This is an appeal from the decision1 [Per Assisting Judge Ignacio M. Capulong.] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Joseph Pambid y Cornelio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of statutory rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties, and to indemnify the victim, Maricon Delvie C. Grifaldia,2 [Also "Marycon Delvie Grefaldia" in some parts of the record.] in the amount of P50,000.00 plus costs for each count of rape.

On the basis of a complaint3 [RTC Records, p. 1. The original criminal complaint was dated May 24, 1993.] filed by Maricon Delvie C. Grifaldia, six years old, assisted by her mother, Delia Calzada Grifaldia, the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office filed an information charging accused-appellant Joseph Pambid with two counts of rape allegedly committed as follows:

When arraigned, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty, whereupon, trial commenced.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that accused-appellant, 23 years old, and Maricon, six years old and a Grade 1 student, were neighbors at Purok 3-A Luzon Avenue, Barangay Culiat, Quezon City, their houses fronting each other. The two incidents of rape happened sometime between April and May 1993. The first rape took place when, one day, as it was almost sundown, Maricon was on her way home after having been sent on an errand. As she was nearing her house, accused-appellant pulled her and took her to his house. As soon as they were inside the house, accused-appellant got a knife from the kitchen and, at knifepoint, ordered Maricon to remove her short pants, then ordered her to lie on the bed while issuing threats that he would beat her up. At first, accused-appellant inserted his forefinger into Maricon’s vagina. He then inserted his penis and commenced the sexual act, but was interrupted by the arrival of his mother who asked why the door was closed. At that point, accused-appellant hurriedly hid the knife under the bed and asked Maricon to leave. Because of accused-appellant’s threat, Maricon never reported the incident to anyone.4 [TSN (Maricon Delvie Grifaldia y Calzada), pp. 2-8a, Nov. 18, 1993.]

The second rape happened one morning in the house of Antonia Adovera, accused-appellant’s aunt, which is situated beside accused-appellant’s house. Accused-appellant saw Maricon on her way to a nearby store. As nobody was present, accused-appellant took Maricon to his aunt’s house. He ordered her to remove her clothes and to lie down on the sofa. Accused-appellant then went on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. Thereafter, he licked her private parts. She was later released and allowed to go home, but not before she was warned not to tell anyone what had happened to her.5 [Ibid., pp. 8a-12; pp. 2-4, Nov. 29, 1993.]

On May 20, 1993, Maricon and her mother, Delia, went to the house of Melita Calzada Ervi, who is Delia’s sister. Melita told Delia how her daughter, Lady Ann Calzada, who was then 10 years old, was nearly raped on May 17, 1993 by their neighbor, Boni Tolentino, then aged 15. Maricon suddenly interrupted them and told her mother: "Ako po mama, me ginawa sa akin ang anak ng kumare ninyo, si Bong-bong" (referring to accused-appellant). Maricon narrated to them the two rape incidents. It was then that Delia realized why sometime on April 5, 1993, Maricon had a high fever and experienced difficulty in urinating ("pahinto-hinto ang ihi") and irritations in her private parts. Delia then confronted Angelita C. Pambid, accused-appellant’s mother, who insisted that accused-appellant was not capable of committing such act. Delia also confronted accused-appellant’s brother, Renato Pambid, who then went to his father’s house in Caloocan to look for accused-appellant.6 [TSN (Maricon Delvie Grifaldia y Calzada), pp. 4-5, Nov. 29, 1993; TSN (Delia Calzada Grifaldia), pp. 2-6, July 19, 1993; pp. 2-10, Aug. 2, 1993; TSN (Melita Calzada Ervi), pp. 2-6, Aug. 31, 1993; Salaysay of Delia Calzada Grifaldia dated May 21, 1993 (Exh. B), RTC Records, pp. 143-144.]

On May 21, 1993, Delia brought the matter to the attention of the barangay tanod who reported it to the police. Accused-appellant was arrested in his house by PO1 Ricardo B. Sibayan and PO3 Wilfredo Nazareno. He was positively identified by Maricon as the person who had abused her. Thereafter, accused-appellant was taken to the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, Quezon City and turned over to the investigating officer, PO3 Felix Dulin, who took the sworn statement of Delia. In a letter dated May 21, 1993, Chief Insp. Jaime Q. Peralta referred the case to the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.7 [TSN (PO3 Felix Dulin y Alfa), pp. 2-5, Oct. 7, 1993; TSN (PO1 Ricardo B. Sibayan), pp. 2-5, Nov. 16, 1993; Affidavit of PO1 Ricardo B. Sibayan dated May 21, 1993, RTC Records, p. 10.]

On the same day, May 21, 1993, Maricon went to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Service for medical examination. Dr. Florante F. Baltazar, PNP Chief Inspector and Medico-Legal Officer, examined Maricon. His report (Exh. A)8 [RTC Records, p. 142.] contains the following findings:

Dr. Baltazar’s findings showed that Maricon is in a non-virgin physical condition which could have been caused by the insertion of a foreign object or by sexual intercourse. He clarified that strenuous physical activities could only produce scratches on the private parts and not deep laceration of the hymen.9 [TSN (Dr. Florante F. Baltazar), pp. 2-5, Oct. 21, 1993.]

The defense evidence consists of denial, alibi and plea of insanity. Accused-appellant did not testify. It was his father and mother who testified for him.

According to Angelita C. Pambid, accused-appellant’s mother, accused-appellant was not home during the time the first incident of rape was alleged to have happened. After he was scolded and beaten up by his elder brother Renato for refusing to fetch water, on March 14, 1993, he went to Bagong Bayan, Caloocan City, and stayed with his father, who was estranged from his mother. Although accused-appellant came home on April 15, 1993, it was only to get some clothes, then he left to stay with his aunt. It was only on May 20, 1993 that accused-appellant returned home. The following day, May 21, 1993, Delia Grifaldia went to accused-appellant’s house, accompanied by two policemen, two civilians and some barangay officials. Accused-appellant was then brought to the police precinct for investigation. Angelita Pambid said that Delia Grifaldia had been her neighbor for the past 15 years.10 [TSN (Angelita C. Pambid), pp. 2-7, Aug. 29, 1994.]

Jesus Q. Pambid, accused-appellant’s father, corroborated his wife’s claim that accused-appellant was not living with his mother in March 1993. He also said that sometime in April 1993, he learned that accused-appellant was residing somewhere in Don Antonio Subdivision, Fairview, Quezon City, and worked as a helper of a meat vendor in Nepa Q-Mart. Jesus admitted, however, that on three separate occasions within the month of April 1993, accused-appellant stayed in his mother’s house. He said that, in one of those occasions, he even accompanied his son to get clothes in the house of Angelita Pambid. On May 21, 1993, he learned from his older son, Renato, that accused-appellant had been apprehended for having allegedly raped Maricon. He claimed, however, that accused-appellant was mentally ill, and that was the reason why the latter did not go to school. In fact, according to him, both his maternal aunt and brother had previously been confined at the National Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong City.11 [TSN (Jesus Q. Pambid), pp. 2-7, Sept. 15, 1994.]

The defense also presented psychological report (Exh. 1), dated July 15, 1994, of a psychologist, Rosalina V. Nuestro, which stated:

Dr. Noemi Angeline E. Jularbal of the National Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City, also examined accused-appellant. Her findings and recommendations were contained in a report (Exh. 2), dated September 21, 1994, which states that:

Dr. Jularbal testified that she found accused-appellant to have very poor attention, a blunt facial expression and is easily distracted. According to her, accused-appellant was often deep in thought, hypoproductive and kept on mumbling things to himself. Accused-appellant also exhibited subnormal intellectual functioning which made him experience hallucinations and delusions. Her conclusion was that it was possible that, at the time of the alleged rapes, accused-appellant was suffering from mental illness. Dr. Jularbal also said that at the time she prepared her report, accused-appellant was no longer psychotic nor actively hallucinating, and that he was aware of the case filed against him as he cooperated with his legal counsel who prepared his defense.14 [TSN (Dr. Noemi Angeline E. Jularbal), pp. 3-9, Dec. 13, 1994.]

On the basis of the evidence presented, the trial court rendered its decision, on January 24, 1996, finding accused-appellant guilty of two counts of rape. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

Hence this appeal, seeking reversal of accused-appellant’s conviction.

First. Accused-appellant capitalizes on Maricon’s statement, made at some point during her testimony, that she was only "fingered," i.e., accused-appellant merely poked his finger into her vagina. This, he contends, puts in doubt her claim that he succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. He also makes much of the fact that Maricon failed to inform her family of the incident immediately after she was allegedly violated.

This contention is without merit. Maricon had no motive to falsely claim that she had been raped by accused-appellant if this was not true. We have ruled that a young girl’s revelation that she has been raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical examination and willingness to undergo public trial where she could be compelled to give details of the assault on her dignity, cannot be easily dismissed as mere concoction.15 [People v. Molas, 286 SCRA 684 (1998).] If her story had only been contrived, she would not have been so composed and consistent throughout her entire testimony in the face of intense and lengthy interrogation.16 [People v. Perez, 296 SCRA 17 (1998).] Maricon’s testimony is likewise corroborated by medical findings of hymenal lacerations. The evidence on record thus supports the trial court’s finding that accused-appellant is guilty of raping Maricon. Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial court since the latter is in a better position to weigh conflicting testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment, unless it is shown that the trial court has plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the result of the case.17 [People v. Baygar, G.R. No. 132238, November 17, 1999; People v. Ablog, G.R. No. 124005, June 28, 1999.]

It is true that the supposed dates of the two rape incidents were not alleged in the information. But, as held in People v. Dimapilis,18 [300 SCRA 279 (1998).] under Rule 110, §§6 and 11 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, an information is sufficient as long as it states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constituting the same, since in rape cases, the time of commission of the crime is not "a material ingredient of the offense." It is thus sufficient if it is alleged that the crime took place "as near to the actual date at which the offense(s) are committed as the information or complaint will permit." We also ruled that in rape cases, victims of rape hardly retain in their memories the dates, number of times and manner they were violated. In the same vein, to be material, discrepancies in the testimony of the victim should refer to significant facts which are determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused, not to mere details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime, such as the exact time of its commission in cases of rape, and are not grounds for acquittal.19 [People v. Sancha, G.R. No. 131818-19, February 3, 2000 citing People v. Maglente, G.R. Nos. 124559-66, April 30, 1999.] Moreover, accused-appellant entered his plea during arraignment without objecting to the sufficiency of the information. He thus waived objection on this ground, as provided in Rule 117, §8.

On the other hand, the alleged discrepancy in Maricon’s testimony ¾ whether she had been raped or merely "fingered" by accused-appellant ¾ is more apparent than real. What she said was that accused-appellant touched her private parts and then had sexual intercourse with her. Thus, Maricon testified:

Maricon was cross-examined by defense counsel but her foregoing testimony remained unshaken. She reiterated that on the second occasion of rape, accused-appellant first inserted his finger into her vagina and, thereafter, his penis.

On re-direct-examination, she clarified that as to the first incident of rape, accused-appellant inserted his penis in her vagina and thereafter "fingered" her.

In any case, the alleged discrepancy concerns mere matters of details which can be expected to happen when a young girl, aged six and inexperienced, is asked to narrate in court how she was violated. Such minor inconsistencies, far from detracting from the veracity of her testimony, in fact, tend to bolster it.24 [People v. Padilla, 301 SCRA 265 (1999); People v. Gementiza, 285 SCRA 478 (1998).]

Second. Accused-appellant’s mother claimed that her son was in the house of his father in Bagong Bayan, Caloocan City, when the first incident of rape allegedly happened in Barangay Culiat, Quezon City. This assertion, however, is inconsistent with her testimony on cross-examination that on April 15, 1993, accused-appellant came back and never left home thereafter.25 [TSN, p. 11, Aug. 29, 1994.] Even Jesus Pambid, accused-appellant’s father, confirmed in his direct examination that on three occasions during the month of April 1993, accused-appellant stayed in the house in Culiat, and that, at one time, he even accompanied accused-appellant to get some clothes. More importantly, the testimonies of accused-appellant’s parents were contradicted by Maricon who, on cross-examination, said that when accused-appellant forcibly took her to his house and raped her, she saw the latter’s mother outside the house. Nor can we believe the claim of Angelita Pambid that her son could not have raped Maricon a second time in Antonia Adovera’s house over Maricon’s consistent claim that accused-appellant indeed raped her.

As we have held time and again, the testimony of rape victims who are young and immature deserves full credence,26 [People v. Carullo, G.R. No. 129289, July 29, 1999; People v. Pineda, G.R. Nos. 118312-13, July 28, 1999.] specially if they are without any motive to testify falsely against accused-appellant.27 [People v. Ibalang, 286 SCRA 387 (1998).] In this case, accused-appellant offered no evidence to show that Maricon was impelled by any ulterior motive to fabricate a story of defloration against him. The fact that Maricon failed to immediately inform any member of her family about the two rape incidents was understandable considering the threats made by accused-appellant.28 [People v. Torio, G.R. Nos. 132216 & 133479, November 17, 1999; People v. Sacapaño, G.R. No. 130525, September 3, 1999; People v. Dizon, G.R. No. 128889, August 20, 1999.]

Third. In the alternative, it is contended that accused-appellant is exempt from criminal liability by reason of insanity. The defense claims that accused-appellant was suffering from schizophrenia and mild mental retardation.

We find accused-appellant’s plea of insanity unacceptable. To begin with, his shift of theory, from denial and alibi to plea of insanity, made apparently after realizing the futility of his earlier defense, is a clear indication that his defenses are nothing but mere concoctions.29 [People v. Balgos, G.R. No. 126115, January 26, 2000 citing People v. Trimor, 243 SCRA 129 (1995); See People v. Amamangpang, 291 SCRA 638 (1998).]

While Art. 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that an imbecile or insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless he has acted during a lucid interval, the presumption, under Art. 800 of the Civil Code, is that every man is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it.30 [People v.Catanyag, 226 SCRA 293 (1993).] He must show that he was completely deprived of reason when he committed the crime charged. As held in People v. Bañez,31 [301 SCRA 248 (1999), citing People v. Formigones, 87 Phil. 658 (1950).] "the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does not exclude imputability."

Based on this standard, we find that accused-appellant failed to discharge this burden. A careful review of the records show the following circumstances which militate against accused-appellant’s claim of insanity:

As to the first incident of rape, it is established that accused-appellant closed the door upon entering his house, apparently so that he would not be seen with Maricon. Then, he got a knife from the kitchen and pointed it at the child. When he heard his mother get into the house, he stopped having intercourse with Maricon, hid the knife under the bed and told the child not to report the incident to anyone, otherwise, he would kill her.

As to the second incident of rape, accused-appellant kept threatening Maricon as he forced himself on her while they were in the house of Antonia Adovera.

By the totality of his acts, accused-appellant showed that he was fully conscious of what he was doing.

The bare testimony of accused-appellant’s father that accused-appellant suffered some mental illness during childhood and that both his maternal aunt and his brother had been previously confined at the National Mental Hospital is inadequate to prove that accused-appellant was completely deprived of reason when he raped Maricon. Neither do the psychological report and the result of the psychiatric examination indubitably establish that accused-appellant was insane immediately before or at the time of the commission of the crime.

The psychiatric examination showed that accused-appellant was found suffering from schizophrenia. When such mental illness completely deprives the offender of the consciousness of his acts, then it shall be an exempting circumstance. It may also be considered mitigating under Art. 13(a) of the Revised Penal Code if it diminishes the exercise of his will power. In this case, however, the defense failed to conclusively establish that accused-appellant was suffering from schizophrenia or any mental illness that could diminish his will power at the time immediately preceding or during the commission of the crime. Acts penalized by law are always presumed to be voluntary, and it is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously in order to relieve him of liability, unless his insanity is conclusively proved.32 [People v. Rafanan, Jr., 204 SCRA 65 (1995) citing People v. Formigones, supra.] It was, therefore, error for the trial court to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of insanity in favor of accused-appellant.

Fourth. The trial court convicted accused-appellant of rape committed on two separate occasions although there was only one information filed against him. It ruled that, on the first occasion of rape, accused-appellant committed the crime with the use of a deadly weapon for which the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death, but the court sentenced him to reclusion perpetua only in view of the suspension of the death penalty at the time the crime was committed. The trial court awarded Maricon Delvie C. Grifaldia, the sum of P50,000.00, plus costs, for each count of rape.

This is error. The Constitution specifically provides that the accused must "be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,"33 [Const., Art. III, §14, par. 2.] in order for him to prepare his defense.

In People v. Manalili,34 [294 SCRA 220, 252 (1998).] we held:

The trial court, in its decision, merely noted that since accused-appellant did not object to having been charged with two counts of rape in one information, "he may be convicted of two offenses of rape."35 [Rollo, p. 30.] The trial court failed to consider, however, that accused-appellant could not have objected to the validity of the information or raise the issue of duplicity of offenses since the information does not charge him with more than one offense or occasion of rape.

Thus, although it was shown that accused-appellant raped Maricon on two occasions, nonetheless, he can be convicted for one count of rape only.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Quezon City, is SET ASIDE and another one is rendered finding accused-appellant Joseph Pambid y Cornelio GUILTY of one (1) count of rape, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordering him to pay complainant Maricon Delvie C. Grifaldia P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages, plus costs.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.