct for it is his moral and legal responsibility to take care, to nourish, and to educate his children to become useful citizens of this country. But since the accused herein had chosen to place the honor and the dignity of her (sic) daughter into shame, into disgrace, and into ill-repute, then the heavy burden of the law that catches upon him cannot show him any mercy.
“With respect to Criminal Case No. 2515-602, for the same offense of Rape committed by the same accused, against the same complainant, the hearing thereof is hereby set to the January calendar of this Court.
“SO ORDERED.”
Two Appellant’s Brief
were filed with this Court -- one filed by the Free Legal Assistance Group
(FLAG) Anti Death Penalty Task Force, and another one filed by Public Attorney
Antonio D. Banico, appellant’s counsel, before the court a quo.
The Appellant’s Brief
filed by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), submits the following
assignment of errors:
I
Accused-appellant was denied due process.
II
The plea of guilt of accused-appellant is null and void as the trial court violated Section 3, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
On the first assigned
error, appellant contends that he was illegally arrested, because there was no
warrant of arrest issued for his arrest.
Worse, appellant avers, his right to preliminary investigation was not
observed, although there is no showing that he waived his right thereto. Appellant further alleges that there was
irregularity in the filing of the information in that a criminal complaint was
filed on September 10, 1996. However,
in the Order of the Court dated October 7, 1996, it mentioned an information
not attached to the records of the case.
The trial court directed the prosecution to submit the resolution which
became the basis for the filing of the alleged information. A resolution dated October 8, 1996 was
submitted by the prosecution on October 17, 1996 in compliance with the Order
dated October 7, 1996. The resolution
was issued only on October 8, 1996, hence, appellant concludes that the same
could not have been the basis for the alleged information (assuming such
information exists) which was obviously filed earlier.[8]
The contentions have no
merit.
In the recent case of
People vs. Galleno,[9] this Court held that an accused, as in this
case, is estopped from questioning any defect in the manner of his arrest if he
fails to move for the quashing of the information before the trial court, or if
he voluntarily submits himself to the jurisdiction of the court by entering a
plea, and by participating in the trial.
With regards to the
absence of preliminary investigation, this Court ruled in Sanciangco, Jr.
vs. People[10] and cited in Larranaga vs. Court of Appeals,[11] that “the absence of preliminary
investigation does not affect the court’s jurisdiction over the case. Nor does it impair the validity of the
(complaint) or, otherwise, render it defective.”
On the second issue,
appellant, through the FLAG, argues that the trial judge failed to conduct a
searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the
accused’s plea of guilty to the capital offense, as mandated in Sec. 3, Rule
116[12] of the New Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus, this case should be remanded to the
court of origin for further and appropriate proceedings, citing People vs. Estomaca.[13]
This contention[14] of the FLAG would have been correct were it
not for the circumstance that accused-appellant did not, in fact, plead guilty
to a capital offense in the first place.
On this matter, Atty. Banico correctly pointed out that only the first
paragraph of the complaint mentions the age of the private complainant and the
relationship of the accused to the private complainant, i.e.,
that the accused is the father of the private complainant. Atty. Banico is correct in arguing that the
first paragraph of the complaint is not part of the allegation of the charge
for rape to which appellant pleaded guilty.
Therefore, said complaint charges only simple rape under Art. 335, for
which the penalty is only reclusion perpetua, and not for rape under R.A. 7659,
qualified by the circumstance that the offender is the father of the victim who
is a minor, for which the penalty is death.[15]
In other words, since the
appellant did not plead guilty to a capital offense, he cannot properly invoke
Sec. 3, Rule 116, and People vs. Estomaca, to have this case
remanded to the trial court for compliance with said rule.
In order for rape to be
punishable with death, the information/complaint must properly allege the
qualifying circumstance of relationship between the accused and the victim, and
the latter’s minority, and the same must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, in
the same manner that circumstances that qualify a killing to murder, must be
alleged in the information, and also proved beyond reasonable doubt during the
trial. Failure to allege the fact of
filiation and minority in the information for rape is fatal and consequently
bars conviction of its qualified form which is punishable with death.[16]
In the case at bar, such
relationship is not stated in the “cause of the accusation,” or in the
narration of the act or omission constituting the offense, but only in the
preamble or opening statement of the complaint. The complaint upon which the appellant was arraigned does not
state in the specifications of the acts constitutive of the offense, that he is
charged as the father of the victim.
Such omission is prejudicial to the right of the accused to be informed
of the nature of the accusations against him.
In the recent case of People
vs. Bali-Balita,[17] the Court, through Madam Justice Minerva P.
Gonzaga-Reyes, reiterated the ruling in Buhat vs. Court of Appeals[18]that:
“xxx the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the
caption or the preamble of the information, nor from the specification of the
provision of law alleged to have been violated xxx, but from the actual recital
of the facts as alleged in the body of the information.”
We should now discuss the
issue of whether or not the prosecution was able to prove appellant’s guilt
beyond reasonable doubt, and the appropriate penalty to be imposed on
appellant. But first, the manner in
which appellant entered his plea of guilt should be tackled.
Accused-appellant entered
a plea of guilty, but it appears from the records of the proceedings before the
court a quo that the same was a conditional plea, because appellant’s
counsel argued that the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and
drunkenness should be appreciated in favor of the appellant.[19] Said counsel was apparently unaware that the
mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty, and the fact that the appellant was
drunk when he committed the crime, cannot be appreciated in the latter’s favor
because a plea of guilty would not, under any circumstance, affect or reduce
the death sentence.
As heretofore discussed,
the appellant pleaded upon a charge of simple rape. The penalty for simple rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code is reclusion perpetua, a single indivisible penalty. It appears that said counsel is also not
aware that under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, in all cases in which
the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the
courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have
attended the commission of the deed (except where there is a privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority of the accused under Art. 68, and when the
crime committed is not wholly excusable under Art. 69 – neither of which is the
case here[20]). While
the records do not show that appellant entered his plea with the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him,
this can be inferred from the arguments made by his counsel during the hearing
on December 2, 1996, and in the appellant’s brief filed by said counsel, asking that appellant be entitled to the
benefit of the plea.[21]
We would, thus, assume
that appellant made a conditional plea because this assumption would be more
favorable to the accused. A conditional
plea of guilty, or one entered subject to the provision that a certain penalty
be imposed upon him, is equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would,
therefore, require a full-blown trial before judgment may be rendered.[22] The question now arises: Was a full-blown
trial conducted?
We answer in the
affirmative. The prosecution presented
evidence to prove the commission of the crime as charged in the Complaint. The victim testified and was
cross-examined. An examination of the
victim’s testimony shows that she testified in a categorical, straightforward,
spontaneous and frank manner, and remained consistent. Also, we find the victim’s testimony to be
natural and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. A rape victim who testifies in a
categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and frank manner, and remains
consistent, is a credible witness.[23] Although no other evidence was presented by the
prosecution, in rape cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the
testimony of the victim, provided that such testimony is credible, natural,
convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.[24] We, therefore,
find that the trial court correctly found the appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.
The victim is entitled to
indemnity of P50,000.00 in line with prevailing jurisprudence[25] in addition to moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00. Award of moral damages to a
rape victim is proper even if there was no proof presented during the trial as
basis therefor.[26]
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED
insofar as it finds the accused-appellant Rodolfo Oling Madraga guilty of the
crime of rape, with the MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is reduced to reclusion
perpetua, and the accused-appellant is directed to pay the victim
P50,000.00 by way of indemnity, in addition to P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo,
Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., on leave.
[1] Penned
by Judge Salvador A. Memoracion.
[2] A
plain photocopy of the Decision
dated July 9, 1997 in this Case No.
2515-602 is attached to the Appellant’s
Brief filed by Atty. Banico, and found
on pp. 123-138 of the Rollo.
Said Decision states on p. 10 (Rollo, p. 132) that Rodolfo
Madraga testified that after May 1995, several acts of sexual intercourse up to
1996 were done with mutual consent. In
said case (2515-602), Rodolfo Madraga,
the same accused in the case at bar,
was found guilty of violation of the
Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination (R.A. 7610).
[3] Order
dated November 4, 1996, Original Records, p. 22.
[4] Order
dated November 18, 1996, Original Records, p. 26.
[5] Complaint,
Original Records, p. 1.
[6] Appellee’s
Brief, Rollo, pp. 97-98.
[7] Original
Records, pp. 36-42; Rollo.
[8] Appellant’s
Brief, Rollo, pp. 57-58.
[9] 291
SCRA 76 [1998].
[10] 149
SCRA 1 [1987].
[11] 287
SCRA 581 [1998].
[12] “Section
3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception
of evidence. – When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court
shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension
of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt
and the precise degree of culpability.
The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.”
[13] 256
SCRA 421 [1996].
[14] See
also People vs. Durango, G.R. 135438-39, April 5, 2000; People vs. Tizon, G.R.
No. 126955, October 28, 1999, which upheld People vs. Estomaca and
People vs. Camay, 152 SCRA 401 [1987]; People vs.
Dayot, 187 SCRA 637 [1990]; and People vs. Albert, 251 SCRA 136 [1995].
[15] Appellant’s
Brief filed by Atty. Banico, Rollo, pp. 119-121.
[16] People
vs. Ambray, 303 SCRA 697 [1999]; People vs. Licanda, G.R. 134084, May 4, 2000.
[17] G.R.
No. 134266, September 15, 2000.
[18] 265
SCRA 701 at 716-717 [1996].
[19] TSN,
December 2, 1996, pp. 22-23.
[20] Revised
Penal Code, Book I, Reyes, 1998 Ed., p. 717.
[21] Appellant’s
Brief, p. 3; Rollo, p. 121.
[22] People
vs. Moro Sabilul, 93 Phil. 567 [1953]; People vs. Magat, May 31,
2000, G.R. No. 130026.
[23] People
vs. Perez, 296 SCRA 17 [1998].
[24] People
vs. Medina, 300 SCRA 98 [1998].
[25] People
vs. Perez, 307 SCRA 276 [1999].
[26] People
vs. Medina, 300 SCRA 98 [1998].