This is a petition for review of the decision1 [Per Justice Minerva P. Gonzaga-Reyes (now Associate Justice of this Court), concurred in by Justices B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz and Demetrio C. Demetria.] of the Court of Appeals affirming petitioner's conviction of illegal possession of lumber in violation of §682 [Renumbered §78 by Republic Act No. 7161.] of the Revised Forestry Code3 [Cutting, Gathering and/or Collecting Timber, or Other Forest Products Without License. - Any person who shall cut, gather, collect, remove timber or other forest products from any forest land, or timber from alienable or disposable public land, or from private land, without any authority, or possess timber or other forest products without the legal documents as required under existing forest laws and regulations, shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Article 309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code: Provided, That in the case of partnerships, associations, or corporations, the officers who ordered the cutting, gathering, collection or possession shall be liable, and if such officers are aliens, they shall, in addition to the penalty, be deported without further proceedings on the part of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation.

The Court shall further order the confiscation in favor of the government of the timber or any forest products cut, gathered, collected, removed, or possessed, as well as the machinery, equipment, implements and tools illegally used in the area where the timber or forest products are found. (As amended by PD No.1559, and by EO No. 277, prom, July 25, 1987, emphasis added).] (P.D. No. 705, as amended) by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon.

The facts are as follows:

Sometime in the latter part of 1992, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) office in Bukidnon received reports that illegally cut lumber was being delivered to the warehouse of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation in Valencia, Bukidnon. The company is engaged in rice milling and trading.

DENR officers, assisted by elements of the Philippine National Police, raided the company's warehouse in Poblacion, Valencia on the strength of a warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Malaybalay, Bukidnon and found a large stockpile of lumber of varying sizes cut by a chain saw. As proof that the company had acquired the lumber by purchase, petitioner produced two receipts issued by R.L. Rivero Lumberyard of Maramag, Bukidnon, dated March 6 and 17, 1992. The DENR officers did not, however, give credit to the receipts considering that R. L. Rivero Lumberyard's permit to operate had long been suspended. What is more, the pieces of lumber were cut by chain saw and thus could not have come from a licensed sawmill operator. Joä spped

The team made an inventory of the seized lumber which, all in all, constituted 29,299.25 board feet, worth P488,334.45 in total. The following day, September 29, 1992, the first batch of lumber, consisting of 162 pieces measuring 1,954.66 board feet, was taken and impounded at the FORE stockyard in Sumpong, Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The seizure order4 [Records, p. 28.] was served on petitioner Perfecto Pallada as general manager of the company, but he refused to acknowledge it.

On October 1, 1992, the raiding team returned for the remaining lumber. Company president Francisco Tankiko and a certain Isaias Valdehueza, who represented himself to be a lawyer, asked for a suspension of the operations to enable them to seek a lifting of the warrant. The motion was filed with the court which issued the warrant but, on October 5, 1992, the motion was denied.5 [Id., p. 136-C.] Accordingly, the remaining lumber was confiscated. By October 9, 1992, all the lumber in the warehouse had been seized. As before, however, petitioner Pallada refused to sign for the seizure orders issued by the DENR officers (Exhs. E, F & G).

On February 23, 1993, petitioner, as general manager, together with Noel Sy, as assistant operations manager, and Francisco Tankiko, as president of the Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation, and Isaias Valdehueza, were charged with violation of §68 of P.D .No. 705, as amended. The Information alleged:6 [Id., p. 1.]

As all the accused pleaded not guilty, trial ensued. Then on July 27, 1994, judgment was rendered as follows:7 [Id., p. 255.]

Petitioner and Francisco Tankiko appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, on October 31, 1997, affirmed petitioner's conviction but acquitted Tankiko for lack of proof of his participation in the purchase or acquisition of the seized lumber.8 [CA Decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 28.]

Hence this petition which raises the following issues:9 [Petition, p. 2; Id., p. 4.]

First. During the trial, the defense presented the following documents, as summarized by the trial court, to establish that Valencia Golden Harvest Corporation's possession of the seized lumber was legal:10 [RTC Decision, pp. 3-5; Records, pp. 249-251.]

The trial court acted correctly in not giving credence to the Certificates of Timber Origin presented by petitioner since the lumber held by the company should be covered by Certificates of Lumber Origin.11 [Id., p. 5; Id., p. 251.] For indeed, as BFD Circular No. 10-8312 [Issued on February 28, 1983, now superseded by DENR Administrative Order No. 07, issued on February 17, 1994.] states in pertinent parts: Maniâ kx

Petitioner contends that the term "timber" includes lumber and, therefore, the Certificates of Timber Origin and their attachments should have been considered in establishing the legality of the company's possession of the lumber.13 [Petition, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 7-8.] In support of his contention, petitioner invokes our ruling in Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.14 [257 SCRA 430 (1996).]

The contention has no merit. The statement in Mustang Lumber that lumber is merely processed timber and, therefore, the word "timber" embraces lumber, was made in answer to the lower court's ruling in that case that the phrase "possess timber or other forest products" in §68 of P.D. No. 705 means that only those who possess timber and forest products without the documents required by law are criminally liable, while those who possess lumber are not liable. On the other hand, the question in this case is whether separate certificates of origin should be issued for lumber and timber. Indeed, different certificates of origin are required for timber, lumber and non-timber forest products.15 [DENR Administrative Circular No. 07, §§ 2&17 (series of 1994).] As already noted, the opening paragraph of BFD Circular No. 10-83 expressly states that the issuance of a separate certificate of origin for lumber is required in order to "pinpoint accountability and responsibility for shipment of lumber . . . and to have uniformity in documenting the origin thereof."

Even assuming that a Certificate of Timber Origin could serve as a substitute for Certificate of Lumber Origin, the trial court and the Court of Appeals were justified in convicting petitioner, considering the numerous irregularities and defects found in the documents presented by the latter. According to the trial court:16 [RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Records, p. 251-252 (emphasis in the original).]

Indeed, aside from the fact that the Certificate of Timber Origin in Exh. 7 bears no date, the dorsal side bears the certification that the logs were "scaled on August 7, 1991," while the receipt attached to that Certificate is dated February 6, 1992. Moreover, the four delivery receipts list the sizes and volume of the lumber sold, indicating that the company purchased cut lumber from the dealers, thus belying the testimony of petitioner that when the company bought the forest products, they were still in the form of flitches and logs, and they were cut into lumber by the company.18 [TSN, pp. 10, 13 & 22, March 12, 1994.]

These irregularities and discrepancies make the documents in which they are found not only questionable but invalid and, thus, justified the trial court in giving no credence to the same.19 [Compare DENR Administrative Order No. 59-93, series of 1993, §6 in relation to §2.8, which provides that certificates of origin with erased or tampered vital entries, such as the name and address of consignee, are void (now superseded by DENR Administrative Order No.07, series of 1994.)]

It is argued that the irregularities in the documentary exhibits should not be taken against petitioner because the documents came from lumber dealers. In addition, it is contended that the CTOs and Auxiliary Receipts, being public documents, should be accorded the presumption of regularity in their execution.20 [Petition, pp. 6-10; Rollo, pp. 8-12.]

This contention is untenable. What render these documents without legal effect are the patent irregularities found on their faces. That petitioner may not have any responsibility for such irregularity is immaterial. In any case, as the corporate officer in charge of the purchase of the lumber, petitioner should have noticed such obvious irregularities, and he should have taken steps to have them corrected. He cannot now feign ignorance and assert that, as far as he is concerned, the documents are regular and complete.21 [Id., pp. 8-10; Id., pp. 10-12.]

The presence of such glaring irregularities negates the presumption that the CTOs were regularly executed by the DENR officials concerned. The presumption invoked by petitioner applies only when the public documents are, on their faces, regular and properly accomplished.22 [See Veloso v. Sandiganbayan, 187 SCRA 504 (1990).]

Second. The penalty imposed should be modified. Art. 309 of the Revised Penal Code, made applicable to the offense by P.D. No. 705, §68, provides:

As the lumber involved in this case is worth P488,334.45, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,23 [People v. Simon, 234 SCRA 555 (1994).] the penalty to be imposed should be six (6) years of prision correccional to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October 31, 1997, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is sentenced to six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. Ncmâ