If capital punishment is justified, it serves as a deterrent; if injudiciously imposed, it generates resentment.1 [People v. Godoy, 321 Phil. 279, 346 (1995)] This truism underscores the wisdom of the admonition that any decision authorizing the State to take life must be as error-free as possible.2 [People v. Esparas, 329 Phil. 339, 352 (1996)] At stake in the case at bar is life itself, hence, we shall strictly adhere to our bounden duty to exercise extreme caution in the review of the parties' evidence.

For the death of Ambrocio Benedicto due to a fatal stab wound, appellant Angel Rios was charged with the crime of murder in an information that reads:

Appellant Rios, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of "not guilty" to the charge against him.3 [Record, p. 2.] Thereupon, trial on the merits of the case ensued.

Ambrocio and Anacita Benedicto owned a sari-sari store in their house in Marigold Subdivision, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. According to Anacita, at around 6:30 in the evening of February 7, 1996, appellant Angel Rios, a neighbor, hurled stones at their house. A few minutes later, and while the Benedicto spouses were tending their store, appellant bought cigarettes. Ambrocio confronted appellant about the stoning incident and an altercation ensued between them.4 [TSN, July 26, 1996, pp. 6-9.]

As the two engaged in a verbal tussle, Joselino Mesa and his fellow barangay tanods named Amorsolo Dayao, Rivera and Espino who were roving the vicinity, chanced upon the disputants. Having heard the appellant shout at Ambrocio, Mesa intervened and requested the two to part ways. He even escorted them to their respective residences.5 [TSN, September 27, 1996, pp. 4-5.]

A few minutes later, appellant went back to the store.6 [TSN, July 26, 1996, p. 8.] Just then, Anacita saw her husband go to the terrace of their house. Appellant suddenly approached Ambrocio and stabbed his right stomach. Anacita was only a meter away from the antagonists; she was facing her husband’s back while appellant was standing in front of Ambrocio. As Anacita started shouting, appellant fled.7 [TSN, May 31, 1996, pp. 6-10.]

Mesa and his group saw Anacita weeping while Ambrocio was lying lifeless in the terrace of their house. Anacita told the tanods that appellant had stabbed her husband. One of the tanods assisted Ambrocio but the latter succumbed to death even before they could reach the hospital. The postmortem certificate of death shows that Ambrocio died of "shock due to a stab wound at the chest around 3 cm. penetrating the right auricle (heart)."8 [Exh. "A-1."]

Mesa and his companions arrested appellant in his brother’s house thirty (30) minutes after the crime happened.9 [TSN, September 27, 1966, pp. 7-8.] The following day, Anacita and Mesa executed sworn statements before the police.10 [Exhs. "B" & "F."]

With only appellant testifying, the defense interposed alibi. Appellant, a 39-year-old laborer from San Fernando, Romblon who had been staying for two decades with his brother in Graceville, Marilao, Bulacan, had reported to his job in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan at 7:00 a.m. of February 7, 1996. He stopped working at 5:00 p.m. and returned to his brother’s house, reaching it at around 8:00 p.m. Moments later, Joselino Mesa, accompanied by some barangay tanods, arrived and brought him to the municipal hall of San Jose del Monte. They did not inform him that he was a suspect in the killing of Ambrocio Benedicto.11 [TSN, June 18, 1997, pp. 14-15.] Appellant knew Ambrocio because they had built a house near the Benedictos’ residence and it was from the latter’s store that they would buy their cooking needs. He denied having seen Ambrocio on that fateful day of February 7, 1996.12 [Id., pp. 8-10.]

On December 3, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 22,13 [Presided by Judge Candido R. Belmonte.] rendered a Decision finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of Ambrocio Benedicto. It found that the killing of Ambrocio was attended by the qualifying circumstance of treachery but that abuse of superior strength is "comprehended" by said circumstance. It ruled out the presence of evident premeditation. However, it considered dwelling as aggravating to the effect that even if the accused did not enter the victim’s house, such as when he shot the victim from under the house or when he fired the shot that fell the victim who was inside his house, said circumstance is aggravating. The trial court thus disposed of Criminal Case No. 572-M-96 as follows:

Appellant is now before this Court on automatic review of said Decision, with the following assignments of error:

The appeal is partly meritorious. While there is proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant dealt the fatal stab wound upon Ambrocio Benedicto, the trial court erroneously appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Hence, appellant cannot be held liable for the crime of murder but for the lesser crime of homicide.

No cogent reason exists to overturn the trial court’s assessment that Anacita Benedicto positively and unequivocally identified appellant as the felon who stabbed her husband. It is doctrinal that the trial court’s evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for the trial court has an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of a witness and thus, to determine whether he or she is telling the truth.14 [People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79, 88 (1998)] Anacita’s testimony on the matter clearly supports the trial court’s finding on the matter. Thus:

There is no doubt therefore, that Anacita had a good look at her husband’s assailant and that she actually saw appellant stab Ambrocio as she was only a meter away from them, behind her husband who was facing appellant. She could not have mistaken another man for appellant because being neighbors, he was familiar to her.16 [People v. Cagalingan, 188 SCRA 313, 319 (1990)] Aside from being her neighbor, appellant even admitted that he used to be a customer in the Benedictos’ sari-sari store where he would buy cooking needs. Familiarity with the physical features, particularly those of the face, is the best way to identify a person.17 [People v. Lagnas, 222 SCRA 745, 757 (1993)] Thus, in the absence of an established ill motive on the part of Anacita, her identification of appellant as her husband’s killer should be given full faith and credit, her relationship with the victim notwithstanding. Relationship with the victim per se is not proof of prejudice.18 [People v. Escandor, 333 Phil. 277, 282 (1996)]

Anacita’s failure to name the weapon used by appellant and to recall his position as he stabbed Ambrocio cannot diminish her credibility. Her relative position to the two accounts for Anacita’s failure to see the details surrounding the incident. Witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total recall.19 [People v. Alas, 274 SCRA 310, 320 (1997)] Nevertheless, Anacita’s one-meter distance from the two enabled her to observe the manner by which appellant stabbed Ambrocio – he did so in a manner described in the dialect as "pakadyot,"20 [TSN, July 26, 1996, pp. 4-5.] meaning the bladed instrument came from underneath.

Appellant’s positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime was thus proven beyond reasonable doubt by the consistent and firm testimony of Anacita Benedicto. Consequently, such positive identification effectively effaced appellant’s alibi.21 [People v. Bajar, 346 Phil. 250, 262 (1997)] That she was the only eyewitness to the killing presented by the prosecution did not in any way dilute the evidentiary value of her credible testimony. It is entrenched in jurisprudence that the testimony of a single witness, if found convincing and credible by the trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.22 [People v. Lascota, 341 Phil. 593, 604 (1997)]

However, appellant is correct in arguing that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime. Its presence was not established beyond reasonable doubt. As this Court said in People v. Derilo:

In this case, the prosecution failed to discharge its duty under the law as regards the qualifying circumstance of treachery. There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specifically to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party may make. To constitute treachery, these two conditions must be present: (1) employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.24 [People v. Caisip, 290 SCRA 451, 461 (1998)]

Treachery may not be appreciated where, as in this case, the attack against the victim cannot be categorized as unexpected and unforeseen so as to deprive him the opportunity to defend himself. By the facts of the case, where the incident of the victim berating the accused for throwing stones at his residence preceded the fatal assault, a possible retaliation by the accused was not remote. As this Court has repeatedly held, there is no treachery when the victim is placed on guard, as when a heated argument preceded the attack, especially when the victim was standing face to face with his assailant. In that instance, the initial assault could not have been unforeseen.25 [People v. Salvador, 344 Phil. 580, 596 (1997); People v. Lopez, 319 Phil. 734, 753 (1995)]

Moreover, where treachery is alleged, the manner of attack must be proven. Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim unfolded, treachery cannot be appreciated.26 [People v. Nalangan, 336 Phil. 970, 975 (1997)] It cannot be presumed or concluded merely on the basis of the resulting crime.27 [People v. Asis, 286 SCRA 64, 74 (1998)] In the case at bar, the prosecution presented Anacita’s ambiguous testimony on how the attack began to support its claim that treachery attended the commission of the crime. Thus:

On cross-examination, Anacita testified as follows:

x x x.....x x x.....x x x.

From this testimony, it is indubitable that Anacita saw the stabbing incident but she could not describe exactly how it was commenced notwithstanding what appears to be her conclusion that the stabbing was done in a "pakadyot" manner. This may perhaps be blamed on the frailty of human memory but it does not obliterate the fact the she actually saw the stabbing incident. The doubt as to its manner or mode of execution should therefore be resolved in favor of the appellant.

The trial court correctly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of dwelling or morada in this case. The word dwelling includes every dependency of the house that forms an integral part thereof30 [1 AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 1987 ed., p. 316.] and therefore it includes the staircase of the house31 [People v. Alcala, 46 Phil. 739-744 (1923)] and much more, its terrace. When a crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party and the latter has not given provocation, dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.32 [Art. 14 (3), Revised Penal Code; People v. Caisip, 290 SCRA 451, 460 (1998) citing People v. Feliciano, 326 Phil. 719, 730-731 (1996)] Provocation in the aggravating circumstance of dwelling must be: (a) given by the offended party, (b) sufficient, and (c) immediate to the commission of the crime.33 [1 REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 13 ed., p. 339.]

We hold that the altercation between appellant and Ambrocio that immediately preceded the latter’s fatal stabbing is not within the purview of the concept of provocation under Article 14 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. The unrebutted facts established by the prosecution show that it was the appellant who started the events that led to his unfortunate killing of Ambrocio, by stoning the latter’s house. In an apparent show of unmitigated braggadocio, appellant even went to the victim’s house on the pretext of buying cigarettes after the stone-throwing incident. The victim naturally confronted appellant about that incident. As the two engaged in heated argument, the roving tanods intervened and the two parted ways. However, a few minutes later, appellant returned to the victim’s house and right at the latter’s terrace, dealt him the fatal stab wound. Under these circumstances, to cater to appellant’s claim that the victim provoked him would amount to erasing the duly established fact that by stoning the victim’s house, appellant himself instigated the heated argument that resulted in his physical assault upon the victim.

The presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling warrants the imposition of exemplary damages against the appellant.34 [People v. Esguerra, 326 Phil. 670, 679 (1996)] Such damages, the award of which depends upon the Court’s discretion, shall be a part of the civil liability that may be imposed upon the appellant.35 [Art. 2230, Civil Code.] However, we agree with the Solicitor General that the trial court overlooked certain evidentiary requirements in the award of actual damages. Actual damages cannot be allowed unless supported by evidence on record.36 [People v. Nialda, 289 SCRA 521, 535 (1998)] The trial court mainly based its award of P32,892.00 on the photocopy of the receipt issued by the funeral parlor37 [Exh. "D."] and on a receipt issued by a livestock agricultural corporation.38 [Exh. "E."] The prosecution reserved its right to present the original copy of the receipt of the funeral parlor evidencing payment of the amount of P27,000.0039 [TSN, July 5, 1996, p. 5.] but it does not appear on record that it indeed presented that original copy. On the other hand, the receipt issued by the Broadway Livestock Agricultural Corporation in favor of one Sotero Espiritu was in full payment of the amount of P5,092.00 for an undecipherable purpose which the prosecution claimed was for "expenses."40 [Ibid., p. 6.] However, considering that these "expenses" were not explained and the absence of a duly established connection between the death of the victim and the "expenses" paid to a livestock agricultural corporation, the receipt can not be given evidentiary weight.

It is necessary for a party seeking the award of actual damages to produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify such award. Only substantiated and proven expenses, or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial of the victim will be recognized in courts. The courts will not rely merely on suppositions or conjectures.41 [People v. Jamiro, 344 Phil. 700, 722 (1997)] Hence, only the amount of eight hundred pesos (P800.00) spent for the niche and funeral mass that is evidenced by an original receipt42 [Exh. "C."] shall be awarded to the victim’s heirs.

Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of homicide is reclusion temporal. In view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling or morada, the penalty should be imposed in its maximum period.43 [Art. 64 (3), Revised Penal Code.] Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the imposable penalty shall be twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is MODIFIED and appellant is found guilty of the crime of homicide and is meted to suffer an indeterminate sentence of twelve (12) years prision mayor maximum to twenty (20) years reclusion temporal maximum, to indemnify the heirs of Ambrocio Benedicto in the amount of P50,000.00, to pay exemplary damages of P20,000.00, and actual damages of P800.00.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., on official leave.