PARDO, J.: Ky-calr

Before us is an appeal from the decision1 [In CA-G. R. SP No. 46296 promulgated on March 24, 1998, Petition, Annex "DD", Rollo, pp. 364-386.] of the Court of Appeals2 [Somera, J., ponente, Agcaoili and Cosico, JJ., concurring.] dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition initiated by petitioner and the resolution3 [Issued on November 20, 1998, Petition, Annex "GG", Rollo, pp. 427-432.] modifying the aforementioned decision, thus:

The facts are as follows:

On November 21, 1996, the Supreme Court promulgated its decision in Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. and Carmelo and Bauermann, Inc. vs. Mayfair Theater, Inc.,5 [264 SCRA 483 (1996)] the decretal portion of which reads:

In due time, Equatorial filed a motion for reconsideration of the above decision. On January 28, 1997, the Court denied the motion with finality. A second motion for reconsideration filed by Equatorial was denied on March 4, 1997. Calr-ky

On March 17, 1997, the decision became final and executory. Equatorial filed a third motion for reconsideration, and on April 22, 1997, the Court noted the same without action since the decision had become final and executory. To stress the finality of the decision, on June 17, 1997, the Court issued a resolution emphasizing its finality and warning the parties that no further pleadings or motions regarding the matter would be entertained.

On April 25, 1997, Mayfair Theater, Inc. (hereinafter Mayfair) filed with the Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 076 [In Civil Case No. 118019. Presided over by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas.] a motion for execution.

On May 20, 1997, the trial court granted respondent’s motion for execution, as follows:

On the same date, the trial court issued a writ of execution.8 [Petition, Annex "E", Rollo, pp. 105-107.]

On May 21, 1997, Sheriff IV Manuelito P. Viloria of the trial court issued to Carmelo and Bauermann a notice to comply with the trial court’s order and writ of execution. However, Carmelo did not receive both the writ and notice to comply since it could not be located.

On June 9, 1997, Equatorial filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated May 20, 1997, the recall and/or quashal of the writ of execution and the notice to comply, on the ground that the order of execution did not conform to the dispositive portion of the Supreme Court’s decision dated November 21, 1996. Equatorial specifically averred the following variance:

On August 25, 1997, the trial court denied Equatorial’s motion for reconsideration, the dispositive portion of the order reads:

Thereafter, Mayfair deposited with the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Manila its payment to Carmelo, amounting to P10,452,500.00 (P11,300,000.00 less P847,000.00, as withholding tax).11 [There is a P500.00 differential.] Sc-slx

On August 27, 1997, pursuant to the aforesaid order, the acting clerk of court, Regional Trial Court, Manila executed a deed of re-conveyance of the subject property in favor of Carmelo, and a deed of absolute sale in favor of Mayfair.12 [Petition, Annexes "R" and "R-1", Rollo, pp. 185-196.]

On August 28, 1997, both the deed of re-conveyance and deed of absolute sale were submitted to the Register of Deeds of Manila for registration. On the same date, the Register of Deeds of Manila registered the documents, cancelled the transfer certificates of title (TCTs) of Equatorial over the subject property, and issued new TCTs in the name of Mayfair.13 [TCT Nos. 235120, 235121, 235122, and 235123, Petition, Annexes "U", "U--1", "U-2" and "U-3", Rollo, pp. 200-212.]

On September 5, 1997, Equatorial filed with the trial court an urgent motion for reconsideration of the denial. Equatorial contended that the trial court erred in applying Section 10 (a) of Rule 39 since both Carmelo and Equatorial had not yet failed to comply with the order of execution, hence it was erroneous to designate the acting clerk of court to execute the deed of re-conveyance. In fact, Carmelo had not received the notice to comply. Equatorial maintained that the order of execution should not be implemented because it varied with the Supreme Court’s November 21, 1996 decision. Equatorial stressed that since Carmelo had not returned the "purchase price" as ordered by the Court, it could not be compelled to execute the deed of re-conveyance in favor of Carmelo.14 [Petition, Annex "V", Rollo, pp. 213-225.]

On November 6, 1997, the trial court denied the motion for lack of merit.15 [Petition, Annex "AA", Rollo, pp. 264-267.]

On December 16, 1997, Equatorial filed with the Court of Appeals,16 [CA-G. R. SP No. 46296, Petition, Annex "B", Rollo, pp. 268-336.] a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking the annulment of the trial court’s orders dated May 20, August 25, and November 6, 1997, the writ of execution dated May 20, 1997, the sheriff’s notice to comply dated May 21, 1997, the deeds of re-conveyance and transfer, sale and the certificates of title in favor of Mayfair.

Equatorial contended that the trial court acted with grave of discretion in issuing a writ of execution, which was at variance with the dispositive portion of the Court’s decision.

Equatorial averred that Carmelo’s failure to receive the writ of execution and notice to comply was tantamount to denial of due process. Equatorial further stated that the trial court erred in applying Section 10 (a), Rule 39, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in issuing the writ of execution, since the parties did not fail to comply within the time specified.

Equatorial also submitted that it would be grossly and unconscionably unjust, unfair and inequitable to compel it to accept P11,300,000.00 for land which was worth more than P400 million, due to the appreciation of the property or the depreciation of the peso.

On March 24, 1998, the Court of Appeals rendered decision dismissing the petition, to wit: Sl-xsc

On April 8, 1998, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.18 [Petition, Annex "EE", Rollo, pp. 387-412.]

On November 20, 1998, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution as follows:

The Court of Appeals explained that Mayfair had no right to deduct P847,000.00 as withholding tax which must be paid by Carmelo, as the seller. Carmelo must return the amount of P11,300,000.00 to Equatorial as a consequence of the rescission. However, since Carmelo could not be located, Mayfair must complete the full amount of P11,300,000.00 deposited with the Clerk of Court, Manila by depositing an additional P847,000.00. Thereafter, the full amount of P11,300,000.00 must be turned over to Equatorial. The Court of Appeals explained that the judge could not stand idly while Carmelo and Bauermann took time accepting the P11,300,000.00 from Mayfair and returning the amount to Equatorial. Slxmis

Hence, this petition for review20 [Filed on January 6, 1999, Rollo, pp. 9-87.] assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 24, 1998, and its resolution dated November 20, 1998.

Petitioner Equatorial contends that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the applicability of Rule 39, Section 10 (a), 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, since it did not fail to comply with the order, as it did not receive the writ of execution and notice to comply. Petitioner submits that the application of Rule 39, Section 10 (a) violated Carmelo and Bauermann’s constitutional right to due process.

Petitioner maintains that the writ of execution varies with the dispositive portion of the Supreme Court decision and cannot be implemented. Petitioner stresses that the Register of Deeds erred in cancelling its certificates of titles and issuing new titles to Mayfair, since Carmelo and Bauermann has not returned the purchase price. The money deposited by Mayfair with the Office of the Clerk of Court was for the account of Carmelo and cannot be considered as a sufficient tender of payment to Equatorial.

The Supreme Court’s decision in G. R. No. 106063 is clear. Having attained finality, there is nothing left for the parties to do but adhere to the mandates of the decision.

It is a fundamental rule that when a judgment becomes final and executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable and any amendment or alteration, which substantially affects a final and executory judgment, is null and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose.21 [Arcenas vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 733 (1998); Salva vs. Court of Appeals, 304 SCRA 632 (1999)]

A writ of execution must conform to the judgment to be executed22 [Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 131641, February 23, 2000.] and adhere strictly to the very essential particulars.23 [Viray vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 468 (1998)] An order of execution, which varies the tenor of the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity.24 [Philippine Bank of Communications vs. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 364 (1997)] The writ of execution "may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. Where the execution is not in harmony with the judgment which gives it life, and in fact exceeds it, has pro tanto no validity. To maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional provision against depriving a person of his property without due process of law."25 [Nazareno vs. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 131641, February 23, 2000, citing Matiguina Integrated Wood Products, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 263 SCRA 491 (1996)] Having attained finality, the decision in G. R. No. 106063 is beyond review or modification even by the Supreme Court.26 [Toledo-Banaga vs. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 331 (1999)] M-issdaa

In issuing the questioned orders, the trial court exceeded its authority by altering the essential portions of the Supreme Court decision. Thus, the proceedings held below and the orders issued therein inconsistent with the Supreme Court decision are null and void for want of jurisdiction.

We agree that Carmelo and Bauermann is obliged to return the entire amount of eleven million three hundred thousand pesos (P11,300,000.00) to Equatorial. On the other hand, Mayfair may not deduct from the purchase price the amount of eight hundred forty-seven thousand pesos (P 847,000.00) as withholding tax. The duty to withhold taxes due, if any, is imposed on the seller, Carmelo and Bauermann, Inc.

WHEREFORE, the petition is partially GRANTED; decision is hereby rendered setting aside the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals27 [In CA-G. R. SP No. 46296.] and the orders of execution of the trial court28 [In Civil Case No. 118019, Regional Trial Court, Manila, Branch 07.] inconsistent and at variance with the dispositive portion of our decision in G. R. No. 106036.

Let the trial court carry out the execution following strictly the terms of the aforesaid Supreme Court decision.

No costs.

SO ORDERED. Sd-aad-sc

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., no part due to prior inhibition.