This petition for review seeks a reversal of the 31 August 1995 Decision1 [Penned by Associate Justice Antonio M. Martinez, with Consuelo Ynares-Santiago and Ruben T. Reyes, JJ., concurring; Rollo, 35-49.] and 11 January 1998 Resolution2 [Ibid., 51.] of the Court of Appeals holding private respondent Claudia Tagunicar solely liable for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees, and deleting the trial court’s award for actual damages.

The facts as found by the trial court are as follows: Kycalrâ

A complaint for damages was filed by petitioners against private respondents Pan American World Airways, Inc.(Pan Am), Tourist World Services, Inc. (TWSI), Julieta Canilao (Canilao), and Claudia Tagunicar (Tagunicar) for expenses allegedly incurred such as costs of tickets and hotel accommodations when petitioners were compelled to stay in Hongkong and then in Tokyo by reason of the non-confirmation of their booking with Pan-Am. In a Decision dated November 14, 1991, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 3, held the defendants jointly and severally liable, except defendant Julieta Canilao, thus: ScslxÓ

Only respondents Pan Am and Tagunicar appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 11 August 1995, the appellate court rendered judgment modifying the amount of damages awarded, holding private respondent Tagunicar solely liable therefor, and absolving respondents Pan Am and TWSI from any and all liability, thus: Slxsä c

In so ruling, respondent court found that Tagunicar is an independent travel solicitor and is not a duly authorized agent or representative of either Pan Am or TWSI. It held that their business transactions are not sufficient to consider Pan Am as the principal, and Tagunicar and TWSI as its agent and sub-agent, respectively. It further held that Tagunicar was not authorized to confirm the bookings of, nor issue validation stickers to, herein petitioners and hence, Pan Am and TWSI cannot be held responsible for her actions. Finally, it deleted the award for actual damages for lack of proof.

Hence this petition based on the following assignment of errors: slxä mis

We affirm.

I. The first issue deserves scant consideration. Petitioners contend that contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, the decision of the trial court conforms to the standards of an ideal decision set in Nicos Industrial Corporation, et. al. vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.,4 [206 SCRA 127 (1992).] as "that which, with welcome economy of words, arrives at the factual findings, reaches the legal conclusions, renders its ruling and, having done so, ends." It is averred that the trial court’s decision contains a detailed statement of the relevant facts and evidence adduced by the parties which thereafter became the bases for the court’s conclusions.

A careful scrutiny of the decision rendered by the trial court will show that after narrating the evidence of the parties, it proceeded to dispose of the case with a one-paragraph generalization, to wit: Missdaa

The trial court’s finding of facts is but a summary of the testimonies of the witnesses and the documentary evidence presented by the parties. It did not distinctly and clearly set forth, nor substantiate, the factual and legal bases for holding respondents TWSI, Pan Am and Tagunicar jointly and severally liable. In Del Mundo vs. CA, et al.6 [240 SCRA 348 (1995).] where the trial court, after summarizing the conflicting asseverations of the parties, disposed of the kernel issue in just two (2) paragraphs, we held: SdaÓ adsc

For failing to explain clearly and well the factual and legal bases of its award of moral damages, we set it aside in said case. Once more, we stress that nothing less than Section 14 of Article VIII of the Constitution requires that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." This is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution. In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court leaves much to be desired both in form and substance. Even while said decision infringes the Constitution, we will not belabor this infirmity and rather examine the sufficiency of the evidence submitted by the petitioners. RtcÓ spped

II. Petitioners assert that Tagunicar is a sub-agent of TWSI while TWSI is a duly authorized ticketing agent of Pan Am. Proceeding from this premise, they contend that TWSI and Pan Am should be held liable as principals for the acts of Tagunicar. Petitioners stubbornly insist that the existence of the agency relationship has been established by the judicial admissions allegedly made by respondents herein, to wit: (1) the admission made by Pan Am in its Answer that TWSI is its authorized ticket agent; (2) the affidavit executed by Tagunicar where she admitted that she is a duly authorized agent of TWSI; and (3) the admission made by Canilao that TWSI received commissions from ticket sales made by Tagunicar. Korteä

We do not agree. By the contract of agency, a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.7 [New Civil Code, Article 1868.] The elements of agency are: (1) consent, express or implied, of the parties to establish the relationship; (2) the object is the execution of a juridical act in relation to a third person; (3) the agent acts as a representative and not for himself; (4) the agent acts within the scope of his authority.8 [Tolentino, Civil Code of the Phils., Vol. V, 1992 ed., p. 396.] It is a settled rule that persons dealing with an assumed agent are bound at their peril, if they would hold the principal liable, to ascertain not only the fact of agency but also the nature and extent of authority, and in case either is controverted, the burden of proof is upon them to establish it.9 [BA Finance v. CA, et al., 211 SCRA 112 (1992).]

In the case at bar, petitioners rely on the affidavit of respondent Tagunicar where she stated that she is an authorized agent of TWSI. This affidavit, however, has weak probative value in light of respondent Tagunicar’s testimony in court to the contrary. Affidavits, being taken ex parte, are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial suggestion, or for want of suggestion and inquiries. Their infirmity as a species of evidence is a matter of judicial experience and are thus considered inferior to the testimony given in court.10 [People v. Diaz, 262 SCRA 723 (1996).] Further, affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the declarant has in mind because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply signs them after the same have been read to her.11 [People v. Gondora, 265 SCRA 408 (1996).] Respondent Tagunicar testified that her affidavit was prepared and typewritten by the secretary of petitioners’ lawyer, Atty. Acebedo, who both came with Adrian Yu, son of petitioners, when the latter went to see her at her office. This was confirmed by Adrian Yu who testified that Atty. Acebedo brought his notarial seal and notarized the affidavit of the same day.12 [TSN, December 16, 1982, pp. 17-19.] The circumstances under which said affidavit was prepared put in doubt petitioners’ claim that it was executed voluntarily by respondent Tagunicar. It appears that the affidavit was prepared and was based on the answers which respondent Tagunicar gave to the questions propounded to her by Atty. Acebedo.13 [TSN, September 29, 1983, pp. 12-13.] They never told her that the affidavit would be used in a case to be filed against her.14 [TSN, December 16, 1982, p. 17.] They even assured her that she would not be included as defendant if she agreed to execute the affidavit.15 [TSN, September 29, 1983, pp. 16-17.] Respondent Tagunicar was prevailed upon by petitioners’ son and their lawyer to sign the affidavit despite her objection to the statement therein that she was an agent of TWSI. They assured her that "it is immaterial"16 [TSN, July 22, 1983, p. 43.] and that "if we file a suit against you we cannot get anything from you."17 [Ibid., p. 38.] This purported admission of respondent Tagunicar cannot be used by petitioners to prove their agency relationship. At any rate, even if such affidavit is to be given any probative value, the existence of the agency relationship cannot be established on its sole basis. The declarations of the agent alone are generally insufficient to establish the fact or extent of his authority.18 [Reuschlein & Gregory, The Law of Agency and Partnership, 1990, Second ed., p. 28; BA Finance v. CA, et al., 211 SCRA 112 (1992).] In addition, as between the negative allegation of respondents Canilao and Tagunicar that neither is an agent nor principal of the other, and the affirmative allegation of petitioners that an agency relationship exists, it is the latter who have the burden of evidence to prove their allegation,19 [Martinez v. NLRC, et al., 272 SCRA 793 (1997).] failing in which, their claim must necessarily fail. Sclawä

We stress that respondent Tagunicar categorically denied in open court that she is a duly authorized agent of TWSI, and declared that she is an independent travel agent.20 [TSN, July 22, 1983, p. 44; August 12, 1983, pp. 6-7.] We have consistently ruled that in case of conflict between statements in the affidavit and testimonial declarations, the latter command greater weight.21 [People v. Aliposa, 263 SCRA 471 (1996).]

As further proofs of agency, petitioners call our attention to TWSI’s Exhibits "7", "7-A", and "8" which show that Tagunicar and TWSI received sales commissions from Pan Am. Exhibit "7"22 [Original Records, p. 448.] is the Ticket Sales Report submitted by TWSI to Pan Am reflecting the commissions received by TWSI as an agent of Pan Am. Exhibit "7-A"23 [Ibid., 449.] is a listing of the routes taken by passengers who were audited to TWSI’s sales report. Exhibit "8"24 [Ibid., 450.] is a receipt issued by TWSI covering the payment made by Tagunicar for the tickets she bought from TWSI. These documents cannot justify the deduction that Tagunicar was paid a commission either by TWSI or Pan Am. On the contrary, Tagunicar testified that when she pays TWSI, she already deducts in advance her commission and merely gives the net amount to TWSI.25 [TSN, July 22, 1983, p. 50.] From all sides of the legal prism, the transaction is simply a contract of sale wherein Tagunicar buys airline tickets from TWSI and then sells it at a premium to her clients. ScÓ lex

III. Petitioners included respondent Pan Am in the complaint on the supposition that since TWSI is its duly authorized agent, and respondent Tagunicar is an agent of TWSI, then Pan Am should also be held responsible for the acts of respondent Tagunicar. Our disquisitions above show that this contention lacks factual and legal bases. Indeed, there is nothing in the records to show that respondent Tagunicar has been employed by Pan Am as its agent, except the bare allegation of petitioners. The real motive of petitioners in suing Pan Am appears in its Amended Complaint that "[d]efendants TWSI, Canilao and Tagunicar may not be financially capable of paying plaintiffs the amounts herein sought to be recovered, and in such event, defendant Pan Am, being their ultimate principal, is primarily and/or subsidiarily liable to pay said amounts to plaintiffs."26 [Original Records, p. 46.] This lends credence to respondent Tagunicar’s testimony that she was persuaded to execute an affidavit implicating respondents because petitioners knew they would not be able to get anything of value from her. In the past, we have warned that this Court will not tolerate an abuse of the judicial process by passengers in order to pry on international airlines for damage awards, like "trophies in a safari."27 [Alitalia Airways vs. CA, et al., 187 SCRA 763 (1990).]

This meritless suit against Pan Am becomes more glaring with petitioners’ inaction after they were bumped off in Tokyo. If petitioners were of the honest belief that Pan Am was responsible for the misfortune which beset them, there is no evidence to show that they lodged a protest with Pan Am’s Tokyo office immediately after they were refused passage for the flight to San Francisco, or even upon their arrival in Manila. The testimony of petitioner Yu Eng Cho in this regard is of little value, viz.:

x x x x x x x x x

x x x x x x x x x

It grinds against the grain of human experience that petitioners did not insist that they be allowed to board, considering that it was then doubly difficult to get seats because of the ongoing Northwest Airlines strike. It is also perplexing that petitioners readily accepted whatever the Tokyo office had to offer as an alternative. Inexplicably too, no demand letter was sent to respondents TWSI and Canilao.29 [TSN, November 23, 1983, p. 35.] Nor was a demand letter sent to respondent Pan Am. To say the least, the motive of petitioners in suing Pan Am is suspect. xä law

We hasten to add that it is not sufficient to prove that Pan Am did not allow petitioners to board to justify petitioners’ claim for damages. Mere refusal to accede to the passenger’s wishes does not necessarily translate into damages in the absence of bad faith.30 [Air France v. CA, et al., 171 SCRA 399 (1989).] The settled rule is that the law presumes good faith such that any person who seeks to be awarded damages due to acts of another has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith or with ill motive.31 [Ford Phils., Inc. v. CA, et al., 267 SCRA 320 (1997).] In the case at bar, we find the evidence presented by petitioners insufficient to overcome the presumption of good faith. They have failed to show any wanton, malevolent or reckless misconduct imputable to respondent Pan Am in its refusal to accommodate petitioners in its Tokyo-San Francisco flight. Pan Am could not have acted in bad faith because petitioners did not have confirmed tickets and more importantly, they were not in the passenger manifest. Scä

In not a few cases, this Court did not hesitable to hold an airline liable for damages for having acted in bad faith in refusing to accommodate a passenger who had a confirmed ticket and whose name appeared in the passenger manifest. In Ortigas Jr. v. Lufthansa German Airlines Inc.32 [64 SCRA 610 (1975).] we ruled that there was a valid and binding contract between the airline and its passenger after finding that validating sticker on the passenger’s ticket had the letters "O.K." appearing in the ‘Res. Status’ box which means "space confirmed" and that the ticket is confirmed or validated. In Pan American World Airways Inc. v. IAC, et al.33 [153 SCRA 521 (1987).] where a would-be-passenger had the necessary ticket, baggage claim and clearance from immigration all clearly showing that she was a confirmed passenger and included in the passenger manifest and yet was denied accommodation in said flight, we awarded damages. In Armovit, et al. v. CA, et al.,34 [184 SCRA 476 (1990).] we upheld the award of damages made against an airline for gross negligence committed in the issuance of tickets with erroneous entries as to the time of flight. In Alitalia Airways v. CA, et al.,35 [187 SCRA 763 (1990).] we held that when airline issues a ticket to a passenger confirmed on a particular flight, on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises, and the passenger has every right to expect that he would fly on that flight and on that date. If he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for breach of contract of carriage. And finally, an award of damages was held proper in the case of Zalamea, et al. v. CA, et al.,36 [228 SCRA 23 (1993).] where a confirmed passenger included in the manifest was denied accommodation in such flight. ScmisÓ

On the other hand, the respondent airline in Sarreal, Sr. v. Japan Airlines Co., Ltd.,37 [207 SCRA 359 (1992).] was held not liable for damages where the passenger was not allowed to board the plane because his ticket had not been confirmed. We ruled that "[t]he stub that the lady employee put on the petitioner’s ticket showed among other coded items, under the column "status" the letters "RQ" – which was understood to mean "Request." Clearly, this does not mean a confirmation but only a request. JAL Traffic Supervisor explained that it would have been different if what was written on the stub were the letter "ok" in which case the petitioner would have been assured of a seat on said flight. But in this case, the petitioner was more of a wait-listed passenger than a regularly booked passenger." MisÓ sc

In the case at bar, petitioners’ ticket were on "RQ" status. They were not confirmed passengers and their names were not listed in the passenger manifest. In other words, this is not a case where Pan Am bound itself to transport petitioners and thereafter reneged on its obligation. Hence, respondent airline cannot be held liable for damages. MisÓ spped

IV. We hold that respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the tickets were never confirmed for good reasons: (1) The persistent calls made by respondent Tagunicar to Canilao, and those made by petitioners at the Manila, Hongkong and Tokyo offices of Pan Am, are eloquent indications that petitioners knew that their tickets have not been confirmed. For, as correctly observed by Pan Am, why would one continually try to have one’s ticket confirmed if it had already been confirmed? (2) The validation stickers which respondent Tagunicar attached to petitioners’ tickets were those intended for the exclusive use of airline companies. She had no authority to use them. Hence, said validation stickers, wherein the word "OK" appears in the status box, are not valid and binding. (3) The names of petitioners do not appear in the passenger manifest. (4) Respondent Tagunicar’s "Exhibit 1"38 [Original Records, p. 292.] shows that the status of the San Francisco-New York segment was "Ok", meaning it was confirmed, but that the status of the Tokyo-San Francisco segment was still "on request". (5) Respondent Canilao testified that on the day that petitioners were to depart for Hongkong, respondent Tagunicar called her from the airport asking for confirmation of the Tokyo-San Francisco flight, and that when she told respondent Tagunicar that she should not have allowed petitioners to leave because their tickets have not been confirmed, respondent Tagunicar merely said "Bahala na."39 [TSN, November 23, 1983, pp. 29-31.] This was never controverted nor refuted by respondent Tagunicar. (6) To prove that it really did not confirm the bookings of petitioners, respondent Canilao pointed out that the validation stickers which respondent Tagunicar attached to the tickets of petitioners had IATA No. 2-82-0770 stamped on it, whereas the IATA number of TWSI is 28-30770.40 [Ibid., p. 14.]

Undoubtedly, respondent Tagunicar should be liable for having acted in bad faith in misrepresenting to petitioners that their tickets have been confirmed. Her culpability, however, was properly mitigated. Petitioner Yu Eng Cho testified that he repeatedly tried to follow up on the confirmation of their tickets with Pan Am because he doubted the confirmation made by respondent Tagunicar.41 [TSN, August 27, 1981, p. 42.] This is clear proof that petitioners knew that they might be bumped off at Tokyo when they decided to proceed with the trip. Aware of this risk, petitioners exerted efforts to confirm their tickets in Manila, then in Hongkong, and finally in Tokyo. Resultantly, we find the modification as to the amount of damages awarded just and equitable under the circumstances. Sppedâ

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Cost against petitioners. Joä spped

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.