Petitioners appealed the orders of Secretary Cariño to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB) and later to the CSC. In 1995, the CSC modified the said orders of Secretary Cariño as follows:

Following the denial of their motion for reconsideration, petitioners questioned the matter before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court denied their petition for certiorari and subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.

Petitioners submit the following issues for our consideration:

This petition is not impressed with merit.

Petitioners do not deny their absence from work nor the fact that said absences were due to their participation in the mass actions at the Liwasang Bonifacio. However, they contend that their participation in the mass actions was an exercise of their constitutional rights to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances. Petitioners likewise maintain that they never went on strike because they never sought to secure changes or modification of the terms and conditions of their employment.

Petitioners' contentions are without merit. The character and legality of the mass actions which they participated in have been passed upon by this Court as early as 1990 in Manila Public School Teachers' Association (MPSTA) v. Laguio, Jr.6 [200 SCRA 323 (1991).] wherein we ruled that "these 'mass actions' were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers' sworn duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic reasons."7 [Id. at 329-30.] In Bangalisan v. Court of Appeals,8 [276 SCRA 619 (1997).] we added that:

In Jacinto v. Court of Appeals,10 [281 SCRA 657 (1997).] De la Cruz v. Court of Appeals,11 [G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999.] and Alipat v. Court of Appeals,12 [G.R. No. 132841, June 21, 1999.] we upheld our rulings in MPSTA and Bangalisan. Considering the factual circumstances of this case and the doctrine of stare decisis to which we consistently adhere, we find no compelling reason to deviate from our earlier rulings in these related cases.

Anent the second issue, petitioners invoke our statement in Bangalisan that payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which caused his suspension and if his suspension is unjustified. Petitioners cite CSC Resolution No. 93-162 and contend that the determination of the CSC therein that not an iota of evidence was given to substantiate the conclusion that they participated in a "teacher's strike" amounted to a finding that they were innocent of the charges filed against them.

As a general proposition, a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he has not rendered any service.13 [Villamor vs. Lacson, 12 SCRA 418, 423 (1964).] While there are recognized instances when backwages may be awarded to a suspended or dismissed public official who is later ordered reinstated, as pointed by petitioners in citing Bangalisan, the factual circumstances of the case at bar impel us to rule otherwise.

Petitioners' reliance on CSC Resolution No. 93-162 is misplaced. Said CSC resolution disposed of the appeals of Fely Ilarina, Adelaida Dela Cruz, Alicia Galvo, Nenita Albios and Nerissa Abellanda. Petitioners were never parties to their appeals and, therefore, cannot cite CSC Resolution No. 93-162 in support of their contention. Petitioners also overlook the fact that although no evidence was presented to prove that Ilarina, et al. participated in the mass actions, the CSC explained that the deficiency was cured by their admissions during the hearings before the MSPB.14 [Annex "E" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 81.] More importantly, however, herein petitioners' claim of exoneration is belied by the determination of the CSC that their participation in the mass actions constituted conduct prejudicial to the service. Being found liable for a lesser offense is not equivalent to exoneration.15 [Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, supra at 682.]

Petitioners also point out that from the issuance of the orders of dismissal by Secretary Cariño to the modification thereof by the CSC, almost five (5) years elapsed. Petitioners argue that the period in excess of their preventive suspension and penalty of six (6) months suspension amounted to unjustified suspension for which an award of backwages was proper pursuant to our rulings in Bautista v. Peralta16 [18 SCRA 223 (1966).] and Abellera v. City of Baguio.17 [19 SCRA 600 (1967).]

We disagree. It will be recalled that in Jacinto, we upheld the legality of the immediate execution of the dismissal orders issued by Secretary Cariño on the ground that under Section 47(2),18 [SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.

....(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or a fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days’ salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the (Civil Service) Commission, the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the same shall be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned.] Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, the decision of a department secretary confirming the dismissal of an employee under his jurisdiction is executory even pending appeal thereof.19 [Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, supra at 680.] Since dismissal orders remain valid and effective until modified or set aside, the intervening period during which an employee is not permitted to work cannot be argued as amounting to unjustified suspension. In Gloria v. Court of Appeals,20 [G.R. No. 131012, April 21, 1999.] we further explained that:

Petitioners' reliance on Fabella v. Court of Appeals22 [282 SCRA 256 (1997).] is likewise unavailing. In that case, the petitioners therein immediately went to court to seek injunctive relief against the DECS administrative proceedings on the ground that they were deprived of due process. The trial court declared the administrative proceedings void and ordered the payment of backwages to the petitioners therein. The Court of Appeals then upheld the order of the trial court. In affirming both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we stated therein that:

On the other hand, in the case at bar, petitioners initially assailed the alleged non-observance of due process by the DECS Investigating Committees only upon appeal to the MSPB. Significantly, however, it has been our consistent ruling that an appeal is curative of any supposed denial of due process.24 [Esber v. Sto. Tomas, 225 SCRA 664 (1993); Cebu Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Regional Director/Minister of Labor, 168 SCRA 315 (1988); B. Sta. Rita & Company, Inc. v. Arroyo, 168 SCRA 581 (1988); Rosales v. Court of Appeals, 165 SCRA 344 (1988); Sumpang v. Inciong, 137 SCRA 56 (1985).] Thus, after full ventilation of their case before the MSPB and CSC, and later on before the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot now allege denial of due process to justify their claim for backwages.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Buena, JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., no part.