FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126746. November 29, 2000]
ARTHUR TE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and
LILIANA CHOA, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
KAPUNAN,
J.:
Before us is a petition
for review on certiorari which seeks to reverse the Decision of the
Court of Appeals Tenth Division, dated 31 August 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971[1] and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178[2] and the Resolution
dated October 18, 1996 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of the case are
as follows:
Petitioner Arthur Te and
private respondent Liliana Choa were married in civil rites on September 14, 1988. They did not live together after the
marriage although they would meet each other regularly. Not long after private respondent gave birth
to a girl on April 21, 1989, petitioner stopped visiting her.[3]
On May 20, 1990, while
his marriage with private respondent was subsisting, petitioner contracted a
second marriage with a certain Julieta Santella (Santella).[4]
On the basis of a
complaint-affidavit filed by private respondent sometime in June 1990, when she
learned about petitioner’s marriage to Santella, an information charging
petitioner with bigamy was filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon
City on August 9, 1990.[5] This case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409.[6]
Meanwhile, on July 20,
1990, petitioner filed in the RTC of Quezon City an action for the annulment of
his marriage to private respondent on the ground that he was forced to marry
her. He alleged that private respondent
concealed her pregnancy by another man at the time of their marriage and that
she was psychologically incapacitated to perform her essential marital
obligations.[7]
On November 8, 1990,
private respondent also filed with the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)
an administrative case against petitioner and Santella for the revocation of
their respective engineering licenses on the ground that they committed acts of
immorality by living together and subsequently marrying each other despite
their knowledge that at the time of their marriage, petitioner was already
married to private respondent. With
respect to petitioner, private respondent added that he committed an act of
falsification by stating in his marriage contract with Santella that he was
still single.[8]
After the prosecution
rested its case in the criminal case for bigamy, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court
and motion to inhibit the trial court judge for showing antagonism and
animosity towards petitioner’s counsel during the hearings of said case.
The trial court denied
petitioner’s demurrer to evidence in an Order dated November 28, 1990 which
stated that the same could not be granted because the prosecution had
sufficiently established a prima facie case against the accused.[9] The RTC also
denied petitioner’s motion to inhibit for lack of legal basis.[10]
Petitioner then filed
with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court judge, Judge Cezar C.
Peralejo, for (1) exhibiting antagonism and animosity towards petitioner’s
counsel; (2) violating the requirements of due process by denying petitioner’s
[motion for reconsideration and] demurrer to evidence even before the filing of
the same; (3) disregarding and failing to comply with the appropriate
guidelines for judges promulgated by the Supreme Court; and (4) ruling that in
a criminal case only “prima facie evidence” is sufficient for conviction of an
accused. This case was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 23971.[11]
Petitioner also filed
with the Board of Civil Engineering of the PRC (PRC Board), where the
administrative case for the revocation of his engineering license was pending,
a motion to suspend the proceedings therein in view of the pendency of the
civil case for annulment of his marriage to private respondent and criminal
case for bigamy in Branches 106 and 98, respectively of the RTC of Quezon City.[12] When the Board denied the said motion in its Order
dated July 16, 1991,[13] petitioner filed
with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari, contending
that the Board gravely abused its discretion in: (1) failing to hold that the resolution of the annulment case is
prejudicial to the outcome of the administrative case pending before it; (2)
not holding that the continuation of proceedings in the administrative case
could render nugatory petitioner’s right against self-incrimination in this
criminal case for bigamy against him; and (3) making an overly-sweeping
interpretation that Section 32 of the Rules and Regulations Governing the
Regulation and Practice of Professionals does not allow the suspension of the
administrative proceeding before the PRC Board despite the pendency of criminal
and/or administrative proceedings against the same respondent involving the
same set of facts in other courts or tribunals. This petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 26178.[14]
The two petitions for certiorari
were consolidated since they arose from the same set of facts.
On 31 August 1994, the
Court of Appeals, Tenth Division, rendered the assailed decision in the
consolidated petitions. The appellate
court upheld the RTC’s denial of the motion to inhibit due to petitioner’s
failure to show any concrete evidence that the trial court judge exhibited
partiality and had prejudged the case.
It also ruled that the denial of petitioner’s motion to suspend the
proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question was in accord with law.[15] The Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the RTC’s
denial of the demurrer to evidence filed by petitioner for his failure to set
forth persuasive grounds to support the same, considering that the prosecution
was able to adduce evidence showing the existence of the elements of bigamy.[16]
Neither did the appellate
court find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Board’s Order denying
petitioner’s motion to suspend proceedings in the administrative case on the
ground of prejudicial question.
Respondent court held that no prejudicial question existed since the
action sought to be suspended is administrative in nature, and the other action
involved is a civil case.[17]
Petitioner thereafter
filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals but
the same was denied.[18]
Hence, petitioner filed
the instant petition raising the following issues:
I
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS ERROR IN REFUSING TO SUSPEND THE LEGAL [CRIMINAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE] PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE PENDENCY OF THE CIVIL CASE FOR DECLARATION OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
II
PUBLIC RESPONDENT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN DUE COURSE.
III
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL
ERROR IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL JUDGE A QUO SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED
HIMSELF.[19]
The petition has no
merit.
While the termination of
Civil Case No. Q-90-6205 for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent has rendered the issue of the propriety of suspending both the
criminal case for bigamy before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 98 and the
administrative case for revocation of petitioner’s engineering license before
the PRC Board moot and academic, the Court shall discuss the issue of
prejudicial question to emphasize the guarding and controlling precepts and
rules.[20]
A prejudicial question
has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime
but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence
of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not
only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal
prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or
issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would
necessarily be determined.[21] The rationale behind the principle of suspending a
criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting
decisions.[22]
The Court of Appeals did
not err when it ruled that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of
marriage filed by petitioner against private respondent did not pose a
prejudicial question which would necessitate that the criminal case for bigamy
be suspended until said civil case is terminated.
The outcome of the civil
case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to private respondent had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the
criminal case for bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second
marriage is contracted.[23] Petitioner’s argument that the nullity of his
marriage to private respondent had to be resolved first in the civil case
before the criminal proceedings could continue, because a declaration that
their marriage was void ab initio would necessarily absolve him from
criminal liability, is untenable. The
ruling in People vs. Mendoza[24] and People vs.
Aragon[25] cited by petitioner
that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of a marriage
which is void ab initio has been overturned. The prevailing rule is found in Article 40 of the Family Code,
which was already in effect at the time of petitioner’s marriage to private
respondent in September 1988. Said
article states that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may not be
invoked for purposes of remarriage unless there is a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void. Thus,
under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.[26] In Landicho vs.
Relova,[27] we held that:
Parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for this must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as
void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption of marriage
exists.[28]
It is clear from the
foregoing that the pendency of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s
marriage to private respondent did not give rise to a prejudicial question
which warranted the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal case for
bigamy since at the time of the alleged commission of the crime, their marriage
was, under the law, still valid and subsisting.
Neither did the filing of
said civil case for annulment necessitate the suspension of the administrative
proceedings before the PRC Board. As
discussed above, the concept of prejudicial question involves a civil and a
criminal case. We have previously ruled
that there is no prejudicial question where one case is administrative and the
other is civil.[29]
Furthermore, Section 32
of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of
Professionals of the PRC Board expressly provides that the administrative
proceedings before it shall not be suspended notwithstanding the existence of a
criminal and/or civil case against the respondent involving the same facts as
the administrative case:
The filing or pendency of a criminal and/or civil cases in the courts or an administrative case in another judicial body against an examinee or registered professional involving the same facts as in the administrative case filed or to be filed before the Board shall neither suspend nor bar the proceeding of the latter case. The Board shall proceed independently with the investigation of the case and shall render therein its decision without awaiting for the final decision of the courts or quasi-judicial body.
It must also be noted
that the allegations in the administrative complaint before the PRC Board are
not confined to the issue of the alleged bigamous marriage contracted by
petitioner and Santella. Petitioner is
also charged with immoral conduct for continued failure to perform his
obligations as husband to private respondent and as father to their child, and
for cohabiting with Santella without the benefit of marriage.[30] The existence of these other charges justified the
continuation of the proceedings before the PRC Board.
Petitioner also contends
that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the trial court’s denial of his
demurrer to evidence in the criminal case for bigamy, arguing that the
prosecution failed to establish the existence of both the first and second
marriages beyond reasonable doubt.
Petitioner claims that the original copy of marriage contract between
him and private respondent was not presented, the signatures therein were not
properly identified and there was no showing that the requisites of a valid
marriage were complied with. He alleges
further that the original copy of the marriage contract between him and
Santella was not presented, that no proof that he signed said contract was
adduced, and that there was no witness presented to show that a second marriage ceremony participated in by
him ever took place.[31]
We are not
persuaded. The grant or denial of a
demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and
its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse
of such discretion.[32] In this case, the Court of Appeals did not find any
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court, which based its
denial of the demurrer on two grounds:
first, the prosecution established a prima facie case for bigamy
against the petitioner; and second, petitioner’s allegations in the demurrer
were insufficient to justify the grant of the same. It has been held that the appellate court will not review in a
special civil action for certiorari the prosecution’s evidence and
decide in advance that such evidence has or has not yet established the guilt
of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.[33] In view of the
trial court’s finding that a prima facie case against petitioner exists,
his proper recourse is to adduce evidence in his defense.[34]
The Court also finds it
necessary to correct petitioner’s misimpression that by denying his demurrer to
evidence in view of the existence of a prima facie case against him, the
trial court was already making a pronouncement that he is liable for the
offense charged. As correctly held by
the Court of Appeals, the order of the RTC denying the demurrer was not an
adjudication on the merits but merely an evaluation of the sufficiency of the
prosecution’s evidence to determine whether or not a full-blown trial would be
necessary to resolve the case.[35] The RTC’s observation that there was a prima
facie case against petitioner only meant that the prosecution had presented
sufficient evidence to sustain its proposition that petitioner had committed
the offense of bigamy, and unless petitioner presents evidence to rebut the
same, such would be the conclusion.[36] Said declaration
by the RTC should not be construed as a pronouncement of petitioner’s
guilt. It was precisely because of such
finding that the trial court denied the demurrer, in order that petitioner may
present evidence in his defense and allow said court to resolve the case based
on the evidence adduced by both parties.
Lastly, petitioner
contends that his motion to inhibit Judge Peralejo in Criminal Case No.
Q-90-14409 should have been granted since said judge exhibited partiality and
bias against him in several instances.
First, when petitioner manifested that he would file a motion for
reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suspend the proceedings in said
case, the judge said such motion was dilatory and would be denied even though
the motion for reconsideration had not yet been filed. Second, when petitioner’s counsel manifested
that he had just recovered from an accident and was not physically fit for
trial, the judge commented that counsel was merely trying to delay the case and
required said counsel to produce a medical certificate to support his
statement. Third, when petitioner
manifested that he was going to file a demurrer to evidence, the judge
characterized the same as dilatory and declared that he would deny the
same. According to petitioner, the
judge’s hostile attitude towards petitioner’s counsel as shown in the foregoing
instances justified the grant of his motion to inhibit.
We agree with the
appellate court that the grounds raised by petitioner against Judge Peralejo
did not conclusively show that the latter was biased and had prejudged the
case.[37] In People of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals,[38] this Court held
that while bias and prejudice have been recognized as valid reasons for the
voluntary inhibition of a judge under Section 1, Rule 137, the rudimentary rule
is that the mere suspicion that a judge is partial is not enough. There should be clear and convincing
evidence to prove the charge of bias and partiality.[39]
Furthermore, since the
grounds raised by petitioner in his motion to inhibit are not among those
expressly mentioned in Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
decision to inhibit himself lay within the sound discretion of Judge
Peralejo. Said provision of law states:
Section 1. Disqualification of judges. – No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the record.
A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in the case, for just and valid reasons other than those mentioned above.
Thus, it was not
mandatory that the judge inhibit himself from hearing and deciding the case.
This Court does not find
any abuse of discretion by respondent judge in denying petitioner’s motion to
inhibit. The test for determining the
propriety of the denial of said motion is whether petitioner was deprived a
fair and impartial trial.[40] The instances when Judge Peralejo allegedly
exhibited antagonism and partiality against petitioner and/or his counsel did
not deprive him of a fair and impartial trial.
As discussed earlier, the denial by the judge of petitioner’s motion to
suspend the criminal proceeding and the demurrer to evidence are in accord with
law and jurisprudence. Neither was
there anything unreasonable in the requirement that petitioner’s counsel submit
a medical certificate to support his claim that he suffered an accident which
rendered him unprepared for trial. Such
requirement was evidently imposed upon petitioner’s counsel to ensure that the
resolution of the case was not hampered by unnecessary and unjustified delays,
in keeping with the judge’s duty to disposing of the court’s business promptly.[41]
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,
(Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago,
JJ., concur.
[1] Arthur
Te, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Cesar C. Peralejo as Judge, RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 98 and People of the Philippines, Respondents.
[2] Arthur
Te, Petitioner, vs. Board of Civil Engineering, Professional Regulation
Commission and Liliana Choa Te, Respondents.
[3] Decision
of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1994, Rollo, p. 29.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Id.,
at 29-30.
[6] Records,
Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409, p.1.
[7] Rollo,
pp. 29-30.
[8] Id.,
at 30.
[9] Records,
Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409, p. 37.
[10] Id.,
at 33.
[11] Id.,
at 6-10.
[12] These
cases were: (1) Arthur Te, vs. Liliana
Choa-Te, Civil Case No. 90-6265 for Annulment of Marriage, Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 106; and (2) People of the Philippines vs. Arthur Te,
Criminal Case No. Q-90-14409 for Bigamy, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 98.
[13] Records,
CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, p. 15.
[14] Records,
CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, pp. 6-10.
[15] Decision
of the Court of Appeals, Rollo, pp. 33-34, 36.
[16] Id.,
at 35.
[17] Id.,
at 36.
[18] Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated October 18, 1996, Id., at 103.
[19] Petition,
Id., at 18-24.
[20] Salonga
vs. Cruz Pano, 134 SCRA 438, 463 (1985).
[21] Librado
vs. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303, 309-310 (1982).
[22] Carlos
vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 25, 33 (1997) citing Tuanda
vs. Sandiganbayan, 249
SCRA 342 (1995).
[23] The
elements of the crime of bigamy are as follows: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the marriage has
not been legally dissolved; (3) the offender contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (4) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential
requisites for validity. (REYES, LUIS
B. THE REVISED PENAL CODE ANNOTATED, Vol. 2 , Thirteenth Edition, p. 828.)
[24] 95
Phil. 843 (1954).
[25] 100
Phil. 1033 (1957).
[26] Mercado
vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000; Bobis vs. Bobis,
G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000; Wiegel vs. Sempio-Diy, 143 SCRA 499,
501 (1986).
[27] 22
SCRA 731(1968).
[28] Id.,
at 734, citing 3 VIADA, PENAL CODE 275.
[29] Ocampo
vs. Buenaventura, 55 SCRA 267, 271 (1974).
[30] Records,
CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, pp. 18-19.
[31] Petition,
Rollo, pp. 21-23.
[32] People
vs. Mercado, 159 SCRA 453, 459 (1988).
[33] People
vs. Cruz, 144 SCRA 677, 681 (1986).
[34] Section
15, Rule 119, Revised Rules of Court.
[35] Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, Rollo,
pp. 35-36.
[36] People
vs. Nuque, 58 O.G. 8445; Salonga vs Cruz Pano, supra note
20 at 450.
[37] Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23971 and CA-G.R. SP No. 26178, Rollo,
p. 33.
[38] 309
SCRA 705 (1999).
[39] Id.,
at 709-710.
[40] Associacion
de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay, Inc. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co.,
Inc., 88 SCRA 294.
[41] Rule
3.05, Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct.