PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ALEXANDER TAÑO y CABALLERO, accused-appellant.HATOL

The appellant cannot be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape because the asportation was conceived and carried out as an afterthought and only after the rape has been consummated. Dwelling cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in this case because the rape was committed in the ground floor of a two-story structure, the lower floor being used as a video rental store and not as a private place of abode or residence.

This is an automatic review of the Decision1 [Penned by Judge Myrna Dimaranan Vidal; rollo, pp. 20-33.] dated April 23, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 127, in Criminal Case No. C-53066, finding Accused-Appellant Alexander Taño y Caballero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with rape and imposing upon him the supreme penalty of death. The case arose out of an Information,2 [Rollo, p. 5; records, p.1.] dated November 10, 1997, signed by Assistant City Prosecutor Salvador C. Quimpo, accusing the appellant of robbery with rape allegedly committed as follows:

During his arraignment on November 26, 1997, appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the charge.3 [Records, p. 7.] After trial on the merits, the lower court promulgated the herein assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

The solicitor general sums the evidence for the prosecution in this wise:4 [Brief for the Appellee, pp. 3-5; rollo, pp. 95-97. The Brief was signed by Sol. Gen. Ricardo P. Galvez, Asst. Sol. Gen. Maria Aurora P. Cortes and Solicitor Ronald B. de Luna.]

On the other hand, appellant’s version of the incident is as follows:5 [Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-8; rollo, pp. 50-51. Said Brief was signed by Attys. Arceli A. Rubin, Teresita S. de Guzman and Josephine M. Advento-Vito Cruz of the Public Attorney's Office.]

Assessing the testimony of the private complainant, the trial judge observed:6 [Assailed Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 28.]

The lower court accepted the judicial admission of the accused that he stole valuables belonging to private complainant and her employer, and then proceeded to determine "whether or not the prosecution evidence has sufficiently established the rape angle of the case."

Furthermore, the trial court appreciated dwelling as an aggravating circumstance because the incident took place supposedly at the residence of private complainant's employer, "which doubles as a video rental shop."7 [Assailed Decision, p. 12; rollo, p. 31.] Applying Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 7659, it imposed the maximum penalty provided under Article 294 of the same Code as amended, which is death.

Thus, this automatic review by this Court.8 [This case was deemed submitted for resolution on November 5, 1999, upon receipt by this Court of the appellant’s Reply Brief.]

In his Brief,9 [P. 1; rollo, p. 44.] Appellant Taño assigns only two errors or issues. These are:

In criminal cases, an appeal throws the whole case open for review and the appellate court may correct such errors it may find in the appealed judgment, even if they have not been specifically assigned.10 [People v. Llaguno, 285 SCRA 124, 147, January 28, 1998. See also People v. Atop, 286 SCRA 157, 174, February 10, 1998.] Hence, this Court likewise reviewed (a) the propriety of appellant's conviction of the special complex crime of robbery with rape and (b) the trial court's appreciation of dwelling as an aggravating circumstance. These two items will be discussed as the third and fourth issues.

After a careful review of the evidence on record, the Court finds that (a) appellant is guilty of two separate crimes -- rape and robbery, (b) dwelling cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, and (c) the proper penalty for rape is reclusion perpetua, not death.

Appellant contends that the trial court failed to give due credence to the testimonies of Dr. Godofredo Balderosa and Dr. Ma. Redencion Bukid-Abella, who both examined and treated Amy de Guzman's physical injuries immediately after the incident. Both doctors similarly stated that the victim complained to them of physical assault and attempted rape only, not of consummated rape.11 [Appellant's Brief, pp. 9-11, citing TSN, January 20, 1998, pp. 9-10, and TSN, February 18, 1998, p. 12.] Additionally, the findings of NBI Medico-Legal Officer Aurea Villena were allegedly inconclusive as to whether there was sexual intercourse between the appellant and the victim.12 [Ibid., pp. 12-15, citing TSN, February 4, 1998, pp. 11-13.] Their testimonies supposedly bolster appellant's innocence of the rape charge.

Otherwise stated, appellant claims that the failure of Amy de Guzman to immediately disclose the rape to her examining physicians could only mean that she was not in fact sexually assaulted.

In many criminal cases, especially of rape, this Court has acknowledged that the vacillation of the victim in reporting the crime to the authorities is not necessarily an indication of a fabricated charge. Neither does it always cast doubt on the credibility on the complaining witness.13 [People v. Cabel, 282 SCRA 410, December 4, 1997; People v. Escober, 281 SCRA 498, November 6, 1997; People v. Fuensalida, 281 SCRA 452, November 6, 1997; People v. Perez, 270 SCRA 526, March 26, 1997.] The initial reluctance of a young, inexperienced lass to admit having been ravished is normal and natural.14 [People v. Del Rosario, 282 SCRA 178, November 18, 1997.] The Court takes judicial notice of the Filipina's inbred modesty and shyness and her antipathy in publicly airing acts which blemish her honor and virtue.15 [People v. Alfeche, 294 SCRA 352, August 17, 1998; People v. Sabalones, 294 SCRA 751, August 31, 1998.] She cannot be expected to readily reveal the fact of her sexual violation to total strangers.

It is thus perfectly understandable and consistent with common experience that Amy initially tried to downplay the assault upon her chastity by telling the doctors that there was no consummation of the act. The following day, however, she was finally able to gather the courage to reveal the entire truth to her cousin-employer, Ana Marinay.16 [TSN, January 13, 1998, p. 7.] She also executed a Sworn Statement17 [Records, p. 2 et seq.] before PO3 Jaime Basa, detailing how she had been raped and beaten by appellant. Four days later, she acceded to undergo a medico legal examination of her genital organ, which was conducted by Dra. Aurea Villena of the Jose R. Reyes Memorial Hospital, where she was confined.

Time-honored is the doctrine that no young and decent woman would publicly admit that she was ravished and her virtue defiled, unless such was true, for it would be instinctive for her to protect her honor.18 [People v. Auxtero, 289 SCRA 75, April 15, 1998.] No woman would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and submit herself to public humiliation and scrutiny via an open trial, if her sordid tale was not true and her sole motivation was not to have the culprit apprehended and punished.19 [See People v. Escober, 281 SCRA 498, November 6, 1997; People v. Antipona, 274 SCRA 328, June 19, 1997; People v. Ramirez, 266 SCRA 335, January 20, 1997.] Thus, absent any credible imputation of ill motive on the part of the private complainant to falsely accuse the appellant of a heinous crime, her candid and consistent testimony should be given full faith and credit.20 [People v. Abrecinoz, 281 SCRA 59, October 17, 1997; People v. Escober, supra.] It is a basic rule, founded on reason and experience, that when a victim testifies that she has been raped, she effectively says all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.21 [People v. Garcia, 281 SCRA 463, November 6, 1997; People v. Cabel, supra.]

In the case at bar, we find no reason to deviate from these doctrines. Amy de Guzman's straightforward and convincing testimony, which will be detailed later, bears no badge of material inconsistency which would bring doubt to its veracity. She stood firm on her tale throughout her court appearance. The trial judge observed her "to be candid, straightforward, spontaneous and frank x x x [and she] remained consistent and unwavering despite the rigid cross-examinations of the defense counsel x x x."22 [Assailed Decision, p. 9; rollo, p. 28.]

Besides, no ill motive was imputed on her. Appellant offers us no plausible explanation why Amy de Guzman cried rape against him. We believe she did so in order to bring out the truth and to obtain justice.

Appellant's contention that the absence of genital and other injuries on Amy's body proves his innocence is unacceptable. Time and again, we have ruled that hymenal laceration is not an element of rape.23 [People v. Escober, supra; People v. Zaballero, 274 SCRA 627, June 30, 1997; People v. Garcia, 288 SCRA 382, March 31, 1998; People v. Tirona, 300 SCRA 431, December 22, 1998.] The victim need not sustain genital injuries, for even the slightest penetration of the labia by the male organ is equivalent to consummated rape.24 [People v. Borja, 267 SCRA 370, February 3, 1997.]

Besides, the examining physician satisfactorily explained the absence of lacerations on private complainant's genitalia:25 [TSN, February 4, 1998, p. 8.]

She elucidated that "[l]aceration only occur[s] on non-elastic hymen because non-elastic hymen cannot accommodate the size of the penis without producing injury but hers is that of the elastic type, like rubber band that could stretch and turn back into its proper size."26 [Ibid., p. 11.]

Time-tested is the guiding principle that when a victim cries rape, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that the crime was inflicted on her; and so long as her testimony meets the test of credibility, the accused may be convicted on the basis thereof.27 [People v. Garcia, supra; People v. Erardo, 277 SCRA 643, August 18, 1997; People v. Butron, 272 SCRA 352, May 7, 1997.] We have no reason in the instant case to deviate from this settled jurisprudence.

Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following instances: (1) force or intimidation is used, (2) the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (3) she is under twelve years of age.28 [People v. Pili, 289 SCRA 118, April 15, 1998.] We find the necessary elements of rape duly established by Private Complainant Amy de Guzman when she candidly testified thus:29 [TSN, January 8, 1998, pp. 4-6.]

x x x.......x x x.......x x x

As noted earlier, the trial judge, who was able to observe firsthand the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying, perceived Amy to be candid, straightforward, spontaneous and frank. Said witness was also found to have been consistent and unwavering despite the rigid cross-examination of the defense counsel. We note from the transcript of stenographic notes that the judge herself had posed additional clarificatory questions upon Amy.30 [See TSN, January 12, 1998, pp. 14-15.] Throughout her testimony, she indeed remained consistent as well as convincing.

Of long-standing is the rule that findings of trial courts, especially on the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to great weight and accorded the highest respect by the reviewing courts, unless certain facts of substance and value were overlooked or misappreciated such as would alter the conviction of the appellant.31 [People v. Sumalpong, 284 SCRA 464, January 20, 1998; People v. Correa, 285 SCRA 679, January 30, 1998; People v. Quinao, 269 SCRA 495, March 13, 1997; People v. Arellano, 282 SCRA 500, December 5, 1997.] Trial judges are in a better position to assess the behavior of witnesses and to detect whether they are telling the truth or not because they could directly observe them in court.32 [People v. Navales, 266 SCRA, 569, January 23, 1997; People v. Dinglasan, 267 SCRA 26, January 28, 1997; People v. Daraman, 294 SCRA 27, August 7, 1998.] The reviewing magistrate, on the other hand, has only the cold and impersonal records of the proceedings to rely upon.

With respect to the robbery, its elements are: (1) the subject is personal property belonging to another; (2) there is unlawful taking of that property, (3) the taking is with the intent to gain, and (4) there is violence against or intimidation of any person or use of force upon things.33 [People v. Mendoza, 284 SCRA 705, January 23, 1998; People v. Gungon, 287 SCRA 618, March 19, 1998.] There is no question on the unlawful taking of valuables belonging to Amy and her employer, Ana Marinay. Appellant openly admitted in court the unlawful asportation, thus:

..............x x x.......x x x.......x x x

During his arrest, the following stolen valuables were found in his bag: P5,000 cash, two bracelets, two rings and a pair of earrings, which Ana Marinay identified as belonging to her; and one wristwatch and a bracelet belonging to Amy de Guzman.37 [TSN, January 13, 1998, p. 10.] Unrebutted is the presumption that a person in possession of stolen personal effects is considered the author of the crime.

We do not, however, agree with the trial court that appellant is guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with rape. This felony contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another; and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime.38 [People v. Barrientos, 285 SCRA 221, 241, January 28, 1998; People v. Cruz, 203 SCRA 682, 697, November 18, 1991; People v. Faigano, 254 SCRA 10, February 22, 1996.]

Such factual circumstance does not obtain here. As related by Private Complainant Amy de Guzman, accused-appellant suddenly jumped over the counter, strangled her, poked a knife at the left side of her neck, pulled her towards the kitchen where he forced her to undress, and gained carnal knowledge of her against her will and consent. Thereafter, he ordered her to proceed upstairs to get some clothes, so he could bring her out, saying he was not leaving her alive. At this point, appellant conceived the idea of robbery because, before they could reach the upper floor, he suddenly pulled Amy down and started mauling her until she lost consciousness; then he freely ransacked the place. Leaving Amy for dead after repeatedly banging her head, first on the wall, then on the toilet bowl, he took her bracelet, ring and wristwatch. He then proceeded upstairs where he took as well the jewelry box containing other valuables belonging to his victim's employer.

Under these circumstances, appellant cannot be convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape. However, since it was clearly proven beyond reasonable doubt that he raped Amy de Guzman and thereafter robbed her and Ana Marinay of valuables totaling P16,000, he committed two separate offenses -- rape with the use of a deadly weapon and simple robbery with force and intimidation against persons.

Appellant may well be convicted of the separate offenses of rape and robbery notwithstanding the fact that the offense charged in the Information is only "Robbery with Rape." In a similar case, People v. Barrientos,39 [Supra, pp. 244-245, per Vitug, J.] this Court held:

In the case at bar, we find the Information filed against appellant to have sufficiently alleged all the elements necessary to convict him of the two separate crimes of rape and robbery. Needless to state, appellant failed, before his arraignment, to move for the quashal of the Information which appeared to charge more than one offense. He has thereby waived any objection and may thus be found guilty of as many offenses as those charged in the Information and proven during the trial.40 [People v. Manalili, 294 SCRA 220, August 14, 1998; People v. Bugayong, 299 SCRA 528, December 2, 1998.]

Dwelling aggravates a felony when the crime was committed in the residence of the offended party and the latter has not given any provocation.41 [People v. Paraiso, GR No. 127840, November 29, 1999; People v. Molina, GR No. 129051, July 28, 1999.] It is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of privacy that the law accords to human abode.42 [People v. Monsayac, GR No. 126787, May 24, 1999; People vs. Parazo, 272 SCRA 512, May 14, 1997.] As one commentator puts it, one’s dwelling place is a sanctuary worthy of respect; thus, one who slanders another in the latter’s house is more severely punished than one who offends him elsewhere.43 [Aquino, Revised Penal Code Annotated, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 315.] According to Cuello Calon, the commission of the crime in another’s dwelling shows worse perversity and produces graver alarm.44 [Ibid.]

In the case at bar, the building where the two offenses were committed was not entirely for dwelling purposes. The evidence shows that it consisted of two floors: the ground floor, which was being operated as a video rental shop, and the upper floor, which was used as a residence. It was in the video rental shop where the rape was committed. True, the victim was dragged to the kitchen and toilet but these two sections were adjacent to and formed parts of the store. Being a commercial shop that caters to the public, the video rental outlet was open to the public. As such, it is not attributed the sanctity of privacy that jurisprudence accords to residential abodes. Hence, dwelling cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of rape.

Under Article 335, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, "[w]henever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon x x x the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death." Under Article 63 of the same Code, reclusion perpetua is the appropriate penalty imposable upon accused-appellant for the crime of rape, inasmuch as no aggravating circumstance was proven. Pursuant to current jurisprudence, the award of P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape.45 [People v. Maglente, 306 SCRA 546, 578, April 30, 1999; People v. Penaso, GR No. 121980, February 23, 2000.] Moral damages may additionally be awarded to the victim in such amount as the Court deems just, without the need of pleading or proof of the basis thereof.46 [People v. Prades, 293 SCRA 411, July 30, 1998; People v. Arizapa, GR No. 131814, March 15, 2000.] In rape cases, it is recognized that the victim's moral injury is concomitant with and necessarily results from the odiousness of the crime to warrant the grant of moral damages.47 [People v. Arizapa, ibid.] In the instant case, we deem it appropriate to grant Amy de Guzman P30,000 as moral damages. However, since no aggravating circumstance attended the rape, no exemplary damages may be awarded.48 [See Art. 2230, Civil Code; People v. De Guzman, 265 SCRA 228, 247, December 2, 1996.]

For the crime of robbery committed under the circumstances of this case, the Code provides the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.49 [Art. 294, no. 5, RPC.] Further, the appellant is also entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. For the actual damages incurred by Amy de Guzman in connection with her physical injuries, the lower court awarded P2,687.65, based on receipts submitted by her. A recomputation of the receipts, however, reveals a total of only P2,487.65. We, therefore, reduce the award accordingly. The trial court also ordered appellant "to restore to the victim her gold ring of undetermined amount," which was supposedly unrecovered. Upon an examination of the records, we note that the Information alleges the robbery of the following items: P5,000 cash, three (3) bracelets, two rings, one pair of earrings and one (1) Alba wristwatch. Except for the cash money, which has already been returned to Ana Marinay by the police, the other items were offered as evidence50 [Exhs. "E," "E-1," "E-2" (3 bracelets); "E-3," "E-4" (2 rings); "E-5" (earrings); and "E-6" (wristwatch)] and submitted to the custody of the trial court. Upon Motion51 [Rollo, p. 81.] of Ana Marinay and Amy de Guzman, the release to them of these items was ordered by this Court via a Resolution issued on December 7, 1999. The stolen items are therefore all accounted for. Thus, we find no sufficient basis for the trial court's order for the appellant to return a "gold ring of undetermined amount."

In robbery and other common crimes, the grant of moral damages is not automatic, unlike in rape cases. The rule that a claim for moral damages must be supported by proof still stands. It must be anchored on proof showing that the claimant experienced moral suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation or similar injury.52 [People v. Sumalpong, supra; People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441, July 14, 1997.] The private complainants, however, did not present any evidence of their moral sufferings as a result of the robbery. Thus, there is no basis for the grant of moral damages in connection with the robbery.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-Appellant Alexander Taño y Caballero is found guilty of two separate offenses: rape and robbery. For the crime of rape, appellant is hereby SENTENCED to reclusion perpetua and to pay Private Complainant Amy de Guzman P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto and P30,000 as moral damages. For the crime of robbery, appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay De Guzman P2,487.65 as actual damages.

SO ORDERED. 6/21/00 1:43 PM

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.

Melo, Kapunan, and Purisima, JJ., no part-abroad.