On appeal is the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 45, in Criminal Case No. 6656, finding appellant Elmer Salas y David guilty of Robbery with Homicide and imposing upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The factual background of this case is as follows:

On October 14, 1992, Salas was charged in an Information filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, as follows:

On November 9, 1992, appellant was arraigned with assistance of counsel. He entered a plea of "Not Guilty."2 [Id. at 8.] Trial on the merits immediately ensued.

The prosecution’s evidence as synthesized by the trial court reads:

Appellant’s defense was denial. He also asked the trial court to appreciate his voluntary surrender. The lower court summed up his version of the incident as follows:

On March 14, 1994, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

On April 4, 1994, Salas filed his notice of appeal. Appellant assigns the following errors:

Appellant submits that the errors assigned are intertwined and hence, may be discussed jointly.

In his brief,6 [Rollo, p. 56.] appellant raises the following arguments to support his claim of innocence: First, he denies that he was the last person seen in the company of the victim during the wee hours of that fateful morning. Instead, he points an accusing finger at the father and son duo of Orlando and Richard Pangan, as the last persons to be with the victim. He insists that he passed the three of them on his way home to San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga and did reach his house ahead of them. Appellant particularly assails the testimony of Orlando Pangan that he heard a loud shout after the latter had entered his house. Appellant argues that Richard failed to corroborate Orlando’s claim, thus making their story doubtful. He also contends that Orlando’s statement that he failed to come out of his house to see what the shouting was about or to render assistance and succor to the victim is contrary to human knowledge and experience. He submits that the Pangans should be the prime suspects in the offense charged and not him.

Second, he faults the court a quo for relying on speculation, surmise, and conjecture in finding that he robbed the victim. Appellant vehemently insists that there is not a shred of concrete evidence to show that the deceased Virginia Talens was carrying the sum of P2,000.00 in her purse at the time of the incident or that he stole the same. He now insists that to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the robbery must be as conclusively proven as any other essential element of a crime.

Third, appellant charges the court below with reversible error when it held that his failure to report for work on March 6, 1992 was a sign of flight and evident guilt. He insists that he quit his painting job in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, over a disagreement with his employer over his work rates and had a better offer in Calamba, Laguna. He claims that he never went into hiding and begs this Court to take a second look at the probative value of the testimonies of the witnesses he presented to support his claim.

Finally, appellant argues that the trial court committed grave error when it failed to consider his voluntary surrender. He said that he was hospitalized and thus could not surrender at that time. He said he used the name "Rommel Salas,"7 [Exhibit s"DD-14", "DD-14-A" to "DD-14-J" and Exhibit "EE."] when he was hospitalized following a vehicular accident in Arayat, Pampanga. His use of "Rommel" instead of "Elmer" should not have been taken by the court as a sign of his intent to evade the law. He asks us to take notice of his explanation that his nickname is "Rommel." Besides, he insists that it makes no difference whether he used "Rommel" or "Elmer," as the two have the same sound (idem sonans). His use of Rommel cannot be successfully used to hide his identity.

Petitioner, therefore, prays that we reverse the decision of the trial court and acquit him of the offense charged.

The pivotal issue in this case is whether or not there is evidence sufficient to sustain a conviction of the appellant of the crime of Robbery with Homicide.

In this case, there was no eyewitness nor direct evidence, either to the robbery or to the homicide and none of the things allegedly stolen were ever recovered. However, direct evidence is not the only matrix from which the trial court may draw its findings and conclusion of culpability.8 [People v. Lopez, G.R. No. 131151, August 25, 1999, p.4; People v. De La Cruz, G.R. No. 111704, March 17, 1999, p.10.] Resort to circumstantial evidence is essential when to insist on direct testimony would result in setting felons free.

For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction,9 [Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt."] all the circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with the theory that the accused is guilty of the offense charged, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis excepting that of guilt.10 [People v. Olivarez, Jr., 299 SCRA 635, 652 (1998) citing People v. De Guia, 280 SCRA 141 (1997).] All the circumstances established must constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one and fair and reasonable conclusion pointing solely to the accused, to the exclusion of all other persons, as the author of the crime.11 [People v. Bantilan, G.R. No. 129286, September 14, 1999 citing People v. Parel, 261 SCRA 720 (1996), People v. Tabag, 268 SCRA 115 (1997), People v. Villaran, 269 SCRA 630 (1997) and People v. Salvame, 270 SCRA 766 (1997); People v. Tapales, G.R. No. 125808, September 3, 1999, p.8; People v. Gargar, et al., 300 SCRA 542, 552 (1998) citing People v. Danao, 323 Phil. 178 (1996).] The facts and circumstances consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his innocence can constitute evidence which, in weight and probative value, may be deemed to surpass even direct evidence in its effect on the court.12 [People v. Acuno, G.R. No. 130964, September 3, 1999, p. 12 citing People v. Eubra, 274 SCRA 180 (1997).]

The fatal stabbing of Virginia Talens occurred at around 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992. Appellant hastily abandoned his house in Barrio San Nicolas, Mexico, Pampanga, his residence since childhood, on that very date. Appellant was nowhere when his co-worker and barriomate, Eduardo Bagtas, came to appellant’s house to fetch him for work at around 6:30 to 7:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992.13 [TSN, November 11, 1992, pp. 16-17.] Appellant also abandoned his job as a painter in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, on March 6, 1992, the date of the crime, leaving behind an unfinished painting project. He was not seen again from said date.14 [Supra, at 18-19.] Police investigators found human bloodstains on the front door of appellant’s house, on his clothing, and on his yellow slippers after the victim was killed.15 [TSN, December 15, 1992, pp. 28-33.] Despite efforts of the police to find appellant as the principal suspect, a fact known to appellant’s family and neighbors, appellant did not present himself to the authorities.16 [Supra, at 34.] Appellant was apprehended only a full six (6) months after the date of the crime, following his confinement in a hospital in Arayat, Pampanga because he was sideswiped by a Victory Liner bus in Arayat.17 [Exhibit "X."] When hospitalized, appellant used the alias Rommel Salas, instead of his true name Elmer Salas.18 [TSN, January 25, 1993, pp. 4-5; see also Exhibit "X."] These circumstances denote flight, which when unexplained, has always been considered by the courts as indicative of guilt.19 [People v. Mantung, G.R. No. 130372, July 20, 1999; People v. Abria, 300 SCRA 556, 564 (1998).]

Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake they attended.20 [Supra, Note 18 at 13-14.] The victim was, in fact, enjoying a winning streak when her son, Ramil Talens, came to fetch her but which he failed to do because his mother was winning, and she refused to leave.21 [TSN, December 16, 1992, pp. 7-9.] The purse of Talens containing cash was gone when her corpse was found in the canal with a stab wound and bruises. What was left was a safety pin which victim used to fasten the missing purse to her clothes.22 [Supra, at 7-8.]

The foregoing circumstances, together, lead to no other conclusion except that appellant robbed and killed the victim.

Appellant insists that he neither robbed nor killed Virginia Talens. He vehemently denies being the last person seen with the victim alive. He instead points to prosecution witness Orlando Pangan and his son, Richard Pangan, as the most likely malefactors. We note, however, that appellant failed to rebut Orlando Pangan’s testimony that it was appellant who was last seen with the victim alive about 3:00 a.m. of March 6, 1992, in the company of appellant who was her next-door-neighbor.23 [TSN, November 24, 1992, pp. 14-17.] Denial is an inherently weak defense which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility.24 [People v. Macuha, G.R. No. 110085, July 6, 1999, p. 8.] Denial is negative and self-serving and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight over the testimonies of credible witnesses who positively testified that appellant was at the locus criminis and was the last person seen with the victim alive.25 [People v. Mores, et al., G.R. No. 107746, July 28, 1999, p. 6.]

We likewise note that appellant is the nephew of prosecution witness Orlando Pangan. Appellant miserably failed to show any reason why Orlando Pangan should wrongly testify against his own kin who stands accused. The absence of evidence showing any improper motive on the part of the principal witness for the prosecution to falsely testify against the appellant strongly tends to buttress the conclusion that no such improper motive exists and that the testimony of said witnesses deserve full faith and credit.26 [People v. Abdul, G.R. No. 128074, July 13, 1999, p. 18 citing People v. Lapinoso, G.R. No. 122507, February 25, 1999, p. 14; People v. Rada, et al., G.R. No. 128181, June 10, 1999, p. 15.]

The trial court found the testimonies of appellant’s two witnesses, Meliton Ocampo and Wilfredo Salas, biased and inconsistent.27 [Records, p. 189.] The transcript of stenographic notes shows that their testimonies not only contradicted each other, but likewise contradicted appellant’s testimony. Appellant claimed that he left during the wee hours of March 6, 1992, for his new painting job in Calamba, Laguna28 [TSN, October 13, 1993, pp 11, 17, 23 –24.] and that it was his first time to go to said place.29 [Id. at 26.] Defense witness Meliton Ocampo, however, testified that the appellant had been to Calamba several times before the incident.30 [TSN, December 1, 1993, p. 4.] Defense witness Wilfredo Salas, appellant’s brother and son-in-law of Meliton, claimed that the bloodstains found on the front door of appellant’s house were his. He testified that the stains were the result of an injury his hand sustained when he boxed their front door in February 1992.31 [TSN, November 3, 1993, pp. 4-5.] Appellant, however, testified that the boxing incident happened in January 1992.32 [TSN, October 13, 1993, p. 6.] We note also that Wilfredo’s testimony failed to explain the presence of bloodstains on appellant’s clothes and slippers after the killing of Virginia Talens. Wilfredo further claims that he was residing in Mexico, Pampanga, at the time Virginia Talens was killed.33 [TSN, November 23, 1993, p. 3.] However, his father-in-law testified that Wilfredo was then residing in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.34 [TSN, December 1, 1993, p. 4.] We find that the trial court did not err when it found the testimonies for the defense so riddled with inconsistencies as to have no probative value. The trial court, which had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and conduct of the defense witnesses on the stand, was not convinced of their credibility. It is a time-tested doctrine that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of a witness is entitled to great weight, and is even conclusive and binding upon us, if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence.35 [People v. Reduca, 301 SCRA 516, 528 (1999).]

Appellant contends that the trial court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. After the killing of Virginia Talens, appellant as the prime suspect was the object of a police manhunt, which lasted for half a year. During said period, appellant continued to evade arrest. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give himself up and submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wants to save the State the trouble of having to effect his arrest. Spontaneity and an intent to give one’s self up are absent where the accused went into hiding for six months after the incident and had to resort to an alias when he was involved in an accident being investigated by the police authorities.

Appellant also avers that his alias "Rommel Salas" sounds the same as "Elmer Salas" and his use of "Rommel" proves he was never in hiding. Under the rule of idem sonans, two names are said to be "idem sonantes" if the attentive ear finds difficulty in distinguishing them when pronounced.36 [Martin v. State, 541 S.W. 2d 605, 606.] It is not difficult to distinguish between the pronunciation of "Rommel" and "Elmer." They do not sound alike contrary to appellant’s assertion, hence, the use of "Rommel" does hide appellant’s identity.

Is appellant’s crime homicide or robbery with homicide?

Robbery with Homicide is a special complex crime against property. Homicide is incidental to the robbery which is the main purpose of the criminal.37 [People v. Faco, G.R. No. 115215, September 16, 1999, p. 17 citing People v. Navales, 266 SCRA 569 (1997).] In charging Robbery with Homicide, the onus probandi is to establish: "(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is used in the generic sense, was committed."38 [People v. Faco, supra, citing People v. Nang, 289 SCRA 16 (1998).] Although there was no witness as to the actual robbing of the victim, there is testimony that the victim had more or less P2,000.00; and wore gold earrings valued at P750.00. These were never recovered.

While there is indeed no direct proof that Virginia Talens was robbed at the time she was killed, we may conclude from four circumstances that the robbery occasioned her killing: (1) Both appellant and victim gambled at the wake. (2) The appellant knew that victim was winning. (3) The victim was last seen alive with appellant. (4) The victim’s purse containing her money and earrings were missing from her body when found.

In our view, these circumstances logically lead to the inescapable conclusion that appellant should be liable not just of simple homicide, but robbery with homicide under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as ruled by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, Pampanga, Branch 45, in Criminal Case No. 6656, dated March 14, 1994, is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.