This is a petition for review of the decision1 [Per Justice Bernardo Ll. Salas, and concurred in by Justices Gloria C. Paras and Ma. Alicia Austria Martinez.] of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 [Presided by Judge Rodolfo C. Soledad.] admitting petitioner Ong Chia to Philippines citizenship.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications enumerated in §3 of the law, stated -

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness against him, he remarked: novero

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed contending that petitioner: (1) failed to state all the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former places of residence in violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of §2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.4 [Appellant's Brief, pp. 21-22; CA Rollo, pp. 35-36.]

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,5 [Annex B; Id., pp. 129-138.] in which petitioner stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as "Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail.6 [Citing Watt v. Republic, 46 SCRA 683 (1972); Id., p. 37.] The state also annexed income tax returns7 [Annexes F, F-1, F-2, F-3 and F-4; Id., pp. 144-157.] allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in 1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977 marriage contract8 [Annex D; Id., p. 139.] and a Joint-Affidavit9 [Annex E; Id., p. 140.] executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been required in accordance with Art.76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been married. ella

The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence,10 [Annex A; Records, p. 16.] petitioner resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in his petition.

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted, reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the importance of naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal.11 [CA Decision, P. 8; Rollo, p. 50. Citations omitted.] The appellate court held:

Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence, they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value,"12 [Petition, p. 21; Id., p. 29.] so it was argued, because under Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 14313 [Now found under Rule 1, §4 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.] of the Rules of Court which provides that -

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is "practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and convenient course of action considering that decision in naturalization proceedings are not covered by the rule on res judicata.14 [Republic v. Guy, 115 SCRA 244 (1982).] Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same documents.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process.15 [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 25.] We are not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their admissibility.16 [See Peninsula Construction, Inc. v. Eisma, 194 SCRA 667 (1991).] Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections, as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals, thus: nigella

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation Sheet18 [Annex C; CA Rollo, p. 133. Said evaluation sheet recommended that the petition be dismissed as petitioner failed to meet the requirements under LOI 491 because his income is insufficient for his support and that of his family and also because he failed to show that he believes in the principles underlying the Constitution.] of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No. 031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the documents presented by the State.

Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents - namely, the petition in SCN Case No. 031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and petitioner's income tax returns - are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make satisfactory showing of any flaw or irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the appellate court did not err in relying upon them.

One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had been fully published,19 [In the Official Gazette and in the Sarangani Journal.] with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes substantial compliance with §7.20 [Petition, p. 22; Rollo, p. 30.] This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have lived at one time or another.21 [Watt v. Republic, supra.] It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant.22 [Chan Chen v. Republic, 109 Phil. 940 (1960), citing Co Quing v. Republic, 104 Phil. 889 (1958) and Co. v. Republic, 108 Phil. 265 (1960).] As noted by the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the petition his present and former places of residence.23 [Comment, p. 23; Rollo, p. 110.] This provision and the rule of strict application of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought to be denied. marinella

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur. francis