This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to enjoin further proceedings in Criminal Case Nos. Q-96-66607-08, and to annul the Order, dated August 27, 1996, of Branch 217 of the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City, which denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash the Informations.

Petitioner Judy Carol L. Dansal was the Department Manager of the Enforcement, Investigation, and Prosecution Department of the National Food Authority ("NFA"), with office address at E. Rodriguez Sr. Avenue, Quezon City. Petitioner Rafael T. Flores was the Assistant Manager of the said department of NFA. Petitioner Herminio C. Elizon was the chief of the Security Division of the same department of NFA, while Petitioner Arnulfo S. Soloria was a security officer of the said department of NFA. Respondent Benigno S. Montera, on the other hand, was employed with the Enforcement, Investigation, and Prosecution Department of NFA.1 [Rollo, pp. 4-5.]

On December 16, 1991, respondent Montera filed an "Affidavit of Complaint" with the Office of the Ombudsman, charging the herein petitioners and one Ronaldo Vallada, a casual security guard of NFA, with the offense of estafa through falsification of public document.

On January 14, 1992, petitioners were required by the Office of the Ombudsman to submit their respective counter-affidavits and other controverting evidence. Petitioners complied. On April 1, 1992, respondent Montera sent in a reply-affidavit.

On July 10, 1992, petitioner Dansal was directed to submit her verified answer to respondent Montera’s additional charge of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.

On September 9, 1992, petitioner Dansal submitted her answer with a counter-charge.

On January 15, 1993, petitioner Dansal filed her rejoinder to respondent Montera’s reply-affidavit, after which the cases were ripe for resolution.2 [Ibid., pp. 5, 6.]

On May 30, 1994, or after one (1) year and four (4) months, the office of the Ombudsman came out with its Resolution, copy of which petitioners allegedly received on February 5, 1996.3 [As reflected in the NFA logbook, Rollo, p. 97.] Said Resolution ruled:

On May 13, 1996, after the denial of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration, the aforesaid cases were referred to the deputized prosecutor of Quezon City, together with two Informations, dated October 20, 1995 and January 15, 1996, respectively, accusing Judy Carol L. Dansal of estafa through falsification of public document, and violation of Section 3(e) of R. A. No. 3019;5 [Rollo, ibid.] and the other petitioners of estafa through falsification of public document.

On July 18, 1996, petitioners interposed a Motion to Quash, contending that the delay in terminating the preliminary investigation violated their constitutional rights to due process and to a speedy disposition of their cases.6 [Ibid., Sec. 16.]

On August 27, 1996, the respondent court denied the said motion, ruling thus:

Undaunted, petitioners found their way to this Court via the present petition under Rule 65 with a prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order, theorizing that:

On December 18, 1996, without giving due course to the Petition, the Court required the respondents to comment and denied the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.9 [Ibid. p. 137.]

In his Manifestation and Motion in lieu of Comment, the Solicitor General recommended the granting of the petition.10 [Ibid. p. 183-205.]

The accusation against the petitioners is based on the "Affidavit of Complaint" alleging that petitioners falsified the Daily Time Record (DTR) of one Ronaldo Vallada, by making it appear that the latter reported for work during the month of July 1991 when, in truth and in fact, he did not so report, and that the petitioners collected the amount of P2,244.04 paid on the basis of the falsified DTR.

In their answer, petitioners countered that the imputation against them is a mere harassment by complainant Benigno S. Montera, so as to silence, embarrass and destroy their (petitioners’) credibility, and that the complainant lodged the complaint because prior to the filing thereof, petitioner Dansal initiated an investigation of the complainant for alleged irregularities involving the latter’s daily time record, which investigation was set by petitioner Dansal after Ronaldo Vallada admitted having illegally punched in the Bundy Clock the DTRs of several employees and the complainant, who requested him to do so, and as a result, an administrative case was instituted against the complainant before the Director for Legal Affairs, docketed as Administrative Case No. 1-05-92 for Dishonesty, Falsification of Public Documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.11 [Rollo, p. 188.]

Placing reliance on the ruling in the case of Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan,12 [159 SCRA 70.] petitioners seek redress for what they theorized upon as a violation of their right to due process and speedy disposition of their cases by reason of the alleged unreasonable delay of the preliminary investigation against them.

The petition is barren of merit.

To begin with, the petition is flawed by the failure of petitioners to move for reconsideration of the assailed Order. Settled is the rule that, except in some recognized exceptions, the filing of a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non to the filing of a petition for certiorari.13 [Co Tuan vs. NLRC, 289 SCRA 415.] The rationale behind the rule is to give the respondent court an opportunity to correct its supposed mistake and to rectify its questioned Order.

Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, reads:

Initially embodied in Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the aforesaid constitutional provision is one of three provisions mandating speedier dispensation of justice.14 [Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996, p. 489] It guarantees the right of all persons to "a speedy disposition of their case"; includes within its contemplation the periods before, during and after trial, and affords broader protection than Section 14(2),15 [Art. III, Sec 14 (2). " In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable. (Underscoring supplied)] which guarantees just the right to a speedy trial. It is more embracing than the protection under Article VII, Section 15, which covers only the period after the submission of the case.16 [Bernas, id., citing Talabon vs. Iloilo Provincial Warden, 78 PHIL 599.] The present constitutional provision applies to civil, criminal and administrative cases.17 [Bernas, id.]

Section 16 was first given flesh and blood in the Tatad case, which also involved a petition seeking to reverse an order of the trial court denying a motion to quash the Information. Applying Section 16, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the Court opined in that case:

But the concept of "speedy disposition of cases," like "speedy trial," is a relative term and a flexible concept. It is consistent with reasonable delay.19 [Bernas, supra..]

In the determination of whether or not the constitutional right invoked by petitioners has been violated, the factors to consider and balance are the duration of the delay, reason thereof, assertion of the right or failure to assert it and the prejudice caused by such delay.20 [Ibid., citing Barker vs. Wings, 407 US 524.] The desideratum of a speedy disposition of cases should not, if at all possible, result in the precipitate loss of a party’s right to present evidence and either in a plaintiff’s being non-suited or the defendant’s being pronounced liable under an ex parte judgment.21 [Padua vs. Ericta, 161 SCRA 458.]

The Court believes, and so holds, that the aforecited doctrine laid down in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan is inapplicable in light of the attendant facts and circumstances in this case. Records disclose that the original complaint against petitioners was brought before the Office of the Ombudsman on December 16, 1991. The same was deemed submitted for resolution on January 15, 1993. On May 30, 1994, the investigator issued a Resolution finding a probable cause, which finding was later approved by the Ombudsman. Petitioners were furnished a copy of the said Resolution on February 5 and 6, 1996. On June 30, 1996 were filed the Information dated October 20, 1995, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-66607, and the other Information dated January 15, 1996, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-96-66608.22 [Rollo, p. 192-193.]

The preliminary investigation in subject cases against the petitioners took more than one year and four months to finish. But such a happenstance alone, or any like delay, for that matter, should not be cause for an unfettered abdication by the court of its duty to try cases and to finally make a determination of the controversy after the presentation of evidence. In Francisco Guerrero vs. Court of Appeals,23 [257 SCRA 703, 716.] et al., the Court had this to say:

The protection under the right to a speedy disposition of cases should not operate as to deprive the government of its inherent prerogative in prosecuting criminal cases or generally in seeing to it that all who approach the bar of justice be afforded a fair opportunity to present their side.

Contrary to the stance of the Solicitor General, the delay adverted to in the cases under consideration does not measure up to the unreasonableness of the delay of disposition in Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, and other allied cases. It cannot be said that the petitioners found themselves in a situation oppressive to their rights simply by reason of the delay and without more.

In Magsaysay et al. vs. Sandiganbayan et al.,24 [G.R. No. 128136, October 1, 1999.] this Court ruled that:

From the facts and circumstances at bar, the Court cannot glean any grave abuse of discretion tainting the denial by the respondent court of petitioners’ motion to quash.

The Court is not unmindful of the duty of the Ombudsman under the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770 to act promptly on Complaints brought before him.25 [Roque, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al., supra.] But such duty should not be mistaken with a hasty resolution of cases at the expense of thoroughness and correctness. Judicial notice should be taken of the fact that the nature of the Office of the Ombudsman encourages individuals who clamor for efficient government service to freely lodge their Complaints against wrongdoings of government personnel, thus resulting in a steady stream of cases reaching the Office of the Ombudsman.

As stressed upon by the Solicitor General, the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman26 [Administrative Order No. 7] do not specifically prescribe a period within which a criminal complaint may be investigated and decided. But the same Rules adopt the Rules of Court on Preliminary Investigation, as modified by the Rules of Procedure of the Ombudsman. Under the Rules of Court,27 [Rule 112, Sec 3 (f). "Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded and the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the investigating officer shall determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.] the Investigating Officer has ten (10) days from submission of the case to come out with the resolution.

But it bears stressing that the period fixed by law is merely "directory", although it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity.28 [Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, supra.] The records of the case do not show any such complete disregard. In like manner, the circumstances averred in the petition do not suffice to overcome the presumption of regularity in the performance by the Ombudsman of his functions, especially those involving the review of numerous resolutions and recommendations of his investigating officers.

In a number of cases, this Court has not hesitated to grant the so-called "radical relief" and to spare the accused from undergoing the rigors and expense of a full blown trial where it is clear that he has been deprived of due process of law and/or other constitutionally guaranteed rights.29 [Ibid., p. 80, citing Salonga vs. Cruz Paño, et. al., 134 SCRA 438; Mead vs. Argel, 115 SCRA 256; Yap vs. Lutero, 105 Phil. 1307; People vs. Zulueta, 89 Phil. 752.] But here, the Court finds none.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the respondent Regional Trial Court is hereby ordered to attend with dispatch to the trial of Criminal Case No. Q-96-66607, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Judy Carol L. Dansal, Rafael T. Flores, Herminio T. Elizon and Arnulfo S. Soloria", and Criminal Case No. Q-96-66608, entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Judy Carol L. Dansal". No pronouncement as to costs.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.