A suit for malicious prosecution cannot prosper unless the plaintiff satisfactorily proves that the earlier criminal action lacked probable cause and was filed, by a sinister design, mainly to injure, vex, annoy or humiliate. An acquittal, by itself, does not necessarily prove the absence of probable cause in the criminal information or complaint. Upon the other hand, the complainant cannot escape liability merely on the ground that it was the fiscal who prosecuted the proceedings in court.

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the October 30, 1998 Decision1 [Rollo, pp. 13-25.] and the April 8, 1999 Resolution2 [Rollo, p. 33.] of the Court of Appeals3 [Tenth Division composed of JJ Fermin A. Martin Jr., ponente and chairman; Romeo J. Callejo Sr. and Mariano M. Umali, members (both concurring).] (CA) in CA-GR CV No. 52904. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:4 [CA Decision, p. 13; Rollo, p. 25.]

The assailed Resolution denied the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.5 [Rollo, p. 33.]

The Court of Appeals, in its assailed Decision, related the antecedents of this case in this wise:6 [CA Decision, pp. 2-6; Rollo, pp. 14-18.]

‘xxx xxx xxx.’

After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its Decision7 [Written by Judge Alvin L. Tan.] dated November 6, 1995, in favor of petitioner. The dispositive portion reads:8 [RTC Records, vol. II, p. 264.]

On appeal, the CA reversed the trial court in the assailed Decision and Resolution.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the petitioner had failed to prove the elements of malicious prosecution.

First, even if the respondent bank filed the six criminal Complaints against the petitioner, it was not the prosecutor but merely the complainant. The prosecution of those criminal cases was left solely to the discretion and control of the city fiscal. Second, the prosecutor acted with probable cause. The Resolution of the city fiscal of Dumaguete clearly showed petitioner’s participation in the alleged crimes and the reasons why the accused was probably guilty as charged. Third, the petitioner also failed to establish malice behind the filing of the criminal Complaints.

The adverse result of an action does not by itself make the prosecution thereof wrongful; neither does it subject the actor to payment of damages. The law does not impose a penalty on the right to litigate.

Hence, this Petition.9 [This case was deemed submitted for decision upon simultaneous receipt by this Court of the parties’ respective Memoranda on November 29, 1999. The Memorandum of petitioner was signed by Atty. Justo J. Paras of Paras & Associates, while that of respondent was prepared by Attys. Jefferson M. Marquez and Joseph Randi C. Torregosa of Abello Concepcion Regala & Cruz.]

In his Memorandum, the petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:

Restated, the issues brought forth in this case are as follows: (1) Was there probable cause against petitioner? (2) May the private complainant in a criminal case be held liable for malicious prosecution, considering that it is the fiscal who prosecuted the criminal action against the accused? and (3) Was the petitioner prosecuted out of malice?

The Petition has no merit.

For a malicious prosecution suit to prosper, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) the prosecution did occur, and the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement; (2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (3) in bringing the action, the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice -- an improper or a sinister motive.11 Ponce v. Legaspi, 208 SCRA 377, 388, May 6, 1992; Lao v. Court of Appeals, 199 SCRA 58, 61, July 11, 1991; Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 211, 220-221, March 20, 1997.] Stripped of legal jargon, malicious prosecution means persecution through the misuse or abuse of judicial processes; or the institution and pursuit of legal proceedings for the purpose of harassing, annoying, vexing or injuring an innocent person.

Petitioner avers that there was no probable cause against him, because the imputed acts were not covered or punished by a penal statute. Despite being a complete stranger to the loan transaction, he was implicated by the bank as a conspirator in the six Complaints for violation of the General Banking Act. However, only three Informations were filed for violations of the following: one, Secs. 77, 87-A-2(b) and 87-A-1(d) of the General Banking Act (Republic Act No. 337 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 71), as well as Central Bank Circular No. 517, Series of 1976; two, Secs. 87-A-2(d) and 87-A-1(c) of the General Banking Act, as amended; and, three, Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The petitioner was acquitted of all three charges.

The contention is untenable. Probable cause is evident from the facts and circumstances established during the preliminary investigation conducted by the city prosecutor. In its 23-page Resolution of October 8, 1979, the City Prosecutor’s Office outlined petitioner’s participation, as follows:

The bank cannot be faulted for its desire to protect its interest in the subject loans. Since the proceeds thereof were already released and transferred to the bank account of petitioner from that of his father, the bank had to implead the petitioner in the criminal cases.

Probable cause is the existence of such facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind that the person who is charged and prosecuted in a criminal case is probably guilty of the crime or wrongdoing.15 [Ponce v. Legaspi, supra, p. 389; Drilon v. Court of Appeals, 270 SCRA 211, 221, March 20, 1997.] The term does not connote absolute certainty. Neither does it require an inquiry into the sufficiency of the evidence to obtain a conviction.

In this case, the above-quoted facts taken together constitute prima facie evidence to engender a reasonable belief that petitioner was part of a conspiracy to defraud the respondent bank. Thus, there was probable cause for the filing of the Complaints, which were not products of the whim or caprice of the respondent bank.

In malicious prosecution, even if the act complained of does not constitute a crime, there can still be probable cause behind the commission of a civil wrong. The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless.16 [Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 217 SCRA 16, 28, January 11, 1993; Chua v. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 341, 345, March 14, 1995; China Banking Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 472, 478, March 28, 1994.] In the case at bar, even if Secs. 87-A-1, 87-A-1(d), 87-A-2, and 87-A-2(b) of the General Banking Act punish only bank officers, employees, borrowers or banking institutions, the respondent bank nonetheless filed these Complaints based on a theory of a conspiracy to defraud it.

The petitioner’s acquittal, by itself, did not disprove the presence of probable cause. Evidence of probable cause to warrant the filing of a criminal information may not suffice to procure a conviction, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, an acquittal does not necessarily imply lack of probable cause.

Petitioner avers that the CA erred in absolving the respondent bank on the basis merely of the fact that the fiscal had absolute control and supervision of the prosecution.

We agree that the CA erred on this point. As held in Lagman v. Intermediate Appellate Court,17 [166 SCRA 734, 739, October 28, 1988, per Fernan, CJ.] the second requisite of malicious prosecution is "that the defendant was himself the prosecutor or that he instigated its commencement." Indeed, the right to institute a criminal action cannot be exercised maliciously and in bad faith, as when a criminal complaint is used "as a weapon to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness."18 [Yutuk v. Manila Electric Co., 2 SCRA 337, 348-349, May 31, 1961; Globe Mackay Cable & Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778, 787, August 25, 1989.] Such complaint designed to annoy or harass may be the basis of a suit for malicious prosecution. Clearly, the mere fact that the fiscal took full control of a litigation does not grant immunity to persons who misuse their rights to instigate criminal actions.

The respondent bank filed the criminal Complaints for violations of the General Banking Act in its honest belief that these charges were meritorious. There is no credible evidence to show that it was impelled by a desire to unjustly vex, annoy and inflict injury on the petitioner. Before these cases were referred to the city fiscal, it had even conducted its own investigation with the assistance of the National Bureau of Investigation.19 [Memorandum for the Respondent, p. 27; Rollo, p. 102; TSN, March 1, 1995, pp. 6-7.]

Malicious prosecution requires proof that the prosecution was prompted by a sinister design to vex and humiliate the plaintiff.20 [Globe Mackay v. CA, supra, p. 788; Lagman v. IAC, supra, p. 740.] The respondent bank had neither a "bone to pick" with the petitioner nor a "previous dealing with petitioner that could have prompted the respondent bank to turn the tables on him."21 [Ibid, p. 25; Ibid, p. 100.]

Resort to judicial processes, by itself, is not evidence of ill will, as the mere act of filing a criminal complaint does not make the complainant liable for malicious prosecution.22 [Globe Mackay v. CA, supra, p. 788; Lagman v. IAC, supra, p. 740; Albenson v. CA, supra.] There must be proof that the suit was prompted by legal malice -- an inexcusable intent to injure, oppress, vex, annoy or humiliate.23 [Pro Line Sports Center, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 162, 172, October 23, 1997.] A contrary rule would discourage peaceful recourse to the courts and unjustly penalize the exercise of a citizen’s right to litigate.24 [Ibid.; "J" Marketing Corporation v. Sia Jr., 285 SCRA 580, 582, January 18, 1998.] Where the action is filed in good faith, no penalty should be imposed thereon.25 [Lagman v. IAC, supra, p. 741; China Banking v. CA, supra, p. 478.]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.