Accused RENE MAMALIAS Y FIEL was convicted of murder and frustrated murder by the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 33). He seeks his acquittal on the ground that the trial court convicted him purely on the basis of hearsay evidence but he escaped pending decision of his appeal. The threshold issue is whether we should acquit the accused who is no longer in the custody of the law. We acquit to prevent failure of justice.

The records show that on January 31, 1993, accused Rene Mamalias and a John Doe were charged with the crimes of murder and frustrated murder, for the death of Francisco de Vera y Del Valle, and the gunshot wound inflicted on Alexander Bunag.1 [Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 115102-03.] The crimes were allegedly committed as follows:

Accused pleaded not guilty.2 [Original Records, p. 11.] His co-accused remained at large. Trial ensued.

The prosecution presented only two (2) witnesses, namely police investigator SPO3 Manuel Liberato of the Western Police District Command and Dr. Remigio Rivera of the Mary Johnston Hospital.

SPO3 LlBERATO testified that the accused was arrested on January 4, 1993. A few days later, a relative of the murder victim Francisco De Vera brought to the police headquarters Epifanio Raymundo, an alleged eyewitness to the shooting incident. The sworn statement of Raymundo was taken by SPO3 Liberato. In his worn statement, Raymundo claimed that at about 5:00 a.m., on August 9, 1992, he saw De Vera standing in front of house no.1001 in Ilaya Street near Padre Capitan Street, Tondo, Manila. Two (2) unidentified men approached De Vera and, without any provocation, shot him in the head. Alexander Bunag, a fruit vendor, was caught in the line of fire and got hit on the cheek by a stray bullet that killed De Vera.3 [Exhibit "A", Original Records, p. 1.] The assailants fled after shooting De Vera three (3) times.

SPO3 Liberato also prepared the Booking Sheet and Arrest Report and the Progress Report of the case at bar. In his Progress Report,4 [Original Records, p. 7.] dated January 7, 1993, SPO3 Liberato stated:

DR. REMEGIO RIVERA, a resident physician at Mary Johnston Hospital in Tondo, Manila, testified that on August 9, 1992, he treated the gunshot wounds of Alexander Bunag. Bunag sustained gunshot wound at the right cheek, measuring about 1 cm., and possibly a penetrating wound in the cranial area, measuring about 5 cms. However, he did not determine the extent of Bunag's possible head injury as Bunag refused to undergo a skull x-ray. Thus, he just cleansed Bunag's wounds and gave him anti-tetanus medications. Bunag was released that same day.

The prosecution tried to present Alexander Bunag, the heirs of Francisco De Vera and Epifanio Raymundo as additional witnesses but the authorities could not locate them.5 [Warrants of arrest were issued against the heirs of Francisco De Vera, Alexander Bunag and Epifanio Raymundo for their failure to appear in court and for giving fictitious addresses. See Original Records, pp. 30, 34-35.] For lack of other material witnesses, the prosecution rested its case.

The defense presented only one witness, accused Rene Mamalias.

Accused claimed that on the date and time of the shooting incident, he was in his house in Masinop, Wagas Street, Tondo, Manila. He fetched water and was unaware of any unusual incident. He denied any knowledge of the crimes imputed against him. On January 4, 1993, while he was counting the proceeds of his sales for watches and eyeglasses, he was arrested without warrant by the police and brought to the Western Police District. He was also not assisted by counsel during his custodial investigation.

On May 15, 1995, the trial court rendered its judgment, finding accused guilty as charged.6 [Penned by then Judge now Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan, Rodolfo G. Palattao; Rollo, pp. 13-22.] The trial court held:

Hence, the appeal.7 [Counsel for the accused-appellant erroneously appealed the case to the Court of Appeals. The complete records of the case were transmitted by the Court of Appeals to this Court on February 24, 1997, considering that the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua.] Accused-appellant contends that:

In a Resolution dated August 25, 1997, we inquired from the Director of the Bureau of Corrections whether the accused-appellant is confined in the New Bilibid Prisons or some other institutions under said Bureau.8 [Rollo, p. 28.] In a 1st Indorsement, dated October 7, 1997, the Bureau of Corrections notified this Court that it has no record of confinement of the accused-appellant.9 [Rollo, pp. 31-35.] Hence, on October 22, 1997, we issued another resolution, ordering the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, to inform the Court of the whereabouts of the accused-appellant within ten (10) days from notice of our resolution. On September 13, 1999, we issued another resolution with the following directives:

On September 24, 1999, we received a communication from the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, informing this Court that "the Order of Commitment dated August 2, 1995 issued by then Judge Rodolfo G. Palattao has long been satisfied. It was delivered by a certain M.O. Labata of the Manila Sheriff’s Office and was received at the Manila City Jail by SJ 04 EA Elanda on August 11, 1995 x x x." It thus appears that the accused-appellant is no longer in the custody of the law and cannot be located.

In a Manifestation and Motion,10 [Dated August 10, 1998.] the solicitor General recommended the acquittal of the accused-appellant as his conviction was based on hearsay evidence.

The first issue is the jurisdiction of this Court to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused-appellant in view of the fact that his whereabouts is now unknown. Section 8, Rule 124 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

The general rule is that "a party appealing who flees the jurisdiction, pending the appeal, is in contempt of the authority of the court and of the law and places himself in a position to speculate on the chances for a reversal, meanwhile keeping out of the reach of justice and preparing to render the judgment nugatory or not, at his option. Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on the part of the appellate court."11 [People vs. Wilson & Dolores, 52 Phil. 907 (1929).] Moreover, the escapee loses his standing in court and unless he surrenders or submits to the jurisdiction of the court, he is deemed to have waived any right to seek relief from the court.12 [People vs. Agbulos, 222 SCRA 196 (1993); People vs. Mapalao, 197 SCRA 79 (1991); People vs. Ang Gioc, 73 Phil. 366 (1941); People vs. Quiritan, 197 SCRA 32 (1991); People vs. Acol, 232 SCRA 406 (1994); People vs. Codilla, 224 SCRA 104 (1993).]

Be that as it may, the escape of an accused-appellant during the pendency of his appeal will not necessarily prevent this Court from exercising its jurisdiction in exceptional cases. Thus, in People vs. Araneta,13 [300 SCRA 80 (1998), pp. 89-90.] we held:

Similarly instructive is the case of People vs. Francisco,14 [74 SCRA 158 (1976).] where the accused-appellant was convicted of murder and meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He escaped from confinement during the pendency of his appeal. Nevertheless, we reviewed his sentence and eventually acquitted him of the crime charged. We held:

In the case at bar, we hold that this Court should retain its jurisdiction to pass upon the guilt or innocence of the accused-appellant to prevent a miscarriage of justice. The ultimate task of this Court is to render justice and rules of procedure should be interpreted to serve this objective. No obeisance should be rendered to any technical rule when its result will be to frustrate the rendition of a just decision. Again, we reiterate our fealty to the rule of justice and not to the role of technicalities.

The second issue is whether the guilt of the accused-appellant was established beyond reasonable doubt. The Constitution15 [Section 14 (12), Article III, 1987 Constitution.] mandates that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This presumption of innocence is anchored on the basic principles of justice. It cannot be overcome by suspicion or conjecture, i.e., a probability that the accused committed the crime or that he had the opportunity to do so. To overcome the presumption of innocence, proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact essential to constitute the offense with which the accused is charged must be clearly established by the prosecution.16 [People vs. Isla, 278 SCRA 47 (1997).]

In the case at bar, the trial court merely relied on hearsay evidence, particularly on the testimony of SPO3 Liberato and the sworn statement of Epifanio Raymundo who did not testify in the trial court. The records clearly show that prosecution witness SPO3 Liberato has no personal knowledge of the facts surrounding the shooting incident. The Progress Report and the Booking and Arrest Report he prepared were based on information related to him by Epifanio Raymundo almost five (5) months after the crimes were committed. In fact, contrary to the factual finding of the trial court that SPO3 Liberato went to the locus criminis shortly after the shooting incident, the records show that it was PO3 Edgardo E. Ko who was dispatched by the WPD Command to investigate the case. For unknown reason, PO3 Ko was not called to the witness stand. The records also show that SPO3 Liberato was not even a member of the team of policemen that apprehend the accused-appellant on January 4, 1993. He testified that the accused-appellant was turned over to him only on January 6, 1993, and he did not know how the accused-appellant was apprehended. He was also not aware whether a warrant of arrest had been issued against the accused-appellant.17 [TSN, April 27, 1993, p. 6.] Clearly, his knowledge of the circumstances surrounding the shooting incident was limited to the matters relayed to him by his co-policemen and the alleged eyewitness, hence, hearsay.

In the same vein, the sworn statement of Epifanio Raymundo is merely hearsay evidence as he did not personally appear in court to affirm its content. Its probative value, if any, is little. We have held that in criminal cases, the admission of hearsay evidence would be a violation of the constitutional provision that the accused shall enjoy the right to confront the witnesses testifying against him and to cross-examine them.18 [People vs. Melosantos, 245 SCRA 569 (1995).] A conviction based alone on proof that violates the constitutional right of an accused is a nullity and the court that rendered it acted without jurisdiction in its rendition. Such a judgment cannot be given any effect whatsoever especially on the liberty of an individual.

Apparently, the trial court was swayed to convict the accused-appellant because he was suspected by the police as a member of the dreaded "Robin Padilla gang", that was allegedly involved in a series of bank robberies, murders and other offenses in Manila. Be that as it may, suspicion is never synonymous to proof and notoriety without more is not evidence and cannot convict.

We emphasize that the great goal of our criminal law and procedure is not to send people to the gaol but to do justice.19 [People vs. De Guzman, 250 SCRA 118 (1995).] The prosecution's job is to prove that the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense-- the obligation is upon the shoulders of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused, not on the accused to prove his innocence. Thus, when the evidence for the prosecution is not enough to sustain a conviction, it must be rejected and the accused absolved and released at once.20 [People vs. Alcantara, 240 SCRA 122 (1995).]

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the impugned decision of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Manila (Branch 33), in Criminal Case Nos. 93-115102-03, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and appellant RENE MAMALIAS Y FIEL is hereby ACQUITTED of the crimes charged due to reasonable doubt. Costs de oficio.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.