Petitioner Adrian de la Paz is a holder of Letter of Patent No.14132 issued by the Patent Office on February 27, 1981 for his alleged invention, Coco-diesel fuel for diesel engines and its manufacture. On March 7, 1983, petitioner filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City, Branch LXII, for infringement of patent with prayer for payment of reasonable compensation and for damages against respondents Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., Caltex (Phils.), Mobil Oil Philippines Inc. and Petrophil Corporation. There was no mention in the complaint of the amount of damages being claimed but petitioner alleged that the conservative estimate of the combined gross sales of his invention by respondents is P934,213,780.00 annually computed at the rate of 20 million barrels being sold yearly by the marketing arms of respondents at the price of P2.938 per liter. At the hearing on November 13, 1984, petitioner estimated the yearly royalty due him from respondents to be P236,572,350.00. micks

At the hearing on February 19, 1985, respondents discovered that petitioner paid only P252.00 as filing fee based on his claim for attorney's fees in the sum of P200,000.00. Respondents orally moved for dismissal of the complaint for failure of petitioner to pay the correct filing fee. The trial court denied respondents' motion to dismiss and ordered petitioner to pay the additional docket fee in the sum of P945,636.90, computed at P4.00 per P1,000.00 in excess of the first P150,000.00 based on P236,572,350.00, the amount petitioner seeks to recover.

On July 31, 1985, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order requiring him to pay an additional docket fee. This was opposed by respondents. The trial court, however, issued an order allowing petitioner to pay the required additional docket fee after the termination of the case, to be deducted from whatever judgment in damages shall be awarded by the Court. Their motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to annul and set aside the order of the trial court, with prayer for a restraining order/preliminary injunction. On September 4, 1986, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Upon denial of their motion for reconsideration, respondents filed the instant petition raising the sole issue of whether or not a party can file a complaint without specifying the amount of damages he is claiming and as a result defer the payment of the proper fees until after trial on the merits.

On April 10, 1989, this Court promulgated its Decision in G.R. No. 76119 entitled "Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Court of Appeals,"1 [171 SCRA 680-81 (1989).] where it made the following pronouncement:

Citing the case of Sun Insurance Office Ltd. vs. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion,2 [G.R. No. 79937-38, February 13, 1989.] this Court reiterated the following rules concerning payment of docket fees: nigella

The dispositive portion of said decision reads as follows:

On May 22, 1989, petitioner filed an application as pauper litigant.4 [Records, Vol. II, p. 465.] In the meantime, petitioner had paid the following amounts as partial payments for docket fees to the court a quo:

While petitioner's motion to litigate as a pauper was pending,6 [Petitioner actually filed a motion praying that he be allowed to sue as "partial-pauper."] he filed an amended complaint on March 29, 1990 reducing his claim against respondents from P236,572,350.00 to P162,572,000.00. This was admitted by respondent Court.7 [Records, Vol. II, p. 532.] On June 15, 1990, petitioner's motion to litigate as pauper was denied.8 [Records, Vol. II, pp. 559-560.] Respondents, on the other hand, filed on July 21, 1990 an "Ex-Cautela Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint" alleging that the action for damages had already prescribed and that the trial court no longer had jurisdiction to entertain the case. The Ex-Cautela Motion to Dismiss, however, was denied by the trial court in its order dated February 11, 1991.9 [Records, Vol. II, pp. 635-640.] The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion to dismiss amended complaint but the same was denied on December 23, 1992. Thus, they appealed to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the rationale that the admission of the amended complaint was done merely to implement the judgment in G.R. No.76119 which had already become final. Respondents moved for a reconsideration of the Court of Appeal's decision but the motion was denied. Respondents elevated the case to the Supreme Court but the same was dismissed "for having been filed late and the docket fees also paid late."10 [Records, Vol. II, p. 862.] Their motion for reconsideration was also denied.

Meanwhile, herein petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a second amended complaint on June 7, 1991 which was opposed by the respondents. The trial court however admitted the second amended complaint in an order dated April 27, 1992.11 [Records, Vol. II, p. 846.] The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration of the trial court's order which was denied. On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the said order was reversed on the ground that the first and second amendment to the complaint did not toll the running of the prescriptive period within which to perfect a claim.

Hence this petition on the sole issue of: Did our ruling in G.R. No. 76119 give petitioner the right to amend his complaint to accommodate his finances for payment of prescribed docket fees? ScmisÓ

We rule in the affirmative.

In Lee vs. Republic,12 [10 SCRA 65 (1964).] the court held that a declaration of intention to be a Filipino citizen produced no legal effect until the required filing fee is paid. In Malimit vs. Degamo,13 [12 SCRA 450 (1964).] it was held that payment of the docket fee must be considered the real date of filing for a petition for quo warranto and not the date it was mailed. In Magaspi vs. Ramolete,14 [115 SCRA 193 (1982).] it was reiterated that a case is deemed filed only upon payment of docket fee regardless of the date of its filing in Court. The rule in Magaspi, however, has to be distinguished from the first two cases in that, in Magaspi, what was at issue was not the timeliness of the payment of the docket fee but the amount that had to be paid. Hence, the Court ruled that the court may take cognizance of the case even if the docket fee paid was insufficient. This ruling was overturned in Manchester Development Corporation vs. CA15 [149 SCRA 562 (1987).] where the court stated that "The court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the payment of docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended pleading." The strict set of guidelines provided in Manchester was prompted by the fraudulent intent of the counsel in said case to avoid payment of the required docket fee.

Faced with an entirely different set of circumstances in Sun Insurance vs. Judge Asuncion,16 [170 SCRA 274 (1989).] we modified our ruling in Manchester and decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. The aforesaid ruling was made on the justification that, unlike in the case of Manchester, the private respondent in Sun Insurance, demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the additional docket fees required. MisÓ sc

At first blush, respondents' claim would hold water under a strict application of our ruling in Sun Insurance and G.R. No.76119. It should be pointed out, however, that even before 1986, the trial court, instead of requiring petitioner to pay additional docket fees, had ordered that the additional fees may be deducted from whatever damages petitioner may be adjudged to be entitled to in the final disposition of the case. During the pendency of the civil case with the Court of Appeals17 [The case was docketed in the Court of Appeals as C.A. G.R. SP. 08155.] and later with the Supreme Court, an injunction18 [Records, Vol. I, p. 334; See Pilipinas Shell, G.R. No. 76119, supra.] was issued by both courts restraining the trial court from proceeding with the case until further orders. This made it legally impossible for petitioner to pay the additional docket fee required in the lower court. Hence, instead of dismissing the complaint, this Court ordered the resumption of the proceedings of the case upon full payment of the prescribed docket fees as assessed by the Clerk of Court or upon exemption from payment of the docket upon proper application by petitioner to litigate as a pauper.

Despite their claim of prescription, however, respondents argue that the proceedings in the trial court can only be deemed resumed upon payment by petitioner of all lawful fees based on the July 11, 1985 order of the court requiring petitioner to pay the additional docket fee in the sum of P945,636.90, or upon exemption from payment of docket fees as pauper litigant.19 [Rollo, p. 20.] If the claim of petitioner had already prescribed as early as 1986, even if petitioner paid the additional sum of P945,636.90 immediately after G.R. No. 76119 was promulgated, it would not have cured the defect of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

But there is nothing in G.R. No. 76119 which stated that petitioner should pay the additional docket fee in the sum of P945,636.90, otherwise the lower court would dismiss petitioner’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction. After the trial court ruled that the payment for the additional docket fee could be deducted from whatever judgment in damages shall be awarded by the court, an injunction was issued by the Court of Appeals and, later, the Supreme Court, during the pendency of the case which preserved the status quo among the parties. Even if he wanted to, petitioner could not have amended his complaint to lower the amount of his claim to accommodate his finances for purposes of paying the prescribed docket fee during the reglementary period. Hence, although the case was decided in 1989, petitioner was given the chance to pay the required docket as assessed by the clerk of court or to seek exemption from payment upon proper application to litigate as pauper. Prescinding from the foregoing, if petitioner had been given the chance to pay the correct docket fee even beyond the alleged prescriptive period, there was no reason why he could not have amended his complaint and lowered his claim to accommodate his finances in order to pay the prescribed docket fees. Inasmuch as this Court has not specified the period within which petitioner should comply with its ruling, it is understood that the same was to be done within a reasonable period of time. Of course, what is reasonable is relative according to the factual circumstances of the case. In the case at bar, this Court finds that the filing of the second amended complaint a year after the denial of petitioner’s motion to litigate as pauper had been denied was reasonable.

It appears that petitioner, a day after the finality of G.R. No. 76119 and during the pendency of his motion to litigate as a pauper, has continuously paid additional sums for the prescribed docket fees amounting to at least P50,000.00, almost equivalent to his annual gross income of P56,271.24.20 [Records, Vol. II, p. 559.] Clearly, the subsequent amendments of his complaint were done for no other reason than to accommodate his finances. Hence, while petitioner’s manner of paying the docket fees in installments should normally be disallowed, it would be more unfair for this Court to sanction respondents’ conduct of prolonging the proceedings of the case in a patent design to wear out the petitioner before conveniently raising the issue of prescription. Equity demands that procedural rules be relaxed considering the peculiar circumstances availing in the case at bar. It would be grossly unjust if petitioner’s claim against respondents, who have allegedly reaped the profits of his lifetime work, would be dismissed for the sole reason that his finances are not sufficient to allow him to file his claim. MisÓ spped

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 11, 1995 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The assailed orders dated April 27, 1992 and December 23, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73 of Olongapo City are REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.